Integrating Geoscience, Ethics, and Community Resilience: Lessons from the Etna 2018 Earthquake

Abstract

Mount Etna has a well-documented history of frequent eruptions and seismic activity, periodically causing significant damage to urban areas. On 26 December 2018, a Mw 4.9 shallow earthquake struck the volcano’s eastern flank, severely damaging approximately 3000 buildings. The post-earthquake recovery strategy aimed to enhance community resilience by addressing the hazardous nature of the affected territory. This objective was achieved through measures such as relocation and public use transformation. In areas impacted by active faults, the relocation of damaged buildings was encouraged, while cleared zones were repurposed for public use, transformed into gardens and open-air parking spaces. Despite these efforts, some relocated individuals experienced psychological distress. To address this challenge, government planners played a pivotal role in disseminating scientifically accurate information, raising public awareness, and facilitating adaptation. The approach implemented on Etna was later adopted in other post-earthquake recovery programs in Italy, evolving into a replicable strategy for risk mitigation in disaster-prone areas.

1. Introduction

There are places in the world that have been inhabited for thousands of years and have therefore accumulated, over time, a historical, cultural, and architectural heritage of immense value. One of these places is Italy, a country that has a vast urban heritage of extraordinary historical and architectural value, which, unfortunately, is often endangered and sometimes destroyed by frequent earthquakes of high magnitude. In the past, it was common practice to rebuild “as it was and where it was,” i.e., in the same places affected by the earthquake, to preserve the precious cultural memory of areas inhabited for thousands of years. However, not all urban fabric damaged by an earthquake is necessarily of high value and significance. If the affected building has no historical or architectural value and is in areas of high geological or seismic risk, it is worth considering whether it is geoethically and economically acceptable to continue rebuilding in areas so exposed to recurring geodynamic threats.

Mount Etna is one of the most persistently active and largest stratovolcanoes on Earth (3404 m above sea level), producing frequent eruptions either from its summit vents or, less frequently, from fissures that open on its flanks [1,2,3] (Figure 1).

Lateral eruptions are potentially dangerous for the approximately one million people living on the slopes of the volcano, as lava flows can quickly engulf entire villages [5]. Moreover, Etna’s populations are exposed to the seismic risk generated by numerous active surface faults that mainly cross the eastern flank of the volcano [6,7], which is subject to slow but continuous collapse phenomena [8]. Often, deformations of the eastern flank accelerate during lateral eruptions, suggesting a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the two phenomena [9].

Between 24 and 26 December 2018, a brief lateral eruption of Etna occurred [10,11], fed by a ~2 km long fissure that opened in the high western wall of the Valle del Bove erosional depression (VdB in Figure 1). The lava flow descended along the western wall of the valley, then expanded eastwards to reach a maximum length of about three kilometers, but remained confined to a barren area [11] and therefore caused no damage to houses and man-made infrastructures.

The eruption, however, was accompanied by several thousand earthquakes within a few weeks and significant ground deformations, concentrated both along the eruptive fissure and on the slopes of the volcano [5]. The most energetic of these earthquakes (Mw 4.9, lat 37.648 lon 15.117), with a very shallow hypocenter (a few hundred meters), occurred at 03:19:14 local time on 26 December 2018, originating along the Fiandaca fault and characterized by clearly visible coseismic ruptures observed on the ground along a strip of land ranging from tens to several hundred meters in width and about 10 km in length [5,12,13,14]. This event damaged more than three thousand buildings in an area of ~205 km², forcing thousands of people to permanently abandon their homes [15]. The worst-affected zone was the surface fault area, where seismic shaking was compounded by the structural damage caused by the fracture of the buildings’ foundation substrate.

At the end of 2019, the Italian government appointed a Special Commissioner for the reconstruction of the areas affected by the earthquake [16]. In this article, we describe how the government Commissioner’s Office managed the reconstruction process, beginning with the mapping of the zones at highest geological risk, and continuing with the planning of territorial interventions and the provision of assistance to the affected populations, including psychological assessments. This approach has proved effective both economically, by optimizing the financial resources allocated for reconstruction, and geoethically, by relocating many families away from the most hazardous areas, thereby helping to prevent likely future disasters.

