On the Strength of Weak Ties: Barriers to Political Expression Online

Abstract

This study explores how the structure of social networks (homogeneous/heterogeneous) and the quality of connections (strong/weak ties) are perceived to shape motivations and barriers to civic and political participation. Contrary to the prevailing view of the power of weak ties (as argued by Granovetter), this research highlights the opposite phenomenon, where weak ties are described by participants as inhibiting young adults from expressing their political identity online. Through an analysis of data from in-depth interviews with 50 Tel Aviv University students, the study reveals that, while participants feel unrestricted in discussing political issues offline with their strong ties, they actively avoid explicit political expression on Facebook. Thematic analysis of interview data further shows that the key reason for this avoidance is the presence of weak ties in online networks, where participants fear social disapproval or lack of validation. These findings offer new insights into the role of weak ties in political communication, suggesting that instead of fostering movement, these connections can lead to a stagnation effect in online political expression.

1. Introduction

Online space is broadly understood as a “social laboratory” for identity construction (Turkle 1995). In online social interactions, users can emphasize various components of their identity (Merunková and Šlerka 2019; McConnell et al. 2018; Fullwood et al. 2020). As active agents managing their public image, users can invest extensive resources in managing it. In this context, the question arises as to how people use online communication to both construct and manifest their political identity, and to engage in political discussions (Lane et al. 2022). Previous research (Barnidge et al. 2023; Peacock 2020) has proposed two major explanations for why individuals actively engage, or not, in online political participation. First, individuals’ perceptions of themselves as similar to or different from other members of their network and, second, the strength of connections—strong and weak ties—are thought to shape different types of political participation online (Valenzuela et al. 2019). With regard to the first factor, one of the basic framings in prior research on online political communication is that the heterogeneity or homogeneity of online environments, that is, whether these environments expose users to diverse information or, alternatively, shut them down in isolated “information cells”, has important political implications. In a deliberative democratic society, citizens are presupposed to have unlimited access to information from diverse sources and perspectives, including challenging attitudes that are contrary to individuals’ own positions (Habermas 1996), all of which may help citizens to make informed decisions (Beam et al. 2018; Kümpel et al. 2022). Stated differently, exposure to diverse information from different sources, including exposure to political disagreements, is essential to shaping a healthier democracy (Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Mutz 2002, 2006; Peacock 2020). In this view, when people are exposed exclusively to perspectives that are akin to their own, over time, they may become less tolerant of opposing positions, which may eventually lead to the emergence of a polarized and divided society (Mutz 2002; Stroud 2010; Sunstein 2001, 2017). Accordingly, in the context of the growing popularity of social media sites, including Facebook (Min and Wohn 2018), previous research on online political communication has focused on two interrelated questions. First, do social platforms contribute to exposing individuals to heterogeneous information and competing points of view, or, alternatively, do they expose individuals to homogeneous information with a limited number of points of view? Second, how might political communication online relate to political participatory behavior (Brundidge 2010; Brundidge and Rice 2009; Verba et al. 1995)? The second factor underpinning the existence or absence of online political participation is the strength of the connections among members of the network, which captures varying degrees of intimacy that exist in relationships among individuals (Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela 2011). Overall, two major types of connection, strong ties and weak ties, are differentiated in the literature. The assumption is that the intensity of the connections on the social network produces different patterns of discourse (Shumate and Contractor 2014) and constitutes a central component of online participatory behavior in general, and of political participation on the Internet in particular (Shumate and Contractor 2014). While previous studies have extensively examined the exposure to diverse viewpoints and the effects of strong versus weak ties on political engagement, limited attention has been paid to how weak ties may actually inhibit political expression among young adults in online settings. This study addresses this gap by exploring whether and how participants interpret the presence of weak ties in social networks contributes not to the facilitation, but rather to the suppression, of political discourse online. This study draws on grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and field-based theory (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003), two qualitative approaches well-suited for exploring participants’ subjective meanings and constructing theory directly from the data. Accordingly, the two research questions addressed in this study are as follows.

RQ1: 

How do young adults express themselves politically in offline and online communication?

RQ2: 

What reasons underlie individuals’ avoidance of political communication online?

