Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Previous Research
3. The Argument
- (1)
- The outcome xi equals the agent’s effort ei plus a normally distributed error(e.g., xi = ei + εi, for i = 1, 2, … n) and the errors εi are independent with variance v;
- (2)
- the agent’s cost of effort is quadratic(e.g., C(e1, e2, … en) = (1/2ce1)2 + (1/2ce2)2 + … (1/2cen)2); and
- (3)
- the principals are all risk-neutral, but the agent’s risk aversion is r.
4. Examples of IGO Influence on National Governments
5. Research Design
5.1. Dependent Variables
5.2. Independent Predictors of Interest
5.3. Control Variables
6. Results
Robustness Checks
7. Discussion
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Afghanistan | Albania | Algeria | Andorra | Angola |
Antigua and Barbuda | Argentina | Armenia | Australia | Austria |
Azerbaijan | The Bahamas | Bahrain | Bangladesh | Barbados |
Belarus | Belgium | Belize | Benin | Bhutan |
Bolivia | Bosnia-Herzegovina | Botswana | Brazil | Brunei |
Bulgaria | Burkina Faso | Burundi | Cambodia | Cameroon |
Canada | Cape Verde | Central African Republic | Chad | Chile |
China | Colombia | Comoros | Congo, Dem. Rep. | Congo, Rep. |
Costa Rica | Cote D’Ivoire | Croatia | Cuba | Cyprus |
Czech Republic | Denmark | Djibouti | Dominica | Dominican Republic |
Ecuador | Egypt, Arab Rep. | El Salvador | Equatorial Guinea | Eritrea |
Estonia | Ethiopia | Fiji | Finland | France |
Gabon | Gambia | Georgia | Germany | Ghana |
Guyana | Haiti | Honduras | Hungary | Iceland |
India | Indonesia | Iran, Islamic Rep. | Iraq | Ireland |
Israel | Italy | Jamaica | Japan | Jordan |
Kazakhstan | Kenya | Kiribati | Korea, Dem. Rep. | Korea, Rep. |
Kuwait | Kyrgyz Republic | Kyrgyzstan | Lebanon | Lesotho |
Liberia | Libya | Liechtenstein | Luxembourg | Macedonia |
Marshall Islands | Mauritania | Mauritius | Mexico | Moldova |
Mongolia | Morocco | Mozambique | Myanmar | Namibia |
Nepal | Netherlands | New Zealand | Nicaragua | Niger |
Nigeria | Norway | Oman | Pakistan | Palau |
Panama | Papua New Guinea | Paraguay | Peru | Philippines |
Poland | Portugal | Qatar | Republic of Yemen | Romania |
Russian Federation | Rwanda | Saint Lucia | San Marino | Sao Tome & Principe |
Saudi Arabia | Senegal | Serbia And Montenegro | Seychelles | Sierra Leone |
Singapore | Slovak Republic | Slovenia | Solomon Islands | Somalia |
South Africa | Spain | Sri Lanka | St. Vincent | Sudan |
Suriname | Swaziland | Sweden | Switzerland | Syrian Arab Republic |
Tajikistan | Tanzania | Thailand | Togo | Tonga |
Trinidad and Tobago | Tunisia | Turkey | Turkmenistan | Uganda |
Ukraine | United Arab Emirates | United Kingdom | United States | Uruguay |
Uzbekistan | Vanuatu | Venezuela | Vietnam | Western Samoa |
Yemen, Rep. | Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. | Zaire | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
Mean | S.D. | Min | Max | |
---|---|---|---|---|
ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government | 0.56 | 0.23 | 0.04 | 1.00 |
Control of Corruption | −0.05 | 1.01 | −2.06 | 2.59 |
Government Effectiveness | −0.06 | 1.00 | −2.32 | 2.34 |
Political corruption | 0.48 | 0.27 | 0.01 | 0.94 |
Public sector corruption index | 0.48 | 0.30 | 0.01 | 0.97 |
Number of IGOs Country Participates | 49.2 | 23.6 | 1 | 150 |
Institutionalized Democracy | 3.99 | 4.22 | 0 | 10 |
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), log | 7.83 | 1.61 | 4.24 | 11.75 |
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | 9.66 | 13.52 | 0.00 | 88.05 |
Economic Globalization | 47.64 | 18.93 | 8.49 | 99.03 |
English Common Law | 0.18 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 |
Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.46 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
Number of IGOs Country Participates, 5-year Lag | Institutionalized Democracy | GDP per Capita (Constant 2005 US$), log | Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) | Economic Globalization | English Common Law | Ethnic Fractionalization | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Number of IGOs Country Participates, 5-year Lag | 1.00 | ||||||
Institutionalized Democracy | 0.21 | 1.00 | |||||
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), log | 0.18 | 0.59 | 1.00 | ||||
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | −0.07 | −0.40 | −0.11 | 1.00 | |||
Economic Globalization | 0.06 | 0.50 | 0.74 | 0.04 | 1.00 | ||
English Common Law | −0.05 | 0.14 | −0.07 | −0.00 | 0.07 | 1.00 | |
Ethnic Fractionalization | −0.14 | −0.25 | −0.45 | 0.33 | −0.25 | 0.28 | 1.00 |
