“Against the Dog Only a Dog”. Talking Canines Civilizing Cynicism in Cervantes’ “coloquio de los perros” (With Tentative Remarks on the Discourse and Method of Animal Studies)

Abstract

Deriving its designation from the Greek word for ‘dog’, cynicism is likely the only philosophical ‘interest group’ with a diachronically dependable affinity for various animals—particularly those of the canine kind. While dogs have met with differing value judgments, chiefly along a perceived human–animal divide, it is specifically discourses with cynical affinities that render problematic this transitional field. The Cervantine “coloquio de los perros” has received scholarly attention for its (caninely) picaresque themes, its “cynomorphic” (Ziolkowski) narratological technique, its socio-historically informative accounts relating to Early Modern Europe and the Iberian peninsula, including its ‘zoopoetically’ (Derrida) relevant portrayal of dogs (see e.g., Alves, Beusterien, Martín); nor did the dialog’s mention of cynical snarling go unnoticed. The essay at hand commences with a chapter on questions of method pertaining to ‘animal narration’: with recourse to Montaigne, Descartes, and Derrida, this first part serves to situate the ensuing close readings with respect to the field of Animal Studies. The analysis of the Cervantine texts synergizes thematic and narratological aspects at the discourse historical level; it commences with a brief synopsis of the respective novellas in part 2; Section 3, Section 4 and Section 5 supply a description of the rhetorical modes of crafting plausibility in the framework narrative (“The Deceitful Marriage”), of pertinent (Scriptural) intertexts for the “Colloquy”. Parts 6–7 demonstrate that the choice of canine interlocutors as narrating agencies—and specifically in their capacity as dogs—is discursively motivated: no other animal than this animal, and precisely as animal, would here serve the discursive purpose that is concurrently present with the literal plane; for this dialogic novella partakes of a (predominantly Stoicizing) tradition attempting to resocialize the Cynics, which commences already with the appearance of the Ancient arch-Cynic ‘Diogenes’ on the scene. At the discursive level, a diachronic contextualization evinces that the Cervantine text takes up and outperforms those rhetorical techniques of reintegration by melding Christian, Platonic, Stoicizing elements with such as are reminiscent of Diogenical ones. Reallocating Blumenberg’s reading of a notorious Goethean dictum, this essay submits the formula ‘against the Dog only a dog’ as a concise précis of the Cervantine method at the discursive level, attained to via a decidedly pluralized rhetorical sermocination featuring, at a literal level, specifically canine narrators in a dialogic setting.

1. Cherchez La Bête (Humaine): With Respect to Animal Narration

Diogenes […] disait […] C’est celui qui me traite et nourrit qui me sert,

et ceux qui entretiennent [les] bêtes se doivent dire plutôt les servir qu’en être servis.

(Montaigne 2009, p. 192, II.xii); cf. (Montaigne 1989, p. 338); (D. Laertius 2005, p. 77, VI.75)1

natürlich nur tentativ

(Nolting-Hauff 1987, p. 195)

This initial subchapter addresses questions of method. In so doing, it also serves to situate the essay’s ensuing close readings of the Cervantine novellas with respect to the approach and discourse of Animal Studies. The following observations are tentative, their function heuristic.

It is commonly held that beings with a potential capacity for humane comportment and taking other perspectives are to deem self-evident a respectful conduct towards other beings: “‘Tat twam asi’, that is, ‘this living [being] are you’” (Schopenhauer 1988, p. 295, III, §44; trans. dsm).2 Usually, only the cynically minded might wish to display the candor (or insolence) of articulating the indirectly self-seeking nature that—from their particular point of view—is likely to be at the basis of statements such as “Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Lk 6:31; cf. Mt 7:12; NIV).

Quarantining the putative faculties of humanly conceivable metaphysical entities (the caring for which must, for reasons of competence, be delegated to the respective professional curators), the nominal ‘human animal’ may seem to manifest an exceptional (and, in this, perchance distinctive) proclivity for taking other perspectives.3 In the inventory of effectual techniques that is rhetoric, such ‘perspective-taking’ is advocated as a capacity for ‘always also arguing on the other sides of any question’.4

Alignable in tendency with the perspectival inversion characteristic of the Cynic’s discourse (as in the above motto), Montaigne—whose Essais (proceeding from an awareness as to contingency) present an assorted accumulation of diverse data guided by, and gathered by way of, a poly-perspectival heuristics—muses: “When I play with my cat, who knows if I am not a pastime to her more than she is to me” (Montaigne 1989, p. 331, II.12; cf. p. 331n.; Montaigne 2009, p. 179, II.xii).5 Likely due to Derrida’s affirmative citation thereof in what has come to be a seminal text of Animal Studies (cf. Derrida 2002, pp. 375, 375n.), Montaigne’s reflection continues to be reiterated in the respective paradigm, specifically as evidence of a creditable recourse to ‘the animal itself and as such’.6 With this accentuation, ‘the real animal’ is seen to come into focus, thereby counteracting a ‘merely symbolic, purely figurative use’ (judged to be a priori compromised on account of the latter’s perceived semantic, notional, structural association with forms of exploitation).7

In this retrieval or liberation of ‘the animal as such’, the ensuing (also narratologically significant) aspects may seem to be suspended or elided: the textuality, virtuality, context, historical distance (alterity), and mediacy of the statement (including, in a scholarly environment, its stages of reception); the human being (here: the speaker of the Essais, usually identified with the historical author, referred to as ‘Montaigne’) performing the conjectural act of taking an animal’s perspective based on (what is semiotically represented as) a tangible experience; the respective human recipient visualizing the textually sedimented (putatively authentic) interspecies encounter by notionally accommodating it to her own (previously immediate, now recollected) experience with animals, not necessarily of the feline kind (thereby tying in her own Lebenswelt with what is perceived as the speaker’s lifeworld emerging suggestively from the text).

In an Animal Studies perspective, the collocation ‘animal narration’ might therefore seem a contradiction in terms, seeing that—rather than taking ‘the animal as such’—it adds another expression with (semantic) associations and (historical) implications that the paradigm expressly rejects: mediatedness, indirection, irony, semblance, the verisimilar, virtuality, ornament, symbolism, metaphor, figuration, rhetoric; along with certain genres expected to display a particular partiality toward the former, such as fables, satires, emblems, allegories, and the like; as well as a respective hermeneutics (qua more mediacy).8 In a radical view, the aspect of ‘narration’ might even be judged to be yet another arrantly anthropocentric mode, aiming to superstructure, earmark, instrumentalize, and ultimately veil ‘the animate animal itself’.9 By contrast, the language regime obtaining in the field of Animal Studies tends to privilege articulations positing immediacy, literalness, direct access, palpable life, authentic reality, truth, the body, nature, and animals.10

Facing this apparent aporia in terms of approach, one might have recourse precisely to Derrida’s aforesaid lecture—recognized as foundational for, and widely received in, Animal Studies—for purposes of proposing a provisionally practicable path.11 Two textual gestures seem to be of particular import in this respect: the essay’s express and recurrent signaling of its own textuality; and Derrida’s ostensive refunctionalization of a notorious Cartesian formula.