From the methodological perspective, most previous studies on online political participation focused on the analysis of self-report data, such as those collected through interviews and surveys (Andreassen et al. 2017; Tazghini and Siedlecki 2013; Thorson 2014; Taylor et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2017; Boulianne 2018). Although less frequently, previous research also looked at individuals’ actual political behavior online, as in the analyses of identifiable activity in online spaces such as public posts (Edgerly et al. 2016; Ellison et al. 2014) or individual components of user behavior such as the number of friends and page likes (Wells and Thorson 2017). Building on this approach, Ziv and Yavetz (2025) employed direct activity logs alongside interviews to provide a more granular understanding of political engagement patterns on Facebook. In this study, merging the two aforementioned perspectives, we assume that the characteristics of online political participation can be understood by combining the insights derived from both observing the online behavior of individuals and examining their perceptions of their political identity and attitudes.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Homogeneous Social Networks

The emergence of homogeneous networks is mainly explained by people’s tendency to connect with others who are similar to them (Aiello et al. 2012; Conover et al. 2011) and thus avoid encountering information that produces cognitive dissonance. That is, it consists of individuals sharing similar characteristics such as demographic characteristics, opinions, tastes, and lifestyles (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987), as well as political backgrounds and attitudes (Ziv and Yavetz 2025). This results in the formation of the so-called echo chambers where, similarly to how sounds reverberate in a closed environment (Aiello et al. 2012; Conover et al. 2011; Sunstein 2017; cf. filter bubbles, Pariser 2011), users are exposed to positions that support their views, while the voices of others (challenging information) are actively excluded (Levy and Razin 2019). Resonance chambers are caused by the human homophilic desire to build connections with others who are similar to them (McPherson et al. 2001), and this effect was reported to be salient in social networks (Spaaij and Hamm 2015). Importantly, these environments not only reinforce confirmation bias but also facilitate the spread and persistence of disinformation (Douglas et al. 2019; Peled and Yavetz 2024). The emergence of echo chambers in social media can be explained by social identity theory (SIT) (Stryker and Burke 2000), which focuses on how identities develop because of membership in each group (Henri and Turner 1986). Social identity theory posits that individuals who wish to belong to a particular group will choose to behave in ways appropriate for that group, thereby repressing their individuality in what is known as the process of depersonalization (Stets and Burke 2000). Recent studies have extended this framework to online environments. For instance, Uysal et al. (2022) demonstrated that social identity on social media played a key role in shaping protestor identity during the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, suggesting a link between online identity-driven leadership cues and collective action. Similarly, Masood et al. (2024) showed that political expression on social networking sites amplifies political disagreement, but that the pathway to incivility is moderated by users’ dual group identifications, emphasizing the central role of social identity in shaping online discourse dynamics. Finally, Moniz (2025) found that individuals tend to perceive problems affecting outgroup members as less serious and express less support for policy interventions in such cases, as these perceptions are driven more by self-interest than symbolic motives.

In addition, seeking to avoid cognitive dissonance, people will seek information tailored to their preconceptions and beliefs (Klapper 1960; Mutz 2006; Stroud 2007), thus overlooking alternative positions that could alter their views (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2011). For instance, in a study on how social networks influence users’ exposure to different perspectives, Bakshy et al. (2015) found that people’s choices play an important role in limiting exposure to opposing views. Specifically, the authors’ analysis of the study participants’ news feeds and Facebook content engagement revealed that, while conservative users interacted with 17% of content that disagreed with their position, liberal users interacted with mere 6% of such content. In another relevant study on Facebook unfriending/unfollowing during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, John and Dvir-Gvirsman (2015) found that 16% of the study participants unfriended people who presented different views from their own, thus placing themselves in echo chambers. Interestingly, most users who did so were individuals with more extreme political stances. Homogeneous online networks have two major consequences. The first one is polarization, or the process of the radicalization of individual attitudes over time, which may ultimately result in a lack of tolerance to opposing political positions (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2011; Mutz 2002; Stroud 2010; Sunstein 2001; Wojcieszak 2011; Yardi and Boyd 2010). The second consequence is users’ exposure to poor knowledge that limits individuals’ abilities to make informed decisions (Sunstein 2017).