The quality of government index (provided by the ICRG) is computed as the average value of three ICRG variables: Corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. It is scaled from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating a higher quality of government (Dahlberg et al. 2019). |
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1 | We use the terms quality of domestic government and quality of government interchangeably. |
2 | In addition to the loss in domestic accountability, which is our focus, there are many other closely related problems, including losses in representation, transparency, cost-efficiency, expediency, public participation in decision-making, the accountability of international organizations, and the democratic deficit. |
3 | For a review of this literature, see Lederman et al. (2005). |
4 | We use the terms “domestic politicians” and “national government” interchangeably. |
5 | Formally defined, in this context, “lower incentives” mean that the agent’s overall payoff would turn out to be relatively insensitive to the outcome (Laffont and Martimort 2009). |
6 | See “Measuring the Quality of Government and Subnational Variation” by the Quality of Government Institute: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1358/1358344_final-report---parts-1-3.pdf. |
7 | This index is included in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg. |
8 | These indicators and indicators of all control variables are provided by the QOG Institute (Dahlberg et al. 2019). |
9 | Varieties of Democracy Dataset (V-Dem) is a collaboration among more than 50 scholars worldwide, which is co-hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame, USA. For more details, see http://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/qog_std_jan17.pdf. Regressions using other measures of corruption compiled by the V-Democracy Project as dependent variables produce similar results. |
10 | In our data, there is only a weak correlation between the main independent variable, the total number of IGO memberships, and the control variables. The correlation matrix of all independent variables is reported in Appendix A Table A2. |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | Fixed Effects Model I | Fixed Effects Model II | Random Effects Model | GLS Model AR(1) |
Total Number of IGO Memberships, 5-year Lag | −0.0008 *** | −0.0005 ** | −0.0009 *** | −0.0004 *** |
(0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0002) | (0.0001) | |
Institutionalized Democracy | 0.003 ** | 0.005 *** | 0.003 *** | |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.0008) | ||
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), log | 0.06 *** | 0.07 *** | 0.06 *** | |
(0.02) | (0.008) | (0.005) | ||
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.0008 *** | |
(0.0005) | (0.0004) | (0.0002) | ||
Economic Globalization | −0.0005 | 0.001 ** | 0.0005 ** | |
(0.0004) | (0.0004) | (0.0002) | ||
British Legal Origin | 0.02 | 0.04 ** | ||
(0.02) | (0.01) | |||
Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.01 | −0.01 | ||
(0.05) | (0.03) | |||
Year | −0.004 *** | −0.003 *** | ||
(0.0006) | (0.0005) | |||
Dummies for Global Regions | Included | Included | ||
Constant | 0.5 *** | 0.1 | 8.1 *** | 5.1 *** |
(0.02) | (0.1) | (1.1) | (1.0) | |
Observations | 2650 | 2111 | 2079 | 2077 |
R-squared | 0.85 | 0.84 | ||
Number of Countries | 138 | 118 | 115 | 113 |
(5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | Control of Corruption 1996–2005 | Government Effectiveness 1996–2005 | Political Corruption 1985–2005 | Public Sector Corruption 1985–2005 |
Total Number of IGO Memberships, 5-year Lag | −0.002 ** | −0.001 ** | 0.0002 *** | 0.0002 *** |
(0.0006) | (0.0005) | (0.00004) | (0.00003) | |
Institutionalized Democracy | 0.03 *** | 0.03 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.008 *** |
(0.004) | (0.003) | (0.0005) | (0.0005) | |
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), log | 0.3 *** | 0.3 *** | −0.08*** | −0.07 *** |
(0.01) | (0.01) | (0.004) | (0.003) | |
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | −0.009 *** | −0.01 *** | 0.001 *** | 0.0009 *** |
(0.0010) | (0.0008) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | |
Economic Globalization | 0.01 *** | 0.008 *** | −0.0008 *** | −0.0003 *** |
(0.0010) | (0.0008) | (0.0001) | (0.00008) | |
British Legal Origin | 0.02 | 0.08 ** | −0.08 *** | −0.04 *** |
(0.03) | (0.03) | (0.006) | (0.007) | |
Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.03 | 0.2 ** | 0.1 *** | 0.04 ** |
(0.08) | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.02) | |