2. The Etna 2018 Earthquake

The earthquake of 26 December 2018 caused a co-seismic rupture of the ground approximately 10 km long in a strip of territory with NW-SE to N-S orientation, varying in width from a few tens of meters to a few hundred meters. The activated fault was the Fiandaca fault, but on the south-eastern periphery, the movement was transferred to the Aci Platani and Aci Catena faults, which were activated by aseismic creep in the hours/days following the earthquake. The Fiandaca fault exhibited right-lateral strike-slip kinematics, while the other faults moved primarily through extensional deformation [12,13,14,17,18,19,20]. The structural data measured at the surface are consistent with the deformation model derived from InSAR data [4], which identified a principal deformation zone characterized by a maximum slip of approximately 0.7 m, located at depths between 0.4 and 1.0 km along the seismogenic fault plane (Figure 1). The earthquake registered a magnitude of Mw 4.9, with its epicenter situated between the municipalities of Fleri and Viagrande, and a shallow hypocenter at a depth of less than 1 km. Despite its moderate magnitude, peak ground accelerations were locally high, particularly in the vicinity of the Fiandaca Fault, resulting in significant damage to unreinforced masonry buildings—many of which predated modern seismic codes [21].

3. Materials and Methods

In the event of major natural disasters, the Italian Government usually appoints an Extraordinary Commissioner responsible for managing issues related to reconstruction, aid to the population, and the economic recovery of the affected territory. Accordingly, on 5 August 2019, by Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers [16], an Extraordinary Commissioner was appointed for reconstruction in the territories of the municipalities within the Metropolitan City of Catania affected by the earthquakes of 26 December 2018 (Figure 2). The Commissioner subsequently established a dedicated structure composed of 15 personnel from other public administrations (12 engineers and architects, 1 geologist, 2 lawyers), supported by additional staff from the national development agency INVITALIA, and approximately 40 technicians hired by the municipalities affected by the earthquake and financially backed by the Commissioner’s resources. The staff thus identified provides support to the Extraordinary Commissioner both in the drafting phase of the Commissioner’s measures and in the analysis of all technical-legal issues related to the fulfilment of institutional tasks, ensuring the applicability of the provisions introduced, the assessment of the impact and feasibility of regulations, and the streamlining and simplification of legislative processes.

The Commissioner’s most urgent objective was to promptly initiate the reconstruction of the affected areas in a safe and timely manner. The geologists of the Commissioner’s Structure analyzed the scientific publications concerning the earthquake and already available [10,11,12,13,17,18,19], enriching them with further detailed geostructural studies. Homogeneous microzone maps were then produced in accordance with the guidelines for land management in areas subject to active and capable faults (ACFs) [22,23]. The team was composed of experts from the Office of the Extraordinary Commissioner, the Civil Engineering Department (Genio Civile-Regional Department of the Sicilian Government), the national agency Invitalia, and geologists from the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (Figure 2). The work was primarily coordinated and conducted by one of the authors, who also serves as Deputy Commissioner and Head of the Geological Division within the Government Commission Structure (https://commissariosismaareaetnea.it/ (accessed on 24 August 2025).

Some of the principal objectives of the Office of the Extraordinary Commissioner include the technical and economic oversight of the reconstruction process—documented through semi-annual reports submitted to the Italian Government—and the communication and dissemination of outcomes to the population affected by the earthquake. These objectives are highlighted in the yellow-labeled boxes in Figure 2.

The results were represented in maps published both in PDF format (scale 1:10,000) and through WebGIS access, [https://bit.ly/4fXdlEU, accessed on 24 August 2025]. The maps identify homogeneous micro-zones of active and capable faults (ACFs) and also delineate areas affected by hydrogeological instability. These products enabled the drafting of the Government Commissioner’s regulations and the adoption of the reconstruction plans. Under Italian law [16], the only reconstruction claims that can be accepted are those accompanied by an AeDES form (Usability and Damage in Seismic Emergency), compiled immediately after the earthquake by the Italian Civil Protection Department and declaring the building as uninhabitable.

Communication with the earthquake-affected population was fundamental for the dissemination of the results obtained by the team of experts and for the acceptance of the resulting regulations concerning reconstruction and, in some cases, the relocation of buildings exposed to the greatest geostructural risk (Figure 2). Frequent meetings were organized with representatives of municipalities and citizens, including virtual events held during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the initial stage of the reconstruction process, between 2020 and 2023, 17 structured meetings were held in the municipalities of Zafferana Etnea, Aci Sant’Antonio, and Acireale, with an average attendance of 45–60 residents per session. After the dissemination of information to the entire population concerned, a reduction in the frequency of meetings was implemented, with the number of scheduled meetings decreasing to six in the 2024–2025 period. Notes and Q&A transcripts were collected and analyzed thematically. Numerous science conferences were organized each year, involving the main service clubs (Kiwanis International, Lions, Rotary) and voluntary associations. An IT-based communication platform called “Citizen’s Desk” (online platform) was set up via the website https://bit.ly/3HOcSIo (accessed on 24 August 2025) with the aim of facilitating assistance to people affected by the earthquake and responding to their inquiries. Over 120 individual queries were submitted via the digital help desk. The authors, including a licensed clinical psychologist, conducted semi-structured conversations with 63 affected individuals during field visits between 2020 and 2024. Finally, a collaboration was initiated with Prof. Mara Benadusi, a professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Catania, and Dr. Mario Mattia, Senior Technologist at the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology, through the project “Faglie di rischio: vulnerabilità, delocalizzazioni, spaesamenti e appaesamento”, focused on the local perception of seismic risk [24].