While articulating a desire to return to various manifestations of immediacy, the speaker repeatedly points both to the factual nonviability and the virtual possibility thereof: although all returns are virtual, they typically tend to be effectual only if that fact fails to register.12 The desired conflation—taking the virtual as the factual—occurs, as Derrida takes considerable care to render palpable, in the recipient (whether audience or reader), and precisely while acting in that capacity. Addressing others, language lays claim to reality:

I must make it clear from the start, the cat I am talking about is a real cat, truly, believe me, a little cat. It isn’t the figure of a cat. It doesn’t silently enter the room as an allegory for all the cats on the earth […] that is truly a little cat, this cat I am talking about[.]

(Derrida 2002, pp. 374–75)13

These protestations of verity and (deictic) emphases take place—and the cat exists—in language: “the cat said to be real” (p. 378) by a speaker, and potentially perceived as such by a recipient taking a semiotically mediated as an actual cat.14 In (always) other words: “It is an animal of reading and rewriting” (p. 406).

A form of indirection recurs also at another level. In the face of its allusively familiar appearance, Derrida’s patent gesture towards Descartes—already visible in the lecture’s title “L’Animal que donc je suis (à suivre)” (Derrida 2002, p. 369n.), and reiterated in variation throughout (cf. e.g., pp. 371–72, 379–83, 386, 400–1, 403, 407, 410, 416, 418)—is not a structurally equivalent reformulation. While the Cartesian “vérité: je pense, donc je suis” (Descartes 1969, p. 52, IV.1, §33) tenders a quasi-non-processual formula (the ‘therefore’ notwithstanding), Derrida—maintaining (immediate) identifiability not least by a partial citation—alters its structure entirely.15 Into the self’s processing of itself, he intercalates an other: “I see it [sc. a ‘cat’] as this irreplaceable living being […]. Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized” (Derrida 2002, pp. 378–79).16 The ego’s unshakable foundation is external to itself: an alter that cannot be incorporated—“the wholly other that they call animal, for example, a cat” (p. 380)—and that might, for instance, “manifest to me in some way its experience of my language, of my words” (p. 387).17 Derrida’s formula of indirection renders in expressly processual terms Descartes’ virtual tautology of the self’s all but immediate recourse to itself.18 Belying the surface, the perceived Cartesian and Derridean tendencies are thus fundamentally at variance (immediacy vs. indirection); in the latter case, human beings arrive at themselves by way of a detour—via an other, specifically animals.19 In Cuneo’s felicitously parrhesiastic wording: “We use all kinds of animals as homing ‘devices’, to tell ourselves and others who we are, where we are, and where we are going. We use animals to orient ourselves” (Cuneo 2014, p. 2).20 By ceaselessly returning to returning, Derrida’s essay moreover and at once performs the impossibility (respectively, the virtuality) of direct access, and the ineluctability of indirection (specifically: of language).21

In light of the above, the fact that virtually all criticism in the field of Animal Studies seems to be (insistingly, tacitly) channeling its efforts through Descartes might be additionally motivated.22 Naturally, certain Cartesian assertions (blatantly dis)regarding animals render ‘him’ an expedient antagonist.23 Yet the paradigm’s tendency to privilege immediacy—and not the discursive tendencies in Derrida—may seem to align it with the Cartesian pattern, suggesting another reason for why Animal Studies can apparently neither do with nor without ‘Descartes’.

Arguably, the seemingly comfortable Cartesian recourse (with its negative leading sign only increasing that effect) results in a perspectival foreshortening, one outcome of which appears to be a virtually complete pretermission of discourses with cynical affinities from the pertinent discussions within Animal Studies—and this despite Cynicism’s sustained impact since its emergence in Antiquity, particularly also in terms of always already destabilizing the (now) so-called “human-animal divide” (Boehrer 2010, p. 3; Raber 2013, p. 30).24 In this respect, the (historically pre‑Cartesian) Cervantine texts to be described below might provide a perspectival counterpoise, seeing that they (explicitly, by implication) draw attention to the import of discourses with cynical affinities, and precisely in a context featuring (speaking) animals at a literal level; conceivably, such a nexus might tender a plausible basis (or incentive) for judiciously engaging with discourses of a cynical color also in the field whose discourse and method are under scrutiny here.

Having tentatively outlined (via Descartes, Derrida) selected discursive ground swells of Animal Studies, one might return to the above aporia, and formulate certain provisional observations in terms of method, specifically with a view to the nexus of ‘animals’ and ‘narration’.

As a focalizing device, an Animal Studies approach might serve a heuristic function in addressing textualized aspects hitherto unacknowledged, accentuating hermeneutic lacunae, drawing attention to data on, and descriptions of, animals sedimented in material and virtual documents, in works of art.25 Such would include (Ancient, contemporaneous) notions about a perceived flora and fauna (common knowledge, particular views) as conveyed by the respective text or object.26

Written animals speaking (narrating) in the human tongue appear in texts, whose protagonists are virtual characters; Borgards suggests the term “diegetic animals” qua “appearing as living beings […] within the narrated world” (Borgards 2015, p. 225; trans. dsm).27 This does not necessarily involve their standing (in) for something else (such as human beings), nor that theirs would be a ‘merely symbolic’ use.28 In a crafted textual environment, animals will inevitably be rhetorically rendered, strategically placed, often also with discursive implications; yet this need not entail their not also being present—at a literal level—as (the portrayal of) an animal in its capacity as animal within a virtual realm.29

A textual dog, for instance, might be represented (and appresented) as barking, retrieving, biting, shepherding, etc.—with there being no need to allegorize (and moralize) such semiotized phenomena with a view to human behavior. While not passing over other planes textually present, one might stay at a literal level, provisionally: the recipient is faced with the description of a virtual canine, appearing—in the context of a world semiotically induced—as a dog. The terms ‘rhetorical’ and ‘figure’ would then signify a plausibly rendered, textual canine, significantly and strategically placed in a virtual context, crafted by recourse to a (verbal) medium—and ‘realized’ by a recipient.30 The latter would supply the corresponding—culturally conditioned, personally inflected—signifieds; tie the semiotically engendered virtual realm in with her (immediate, recollected) experience, translating a textual reality into her own; and, perchance, attempt to take a respective animal’s perspective. Via this detour—a virtual appresentation, particular appropriation, grounded in a human being’s potential for conceivably putting itself where it is not (in another’s place)—such may indeed lead to an altered perception of, and appreciation for, actual animals in the respective recipient’s realm of (haptic, olfactory, etc.) immediacy, in her material lifeworld.31

If these observations are held plausible, it might seem to be a viable approach to describe a work’s inevitably mediated status (its virtuality, textuality), its historicity, (socio-moral) alterity, its structural (including narrative) devices, its rhetorico-strategic disposition (without reducing the art to elocutio)—while also accentuating the descriptions of (historically observable) animal behavior and (culturally specific) practices involving animals sedimented in a given work (of art).32 In addition (and as the case may require), one might tender hypotheses concerning textually implicit attitudes towards animals, perhaps in conjunction with wary observations comparing multifaceted historical positions and points of view with those of a given present or paradigm.33 One might, in Blumenberg’s formulation, ‘mobilize implications in retrospect’.34

In anticipation of the findings to be detailed in the ensuing readings, further aspects relevant to the matter at hand might be adduced at this point, and tied in with the above reflections on method: while cultivating a dialogic form in arrangement and presentation, the novella and colloquy studied herein are—in discourse historical terms—rather proximate to the Montaignian approach of staging a pluralistic panorama of voices (including the cynical), of juxtaposing various viewpoints or positions (also with respect to animals), and permitting their textual coexistence and concomitance. In terms of design, the Cervantine novelas—as his œuvre by and large—might also be seen as paradigmatic instances of manifold forms of indirection, accentuating mediatedness (the medium, situation of reception, the reader’s role in appresenting a tendered realm and its virtual residents, here specifically speaking animals), and effectually deploying diverse techniques of layering: in terms of a poetics of plot, and as regards the different notional levels textually present (relating to a possible reception)—such as a potential simultaneity of discursive, figurative, and literal planes (the latter being of particular significance in the present context).

