Shifting from Religious Populism to Authoritarian Populism: Two Decades of Identity Politics Dynamics in Indonesia
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThe author delivers an original argument. They position their research well in relation to existing relavant research and use a data set that makes sense for the questions they are trying to answer.
My main issue with the article is a theoretical one. After reading the article, I am left with a question: Is the phenomenon described in this article identity politics? If so, what is the identity here (besides “Islam”)?
The author defines what identity politics is. However, the author does not define how the actors discussed in this article define the identity of the group whose grievances they claim to represent. “Muslim” seems to be the only identity that these political actors invoke. However, do they envision all Muslims in Indonesia as belonging to their group? Does ethnicity play any role in who gets included and excluded from this identity group? How about gender and class? The author mentioned a bit about Salafism and Wahhabism but does not give a clear sense of what kinds of Islam are welcome within the group "identity" being discussed.
My sense here is that while these political actors position themselves as representing Indonesia’s Muslims, the actual range of people these envision as belonging to the category of Muslim is much narrower than the entire Muslim population of Indonesia.
I wonder whether “identity politics” is the right term for the phenomenon the author is examining. This feels like religious populism. It also may be inclining toward a form of fascism that takes some form of Islam as the basis on which to identify its in-groups and out-groups.
The author is on to something when they note how identity politics begins as a way for oppressed and marginalized groups to demand redress but eventually gets coopted by hegemonic and majority populations who claim victimhood as a justification for continuing or re-instating policies that favor them and oppress minorities.
Moreover, the goal of early identity politics groups like African Americans in the US was not to seize control of the government and enforce policies that would oppress others in the same ways that they themselves felt they had been oppressed. By contrast, the goal of these actors described in this text is very clearly to seize the reigns of power and demonize and suppress “secularism” in the same way that they feel their brand of Islam (which they now position as the only Islam) was earlier demonized and suppressed. So, while I think the author can make an argument for this Indonesian case as one of appropriation of identity politics by the hegemonic/majority/in-power group, I don't think it is informative or responsible to place genuinely marginalized groups who demanded equity, equality, or just basic human and civil rights in the same category with politically, socially, and economically dominant groups who are clearly using victimhood in a cynical move to retain or increase their power within their society. I do not think that the author means to do this, but without enough explication, it is easy for the article to be read in this way.
In connection with this, I would encourage the author to discuss the international context. This is not a purely Indonesian story. It feels as if we have variations on this story in various majority Muslim societies. We also have non-Muslim versions of the same: the Evangelical Right in the US, Hindu nationalism in India, the policies of Netanyahu’s government toward Palestine, Putin’s arguments for Russia as an Orthodox Christian society, etc. In all these cases, we see hegemonic/majority populations constructing a patently false narrative of victimhood to appeal to members of the hegemonic population who may have real economic grievances resulting from neoliberal economics and/or have anxiety about cultural pluralism and demographic diversity. While these populist actors appeal to the supposedly disenfranchised masses, they are in fact bankrolled by wealthy elites who wish to either maintain the current neoliberal economic order or construct a new order in which they can further enrich themselves. I wonder if placing the Indonesian case in an international context would help the author better define the phenomenon they are observing.
Author Response
Comments 1: The author delivers an original argument. They position their research well in relation to existing relavant research and use a data set that makes sense for the questions they are trying to answer.
Response 1: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. I think this discussion will be interesting because it can be useful for the development of further research on changes in the construction of identity politics and how identity politics is used from what was initially a form of resistance to injustice becoming a tool for the political economic interests of the ruling group.
Comments 2: My main issue with the article is a theoretical one. After reading the article, I am left with a question: Is the phenomenon described in this article identity politics? If so, what is the identity here (besides “Islam”)?