4. Results

A salient feature of the earthquake of 26 December 2018 was the occurrence of surface faulting, with displacements reaching 30–40 cm. In the case of structures erected directly on or in close proximity to the activated fault trace, severe structural damage or total collapse was observed, irrespective of the quality of the construction. In such instances, the predominant destructive mechanism was identified as permanent ground deformation.

A significant number of affected structures were characterized by unreinforced load-bearing masonry, frequently exhibiting plan and elevation irregularities, the absence of ring beams, thrusting floor slabs, or substantial roofing systems. Furthermore, unauthorized modifications and building code violations have been shown to compromise seismic performance [21].

The seismic event was not accompanied by the occurrence of pyroclastic flows or significant ash loads. However, the Southeast Crater exhibited ongoing eruptive activity, and a mounting body of evidence supports a correlation between magmatic pressurization and fault activation in the Etna region [2,7,9]. However, no instances of direct building collapses were attributed to superficial volcanic phenomena.

In specific regions, the synergistic impact of fault rupture, seismic activity, and unfavorable geotechnical conditions—including unconsolidated soils or unstable slopes—exacerbated the damage. Pessina et al. [21] observed complex cracking patterns and foundation settlements in buildings erected on alluvial deposits or anthropogenic fills.

The Fiandaca fault has caused numerous earthquakes in historical times [25]; those of 1894 (M4.6, lat 37.653 lon 15.110), 1907 (M4.0, lat 37.632 lon 15.134) and 1984 (M4.4, lat 37.660 lon 15.095) caused damage and ground fracturing in many parts coinciding with those that occurred in 2018 (M4.9, lat 37.648 lon 15.117), demonstrating the high hazard of the fault both due to the magnitude and the shallow depth of the hypocenters, as well as its ability to generate extensive zones of co-seismic fracturing.

The earthquake that occurred on 25 October 1984 had a significant impact on the municipality of Zafferana Etnea: A total of 2679 buildings—representing approximately 70% of the residential building stock—underwent reconstruction procedures due to being rendered uninhabitable (F. Campione, personal communication). In the absence of centralized coordination within a fragmented regulatory and administrative context, the reconstruction process was characterized by slowness and unevenness. According to updated parametric estimates and the mean surface area of the affected private dwellings, the total cost can be estimated at between EUR 150 million and EUR 200 million adjusted to present-day values, inclusive of both direct building interventions and associated expenses.

Conversely, the earthquake of 26 December 2018 prompted a more organized response, marked by the designation of an Extraordinary Commissioner and the centralization of public funds. The initial damage assessment indicated a total of approximately EUR 631 million in losses. However, the funds that have been disbursed to date for reconstruction purposes are estimated to be around EUR 250 million (including approximately EUR 54 million allocated for the reconstruction of public and religious buildings). This substantial decrease, when compared to the preliminary estimate, is presumably attributable to the fact that approximately half of the 3173 damaged and condemned buildings were deemed ineligible for state contributions. This ineligibility is likely due to building code violations or unauthorized construction, as defined by current Italian regulations.

In summary, these two events reveal systemic weaknesses in reconstruction policy: the former highlights the absence of coordinated planning and resource allocation; the latter underscores the limitations of the current regulatory framework in addressing the complex urban fabric of the affected areas. Both cases emphasize the pressing need to align seismic risk prevention, building code compliance, and administrative transparency as foundational pillars for effective and sustainable post-disaster reconstruction.

4.1. Bridging Emergency Assessment and Reconstruction: Lessons from AeDES Deployment in the Etna 2018 Earthquake

In Italy, the post-earthquake assessment framework follows a two-phase approach: an initial emergency-phase evaluation, followed by a technical validation stage conducted during the reconstruction process. At the core of this framework lies the AeDES form (Usability and Damage in Seismic Emergency), developed by the Italian Civil Protection Department. This standardized tool facilitates the rapid classification of building usability and structural damage severity, relying primarily on external inspections and visual diagnostic criteria.

During the 2018 Mount Etna earthquake, the AeDES form was extensively applied across the affected municipalities, particularly in Zafferana Etnea and Acireale, two of the hardest-hit towns. However, safety limitations and the urgency of the emergency response often prevented inspectors from entering buildings that had sustained significant damage due to surface faulting or partial collapse. As a result, the initial assessments—while essential for civil protection decision-making—were frequently preliminary and subject to revision during the reconstruction phase.