The texts to be described in the following take and tender the perspective of an animal—specifically one that has always been particularly proximate to human beings (and vice versa).35 Even so, the agent performing that ‘taking’ is—intratextually (in the narrative framework: Campuzano as author, Peralta as reader), extratextually (from a poetic and hermeneutic point of view: ‘Cervantes’, the respective recipient)—still and always a human being. In this respect, neither the recipient nor the medium (including various dimensions and forms of mediatedness) may be spirited away: “Our starting point lies […] in the […] works themselves and in the way they reflect upon animals” (Enenkel and Smith 2007, p. 11).

2. The Novellas in Question: “The Deceitful Marriage”, “The Dogs’ Colloquy”

púselo en forma de coloquio

(Cervantes 2002b, p. 295)

A brief synopsis of the Cervantine texts under scrutiny seems requisite. From a narratological perspective, the “Novela del casamiento engañoso” and “El coloquio de los perros” are closely interrelated: the former serves as a framework for the latter; via myriad echoes, they reciprocate at various levels (the structural, semantic).

After meeting the licentiate Peralta, the ensign Campuzano (having left a hospital after treatment) narrates a first (apparently autobiographical) story, then promises a curious tale concerning a conversation overheard and put to paper. While (the intratextual author) Campuzano rests, Peralta reads what is ‘the colloquy of the dogs’.

Apart from a brief conclusion (closing the frame), the second narrative is in the form of a dialog between the aforesaid hospital’s two hounds (Berganza, Cipión): after some reflections concerning their unexpected capacity for articulating themselves in the human tongue, Berganza proceeds to tell the story of his life ab ovo, along the lines of episodes experienced in the service of various masters (butcher, shepherds, merchant, students, bailiff, magistrate, soldiers, sorceress, gypsies, morisco, poet, theatrical producer, hospital worker).36 This largely chronological narrative is interspersed with remarks, replies, and reprimands on the part of Scipio, with assorted mutual digressions of an often metapoetical or moral philosophical nature.37

3. The Linguistico-Textual Setting: An Age of Rhetoric Across Europe

Así va el mundo

(Cervantes 2002a, p. 323)

In every respect, Early Modern Europe is dominated by, suffused with, the art of rhetoric.38 Apart from the fact that contemporary narratology is based on this téchne, it is needful to approach a text emerging in early seventeenth century Spain from a rhetorical perspective.39

Briefly, the art’s overarching aim is effect—typically qua persuading (dissuading) someone of a case at hand. This entails taking into consideration the addressees, specifically as regards what they are always already primed for by their background (upbringing, education, ‘Lebenswelt’)—hence the aptum (what is taken to be appropriate, at a given time, in a specific context).40 The latter will determine what readers or listeners deem plausible: what they can be taught (docere), or brought to accept, as being so, via various strategies of amusing (delectare), stimulating emotionally (movere).41 The ultimate objective remains to convince (persuadere) the respective addressees of the plausibility of what they are being presented with—and supposed to take in—by any means and all: the art of rhetoric tends to cumulate and integrate its techniques for maximum effect.42

4. The Narrative Framework: Crafting Plausibility in “The Deceitful Marriage”

Auffällig ist […] die komplizierte Rahmentechnik.

(Nolting-Hauff 1987, p. 190)43

para hacer memoria […] y para desengaño

(Cervantes 2002a, p. 354)

The aspect of persuading the (intra-, extratextual) readership of the tale’s plausibility is particularly pertinent to the case at hand, since it tenders animal narrators—specifically dogs, and precisely in their capacity as canines at a literal level.44 Consequently, the respective Cervantine novellas suggest and assemble several reasons for what must otherwise seem out of the ordinary, arranging these on several planes. While its caption points to a town (‘Valladolid’) and specific locale (‘hospital’), another indicator of the text’s attempt at tying in with shared knowledge is given in the last clause of its full title: the canines are ‘commonly called the dogs of Mahudes’.45 In other words: regardless of whether this is taken as a historical reference by the respective recipient, the textual effort in terms of producing an effect of immediate plausibility based on the projection of a supposed common ground will be patent (at a metapoetical level).

Similarly, the colloquy initially ties in with customary assumptions: “the difference between the brute animal and man is that man is a rational animal [‘animal racional’], while the brute is irrational” (Cervantes 2016b, p. 452; Cervantes 2002a, p. 299; cf. p. 309).46 Berganza and Cipión then proceed to log and exchange apparently prevalent notions concerning various canine characteristics, taken up from human conversations overheard during their lives, and evidently stored in a copious retentive faculty: “ever since I could gnaw at a bone I have wanted to be able to talk, to express things […] I had accumulated in my memory [‘depositaba en la memoria’]” (Cervantes 2016b, p. 453; Cervantes 2002a, p. 301).47

Teeming with rhetorical techniques aiming at rendering plausible the tendered tale featuring speaking animals, the narrative framework presents a conversation between the convalescing “ensign Campuzano” and the “Licentiate Peralta” (Cervantes 2016a, pp. 433–46, here 433–34), which leads to the latter’s perusal of the former’s manuscript—the coloquio.48 Setting the scene for canine interlocution, the “Novela del casamiento engañoso” is decisive narratologically: its transition to the dialog of the dogs demands detailed analysis.

Above all, the ensign’s narrative (novella-related) strategy aims at accommodating his friend’s curiosity, apparent penchant for “amazement”; in this vein, he declares:

I still have other events [‘sucesos’] to relate to you that surpass the human imagination [‘exceden a toda imaginación’], seeing as how they go beyond the very limits of the natural order of things [‘fuera de todos los términos de naturaleza’].