Response 2: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. I have made improvements by emphasizing more on the religious and ethnic factors that are part of identity politics. In addition, the phenomenon raised in this study also falls into the category of identity politics and not fascism or ethnocentrism. This is because there is identity-based injustice that resulted in the emergence of the 212 social movement. This change can be found in the section of "what is identity politics?" paragraphs 8-10
Comments 3: The author defines what identity politics is. However, the author does not define how the actors discussed in this article define the identity of the group whose grievances they claim to represent. “Muslim” seems to be the only identity that these political actors invoke. However, do they envision all Muslims in Indonesia as belonging to their group? Does ethnicity play any role in who gets included and excluded from this identity group? How about gender and class? The author mentioned a bit about Salafism and Wahhabism but does not give a clear sense of what kinds of Islam are welcome within the group "identity" being discussed
Response 3: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. Indeed, most Indonesian people are Muslim, only those who are members of the 212 movement or are members of the FPI organization under the leadership of Habib Rizieq Shihab are mostly dominated by Muslims who follow the Wahabi movement or Islamic fundamentalism. Not only about religion, this study also discusses the ethnic factors behind the emergence of identity politics. Because the figure of Habib Rizieq Shihab is of Arab Hadrami descent, many of his followers also come from the habaib group and have the same ethnicity. While gender and class factors do not really determine who is included and excluded from this group. For more details, this has been explained in the section "what is identity politics?" paragraphs 8-10
Comments 4: My sense here is that while these political actors position themselves as representing Indonesia’s Muslims, the actual range of people these envision as belonging to the category of Muslim is much narrower than the entire Muslim population of Indonesia.
Response 4: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. It is true that although these politicians describe themselves as Muslims, Muslims who share the same ideology, namely Islamic fundamentalism, are members of this group. For more details, this has been explained in the section "what is identity politics?" paragraphs 8-10
Comments 5: I wonder whether “identity politics” is the right term for the phenomenon the author is examining. This feels like religious populism. It also may be inclining toward a form of fascism that takes some form of Islam as the basis on which to identify its in-groups and out-groups.
Response 5: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. Religious populism is indeed a form of identity politics. According to Muller (2007), populism is always a form of identity politics, although not all versions of identity politics have to be populist. For the difference between whether this phenomenon falls into identity politics or fascism, we have explained in the section "What is identity politics?"
Comments 6: The author is on to something when they note how identity politics begins as a way for oppressed and marginalized groups to demand redress but eventually gets coopted by hegemonic and majority populations who claim victimhood as a justification for continuing or re-instating policies that favor them and oppress minorities.
Response 6: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. The actualization of identity politics has changed from being a form of social movement to fight injustice to becoming a tool for political economic interests by those in power. This is a result of the characteristics of identity politics which are the result of social construction of society. I have made changes to the section of "What is identity politics?" in paragraph 2 line 8 and paragraph 7 line 4
Comments 7: Moreover, the goal of early identity politics groups like African Americans in the US was not to seize control of the government and enforce policies that would oppress others in the same ways that they themselves felt they had been oppressed. By contrast, the goal of these actors described in this text is very clearly to seize the reigns of power and demonize and suppress “secularism” in the same way that they feel their brand of Islam (which they now position as the only Islam) was earlier demonized and suppressed. So, while I think the author can make an argument for this Indonesian case as one of appropriation of identity politics by the hegemonic/majority/in-power group, I don't think it is informative or responsible to place genuinely marginalized groups who demanded equity, equality, or just basic human and civil rights in the same category with politically, socially, and economically dominant groups who are clearly using victimhood in a cynical move to retain or increase their power within their society. I do not think that the author means to do this, but without enough explication, it is easy for the article to be read in this way.
Response 7: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. This arises because of the characteristics of identity politics as a result of social construction. Historically, identity politics has been carried out by minority groups to fight injustice through political channels. However, along with changes in the construction of society about identity and how it is used, identity politics is not only seen as a form of resistance to inequality or injustice, but is also considered a tool for the interests of political economy for political elites. I have made changes to the section of "What is identity politics?" in paragraph 2 line 8 and paragraph 7 line 4
Comments 8: In connection with this, I would encourage the author to discuss the international context. This is not a purely Indonesian story. It feels as if we have variations on this story in various majority Muslim societies. We also have non-Muslim versions of the same: the Evangelical Right in the US, Hindu nationalism in India, the policies of Netanyahu’s government toward Palestine, Putin’s arguments for Russia as an Orthodox Christian society, etc. In all these cases, we see hegemonic/majority populations constructing a patently false narrative of victimhood to appeal to members of the hegemonic population who may have real economic grievances resulting from neoliberal economics and/or have anxiety about cultural pluralism and demographic diversity. While these populist actors appeal to the supposedly disenfranchised masses, they are in fact bankrolled by wealthy elites who wish to either maintain the current neoliberal economic order or construct a new order in which they can further enrich themselves. I wonder if placing the Indonesian case in an international context would help the author better define the phenomenon they are observing.