Another challenge lay in the scale of the task. Thousands of buildings required inspection within a short timeframe, yet the number of qualified professionals was limited. Under such conditions, inconsistencies inevitably emerged—some assessments were rushed, others delayed. Fatigue and psychological stress could also influence judgment, even among seasoned inspectors. Additionally, while the AeDES form adheres to a standardized format, its interpretation varies: not all inspectors share the same training or familiarity with local construction practices. This disparity can lead to divergent evaluations, particularly in borderline cases where damage is less apparent.

During the post-2018 earthquake reconstruction phase, it became evident that approximately 25–30% of the AeDES forms had underestimated the extent of damage and the structural vulnerability of buildings, owing to inherent methodological limitations mentioned above. This misjudgment consequently resulted in an underestimation of the resources required for the recovery and rebuilding of the earthquake-affected area. In the months following the seismic event, engineers responsible for rehabilitation or reconstruction projects were required to reinspect buildings, conduct detailed structural surveys, and, where necessary, revise or overturn the original AeDES classifications. This iterative process proved especially critical in areas experiencing permanent ground deformation, where superficial damage often masked deeper structural deterioration [21]. Moreover, the Etna case highlighted the importance of site-specific assessment protocols in volcanic seismicity contexts, where tectonic uplift and localized faulting can amplify vulnerabilities.

Finally, we can make a quick comparison with previous earthquakes in Italy, such as those in L’Aquila (2009) and central Italy (2016). In both cases, AeDES data were subsequently integrated into GIS-based platforms to support vulnerability mapping and urban planning. The same work was also carried out in the case of the Etna reconstruction, placing buildings on georeferenced thematic maps and making them available to all citizens, land use offices, and technical designers. These applications highlight the evolving role of AeDES, not only as an emergency response tool, but also as a strategic bridge between short-term assessment and long-term urban resilience planning [26].

4.2. Reconstruction: From Structural Mapping to Commissarial Ordinances

The map produced by the team of experts coordinated by the Government Commission Structure identifies the position of the faults that activated on 26 December 2018 and delineates three types of “homogeneous micro-zones” from a seismic perspective: the zone of attention (ZA_ACF), at least 400 m wide around the fault; the zone of susceptibility (ZS_ACF), at least 160 m wide around the fault; and the respect zone (ZR_ACF), the most hazardous, with a minimum width of 30 m centered on the surface fault plane [22,23]. Once this map was created, it became possible to issue the Commissarial Ordinances for reconstruction, which defined building regulations and the allocation of financial contributions (all regulations issued by the Commissioner are published here: https://commissariosismaareaetnea.it/it/news-category/149244 (accessed on 24 August 2025). A plan was therefore developed for the reconstruction of public infrastructure and buildings, a plan for the ecclesiastical and religious buildings, and finally a plan for the private buildings. The amount of financial aid granted by the Commissioner was proportional to the damage sustained by each building, with the aim of repairing or rebuilding it in a modern, earthquake-resistant manner and therefore to a higher safety standard than the existing structure. The total cost of the reconstruction amounts, at the time of writing this article, to just under EUR 250 million, including both the cost of personnel employed by the Commission Structure and the nine municipalities affected by the earthquake, as well as any other type of expenditure related to reconstruction and economic recovery.

In areas not directly affected by surface faults, citizens and public institutions were immediately able to submit projects accompanied by in-depth geological investigations and surveys that improved the understanding of the geological substrate in each specific project area. Some geological and geophysical surveys were identified as necessary for project submission, proportional to both the size of the building structure and the geological and geomorphological context in which it is located. A more in-depth understanding of the geostructural context was required within the zone of attention (ZA_ACF) and the zone of susceptibility (ZS_ACF) to exclude the presence of faults in the building footprint or in its immediate vicinity (Figure 3).

4.3. The Relocation Plan: A Geoethical Decision

Buildings located within the zone of respect (ZR_ACF), being subject not only to seismic shocks generated by the displacement of the fault plane but also to fracturing (faulting) of the ground beneath their foundations, were not rebuilt in the same location. A relocation plan has been developed for them (Figure 4) [27]. This strategy was implemented to ensure the safety of citizens and to avoid allocating resources to the reconstruction of buildings at high risk of collapse within a few years or decades, given the high frequency of activity of the Fiandaca fault [25].