2.2. Heterogeneous Social Networks

In contrast to the body of work documenting the existence of echo chambers in social networks, another stream of research showed that social media sites actually contribute to exposing users to diverse positions that contradict their views (Bakshy et al. 2015; Beam 2014; Flaxman et al. 2016; Garrett 2009; Garrett and Stroud 2014; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011; Messing and Westwood 2014). Researchers holding this view argued that, owing to the growing popularity of these sites among various population cohorts, their users are exposed to diverse political positions (Choi and Lee 2015; Eveland et al. 2018; Kim 2011; Lee et al. 2014).

Some researchers attributed the heterogeneity of social networks to the education individuals have acquired during their lives. For instance, in a study on individuals’ exposure to competing attitudes (cross-cutting point of view), Kim (2011) found that education factor played a crucial role in exposure to a heterogeneous environment. Specifically, according to Kim’s (2011) results, better educated people were less exposed to competing perspectives than less educated people. Furthermore, several studies found that, compared to offline communication, where the risks of direct confrontation are relatively high, social media platforms like Facebook were more likely to expose users to diverse political attitudes (e.g., Min and Wohn 2018; Barnidge et al. 2023; Peacock 2020). Following this line of investigation, Lu and Lee (2020) reported that the type and extent of Facebook use can play a significant role in exposure to opposing views. Specifically, the authors found that users’ interest in politics was positively associated with their exposure to opposing views (also see Dubois and Blank 2018 and Eveland et al. 2018 for similar conclusions). Overall, although people with a solid political position prefer people who share similar views (Bakshy et al. 2015; Goel et al. 2010), social media users are unlikely to avoid exposure to challenging positions. In the present study, we do not align ourselves with either of the two views, specifically, whether social media platforms are inherently homogeneous or heterogeneous. Rather, we assume that, even if social media platforms offer ample opportunities for heterogeneous online exposure (Beam 2014; Flaxman et al. 2016; Garrett 2009; Garrett and Stroud 2014), it is ultimately up to individual users to avoid cognitive dissonance (Klapper 1960; Mutz 2006; Stroud 2007) and thus to receive information that matches their presuppositions (Barberá et al. 2015; Grömping 2014; Quattrociocchi et al. 2016) or group with others similar to them (Neo 2016). Stated differently, we assume that the heterogeneous potential of social media sites does not necessarily generate real exposure and attention to messages that compete with individuals’ positions. Instead, we seek to explore whether young adults’ online political participation via Facebook depends on the strength of their online connections.

2.3. Strong and Weak Ties and Their Impact on Political Participation

As discussed above, previous research on communication categorizes the following two major types of connections: strong ties and weak ties. Weak relationships stem from relationships within diverse groups of distant people, such as acquaintances and friends of friends. The strength of weak connections (Granovetter 1982) as remote networks is expressed in the provision of information and new connections (Baybeck and Huckfeldt 2002; Somma 2009). Weak connections allow people to access different types of information and resources (Lin 1999) that are not available in the immediate environment. Weak connections also serve as a bridge to parts of the social system that would otherwise remain disconnected (Granovetter 1973, 1982).

By contrast, strong relationships, which typically include family members and close friends (Granovetter 1982), are based on intimacy and emotional support (Wellman and Wortley 1990), and their power is significant in situations of change and uncertainty (Nohria and Eccles 2003). In addition, strong ties emerge with people from similar backgrounds. Unlike weak connections, which provide access to resources and information unavailable within an individual’s social circle (Granovetter 1982), strong connections can motivate actions, are more numerous, and are characterized as more accessible (Nohria and Eccles 2003).

Assuming that the strength of ties relates to an individual’s ability to generate social capital, strong ties provide the “linkage” type of social capital, which allows for reciprocity, emotional support, and camaraderie (Wellman and Wortley 1990). Conversely, weak ties that travel among different circles generate social capital of the “bridging” type. This type of social capital allows access to diverse information (Granovetter 1973). Accordingly, although weak ties expose individuals to groups outside their immediate circle and to diverse perspectives, they do not provide social or emotional support (Burke et al. 2011).