Response 8: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. We have fixed this issue in the section of "Identity Politics and Shifting Political Trends: Global Context" paragraph 1-10. In this section we explain that globally, behind the use of identity politics are political economic interests. This is the result of changes in society's construction of identity and how it is used from being normative to pragmatic.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsBefore even we begin to discuss details, there are two major problems with this article that must be addressed:
1. English is unclear. The author ought to rewrite the article with the help of a native speaker or a proofreader. After all, the author wants the readers to understand his content and argument. The current text resembles an AI machine that puts together pieces of academic literature without a critical attitude that constructs sentences, paragraphs and sections.
2. There is also lack of focus. The author summarizes various sources on Indonesian politics without a guiding line. The author jumps from a topic to another within the same paragraph, and then again back and forth.
Instead of rejection, I recommend major revisions to give the author a chance to rewrite the article according to academic conventions in social sciences, that is a clear research question that contributes truly to our understating of Indonesia politics (for example, what is the role of Habib Rizieq Shihab in Indonesian politics in the last 2 decades?), a theoretical framework, a contextualization, a hypothesis, various arguments and data to support the hypothesis, etc.
Comments on the Quality of English LanguageEnglish should be entirely revised.
Author Response
Comments 1: English is unclear. The author ought to rewrite the article with the help of a native speaker or a proofreader. After all, the author wants the readers to understand his content and argument. The current text resembles an AI machine that puts together pieces of academic literature without a critical attitude that constructs sentences, paragraphs and sections.
Response 1: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. I have made document corrections through the proofreading process at a certified institution.
Comments 2: There is also lack of focus. The author summarizes various sources on Indonesian politics without a guiding line. The author jumps from a topic to another within the same paragraph, and then again back and forth.
Response 2: We have made improvements through a line of thinking, namely first, identity politics at the end of the New Order as a historical context for the emergence of militant Islamic groups. The second is political dynamics in Indonesia in the Reform era that provided space for political elites to affiliate with militant Islamic groups, and as a result, there was a shift in political trends from religious populism to authoritarian populism. This phenomenon, indirectly rejects democratic values ​​and supports authoritarian practices. Shifting political trends do not prioritize the principles of justice that originate from people's aspirations, but are formed based on an oligarchic system that favors certain groups. This improvement can be seen through the introductory part in paragraph 10
Reviewer 3 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThe paper provides an in-depth analysis of the shift from religious populism to authoritarian populism in Indonesia, offering a timely exploration of political dynamics in a country marked by significant identity politics. Its focus on the interplay between identity politics and political-economic interests presents a nuanced understanding of how these forces shape political trends. By incorporating Paul Ricoeur's critical hermeneutics, the paper adopts a sophisticated approach to analyzing political discourse, particularly through the examination of the preaching of Habib Rizieq Shihab.
The use of critical hermeneutics to analyze 21 videos of preaching over a significant timeframe (2000–2024) enables the paper to systematically trace the evolution of identity politics. This methodological choice effectively contextualizes identity politics within Indonesia's socio-political and historical framework, adding credibility to the analysis. Additionally, the paper integrates identity politics theories with practical political-economic concerns, shedding light on how elites manipulate identity politics for economic and political gains.
While the paper provides a definition of religious populism, it could benefit from a broader exploration of populism in general. A clearer distinction between populism and related concepts such as nationalism or identity politics would make the arguments more accessible. Similarly, the definition of authoritarian populism as tied to "dynasty politics" is intriguing but could be more explicitly contrasted with other forms of authoritarianism.
The reliance on 21 YouTube videos as the primary dataset raises questions about whether this adequately represents the broader landscape of identity politics in Indonesia. Supplementing this analysis with interviews, surveys, or other qualitative data could enrich the study. As a non-specialist in Indonesian politics (though with expertise in populist discourses), I feel there is a need to recalibrate the scope of the empirical investigation. The paper's heavy focus on Habib Rizieq Shihab, while valuable, may limit the generalizability of its findings to other contexts or figures in Indonesian politics.