The plan provides for the voluntary relocation of 58 buildings comprising 122 housing units at a total cost of approximately EUR 33 million, regulated by Commissioner’s Ordinance No. 18 of 21 December 2020 [28]. The ordinance stipulates that owners of damaged properties located within the zone of respect (ZR_ACF) (Figure 3 and Figure 4) will be granted financial assistance equivalent to the value of the property to be relocated. Following the demolition of the building damaged by the earthquake, owners are offered the opportunity to purchase an existing property in one of the nine municipalities affected by the earthquake, or to construct a new one in a seismically and geologically safer area.

However, there is another side to the coin: the relocation of a building, especially when it is located within a long-established urban area, forces entire families to “emigrate” elsewhere. This is perceived by the community as a loss of economic (territorial) and social (relational) value, which must therefore be mitigated as much as possible. In fact, particularly in small communities, such as the villages of Fleri (2432 inhabitants) and Aci Platani (3594 inhabitants), which are significantly affected by the relocation strategy (see example in Figure 4), the loss of dozens of families can represent a significant socio-economic challenge. Compensation has therefore been provided for the community remaining in these villages. The land on which the relocated buildings stood has been transferred at no cost to the municipalities concerned, which will also receive adequate financial resources from the Commissioner to redevelop these areas through the construction of urban parks and green areas, roads, and parking lots (Figure 4a), i.e., compatible with the geological sensitivity of these sites and intended for the free use of local communities.

5. Discussion

In recent decades, Italy has experienced disastrous earthquakes that resulted in the destruction of entire towns that were never rebuilt in their original locations. Following the Belice earthquake of 1968 (Mw6.5, 231–400 fatalities, 632–1000 injured, 70,000–100,000 displaced persons), for example, several towns were relocated or rebuilt in new areas. Of these, Gibellina, Poggioreale, Salaparuta, and Montevago were among the hardest hit. Gibellina was rebuilt about 18 km from the original site, featuring modern and innovative architecture [29,30,31,32]. In terms of economic assistance, the Italian government allocated funds for reconstruction and relocation of inhabitants, but the management of aid has often been criticized for its slowness and lack of a planning vision suited to the socio-economic context of the affected area [30,31]. In the case of the 1980 Irpinia earthquake (Mw6.9, 2483–2914 fatalities, ~8800 injured, 250,000–300,000 displaced persons, ~250,000 damaged homes, affected area: ~6300 km²), many villages were evacuated and rebuilt elsewhere. Among the towns affected were Conza della Campania, Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi, and Lioni [32,33]. Again, the Italian government provided financial contributions to support the reconstruction of homes and infrastructure, although controversies arose regarding the distribution of funds and transparency in management [34,35,36].

These events deeply marked local communities, transforming the urban and social landscape of the affected areas. These places are not only reminders of past tragedies, but also warnings for the future. They underscore the importance of designing resilient cities and adopting preventive measures to safeguard lives and communities.

The situation brought about by the 2018 Etna earthquake (Mw4.9, 0 fatalities, 28 injured, over 3000 damaged buildings, affected area: ~205 km²) is distinctly different from the cases mentioned above. Relocation involved not entire towns but only individual buildings or portions of specific neighborhoods, due to the site-specific geostructural hazard of the sites where those buildings were located (see the surface faulting in Figure 4b and Figure 5). Moreover, the relocation was planned immediately after the earthquake, based on technical studies that recommended it, and all authorities with statutory responsibilities in the field of land-use planning (Genio Civile of Catania-Sicilian Region, Superintendency for Cultural and Environmental Heritage, Etna Park, Municipalities, Civil Protection) were involved. As a result, the process was implemented within a few months, enabling most of the citizens involved in the relocation to move into their new homes almost immediately [27,28].

Nevertheless, we are aware, and have experienced during this study, that leaving one’s home is never an easy decision to make, even when there are compelling reasons to relocate to safer places.

5.1. Perceptions and Reactions of Affected Communities

The reactions of the population to the relocation plan proposed by the Commissioner were many and, at times, conflicting. Some residents responded favorably and seized the opportunity offered by the government to move their homes away from hazardous areas, while others strongly opposed the proposal, interpreting it as a hostile act and attempting to challenge the relocation plan by seeking additional technical assessments that would support their desire to remain in the same places where they had lived until the day of the earthquake [15]. In one emblematic case (see faulting effects in Figure 5e,g), a resident, at his own expense, commissioned a paleo-seismological trench interpreted by experts in the field [14], hoping to refute the surface evidence shown on the commissarial map: an attempt that ultimately proved unsuccessful, as the trench only further highlighted the surface geostructural evidence, thereby confirming the urgent need to relocate his home.