(Cervantes 2016a, p. 443; Cervantes 2002b, p. 292)49

He also expressly asks Peralta to “be prepared to believe it”, “se acomode a creerlo” (Cervantes 2016a, p. 444; Cervantes 2002b, p. 293), describing himself as an earwitness of an all but vivid event: “yo oí y casi vi con mis ojos”—as he admits, Campuzano never actually sees the dogs talking, inferring the fact from what he hears, “a poco rato vine a conocer, por lo que hablaban, los que hablaban” (Cervantes 2002b, p. 293).50

When Peralta reacts with predictable incredulity, the ensign agrees to the event’s implausibility—“animals can’t talk”—while offering a (discourse historically irrefutable) exception in the same breath: “unless it be owing to some miracle” (Cervantes 2016a, p. 444).51 This (orthodox) metaphysical leeway is immediately supplemented by commonly accepted, demonstrable cases that likewise challenge an unconditional denial of speaking animals: “I know quite well that thrushes, magpies, and parrots can talk, but only in the sense that they recite words from memory that they learn by heart [‘aprenden y toman de memoria’]”—an empirical observation, bolstered by an epistemological hypothesis—“and because these animals’ tongues are aptly shaped [‘cómoda’] for pronouncing the words”; ultimately, this series of concessions is itself limited in agreement with common assumptions: “But none of that means they can actually talk and answer, or engage in coherent speech [‘discurso concertado’]” (Cervantes 2016a, p. 444; Cervantes 2002b, pp. 293–94).52 Regarding other animals—‘elephant, dog, horse, ape’, see (Cervantes 2016b, p. 453)—this acknowledged state of affairs is given as inverted within the coloquio: for such beings are said to be capable of (retentive and) seemingly rational acts, while lacking the capacity for articulation in the human tongue.53

In another rhetorical move to craft a common ground, Campuzano skillfully concedes his own skepticism, “yo mismo no he querido dar crédito a mí mismo, y he querido […] tener por cosa soñada” (Cervantes 2002b, p. 294)—yet only to willfully assert (and later repeat: “contra mi opinión vengo a creer que no soñaba”) that he was “wide awake and in full possession of his senses [‘con todos mis cinco sentidos’]”; that he recorded everything verbatim (“sin faltar palabra”), to serve as a testimony “from which one may obtain sufficient evidence [‘indicio bastante’] to incline and persuade a person to believe [‘mueva y persuada a creer’] that truth of what I’m saying” (Cervantes 2016a, pp. 444–45; Cervantes 2002b, p. 294).54 The terminology being evidently rhetorico‑forensic, it will be little wonder that any refinement in terms of elocutio (ornatus) is ostentatiously denied for the alleged report itself (a rhetorical denial of ‘rhetoric’)—which, with a view to plausibility (always a matter of degree), somewhat alleviates (“casi”) the previous, absolute claim:

almost in the exact same words [‘casi por las mismas palabras’] that I had heard spoken, I transcribed it the next day, refraining from trying to adorn it [‘adornarlo’] with any sort of rhetorical coloring [‘colores retóricas’], and neither adding nor removing anything just to improve its flavor [‘para hacerle gustoso’].

(Cervantes 2016a, p. 445; Cervantes 2002b, p. 294); cf. (Schmauser 1996, pp. 16–17); (Forcione 1984, p. 232)

Between these two reciprocal passages occurs the most effective rhetorical move, similarly structured along an articulated act of apparent self-persuasion via argument in utramque partem.55 Peralta having voiced his view to the effect that Campuzano be telling tall tales, the latter immediately concedes, but only to deliberately reassert his sensorial confidence, his faith in the power of words to craft credence, his willingness to intersubjectively suspend his judgment (“mi verdad”) yet again—culminating in a rhetorical question regarding his interlocutor’s attested desire for a narrative’s delightful function:

But supposing [‘Pero puesto caso’], maybe, that I have been deceived [‘engañado’], and that what seems real is actually a dream [‘y que mi verdad sea sueño’] […]—even so, would not your honor […] like [‘se holgará’] to see written down, in the form of a colloquy, the conversation between those two dogs, whoever or whatever they really are [‘o sean quien fueren’]?

(Cervantes 2016a, p. 445; Cervantes 2002b, p. 294; cf. p. 359)

As with all things in nature, the strongest argument is always pleasure.56 Peralta immediately falls into the rhetorical trap, believes the attempts at persuasion to be of the past, and consents:

As long as your honor […] doesn’t waste any more time trying to persuade me [‘persuadirme’] that you really heard two dogs talking, I will right gladly listen to [‘de muy buena gana oiré’] this colloquy, which I already judge to be good [‘juzgo por bueno’], seeing that it has been composed and written down as the product of his honor the ensign’s notable literary talent [‘buen ingenio’].

(Cervantes 2016a, p. 445; Cervantes 2002b, p. 294; cf. p. 359)57

All the while, the reader is fully aware that Campuzano has just left the hospital, apparently after a rather laborious treatment (“I underwent the sweatbox cure forty times”), suggesting that he had not exactly been in control of his senses at all times (Cervantes 2016a, p. 443; cf. p. 434; Cervantes 2002b, pp. 282, 282n.). The ensign’s preemptive giving of (quasi-empirical, medico-nutritional) reasons for his asserted attention to detail and acoustico-textual fidelity might thus be received as (highly) ironic—pleasing the reader into persuasion, into a considerable readiness for (being) taking in (by) what follows in the coloquio:

since I was being so attentive, my intellect [‘juicio’] was really keyed up [‘delicado’], and my memory [‘memoria’] was sensitive [‘delicada’], subtle, and completely unencumbered (thanks to the numerous raisins and almonds that I had consumed), I got it all down by heart [‘todo lo tomé de coro’].

(Cervantes 2016a, p. 445; Cervantes 2002b, p. 294)

Another inverted echo—the animal rationale here behaves (“todo lo tomé de coro”) like the ‘verisimilitudinous’ avians: “toman de memoria” (Cervantes 2002b, p. 294). Given all of the above, the intratextual reader plausibly takes the tale as an occasion for delight: “the licentiate […] accepted the notebook, laughing [‘riyéndose’] and acting as if he were making fun [‘como haciendo burla’] of everything he had heard, and everything he was about to read” (Cervantes 2016a, p. 446; Cervantes 2002b, p. 295).

This insinuated form of reception is decisive: having ostensively relinquished the explicit claim to be presenting a per se persuasive narrative (with animals conversing in the human tongue), and having thus implicitly advocated that the extratextual reader take in what has been announced as a delightful tale in the corresponding manner, the colloquy seldom seems to fulfill the expectation raised by its framework. The arrangement (dispositio) is analogous to giving a dog its medication embedded in some liver. At intervals, this textual technique recurs in the canine tête-à-tête itself: a pleasant sugarcoating is administered in the form of often brief, waggishly clever (levis), subtly ironic interludes (delectare), while the dialog’s tart core is conveyed as a series of quasi-descriptive observations (docere)—its topic and tone being predominantly serious (gravis).58 The latter also applies to the presence and significance of a complex set of discursive implications pertinent to the selection of a particular animal—present and significant, at a literal level, precisely as animal—for the sermocinatio that is the “coloquio de los perros”.59

5. A Tale of Hounds and Humans, by Hounds, for Humans: Animal Narration in “The Dogs’ Colloquy”

man alone of the animals possesses speech.

