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Article
Peer-Review Record

Bungen—An East Asian Philosophy of Culture in Terms of Intercultural Interactions and a Reinterpretation of Watsuji’s Concept of Aidagara

Humanities 2024, 13(6), 143; https://doi.org/10.3390/h13060143
by Andrew Ka Pok Tam
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3: Anonymous
Humanities 2024, 13(6), 143; https://doi.org/10.3390/h13060143
Submission received: 14 August 2024 / Revised: 16 October 2024 / Accepted: 18 October 2024 / Published: 23 October 2024
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Space Between: Landscape, Mindscape, Architecture)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The author’s project of applying the concept of aidagara to investigate intercultural interactions is a worthy and original. The paper provides in depth research, and I believe that the topic warrants publication. Some of the finer points of the author’s argument could be revised for greater clarity, precision, and concreteness.

 

While I enjoyed reading the paper and could enumerate many positive contributions it makes, below are mainly some criticisms and suggestions for improvement.

 

The author’s suspension of Watsuji’s ontology is problematic since aidagara may be understood as an ontological notion at its root, and the discussion directly following this, from line 329 to 378, is rather weak. The author advances some interesting thoughts, but the argument is inconclusive and doesn’t add anything necessary to the overall thesis. Perhaps instead of exploring the source of normativity and questions about Watsuji’s collectivism, the author could give more of an explanation of how Watsuji’s concept of aidagara can accommodate both substance (Christian) and non-substantive (Buddhist) ontologies. Also, the supposed dialect of the individual and multiplicity of members within a society, which the author refers to as a duality, could use more clarification in the context of this section.  

 

In section 4, both the words “bugen” and “bungen” are used. Since the author is creating a new term, careful attention to the spelling should be paid to avoid confusing the reader.

 

I disagree with the author’s claims that bungen is active and fudo passive, and that two cultures coming into relation are “equal” (lines 407-409). In the era of climate change, fudo continuous to exert heavy influence over cultures. When considering the dynamics of colonization, in which one culture exercises hegemonic power, the colonizer and the colonized can hardly be consider equal even if they have some degree of cultural exchange between them. I think something needs to be said about the power dynamics between affect their ability to have “bungen.” I also think that it is problematic to separate out different spheres of aidagara (like nature, culture, God), which, in my interpretation of Watsuji, are co-constitutive of the climatic milieu of our shared world-space.

 

Also, the author’s discussion of the dialogical nature of cultural exchange as recounted through Han’s model does not address how cultures can “listen” and “speak” apart from the actions of individual members. This is vaguely touched on through the reference to Saussure (line 447), but more clarification of this problem is needed. This a major shortcoming since it is so central to the paper’s main argument.

 

It is unclear what Figure 1 means to illustrate.

 

The 1., 2., 3., lists of how cultural assimilation may take place in section 4 strikes me as a bit facile. I would recommend replacing this type of formula with a more robust discussion of the complexities of the real examples of cross-cultural encounters discussed toward the end of that section.

 

The reference to Hegelian spirit appears only at the beginning of the paper. Given that it never comes again, I question using Hegel as part of the framing of the issue. Perhaps the author could tie Hegel’s notion of spirit back into the discussion if it is indeed relevant.   

Comments on the Quality of English Language

The English language usage in this paper is very good. There are some minor word choice and grammar issues that an editor can easily fix. 

Author Response

While the reviewer asks for “an explanation of how Watsuji’s concept of aidagara can accommodate both substance (Christian) and non-substantive (Buddhist) ontologies”, the citation (tam 2022, 355) has already explained: only examines the rise of a particular consciousness, e.g. the encounter of coldness leads to the rise of the self-consciousness of feeling cold and the encounter of another culture leads to the rise of the self-consciousness of knowing another culture. But whether there is a fundamental self existing before the existence of the self-feeling cold or the self-knowing of another culture is unknown—Christian accounts say yes while Buddhist accounts say no, but this paper does not aim to take a side in this ontological debate.