Similar to offline environments, on social media sites like Facebook, users interact with both their strong and weak ties (Ellison et al. 2007; Ellison and Boyd 2013; Lampe et al. 2006). Some of the available evidence indicates that Facebook friend lists typically include more weak connections than strong ones (Dunbar 2016), and these weak ties may expose an individual to political activities even when they do not use Facebook for these purposes (Kim et al. 2013; Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela 2011). Stated differently, exposure to new political information often takes place through an individual’s interactions with their weak ties (Baybeck and Huckfeldt 2002). Since individuals are not inclined to cancel online friendships with old (weaker) connections, even when they no longer have offline contact with these people (Ellison and Boyd 2013; Bode 2015), the chances of encountering diverse political content on Facebook increase.

Indeed, as demonstrated by several previous studies, the presence of weak connections on social networks contributes to political participation. For example, Min and Wohn (2018) found that the existence of weak connections in social networks results in exposure to more opposing views and more political participation online, such as encouraging people to vote in elections, write posts or comment on political content, post materials related to political issues, and so forth. This evidence suggests that, while strong connections in the offline environment are meaningful and affect political participation (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944), in the online environment on Facebook, weaker connections are more significant in terms of their impact on political participation (Granovetter 1973). Similarly, Tang and Lee (2013) also found that people with more diverse networks, including weaker connections, were exposed to more political information on Facebook and participated in more political activities and more frequently. This suggests that it is not only the size and diversity of the network that significantly affects political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012) but also the quality of existing connections on the network.

However, other researchers argued that strong ties, which typically provide social pressure or reinforcement for individuals to get involved in activities that require time and resources, are more effective in promoting political engagement (e.g., Somma 2009). For instance, Valenzuela (2014) emphasized the power of strong connections on Facebook in spreading ideas and encouraging political engagement (also see Lu and Lee 2020), including engagement that occurs offline, such as demonstrations, participation in political forums, political boycotts, and so forth. It was also argued that, unlike other social media sites (e.g., LinkedIn and X), Facebook is primarily based on communication with strong connections (Ellison et al. 2007). Similarly, several studies established that people tend to interact more with their strong connections on Facebook than with their weak connections (Gilbert and Karahalios 2009; Kaun and Stiernstedt 2014). In addition, Facebook’s algorithm prioritizes content with which the individual interacts more frequently (Bucher 2012; Valenzuela et al. 2018), which gives more visibility to the content published by one’s strong ties. By contrast, weak ties can be easily mapped out of the profile list of friends, which could eliminate their political influence (John and Dvir-Gvirsman 2015). Based on the above, in the present study, we assume that the strength of users’ ties in social networks is central to individuals’ decisions to engage in political participation online.

3. Methodology

3.1. Data Collection

The present study includes self-reported reflections from study participants about their actions, attitudes, and identities (Shkedi 2003). The data were collected through semi-structured qualitative interviews, which all occurred at Tel-Aviv University. The interviews focused on the following topics: a sense of political identity (its definition and stability), the expression of political identity (offline), the creation and preservation of an online political identity, the interaction between political identity in offline and online environments, and Facebook use (see Appendix A for the interview guide). During the interviews, some of the participants used information from their Facebook accounts to provide examples of political content they had encountered, to illustrate their political activity, or to recall information and, thus, more accurately answer the interview questions.

3.2. Research Approach

The focus of our qualitative analysis was on how young adults behaved on Facebook, particularly with regard to their self-perceptions and experiences of communicating their political identities, which involved the study participants’ subjective interpretive processes (Sabar Ben Yehoshua 2001). In doing so, we assumed a constructivist framework that focused on how individuals attribute meanings to phenomena and how, through these meanings, they construct reality (Shlasky and Alpert 2007).

3.3. Study Population

A total of 50 participants participated in the study. The participants were students at Tel Aviv University. In terms of religion, 46 were secular Jews, 3 were traditional, and 1 was religious-traditional. With the exception of two participants with advanced degrees, the remaining respondents were undergraduate students from various faculties. The sample was balanced for gender, with 22 male and 28 female respondents. Regarding political beliefs, the participants positioned themselves on the axis between political left and right: 15 participants from the right, 7 participants from the center-right, 6 participants from the center, 9 participants from the center-left, and 13 participants from the left.

Table 1. Participant demographics and political stances.