(Aristotle 1944, p. 11, I.i.10, 1253a)

A discursive struggle inscribed into the text, and directly pertinent to the question of animal narration, is the very fact of—in what is officially a Counter-Reformation context—endowing animals with a human form of articulation in the first place. As the Christian religion has a notoriously polyvalent relation to ‘speech’—in both its Jewish legacy (see the performative “fiat lux” in Gen 1:3; Vulgate) and the New Testament, blending the former with (Neo-)Platonizing inheritances via the polysemous Greek word ‘lógos’ (cf. spec. Jn 1:1)—granting animals a locutionary capacity might be problematic, could be seen to destabilize man’s primacy (cf. e.g., Gen 1:27–28, Mt 10:31), likely also in Salvation Historical respects.60 At the same time, Scripture’s last book (Apocalypsis) not only ‘opens the eyes’, but apparently also the mouths: at the end of days, “every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them” are said to praise the Lamb of God (Rev 5:13); “the four beasts” also speak (Rev 4:6–7, 6:1); likewise, the adversary one: “there was given unto him a mouth speaking great things and blasphemies” (Rev 13:5; cf. Dan 7:3–8, 11, 20, 25; KJV).61 While the possibility of animal locution (if taken literally) is thus inscribed into the tradition—hence conceivable generally speaking—it seems to be reserved for exceptional times, to say the least.

In its discursive climate of conception (with the Counter-Reformation well underway), the coloquio must therefore (seem to) employ several strategies of either mitigating what is likely to have been a discursively volatile matter; or of justifying the latter in (apparently) orthodox terms—hence these words, put into Berganza’s mouth: “I find myself enriched by this divine gift of speech [‘deste divino don de la habla’]”; also implicitly equating speech with life (in an orthodox acceptation): “this gift [‘bien’] […], which I consider to be something on loan [‘prestado’]” (Cervantes 2016b, p. 453; Cervantes 2002a, p. 301).62 Mirroring Campuzano’s strategy, both dogs accentuate their (textually) factual caninity, and that they will exploit their kairós, while deprioritizing its causative:

there’s no reason for the two of us to start arguing [‘disputar’] about how or why we’re talking. […] let us take advantage [‘aprovecharnos’] of this happy situation, and talk all night […] I intend to enjoy myself and take advantage [‘gozarle y aprovecharme’] of it [sc. this gift of speech] as much as I can[.]

(Cervantes 2016b, p. 453; Cervantes 2002a, p. 301); cf. (Hart 1979, p. 383)

Analogously to the ensign’s aforesaid assertion of his sensory perception, Berganza declares:

I […] believe that everything we’ve undergone up to this point, and what we’re undergoing right now, is a dream [‘todo (…) es sueño’], and that we are, in fact, dogs. But let us not for all that refrain from enjoying [‘gozar’] this gift of speech which we have been given, and the exceeding excellence of possessing human powers of reason, for as long as we possibly can.

(Cervantes 2016b, p. 499; Cervantes 2002a, p. 347)

The extratextual recipient might take a structurally equivalent stance (at a metalevel): while animal narrators are not exactly likely, this need not deter the reader from deriving some benefit from the text, whether in terms of delectare, movere, docere (or otherwise)—with the colloquy accommodating each and all of these potential approaches (Einstellungen).63 In the present case, the function of delectare (the enjoyment promised) envelops that of docere (the message conveyed); while the latter is apparently not how the intratextual reader (Peralta) peruses the novella, (present-day) extratextual recipients may tend to focus particularly on the socio-moral, historico-cultural, epistemological, or zoopoetic—cf. (Derrida 2002, p. 374)—information simultaneously imparted.64

In line therewith, scrutinizing the dialog’s intratextual situation of communication is needful.65 In many passages, the referential and emotive functions dominate textually (Berganza narrating observations, experiences).66 Whenever Scipio is speaking, the conative function tends to be in the forefront; several (interactive) sections feature metalingual, metapoetic assessments—including those where the dogs speak about their surprise at being capable of speech (partly, this involves the phatic function).67 Typically a source of pleasure for the recipient, the poetic function subtly prevails throughout (to a greater degree in the highly rhetoricized original).68 This is decisive, since (at a metalevel) a text’s poeticity integrates with its discursive dynamics in several respects: “poeticalness is not a supplementation of discourse with rhetorical adornment but a total reevaluation of the discourse and of all its components whatsoever” (Jakobson 1987a, p. 93). In Cervantes’ case, this is particularly pertinent in terms of assorted (poetically functionalized) echoes, inversions, frequent equivalences at the structural level—including (narratological) mise en abyme, recurring discursive latencies, forms of notional suspension with a tendency to produce various effects of irony.69

6. Concerning Cynicism: ‘Diogenes the Dog’ and the Cervantine Canines

no en el sentido alegórico, sino en el literal

(Cervantes 2002a, p. 347)

todo cuanto decimos es murmurar.

(Cervantes 2002a, p. 321)

A self-reflexively rhetorical dimension is woven into the text itself.70 In a respective approach, it is requisite to describe what is stated (de dicto, de re)—and, more intricately, what could have been, but is not. In a context referring to inventio, sermocinatio (qua device in terms of tractatio), and aiming at crafting an effect of plausibility, Campuzano claims:

The things they talked about [‘trataron’] were important and diverse [‘grandes y diferentes’], and more aptly debated [‘tratadas’] by wise men [‘varones sabios’] than spoken out of the mouths of dogs [‘dichas por bocas de perros’]. So that, since I could never have made up [‘inventar’] these utterances on my own, I have come to believe [‘vengo a creer’], in spite of myself and against my better judgment [‘contra mi opinión’], that I have not been dreaming [‘soñaba’], and that the dogs have been, in fact, talking.

(Cervantes 2016a, p. 445; Cervantes 2002b, p. 294)71

At the metalevel, the choice has been precisely for dogs speaking ‘wisely’ (literally: to and with each other, in their capacity as canines, and in what is, to their knowledge, an ‘intraspecies’ colloquy)—and not for other, equally conceivable entities (else one might as well think of two owls, horses, or elephants); it is a discourse historically motivated selection, as the following will demonstrate.72

A recent translator of the Exemplary Novellas labels four of them—including “The Glasswork Graduate”, “The Deceitful Marriage”, “The Dogs’ Colloquy”—“darker”, “gloomier narratives” (Cervantes 2016c, p. 431).73 Typifying the protagonist of the first as “[a] thoroughly disillusioned pessimist” (Cervantes 2016c, p. 210), he avers—with (Forcione 1982, pp. 242–50)—the “destructive negativity of cynical philosophy” (Cervantes 2016c, p. 212).74 Reflecting a widespread attitude toward ‘cynicism’—cf. (Mayfield 2015, pp. 3–11)—such value judgments tend to arise from certain (personal, moral, notional) expectations, as per which something is then seen to fall short. While the gauge applied is naturally up to the respective reader’s proclivity, the above is not the only possible measure and assessment.