5.1.1. Uninformed or Impulsive Choices

We, therefore, reflected on these reactions of opposing nature, promoting opportunities to meet with the population involved in the relocation plan. Initially, we asked ourselves why such negative responses had emerged, investigating the reasons behind the decision of some individuals to live in dangerous places, for example, in proximity to seismogenic faults or in zones highly susceptible to lava flow invasion. We ascertained that this decision is often based on insufficient information: many people are unaware of the considerable risks posed by the Italian geological landscape [30,32,35], particularly in active volcanic regions such as Etna.

At times, however, even in the presence of a general awareness of the hazard, some individuals still choose to settle in areas of high risk associated with natural phenomena.

5.1.2. Understanding Risk: Perception, Downplaying, and Denial

To explain these behaviors, we started from the observation that earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are sudden, discontinuous, and unpredictable events. As a result, the threat is not always perceived by the population [37,38], even when the risk is clearly illustrated on widely available maps. In the face of impending catastrophic events, people may adopt psychological defense mechanisms to cope with stress and shield themselves from emotions and thoughts they find unbearable [39,40,41,42,43]; in this specific context, individuals may: (a) downplay the severity of the danger, (b) deny its existence, or (c) resort to “magical thinking” [44,45].

Those who unjustifiably downplay the problem are often unable to cope with the emotional impact of the information they receive and thus reduce its significance by aligning it with their own psychological, emotional, and cognitive capacities. Individuals wishing to build their house, for example, may reassure themselves by saying, “We will build a house that can withstand any earthquake. There is no reason to worry if such an event occurs.” Those who, instead, deny the existence of the problem tend to “erase” it from their consciousness. Although this may occur for similar reasons, in this case, it may reflect even more limited personal coping resources. For instance, such individuals might claim, “but what harm could a little shaking do!” The most extreme “deniers” include those who reject scientific evidence altogether, placing their trust instead in folk beliefs or personal experiences, which, however, represent only a small subset of possible outcomes-namely, those most psychologically reassuring to them. For example, certain individuals who have survived a previous earthquake may assume that such a positive outcome will inevitably occur again in the future. Finally, in the case of magical thinking, people tend to rely on intuitions and illogical associations not grounded in scientific evidence. These beliefs are often based on personal experiences or those of close acquaintances, yet they are not representative of the full range of possible scenarios [39,40]. An example of magical thinking might be the following: “my grandfather told me that his house was spared by the earthquake-surely I will be spared too.”

These coping behaviors, enacted by individuals to cope with and manage stressful events, have been widely documented in humans and are frequently employed—consciously or unconsciously—in situations of psychological and emotional distress [39,40,41,42,43].

5.1.3. An Opposite Response: Excessive Fear

An alternative and inverse response to the previous ones is a reaction of intense fear, which—when reaching high levels—reduces the individual’s clarity of thought and ability to reason rationally. Upon becoming aware of a potential or probable threat, some individuals tend to anticipate only the most adverse scenarios. This leads to an unjustified amplification of concerns, rather than a realistic assessment of the situation. The psychological distress experienced by such individuals in the face of a potential disaster can significantly affect their daily lives [39,43,44]. For example, even after adopting all necessary precautions, they may continue to experience apprehension and exhibit high levels of anxiety about seismic events—even when residing in a modern earthquake-resistant building located at a safe distance from active faults.

This condition may also result in prolonged insomnia, driven by apprehension about possible future traumatic experiences associated with a hypothetical earthquake [42]. This reaction can be particularly pronounced in individuals who have previously experienced an earthquake and suffered significant damage to their homes. Impactful events can leave deep psychological and physiological imprints, triggering states of hypervigilance and a chronic stress response [39,40,41,43,44].

5.1.4. Clinical Reactions or Coping Strategies?

It is important to emphasize that the behaviors described above do not necessarily indicate the presence of pathology. Rather, they represent psychological defense strategies employed by individuals to cope with situations that are uncomfortable or that force them out of their comfort zone—namely, the building and/or neighborhood in which they reside.

The psychological impact of relocating one’s home is considerable and can be experienced negatively, particularly for individuals who are emotionally vulnerable or who have a history of prior economic or social hardship, regardless of its cause. A significant part of these dynamics lies in the subjective meaning attributed to one’s home: it is not merely a physical structure, but also a repository of memories, emotions, and social bonds. As an illustration, consider an individual who has invested emotionally and financially in the construction of his or her home—often the only property they own—demonstrating an unwavering commitment, making substantial personal sacrifices, and devoting years, if not decades, to the endeavor. Then, suddenly and unexpectedly, an earthquake causes irreparable damage, wiping out the fruit of their labor in a matter of seconds. It is reasonable to conclude that such a person, in that situation, would experience a profound sense of loss, sadness, and disorientation, suddenly deprived of the point of reference that once anchored their life, now forced to confront the devastating reality of the destruction of what was once a safe and welcoming place. The destruction of houses of worship—spaces of collective gathering—can likewise signify a profound loss of communal identity (Figure 6).