 

The reviewer disagrees with the categorisation of different kinds of aidagara. However, it is necessary to classify different kinds of aidagara, which consist of different aspects of Ningen sonzai. Gorin originally represented five relationships. The passivity of Fudo specifically refers to the context of communication: that Fudo cannot speak languages. An explanatory footnote is added.

Decolonisation is out of the scope of discussion in this paper. The case study of the ritual controversy in the early Qing dynasty is before the entrance of colonial powers to China; this paper aims to provide an epistemic narration of how intercultural dialogues can be undertaken and a normative principle how they can be maintained, but not a criticism of any form of “colonialism”.

A detailed elaboration of Saussure’s speaking circuit in intercultural communication is added, with new diagrams illustrating the complexity of linking different circuits.

This paper introduces Hegel in the beginning and only aims to explain the reason why New Confucians and the Kyoto School are cultural essentialists; criticising Hegel is out of the scope of this paper and should be done by research in future.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

First, I'm not sure many of the romanized Japanese words need to be capitalized. Bungen is one example. 

Second, verb tenses need to be checked. The last sentence of the main body is an example here. It should read "... the theory of Bungen explains ..." not 
"explain."

Finally, in the references, is something missing for lines 2 & 4? And for line 16, the reference to Hegel is run together with his initials. Line 14 has similar problems. Please be careful here. 

Comments on the Quality of English Language

First, I'm not sure many of the romanized Japanese words need to be capitalized. Bungen is one example. 

Second, verb tenses need to be checked. The last sentence of the main body is an example here. It should read "... the theory of Bungen explains ..." not 
"explain."

Finally, in the references, is something missing for lines 2 & 4? And for line 16, the reference to Hegel is run together with his initials. Line 14 has similar problems. Please be careful here. 

Author Response

The typo of Bugen is edited—the correct spelling is Bungen. Bungen and Ningen should be capitalised as they have a sense of “wholeness”: they refer to the comprehensive picture of culture and human existence, and their status in Watsuji’s philosophy is similar to “Being” in Heidegger’s philosophy. However, in most English secondary literature, “aidagara” is not capitalised because it is more like an “element” constructing Ningen rather than a “whole”. All other typos and missing references are edited or deleted.

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is an interesting effort to threat the needle by exploring tensions between "essentialists" and "non-essentialists,"  the author seems inclined towards essentialism as resistance to cultural imperialism.  But his solution--Watsuji's aidagara applied to cultures as "Bungen" (there are some typos where this is rendered as "Bu-gen", not Bun-gen)--creates a kind of culturally essentialism through its language mode itself.  What I mean is, why not translate Bungen as "interculturality", which it what it strikes me as being?  Then, you could connect it to Joseph Ratzinger's critique of cultural essentialism (even in the form of inculturation, where cultures are deemed static but religions are historically conditioned) and suggestion instead of "interculturality" (where cultures interact and new forms of culture result).  To argue for a kind of non-essentialism through essentialist use of language (eg. Bungen, Ningen) is counterproductive to the great potential of the author's argument.  

Comments on the Quality of English Language

The English seems fine, over all.  Some minor typos (see above) and a few places where an editor's hand would be welcome.  But nothing too serious.

Author Response

My position is not “essentialist”; instead, this paper tries to propose a new perspective outside of the dichotomy between essentialism and non-essentialism. I only describe how New Confucians and the Kyoto School employ “essentialism as resistance to cultural imperialism”, and I have indicated their limitations.

Since I cannot find direct quotation from Ratzinger directly criticising cultural essentialism, I only add a Catholic interpreter’s comment.

Interculturality is not a good word because it still assumes the existence of A and B precedes that of the relationship between A and B.

Bungen, as an aidagara, is reversed: it suggests that the existence of the relationship between A and B precedes those of A and B.

Bungen and Ningen are neither essentialist nor non-essentialist terms and I do not know why reviewer 3 regarded them as essentialist terms. Unlike Nishida, Watsuji is not an essentialist, although Tam failed to distinguish Watsuji’s non-essentialist position from Nishida in (Tam 2020).

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