Participant Number	Age	Gender	Political Stance
P1	31	Male	Left
P2	22	Female	Left
P3	23	Female	Left
P4	23	Female	Left
P5	27	Trans Male	Left
P6	24	Male	Left
P7	21	Male	Left
P8	24	Female	Left
P9	28	Male	Left
P10	21	Male	Left
P11	26	Male	Left
P12	23	Female	Left
P13	26	Male	Left
P14	18	Female	Left-center
P15	27	Male	Left-center
P16	22	Male	Left-center
P17	26	Female	Left-center
P18	27	Female	Left-center
P19	23	Female	Left-center
P20	24	Female	Left-center
P21	25	Female	Left-center
P22	25	Male	Left-center
P23	26	Male	Center
P24	24	Female	Center
P25	25	Male	Center
P26	27	Female	Center
P27	25	Male	Center
P28	30	Female	Center
P29	24	Male	Right-center
P30	23	Female	Right-center
P31	21	Male	Right-center
P32	27	Female	Right-center
P33	24	Male	Right-center
P34	28	Male	Right-centerr
P35	24	Male	Right-center
P36	22	Female	Right
P37	26	Female	Right
P38	21	Female	Right
P39	31	Male	Right
P40	26	Male	Right
P41	23	Female	Right
P42	24	Male	Right
P43	21	Male	Right
P44	27	Female	Right
P45	23	Female	Right
P46	22	Female	Right
P47	22	Female	Right
P48	22	Female	Right
P49	23	Female	Right
P50	26	Male	Right

describes all participants’ demographics and political stances. Throughout the paper, participants are referred to using anonymized codes (e.g., P01, P02) to ensure confidentiality and facilitate reference. The numbering is arbitrary and does not reflect any order or grouping.

3.4. Data Analysis

Following the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 2017; Strauss and Corbin 1997) and the field-based theory method (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003), our interview data analysis focused on rearranging the information collected in order to extract meanings and interpretations by creating a narrative that provides a response to the phenomena at the center of the research (see Appendix B for the Interview Protocol). More specifically, the first step in the interview analysis process was open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Initially, a careful reading of the collected data was conducted. Transcripts of the interviews were read several times before separation into units in the formal analysis process. The screening process was then conducted according to themes that arose in the interviews. This was followed by division into categories to organize the pieces of information according to relevant characteristics (Shkedi 2003).

In the second stage, based on the initial analysis, we sought to find connections between the categories and understand the possible relationships between them. As a product of careful reading and a process of comparison, the categories were arranged vertically and horizontally, with several categories belonging to the same super category family. Subsequently, a category tree was created, which served as a graphic description to understand the hierarchy and relationships between the different themes on several levels of categories and subcategories. The creation of the final mapping, graphically organized in a new order, provided a general picture of the phenomenon being studied and enabled a reassessment of the analyzed material. In the next stage, a focused analysis was conducted, in which the main issues we chose to focus on in this study were identified.

3.5. Ethical Considerations

Prior to enrollment, the participants received all necessary information regarding the entire research process and signed the informed consent form (Appendix A). Since sampling information from personal accounts raises ethical questions, particularly regarding the study participants’ privacy, we provided concrete examples of the information that may appear at the time of browsing Facebook profiles during the interview and sampling of the data. The study was approved by the Tel-Aviv University institutional ethics committee and was conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided written informed consent to participate in this study.

4. Results

4.1. Political Behavior in the Offline Environment

During the interviews, the participants were asked if they conversed offline with other people about political matters and, if so, how. With two exceptions, all respondents (N = 48) testified that they expressed their political identity offline mostly orally, with their family and/or friends (i.e., their strong ties), and with different frequency.

For instance, P17 (a participant from the center-left) provided the following account of his experience of engaging in conversations with his peers in daily life.

“Mostly [through] conversations with friends, I really try to listen to people who are not very similar to me because it’s important. I think it’s wrong to shut down without listening to things that make you uncomfortable. It really bothers me, so I’m all for hearing as many different opinions as I can.”

Furthermore, about one-third of the respondents (N =15) reported that they frequently held conversations about partisan politics. They mentioned feeling comfortable having such conversations with those closest to them (i.e., their strong ties) and expressing the diversity of their opinions with them. For example, P29 (a participant from the center-right) clarified that he regularly discussed political issues with his strong connections.