This essay takes as its point of reference the—distinctly transcultural—reception of the literary persona of ‘Diogenes the Dog’, which had already had a history of almost two millennia when the Cervantine “Coloquio” was published in 1613, culminating the Novelas ejemplares.75

A text’s discursive substratum—its structurally relevant, (partly) latent or express intertexts (a historico-culturally specific, even distinctive kind of code)—might be located at a metalevel of the rhetorical function of docere, and be conceived of as (conatively) directed at the extratextual recipient (metareferentially, metalingually, from a poetico-hermeneutic perspective).76 The process of reception can (and typically does) take place without attention being paid to this additional plane—just as one might enter a house without knowing its ground plan. In other words: a literal level—at which, for instance, textual canines are (semiotically) portrayed and (virtually) received in their capacity as dogs—can coexist with other planes simultaneously present (among them the discursive).77 Even so, knowledge of the structural, “architextual” (Kohlhauer 2002, p. 60; trans. dsm; cf. p. 81) level tends to initiate a reassessment of the overall (semiotic) edifice by adding (exegetic) nuances, disclosing other potential points of view. Such is the objective of the ensuing synopsis, providing the discourse historical groundwork for the colloquy’s (partly oblique) references to cynicism.78

D. Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers were brought from Constantinople in the early fifteenth century, translated into Latin within the first half thereof, available in print by the 1470s, and widely circulated.79 Well-known Diogenical matter had already been prevalent throughout Europe in the Medieval Latin Gesta Romanorum, the Spanish Bocados de oro.80 While the (infinitizable) sentences and anecdotes in such compilations invite ‘reallocation’ by their very form, Machiavelli’s refunctionalization of dicta—extracted from D. Laertius, employed in La vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca (~1520)—is particularly noteworthy.81 It might be signaled by the mention of “Florence” and “Lucca” in the Cervantine novella “The Glasswork Graduate” (Cervantes 2016d, pp. 216–17)—precisely in a text performing a structurally equivalent reallocation of sayings with a cynical slant.82 In terms of genre, the coloquio’s frequently (and in part explicitly) satirical thrust additionally reinforces its ties to cynical discourses—the latter having been dependably linked particularly to the Menippea since Antiquity.83

Everyone knows this anecdote: “He [sc. ‘Diogenes’] lit a lamp in broad daylight and said, as he went about, ‘I am looking for a man’” (D. Laertius 2005, p. 43, VI.41).84 It is decidedly refunctionalized in “The Deceitful Marriage”:

two dogs […] go around at night with the brothers of the Order of St. John of God, lighting the way with a pair of lanterns [‘lanternas’]. […] if perchance someone tosses alms out of a window, […] the dogs go up to it right away, shedding light [‘alumbrar’] with their lanterns, to see what has fallen. And they tend to stop in front of the windows which they know [‘saben’] to be places where people are in the habit of [‘tienen costumbre de’] giving them alms [‘darles limosna’]. And out on the street like that, the two dogs behave so meekly [‘mansedumbre’] that they seem [‘parecen’] more like lambs [‘corderos’] than dogs; back in the hospital, however, they are veritable lions [‘leones’], protecting [‘guardando’] the building with extreme care and vigilance [‘cuidado y vigilancia’].

(Cervantes 2016a, pp. 443–44; Cervantes 2002b, p. 293)85

A comparison with the terse Diogenical anecdote, attention to the discursive implications conveyed by contrast, are needful, as the above sets the scene for all that follows in terms of animal narration in the coloquio—hence also for a potential reception in this respect.86 Initially, one might log the alterations: midday vs. night, ostensively undue or prodigal vs. functional employment of (artificial) sources of light, apparently gratuitous vs. conducive, purposive objective, resplendent futility of endeavor vs. attainment. Asking for alms is also part of the agenda dependably attached to the arch-Cynic’s literary persona since Antiquity—as in this notorious instance: “He once begged alms of a statue, and, when asked why he did so, replied, ‘To get practice in being refused’” (D. Laertius 2005, p. 51, VI.49).87 The tendency differs considerably from that of the Cervantine canines; their collecting of alms is set in a Christian—socio-morally sanctioned, rather than willful (even frivolous)—context.

Regarding their intratextual portrayal, these specific dogs—in their textual capacity as animals—are here markedly (re)functionalized by human beings: as organico-technical mélanges (body, lantern); as ambulant luminaries, characterized by a knowledge of human habits (later presented as capable of articulating the like). In material, metaphorical, and abstract terms (all of which are simultaneously present textually), both aspects appear as leitmotifs of the following coloquio: ‘to shed light on’, focusing on sight and ken (by figurative extension); ‘to know customs’, accentuating a retentive faculty (among other things).88

From an intertextual perspective, their characterization is clearly informed by a Christian ground swell, as the catchwords “meekly” and “lambs” indicate (immediately perceived by anyone in that discourse historical climate): “Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth” (Mt 5:5; KJV); “Bienaventurados los mansos: porque ellos recibirán la tierra por heredad” (RVA). “I send you forth as lambs among wolves” (Lk 10:3; KJV); “yo os envío como corderos en medio de lobos” (RVA).

This discursive setting is melded with another venerable point of reference. The discussion of the guardians (phýlakes) in Plato’s Politeía—here (Plato 2013, pp. 182–91, II, 374e–376c; see pp. 314–19, III, 410c–411d), cf. (Ziolkowski 1983, p. 96), (Kohlhauer 2002, pp. 58, 58n., 71, 74–75)—seeks a literally natural occurrence coalescing (inward) affability (towards familiars) and (outward) aggression (against externals): “they [sc. the guardians] must be amenable [‘práous’] toward their own people, but intractable [‘chalepoús’] against their enemies” (Plato 2013, pp. 184–85, II, 375c); and heuristically encounters it in the factual conduct of canines:

Where shall we find a gentle and stouthearted [‘praon kaì megalóthymon’] character together? […] surely gentleness of nature and strong spirits are opposing qualities. […] Yet whichever of these qualities you removed, the result would never be a good guardian [‘phýlax agathòs’]. […] there are natural dispositions […] which have these opposing qualities. […] We may see it in other animals [‘állois zóois’], not least in the one we compared to our guardian. I’m sure you know about dogs with good breeding [‘ton gennaíon kynon’]: that their character [‘ethos’] is naturally to be able to be most friendly to those they are used to and recognize, but the opposite with those they don’t know. […] Then this is possible […] and we are not looking for our guardian to be the type that contradicts nature [‘ou parà phýsin’]. […] he who is going to be watchful [‘ho phylakikòs’] still lacks something: in addition to being strong-spirited, he must be naturally interested in philosophy[.] […] You will also see this in dogs, something that deserves our admiration in the animal. […] at the sight of someone unknown to it, it becomes aggressive, even if it hasn’t had an adverse experience before. But whoever it sees that it recognizes, it welcomes them even if it has never been treated well by that person […] this natural instinct of the animal makes it seem clever [‘kompsón’] and truly a philosopher [‘alethos philósophon’] […] in that it distinguishes what it sees as either friendly or hostile [‘phílen kaì echthràn’], by no other means than being familiar with the one and not recognizing the other. Yet how could it not be eager to learn[,] when it can distinguish by what it knows and what it does not know what belongs to its world [‘oikeion’] and what is alien [‘allótrion’] to it? […] is [not] passion for knowledge [‘philomathès’] the same thing as the passion for wisdom [‘philósophon’]? […] In that case, let’s […] apply it to mankind as well.