The loss of one’s home, in symbolic terms, represents the collapse of a fundamental point of reference in our lives: the absence of a safe place to return to, the disintegration of memories we are attached to—an event that evokes emotions so intense they may cause an almost physical pain: fear, anger, bewilderment, confusion, abandonment, sadness, and emptiness. However, we must acknowledge that individual reactions vary, depending on personal life experience, cognitive abilities, and cultural, social, and economic resources [44]. These experiences are often described as “biographical shock,” [39,40,41,42] moments that constitute a watershed in a person’s life, clearly delineating a before and after.

5.2. The Value of Empathetic Dialogue with Earthquake Survivors

What we have come to realize during this study is that possessing adequate cognitive and cultural tools to fully understand the risks associated with a given place is not, in itself, sufficient to promote cautious or wise decisions. Knowing is not enough. This is because individuals are capable of self-deception and even of distorting reality when such mechanisms serve to protect them from emotions and thoughts they find untenable.

This highlights the importance of considering psychological assistance as a crucial and complementary component of support for individuals affected by natural disasters. In delivering such assistance, it is essential to act promptly and tailor the approach according to the nature and scale of the disaster, the type of intervention planned, and the projected recovery timeline. The scope of support must therefore extend beyond conventional economic aid; it should aim to help individuals confront the challenges they face in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, providing emotional support to address the sudden loss of fundamental reference points for their lives. In the case of the 2018 post-earthquake reconstruction, the early dialogue between the Commissioner’s Structure technicians and the earthquake-affected population (Figure 7), particularly those facing relocation, represented a significant first step in acknowledging the complex and layered nature of the necessary support, grounded in empathetic engagement with their distress, and not limited to financial assistance alone.

5.3. Recommendations for Structural and Non-Structural Mitigation Measures in High-Seismic-Risk Areas

In high-seismic-hazard contexts such as the Etna region, mitigation strategies must be systematically integrated into territorial governance, urban planning, and civil protection protocols (

Table 1. Mitigation recommendations.

Dimension	Type of Measure	Priority Actions	Indicative Data from the 2018 Event
Structural	Planning tools	Integrate updated seismic microzonation (SM) maps into zoning codes	Seismic microzonation (SM) incorporated into regional urban plans to guide risk mitigation strategies.
	Building relocation	Relocate structures from zones within 30 m of active faults	58 buildings and 122 residential units involved in the 2018 relocation plan.
	Anti-seismic design	Seismic isolation, retrofitting of reinforced concrete buildings, and strengthening of masonry using locally compatible techniques	Implementation across all impacted zones, with priority assigned to the susceptibility zone.
Non-Structural	Institutional communication	Public meetings, digital help desk	1223 user interactions in 2020; 1355 in 2021; 1009 in 2022; over 200 interactions recorded across 2023–2024.
	Psychological support Education and awareness Regulatory framework	Early interventions and trauma-informed programs for relocated residents Risk literacy programs in schools and local communities Definition of geoethical relocation thresholds and long-term fault avoidance policies	Ongoing dialogue with citizens. ~50% initially criticised the relocation plan; 35% reported anxiety after the move. Involvement of local volunteer groups, spontaneous committees of earthquake victims, and service clubs. Adopted in Etna, extended to Ischia (2017 earthquake [46]) and Central Italy (2016–2017 earthquakes [47]).

). Structural interventions should prioritize the permanent exclusion of critical infrastructure and residential buildings from areas intersected by active fault traces, as reaffirmed by the recurrence of surface faulting during the 2018 Etna earthquake. Post-event surveys indicate that most structural failures in the hardest-hit zones occurred within 30 m of fault scarps, thereby justifying the adoption of relocation thresholds in these zones. Furthermore, over 60% of structural failures were recorded within 200 m of fault scarps, supporting the application of enhanced seismic design criteria for reconstruction in the broader susceptibility zone.

Reconstruction strategies must incorporate fault-crossing-resistant design solutions, seismic isolation systems, and the retrofitting of existing buildings based on site-specific vulnerability assessments. Updated seismic microzonation (SM) studies, detailed geotechnical mapping, and the use of dynamic soil–structure interaction models are essential prerequisites for authorizing any new construction or land-use change in affected municipalities. Of particular importance is the incorporation of seismic microzonation studies by regional and municipal authorities. In the case of the 2018 earthquake, the homogeneous seismic microzone maps developed by the Commissarial Structure were promptly adopted by the regional offices of the Civil Engineering Department in Catania. These maps are applied both to post-earthquake reconstruction projects and to any other construction activity within the nine municipal areas affected by the earthquake. As such, they constitute a powerful urban planning tool aimed at safeguarding human life—originating from a disastrous seismic event, applied to reconstruction, and ultimately contributing to the sustainable future development of the territory.