“Yeah, I mostly talking about politics with friends, and family too. I follow the news every day, so there’s always stuff to talk about.”

Similarly, P18 (a participant from the center-left) stated that she discussed political partisanship issues on a daily basis. She also clarified that conversations she had on political issues helped her to form her own political identity and argued that conversations on these topics were, in her opinion, significant for a clearer understanding of political reality.

“You hear more, there’s more dialogue, people come from all over the country, each with their own agenda. So, there’s always discussion, arguments, both sides trying to figure things out. And at home too, we talk about this stuff. I study law, so these issues are always around, you just can’t ignore them.”

However, about one-third of the respondents (N = 14) reported that they rarely held conversations about partisan politics due to a lack of desire or relevant knowledge on the subject; yet, these informants also explicitly stated that they did not refrain from expressing their partisan identity, nor did they try to hide it from their relatives (i.e., their strong ties). For instance, P21 (a participant from the center-left) noted that, although conversations with others helped her to better understand the “other side” and formulate her political position, she had little interest in partisan politics and, therefore, did not talk about these topics on a daily basis.

“It doesn’t happen every day, it’s not every day that I come and ask someone: ‘How about leaving Gaza?’ […] I don’t know, there are more interesting things.”

Notably, no difference was found between the respondents holding different political views, except for the frequency of political partisan conversations. Specifically, our analysis of the interview data revealed that the participants from the center-right reported discussing politics offline the most frequently, followed by the respondents from the center-left, left, and right. The respondents from the center camp reported talking about partisan politics offline the least often. This finding is consistent with these participants’ perceptions of their involvement in partisanship issues and the knowledge they believe they had on these issues.

Furthermore, the respondents also reported having open conversations on political partisanship issues with their strong ties who held different political views. However, several respondents mentioned that, without shying away from presenting their partisan identity or hiding their political partisanship position, they were unlikely to initiate such discussions independently.

4.2. Evaluating Others in the Offline Political Environment

When responding to the question about evaluating others in relation to political identity in offline communication, most participants (N = 46) said they believed that their strong ties knew which political camp they belonged to, regardless of their political position or the frequency of their political conversations. Even participants who reported that they did not discuss partisan politics offline believed that their relatives knew how to associate them with a political party. For example, P20 (a participant from the center-left) stated that her friends knew how to associate her with her partisanship identity. “Most would say center-left.” Similarly, P3O (a participant from the center-right) also believed that her relatives knew how where she belongs politically.

“Yeah, I think they thought I was more right-wing […] They also knew I couldn’t stand Bibi.”

The above indicates that the study participants assumed that their relatives knew how to associate them politically, which is not surprising in light of their previously discussed willingness to freely express their opinions on political partisan issues in the offline environment.

4.3. Political Behavior in the Online Environment

As discussed in previous sections, most of the study participants (N = 44), from all political camps, reported that they preferred expressing themselves politically offline (e.g., with their relatives) rather than online (e.g., on Facebook). In interviews, several factors for this preference were mentioned.

Several participants stated that the preference was based on the conditions of the conversation: In the offline environment, one usually receives feedback and can refine the message. For instance, P46 (a participant from the right wing) explained that she preferred offline partisan political discourse because of the difficulty of articulating her views unequivocally in writing.

“I prefer to talk about political issues offline […] Again, because when I’m one-on-one, it’s easier to explain than writing; writing could imply all sorts of directions.”

Another reason respondents cited for avoiding any online partisan political expression was their social concerns. Specifically, the study participants mentioned fearing a lack of listening, radicalization, and verbal aggression, as well as labeling and criticism. For instance, as illustrated in the following interview excerpt, P9 (a participant from the left wing) explained that his refraining from expressing his political partisanship identity on Facebook was related to his fear regarding his online peers.

“There’s no real dialogue or listening online. A lot of emotion gets mixed in, and people don’t always say exactly what they mean. Even if they try, no one really pays attention. It just doesn’t exist on Facebook.”

Similarly, P32 (a participant from the center-right) stated that she avoided political partisan expression on Facebook because, in her opinion, network members were impatient with long and complex messages.

“People don’t really read long posts anymore. And some things are hard to explain without going into detail or saying, ‘Here’s what I think and why.’”