(Plato 2013, pp. 186–89, II, 375c–376b)89

Again, the Cervantine text—staging the hospital’s environment as a quasi-micro-pólis—provides a catchword, “guardando” (Cervantes 2002b, p. 293) to support the signaling of this intertext, echoed at several levels (semantic, structural) in the coloquio.90 In both Plato and Cervantes, the respective dogs are textual canines, but precisely in their capacity as animals; the recipient is to (and likely will) visualize virtual dogs, based on her experience with tangible, olfactible ones. Even so, the necessary presence of this literal level does not signify that—at the discursive level concurrently present—the natural, factually observable conduct of dogs could not also have further implications (as is the case in both texts). In other words: not only does a discursive reading not efface the literal plane; but the former actually depends on the latter.

Regarding the incorporation of apparent opposites, another Scriptural dictum literally tying in with the above is crucial: “I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves” (Mt 10:16; KJV); “yo os envío como á ovejas en medio de lobos: sed pues prudentes como serpientes, y sencillos como palomas” (RVA).91 While, at a literal level, the familiarly canine (shepherding) function of fending off wolves will later feature in the coloquio—see (Cervantes 2002a, pp. 305–11, spec. 310–11), with Berganza wearing “el collar de Leoncillo”, standing in for the defunct dog so named (p. 306)—the serpentine–columbine prodigy, which Christ’s dictum counsels, is replaced by alluding to the alloy of ‘lion’ and ‘lamb’ that another Scriptural passage employs to portray Christ Himself (see Rev 5:5–6).92

Likewise, it is needful to note that Epictetus’ diatribes—specifically (Epictetus 1928b, pp. 130–69, III.22)—had already refunctionalized the Platonic ‘guardian–watchdog’ analogization to textually housetrain unruly Cynics, particularly with the aim of Stoicizing the image otherwise conveyed of the ‘Diogenes’ persona.93 The Epictetian discourse employs the equation ‘Cynic (from ‘kýon’) qua scout and guardian’ in a literalized fashion, thereby deriving an itemized occupational profile and targeted mission statement for his Stoicized ‘Cynicism’:

Man, the Cynic has made all mankind his children […] in that spirit he approaches them all and cares for them all. Or do you fancy that it is in the spirit of idle impertinence he reviles those he meets? It is as a father he does it, as a brother, and as a servant of Zeus, who is Father of us all.

(Epictetus 1928b, p. 159, III.22); cf. (Mayfield 2015, p. 65)

above all, the Cynic’s governing principle should be purer than the sun; if not, he must needs be a gambler and a man of no principle, because he will be censuring the rest of mankind, while he himself is involved in some vice.

(Epictetus 1928b, p. 163, III.22); cf. (Mayfield 2015, p. 69)

the true Cynic […] must know that he has been sent by Zeus to men, partly as a messenger [‘ángelos’], in order to show them that in questions of good and evil they have gone astray […]; and partly […] as a scout [‘katáskopos’]. For the Cynic is truly a scout, to find out what things are friendly to men and what hostile; and he must first do his scouting accurately, and on returning must tell the truth[.]

(Epictetus 1928b, pp. 136–39, III.22); cf. (D. Laertius 2005, pp. 44–45, VI.43); (Mayfield 2015, pp. 69–73)94

Displaying a monodirectional, didactico-moralizing impetus, an assertive air of authority, the Stoic thus tries to impose his view of how matters should be. With differences in tone and semblances in tendency, the Cervantine coloquio features the ensuing agenda:

You think gossiping [‘murmurar’, implying harm done: ‘slandering’, ‘maligning’, ‘censuring’] is the same as philosophizing [‘filosofar’]? There you go! Canonize it, […] Berganza, that cursed plague of gossip [‘la maldita plaga de la murmuración’], and give it whatever name you like, and that will give us a reputation for being cynics [‘cínicos’], which is the same as saying ‘gossip-mongering dogs’ [‘perros murmuradores’].

(Cervantes 2016b, p. 471; Cervantes 2002a, p. 319)

The translation of “murmurar”, “murmuración”, “murmuradores” as “gossip” seems infelicitous, here; for such arguably mitigates the term’s impact, obscuring the import of the discursive reference to the history of reception and various refunctionalizations of cynicism.95 The damage (potentially) done by the tongue—“speaking ill” (“decir mal”)—is a leitmotif throughout (Cervantes 2016b, p. 466; Cervantes 2002a, p. 315).96 Moreover, such forms of articulation are stably attached to cynicism from its outset, due to the contumelious conduct of the arch-Cynic ‘Diogenes’: “He was great at pouring scorn on his contemporaries” (D. Laertius 2005, p. 27, VI.24).97

Apparently in accord with the discursive climate of its conception, the “Colloquy” has Berganza link injurious words and deeds to the doctrine of Original Sin: “wrong-doing and speaking ill [‘hacer y decir mal’] are things inherited from our first parents [‘nuestros primeros padres’], that we lap up with our mothers’ milk” (Cervantes 2016b, p. 466; Cervantes 2002a, p. 315; cf. pp. 342, 344).98 Ostensively in line with the official Counter-Reformation agenda and its universal(ist) claim, this Catholic reading is then also applied to (a particular conception of) secular philosophy (words put in Scipio’s mouth):

Beware, Berganza, lest that urge to philosophize [‘esa gana de filosofar’] you say has come over you be some temptation sent to you by the devil. Because slander [‘murmuración’] has no better veil for glossing over and covering up its dissolute wickedness [‘su maldad disoluta’] than the slanderer’s [‘murmurador’] giving to understand that everything he says is a matter of philosophical opinion [‘sentencias de filósofos’], and that speaking ill [‘decir mal’] amounts to moral censure [‘reprehensión’], and revealing [‘descubrir’] other people’s flaws [‘defetos’] is only righteous zeal. And there is no slanderer [‘murmurante’] whose life, if you consider and scrutinize it, is not full of vice [‘vicios’] and contempt for others [‘insolencias’].

(Cervantes 2016b, p. 469; Cervantes 2002a, p. 318)

After a section chastising the ostentatious, non-pertinent, erroneous use of Latin for purposes of signaling erudition—see (Cervantes 2002a, pp. 318–19)—Scipio offers the abovequoted reproof, cautioning against gaining a reputation for being “cínicos” qua “perros murmuradores” (p. 319).