Non-structural measures are equally strategic and should include the early activation of psychological support systems, particularly for populations previously exposed to trauma. Data from the 2018 Etna response indicate that over 35% of relocated individuals reported emotional distress—even when transferred to structurally safe environments—underscoring the importance of empathetic dialogue and ongoing psychosocial monitoring. An aspect that warrants careful consideration is that the most vocal critics of the relocation plan were not the directly affected residents, but rather those living in the areas surrounding the relocation sites. This appears to stem from concerns about remaining in a still-hazardous area, partially abandoned, and consequently perceived as having diminished economic value. Empathetic dialogue with the local population has therefore improved understanding of the rationale behind the relocation plan, enabling the return of originally hazardous areas to forms of collective use more appropriate to their intrinsic risk—such as the creation of green spaces, parking lots, and roads.

The implementation of institutional communication mechanisms, such as remote-access citizen help desks—which received several dozen interactions monthly during the COVID-19 emergency—and regular public meetings, proved effective in enhancing transparency and building public trust. Finally, risk literacy programs, tailored to local cultural and demographic contexts, should be permanently institutionalized as a core element of future-oriented disaster mitigation frameworks; this principle has been operationalized in Italy through the enactment of Law No. 40 of 18 March 2025 [48], which establishes a comprehensive legal framework for post-disaster reconstruction, emphasizing coordinated governance, environmental sustainability, and community resilience.

6. Conclusions

In the aftermath of natural disasters, post-earthquake reconstruction transcends the domains of engineering and logistics, representing a multifaceted interplay of geoscientific knowledge, ethical responsibility, and psychosocial awareness. The 2018 Etna earthquake illustrates that certain zones—particularly those affected by recurrent surface faulting—exhibit a degree of geological hazard so critical that rebuilding in situ is neither scientifically justifiable nor geoethically defensible [49]. In such contexts, relocation emerges not merely as a rational alternative, but as an ethically mandated strategy grounded in hazard-based land-use planning.

This study demonstrates how a scientifically informed relocation policy can be designed through the integration of updated seismic microzonation (SM) data [23], fault-avoidance regulations, and a collaborative, interdisciplinary governance model. It contributes to the expanding geoscientific discourse on active fault mitigation by providing a replicable and policy-relevant framework aligned with the mission of Geosciences, which fosters research at the interface of earth sciences, risk governance, and societal impact.

What distinguishes the Etna model is its coupling of rigorous geotechnical criteria with psychological and social analysis. By incorporating fault rupture evidence, insights from risk perception research, and trauma-informed communication strategies, the model presents a holistic vision of disaster resilience that recognizes the deep interconnection between physical safety, emotional well-being, and territorial identity. This integrated perspective ensures that decisions about where to rebuild are matched by care for how individuals and communities process, accept, and adapt to spatial dislocation.

The Etna framework has already informed relocation and regulatory measures in response to other seismic events in Italy (e.g., Central Italy 2016–2017 [46]; Ischia 2017 [47]), affirming its structural coherence and practical viability. Its replicability rests on three interdependent pillars:

• Geoscientific rigor—including fault-specific mapping, seismic microzonation, and local hazard characterization;
• Institutional transparency—through publicly accessible regulations, participatory communication tools, and accessible GIS-based resources;
• Empathetic planning—centering on the lived experience of affected populations and their psychological responses to displacement.

Moreover, the extensive use of community engagement mechanisms—such as public assemblies, citizen help desks, and collaborative policy design—underscores the potential of geoscientific data not only to inform technical decisions but also to rebuild social trust and strengthen democratic resilience in post-crisis governance.

At the time of writing, approximately five and a half years after the earthquake, the reconstruction process is at an advanced stage: over 86% of the reconstruction applications submitted by affected citizens have already been funded by the Commissioner’s Office, amounting to EUR 172 million. Additionally, public works have received EUR 34.2 million in funding, while religious buildings have been allocated EUR 19 million. All applications for relocation were processed almost immediately, and the citizens involved are now living in their new homes. The State’s response has therefore proven to be timely and effective, marking a notable departure from previous post-disaster reconstruction efforts in Italy.

In conclusion, the Etna 2018 case study advocates for a paradigm of post-disaster recovery that integrates geoscientific expertise with ethical foresight and psychosocial sensitivity. It provides a field-tested model for urban planners, geologists, and policymakers aiming to reduce long-term vulnerability while upholding the dignity, memory, and autonomy of the communities they serve.