Addendum: Lehmann, T. et al. Cluster Policy in the Light of Institutional Context—A Comparative Study of Transition Countries. Adm. Sci. 2015, 5, 188–212

The authors would like to make the following corrections to the published paper (Lehmann and Benner 2015). The changes are as follows:

Replace the first paragraph under the heading “Formal Institutional Environment” of Section 3.3.1.:

The formal institutional context in Tunisia is not unlike that found in other transition countries. For example, Adly and Khatib [73] (pp. 41–42) state “that property rights, contract enforcement and the rule of law have been traditionally weak in (…) Tunisia”. The World Bank ranks Tunisia on place 78 in its global index, implying it takes 565 days, and costs 21.8% of the claim to enforce a contract [74], which is slightly above the average in the MENA region. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation transformation index, independence of the judiciary is moderate with a grade of 5 on a 1–10 scale, indicating medium transformation status [75]. Access to finance, land and infrastructure has been unequally distributed in favor of some market actors at the expense of others.” In their survey of Tunisian entrepreneurs, Adly and Khatib [73] (pp. 117–120) find evidence for considerable problems in contract enforcement in Tunisia, including perceived deficiencies in laws and regulations, distrust in the judicial branch, and vulnerability of formal contracts to corruption. Another formal limitation noted in the survey is weak protection for competition:

with:

The formal institutional context in Tunisia is not unlike that found in other transition countries. For example, Adly and Khatib [73] (pp. 41–42) state “that property rights, contract enforcement and the rule of law have been traditionally weak in (…) Tunisia. Access to finance, land and infrastructure has been unequally distributed in favor of some market actors at the expense of others.” The World Bank ranks Tunisia on place 78 in its global index, implying it takes 565 days, and costs 21.8% of the claim to enforce a contract [74], which is slightly above the average in the MENA region. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation transformation index, independence of the judiciary is moderate with a grade of 5 on a 1–10 scale, indicating medium transformation status [75]. In their survey of Tunisian entrepreneurs, Adly and Khatib [73] (pp. 117–20) find evidence for considerable problems in contract enforcement in Tunisia, including perceived deficiencies in laws and regulations, distrust in the judicial branch, and vulnerability of formal contracts to corruption. Another formal limitation noted in the survey is weak protection for competition:

Additionally, we would like to make transparent that the definition of “institutional voids” in Section 2.1 draws on the discussion provided in source [53], and the definition of clusters in Section 2.2. draws on the discussion in source [4]. The research framework in Figure 3 is adapted from sources [4] and [53].

The authors and the Editorial Office would like to apologize for any inconvenience caused to the readers by these changes. The change does not affect the scientific results. The manuscript will be updated, and the original will remain online on the article webpage.