Year | −0.02 *** | −0.01 *** | 0.004 *** | 0.004 *** |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | |
Dummies for Global Regions | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Constant | 35 *** | 20 *** | −7.4 *** | −6.5 *** |
(4.7) | (4.3) | (0.5) | (0.5) | |
Observations | 875 | 875 | 2295 | 2295 |
Number of Countries | 129 | 129 | 125 | 125 |
(9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | Democratic Regimes (Electoral Democracy) | Non-Democratic Regimes | OECD | Non-OECD | Non-EU |
Total Number of IGO Memberships, 5-year Lag | −0.0003 ** | −0.001 *** | −0.0002 * | −0.001 *** | −0.0005 *** |
(0.0001) | (0.0002) | (0.0001) | (0.0002) | (0.0001) | |
Institutionalized Democracy | 0.003 | 0.0006 | 0.009 ** | 0.002 ** | 0.003 *** |
(0.002) | (0.0008) | (0.004) | (0.0009) | (0.0008) | |
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), log | 0.09 *** | 0.03 *** | 0.2 *** | 0.04 *** | 0.06 *** |
(0.007) | (0.007) | (0.02) | (0.006) | (0.005) | |
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | −0.0004 | −0.0007 *** | 0.0003 | −0.0008 *** | −0.0010 *** |
(0.0004) | (0.0002) | (0.0007) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | |
Economic Globalization | 0.001 *** | 0.0009 *** | 0.0007 * | 0.0006 ** | 0.0006 ** |
(0.0003) | (0.0003) | (0.0004) | (0.0003) | (0.0003) | |
British Legal Origin | 0.06 *** | 0.04 ** | 0.06 *** | 0.03 ** | 0.02 ** |
(0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.008) | |
Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.08 ** | −0.006 | −0.06 | 0.01 | 0.03 |
(0.03) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | |
Year | −0.005 *** | −0.002 ** | −0.006 *** | −0.002 ** | −0.003 *** |
(0.0006) | (0.0006) | (0.0008) | (0.0006) | (0.0005) | |
Dummies for Global Regions | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Constant | 8.7 *** | 3.4 * | 11 *** | 3.6 ** | 5.0 *** |
(1.2) | (1.2) | (1.5) | (1.3) | (0.9) | |
Observations | 1268 | 805 | 580 | 1497 | 1825 |
Number of Countries | 81 | 59 | 32 | 81 | 102 |
(14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
VARIABLES | Quality of Government 1985–2005 | Control of Corruption 1996–2005 | Government Effectiveness 1996–2005 | Political Corruption 1985–2005 | Public Sector Corruption 1985–2005 |
IMF, WTO and WB, 5-year Lag | −0.009 *** | 0.02 | −0.03 ** | 0.003 ** | 0.0009 |
(0.003) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.0008) | (0.0007) | |
All Other IGOs, 5-year Lag | −0.0004 ** | −0.002 ** | −0.002 ** | 0.0002 *** | 0.0001 *** |
(0.0001) | (0.0006) | (0.0005) | (0.00004) | (0.00003) | |
Institutionalized Democracy | 0.004 *** | 0.03 *** | 0.03 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.008 *** |
(0.0008) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.0005) | (0.0005) | |
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$), log | 0.06 *** | 0.3 *** | 0.3 *** | −0.08 *** | −0.06 *** |
(0.005) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) | −0.0008 *** | −0.009 *** | −0.01 *** | 0.001 *** | 0.0010 *** |
(0.0002) | (0.0009) | (0.0008) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | |
Economic Globalization | 0.0006 ** | 0.01 *** | 0.009 *** | −0.0008 *** | −0.0003 ** |
(0.0002) | (0.0010) | (0.0008) | (0.0001) | (0.00008) | |
English Common Law | 0.03 *** | 0.02 | 0.08 ** | −0.08 *** | −0.04 *** |
(0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.007) | (0.009) | |
Ethnic Fractionalization | −0.03 | 0.02 | 0.2 *** | 0.2 *** | 0.1 *** |
(0.02) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.02) | |
Year | −0.002 *** | −0.02 *** | −0.008 ** | 0.004 *** | 0.004 *** |
(0.0005) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.0002) | (0.0002) | |
Dummies for Global Regions | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Constant | 4.7 *** | 41 *** | 14 ** | −7.5 *** | −6.3 *** |
(1.0) | (5.6) | (5.1) | (0.5) | (0.5) | |
Observations | 2077 | 875 | 875 | 2295 | 2295 |
Number of Countries | 113 | 129 | 129 | 125 | 125 |
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Abouharb, M.R.; Cingranelli, D.; Filippov, M. Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance. Soc. Sci. 2019, 8, 139. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050139
Abouharb MR, Cingranelli D, Filippov M. Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance. Social Sciences. 2019; 8(5):139. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050139
Chicago/Turabian StyleAbouharb, M. Rodwan, David Cingranelli, and Mikhail Filippov. 2019. "Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance" Social Sciences 8, no. 5: 139. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050139