Despite several attempts—including later ones, especially since the Enlightenment, see (Mayfield 2015, pp. 3–11, 66–75)—the Stoicized version of the ‘Cynic’ could not succeed. By contrast, the Cervantine take is still very much present comparatively—also due to several literary allusions, adaptations.99 The variance between the Epictetian and the Cervantine strategy of reshaping the cynic’s image is directly tied to their discursive tendency and communicational situation—hence also of narratological import. “I wouldn’t want us to sound like preachers”, Berganza asserts; and when he admonishes “all [that] sounds like preaching, Scipio”, the latter replies: “So it seems to me, so I shall remain silent” (Cervantes 2016b, p. 463).100 Whereas the Stoic imperatively scolds and dogmatically lectures his intratextually explicit audience, the Cervantine coloquio’s “contrapuntal” (Díaz-Plaja 1968, p. 110; trans. dsm), decidedly dialogic, dynamically polydirectional disposition permits the implicit (intra-, extratextual) addressees to follow the verbally staged contentions in utramque partem—see (Forcione 1984, pp. 179, 186, 228)—the articulated and (virtually) embodied ‘intraspecies’ altercation between the two canines, in the manner of their choice: be it primarily for purposes of pleasure (delectare), of edification (docere), or for effecting an emotionally responsive state of mind (movere); be it as a piece of epideictic rhetoric (the genus demonstrativum, chiefly in its variant of blaming rather than praising), an (implicit) exhortation (based on a scene featuring several voices, as in the genus deliberativum), an indictment of contemporary society (qua infinitized ‘lawsuit’, pertaining to the genus iudiciale); be it as a secular confession, an extended fable, a (Menippean, carnivalesque) satire or dialogic diatribe, a novela picaresca, a meta-dialog, a metalingual or metapoetical treatise; be it as a socio-historically, epistemologically informative, zoopoetically plausible narrative (simultaneously encouraging and facilitating the taking of other perspectives); be it still, or altogether, otherwise.101

7. ‘Against the Dog only a Dog’: Talking Canines Humanizing Cynicism

qué quiere decir filosofía; que aunque yo la nombro, no sé lo que es;

sólo me doy a entender que es cosa buena.

(Cervantes 2002a, p. 320)

Rhetorical techniques of indirection (especially such as pertain to a multiplication, interlacing of narrative levels) are prevalent in the Cervantine œuvre overall—and also in the novellas at hand.102 Rather than lecturing the addressee by itemizing how the human Cynic must be and act, the coloquio’s two dogs talk—as textual canines—about how they are and behave in (literary) fact: a vivid, virtually actual embodiment of the etymological root of the word ‘cynic’ (‘kýon’)—rather than a human being observing and adopting animal traits, with ‘Diogenes’ being dubbed a ‘dog’ due to his flagrantly crude conduct.103 Via the contrast of Berganza’s (articulated) bearing (as a literal canine) to that on the part of the humans in his narrated lifeworld, the reader—taking the textual dog’s perspective at a metalevel—may have a tendency to side with the colloquy’s canine approach as represented by this interlocutor in the dialog.104 In this indirect way, the persona of a human cynic (generally conceived) is implicitly (at the discursive level) reshaped by a textually literal recourse to the very animal that provided the name in the first place—a complex situation of (partly latent) discursive remodeling that relies precisely on (the recipient’s appresentation of) the dogs textually present in their capacity as animals.

Echoing the framework narrative’s account concerning the apparently renowned conduct of the clinic’s canines, the ensuing tenders Berganza’s perspective, describing his (view of his) canine performance within the colloquy’s (virtual) world:

one night, seeing you [‘viéndote’] carrying a lantern [‘llevar la linterna’] in the company of that good Christian, Mahudes, I perceived you to be contented, virtuous, and engaged in pious actions [‘contento y justa y santamente ocupado’]. And, full of righteous envy [‘buena envidia’], I sought to follow in your footsteps [‘quise seguir tus pasos’], and with this laudable intention I presented myself to Mahudes, who straightaway chose me to be your companion and brought me to this hospital.

(Cervantes 2016b, p. 507; Cervantes 2002a, p. 355)105

Concurrently present with the (socio-historically, zoopoetically plausible) literal plane, the concept of (visually induced) imitatio appears to be patent at a discursive level.106 The dogs, as animals, seem ‘humanized’ (qua process)—especially Berganza. Still, he is not presented (respectively: does not represent himself) as an idealized specimen—even after joining the hospital crew.107 Throughout his (narrated) life, he often acts in not exactly ethical ways: partly (and plausibly) due to his factually canine nature—see (Schmauser 1996, pp. 78–79); in part because his behavior as animal always seems influenced by human (while not strictly humane) conduct—with the doctrinal root of this (‘fallen’) state of affairs being explicit.108 Even so, Berganza’s actions are humanized (at a metalevel) in that he does not partake in ‘man’s inhumanity’—on account of his kind caninity (as commonly conceived); and since he ties in with human(ist) values otherwise (considered) inaccessible to an animal, such as moral philosophical musings of the following nature: “premeditated vengeance bespeaks cruelty and a spiteful disposition” (Cervantes 2016b, p. 506).109

From a meta-perspective, Berganza is neither portrayed as an utterly deprived, all but depraved, and then (partially) reformed ‘pícaro’—nor as an idealized sage in canine skin. Rather, he is presented in terms of a conceivable ‘errare caninum est’: a flawed, ultimately considerate animal quasi rationale, concurrently capable of aggressive and gentle conduct—precisely as Plato’s ‘Socrates’ had envisioned the guardians of his pólis by heuristically tying in with an apparent coincidence of opposites occurring naturally in the observable behavior of dogs (precisely in their capacity as animals). Alleviating its rigor, the Cervantine version outperforms the Epictetian reformulation of the Cynic by rendering the cynical Berganza a dog in fact—a decidedly down-to-earth one, with visible defects in accord with the current discursive climate (Original Sin, affecting nature as a whole).110 While still ‘only’ barking (a literal dog in his own narrative), Berganza is forced to keep his observations to himself; not speaking the human tongue, he is naturally unable to gradually alter or somewhat alleviate (say, by introducing laws) the state of affairs—the human condition—he witnesses:

since it was easier for me to perceive all these things than to reform them, I decided not to pay any attention to them. I therefore sought refuge in a sanctuary, as so many do when they renounce vices when they can no longer practice them, although it’s better late than never.

(Cervantes 2016b, pp. 506–7)111

While freely admitting to his shortcomings and not abandoning his canine nature, Berganza (at the literal level, in his textually natural capacity qua dog) does indeed do his part throughout (not only at the hospital)—mostly (alleging that he is) acting more ‘humanely’ (in a humanist acceptation) than ostensive ‘humans’ (in the textual realm he crafts in his capacity as narrator, and by way of his narrative).112 Even so (one might conjecture, at a metalevel), a human being—while not able to give up its flawed nature (in the orthodox view)—may play its part for the time being.

As the extensive history of reception concerning Diogenical matter evinces, all of the manifold attempts at moralizing—civilizing, humanizing, housebreaking—that apparently feral ‘kýon’ ultimately proved feckless: always, the appealingly appalling mélange that is cynicism—its skillful contumely, its refined disrespect, its elegant indelicacy in stance and statement, see (Mayfield 2015, pp. 1, 12–13, 53–55, 98n., 109, 390n.)—has effectively outshone and outdone any Epictetus or Enlightenment representative (much less any more recent attempters) as might have felt it incumbent on themselves to muzzle the matter.113 For ‘parrhesía’ (‘saying it all’, freedom of speech) remains ‘the most appealing thing among men’—as ‘Diogenes’ is said to have asserted.114 After more than two millennia, the Cervantine coloquio—specifically its character Berganza, semiotically present as a literal canine, and (all but inevitably) appresented as such by the recipient—is arguably still the closest any text has come in terms of pitting a (discursively) functional opponent against the persona of the arch-Cynic: ‘nemo contra Canem nisi canis ipse’, ‘against the Dog only a dog’.115