From a different perspective, P24 (a participant from the centrist camp) explained that her avoidance of partisanship expression on Facebook stemmed from her fear of the radicalization that is typical of political discourse on Facebook.

“People say awful stuff, like ‘I wish all leftists would die.’ That’s not how it’s supposed to be. And yeah, a lot of times you’re just scared—people don’t know how to have a normal conversation.”

Furthermore, P41 (a participant from the right wing) explained that he avoided political expression due to the irrelevant responses he might receive.

“A lot of these reactions are not, how can I say that? They’re not people who I think really understand the situation or don’t care about it, and it’s just an opinion based on, say reading some article that you can’t always really understand everything. And then they’ll write you all sorts of nonsense, which I’m trying to avoid.”

Yet, the most common reason to avoid online political partisan expression cited by the study participants was the fear of social conflict. Participants attest to the fear of radicalization in discourse, ranting, arguments, virtual aggression, physical violence, stings, and shaming. For example, P30 (a participant from the center-right) described a real fear of violent reactions by network members, which could be the result of partisanship expression on Facebook.

“People allow themselves to get carried away on Facebook […] It scares me, it feels like threats and that’s really upsetting.”

In addition, respondents from all political camps also mentioned personal considerations focused on the addressee that prevented them from expressing any partisanship comments on Facebook.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

Taken together, the results of our data analysis revealed that the participants, in our sample, feel strongly connected to their political identity. Specifically, they tend to place themselves on the political scale (between right and left) and attest to political conversations they have had offline with others, predominantly from their immediate environment. These accounts suggest that, for these participants, political identity was perceived as an integral part of their broader self-concept.

Specifically, in the offline environment, young adults reported openly, explicitly, and authentically expressing their partisanship identity by discussing political topics with their relatives, parents, spouses, and close friends (i.e., with their strong ties). This finding suggests that most participants were certain that their relatives know which political camp they are affiliated with, regardless of actual frequency of their political conversations, and highlights that political conversations about these topics occur freely and without self-censorship.

However, in contrast to young adults’ open political expression in the offline environment, the respondents reported consciously avoiding expressing their partisan identity and engaging in political partisanship discourse on Facebook. A major barrier to more explicit partisanship expression on Facebook for the interviewees was their reported fear of social confrontations.

The available literature offers two major explanations why individuals choose to censor their partisanship expression in online environments. The first one, coming from the field of political communication, posits that individuals fear social conflicts and, therefore, refrain from expressing their political views in heterogeneous environments (Mutz 2002). To date, extensive evidence is available showing that, in an environment perceived as heterogeneous, individuals tend to participate in political discussions less (Jang 2009; McClurg 2006; Mutz 2006). Perceptions of the environment as heterogeneous, which is frequently the case with social media platforms, reduce users’ explicit political participation due to the perceived risk of getting involved in social conflict (Eveland and Hively 2009; Hopmann 2012; McClurg 2006; Mutz 2002, 2006). To the extent that social media platform users believe that their political opinions diverge from or contradict those of other users, they tend to avoid political activity because such divergences threaten their social relationships (Mutz 2002). This avoidance results in self-censorship and/or avoidance of getting involved in political discourse (Hampton 2016). Furthermore, taking into account that most of users’ actions on Facebook are public and, thus, visible to the entire network (Bode et al. 2014; Oeldorf-Hirsch and Sundar 2015), users’ perceptions of others’ views as either similar or different from their own may determine not only whether they will participate in political discourse, but also how they will do so (Jang 2009; McClurg 2006; Mutz 2002; Stoycheff et al. 2016). This trend is largely consistent with findings from previous research showing that a clear preference for partisanship expression with strong connections in the offline environment was identified (Bode 2012; Boulianne and Theocharis 2018; Conroy et al. 2012; Valenzuela et al. 2012; Vitak et al. 2011; Yu 2016). However, while most previous studies identified this trend via surveys, in the present study, the analysis of in-depth interview data allowed for the identification of more complex reasons underlying this preference.

The second explanation why individuals choose to censor their partisanship expression in online environments comes from the field of social psychology, particularly psychologicalSIT, which posits that an individual’s self-identity and social identity are largely interrelated. More specifically, the SIT predicts that individual self-concepts are, to a large extent, drawn from their social perception, i.e., from their social relations and the social groups they belong to (Brewer 2001), which makes it important for individuals to identify themselves with a particular social category (Slater 2007).

Furthermore, the SIT posts that identity is a social product that requires the cooperation of the other (Altheide 2000; Thoits and Virshup 1997). A significant component of understanding who and what one is comes from “reflexive evaluation”—that is, the way an individual believes others see them (Solomon 1983). Stated differently, social interactions with others serve as “mirrors” that help individuals understand their own identity (Goffman 1959). In this view, identity construction involves a bilateral social process where, on one hand, an individual claims a particular identity and, on the other hand, perceives his/her identity placement by others who accept that identity (Stone 1981). Congruence between these two processes, namely the declaration and placement of identity, is central, as the construction of identity takes place within a social context. Accordingly, if others do not accept one’s identity, a real threat to the individual’s self-identity emerges (Tajfel 1978).

In this study, we interpret the results based on both explanations presented above, with one coming from the field of political communication and the other from the field of social psychology, and we take into account the distinction between strong and weak ties. In line with the methodological frameworks of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and field-based theory (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003), our interpretation of the findings was guided by an inductive process aimed at identifying recurring themes and constructing meaning directly from participants’ narratives. Rather than applying predefined categories, we allowed the data to shape the conceptual understanding, staying close to participants’ language and subjective perspectives.

Following the homophily logic of the network (John and Dvir-Gvirsman 2015) that assumes the existence of echo chambers in social networks, individuals tend to surround themselves with others similar to themselves (McPherson et al. 2001; Sunstein 2007; Turow 1997). Under the circumstances of a great political similarity between themselves and other users, it would be natural to expect that the study participants would report feeling comfortable expressing themselves or engaging in political discourse on Facebook without the fear of potential alienation from others (Mutz 2006). Yet, as Dubois and Blank (2018) argue, even politically engaged individuals may avoid expression not due to informational homogeneity, but because of social sensitivities. In our case, the deliberate avoidance of explicit political partisan expression on Facebook, through either self-censorship or message moderation, stems primarily from young adults’ concerns about their weak ties. While they feel comfortable expressing their partisan political identity in offline settings among strong ties, they avoid such actions in the public online sphere. This, as we argue, stems first and foremost from young adults’ fear of their weak connections. While the interviewees reported openly expressing their partisanship identity with strong ties and in offline communication, they said they refrained from doing so in online communication. This self-censorship is related to the presence of weak connections in the network. From the perspective of social identity theory (Hogg et al. 1995; Tajfel 1974), individuals’ social conduct is primarily shaped by considerations related to the group to which one belongs. Accordingly, the fear of one’s identity being not accepted or even rejected by one’s peers overrides the fear of potential sanctions from members of the opposite camp. Therefore, based on our results, we propose that the observed refraining from political expression on Facebook among young Israelis stems from their thinking about the broader group on their social networks or their weak homophilic ties.

This conclusion contributes to what is currently known about the power of weak ties and their impact on political life. Previous research on weak ties focused on the driving power of these connections, such as providing new information and political connections (Baybeck and Huckfeldt 2002; Somma 2009), along with granting access to different types of information and resources (Lin 1999) and serving as a bridge to parts of the social system that would otherwise remain disconnected (Granovetter 1973). To these observations, our results add a qualitative perspective that highlights how weak ties can produce a stagnation effect, driving individuals to refrain from openly expressing their political identity in online environments. In this sense, our findings do not refute Granovetter’s classic thesis (Granovetter 1973, 1982), but rather extend it by exploring how weak ties are experienced in polarized contexts. While Granovetter emphasized the potential of weak ties to facilitate access to new information and opportunities, our data, similar to that of Ziv and Yavetz (2025), suggest that in certain social configurations, particularly among young adults in politically divided environments, weak ties are experienced as limiting rather than enabling. Participants avoided expressing political views when their audience included weak ties. Some preferred low-visibility actions, like “liking” a post, while others engaged in self-censorship and chose to stay silent. In such cases, the same weak ties that are supposed to support open communication can make people hold back their opinions out of fear of social judgment (Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela 2011; Min and Wohn 2018).