The argument that political-economic interests drive identity politics is compelling but at times appears reductive. Identity politics may also be shaped by ideological, cultural, or grassroots social movements, which deserve further consideration beyond elite manipulation. While the critical hermeneutics approach is robust, the paper could provide more details on how the videos were analyzed (e.g., coding methods, thematic categories) to enhance replicability.
The paper largely associates religious populism with negative outcomes (e.g., division, authoritarianism). However, studies on populism often highlight its role in social and political transitions. Could the paper balance its perspective by considering cases where populist leaders catalyze transformations within political systems? While there is broad academic consensus on populism as a recycling of identity politics, some studies suggest that populist leaders can serve as catalysts for significant political change, and these perspectives could enrich the paper's argument.
For the clarity of paper, there is a need to give more details about the empirical investigation (why did the author choose this corpus? The scientific exploitation of the speeches needs to be explained albeit some details that were given on the 21 videos.
There seems to be a good knowledge of the field (mirroring my lack of competence on this topic) and the arguments are clear (maybe, the author should review the paper to see if all given information on the background is necessary). These changes won't require a lot of time but they would reinforce the consistency of the paper.
Author Response
Comments 1: The paper provides an in-depth analysis of the shift from religious populism to authoritarian populism in Indonesia, offering a timely exploration of political dynamics in a country marked by significant identity politics. Its focus on the interplay between identity politics and political-economic interests presents a nuanced understanding of how these forces shape political trends. By incorporating Paul Ricoeur's critical hermeneutics, the paper adopts a sophisticated approach to analyzing political discourse, particularly through the examination of the preaching of Habib Rizieq Shihab.
Response 1: Thank you for pointing this out. I think this discussion will be interesting because it can be useful for the development of further research on changes in the construction of identity politics and how identity politics is used from what was initially a form of resistance to injustice becoming a tool for the political economic interests of the ruling group.
Comments 2: The use of critical hermeneutics to analyze 21 videos of preaching over a significant timeframe (2000–2024) enables the paper to systematically trace the evolution of identity politics. This methodological choice effectively contextualizes identity politics within Indonesia's socio-political and historical framework, adding credibility to the analysis. Additionally, the paper integrates identity politics theories with practical political-economic concerns, shedding light on how elites manipulate identity politics for economic and political gains.
Response 2: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. This research is based on textual data that looks at how the text speaks to reveal the context and historical aspects that surround it. In addition, this research does not only look at the text of Habib Rizieq Shihab's preaching as one of the figures who rolled out identity politics, only from one period of government. To increase the credibility of the preaching text, it was taken from several periods of government since the beginning of the reformation until 2024 and linked to the political context that occurred at that time. The preaching text that appeared in a certain period will be correlated with the preaching text that appeared in the following period. So that the contextuality and historicity of this research are quite deep
Comments 3: While the paper provides a definition of religious populism, it could benefit from a broader exploration of populism in general. A clearer distinction between populism and related concepts such as nationalism or identity politics would make the arguments more accessible. Similarly, the definition of authoritarian populism as tied to "dynasty politics" is intriguing but could be more explicitly contrasted with other forms of authoritarianism.
Response 3: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. We have improved it by linking the concept of populism, approaches to populism and how religious populism and authoritarian populism fit into these approaches. This improvement can be found in the section of "Identity Politics and Populism" paragraphs 1-10.
Comments 4: The reliance on 21 YouTube videos as the primary dataset raises questions about whether this adequately represents the broader landscape of identity politics in Indonesia. Supplementing this analysis with interviews, surveys, or other qualitative data could enrich the study. As a non-specialist in Indonesian politics (though with expertise in populist discourses), I feel there is a need to recalibrate the scope of the empirical investigation. The paper's heavy focus on Habib Rizieq Shihab, while valuable, may limit the generalizability of its findings to other contexts or figures in Indonesian politics.
Response 4 : Thank you for pointing this out. In accordance with this research method, the main data comes from texts that are elaborated with literature studies to find out the context and history that emerged when the text was created. To be more focused and in-depth, we limit this research to the textual realm that opens up opportunities for further research development in order to add empirical data through interviews with related parties. Because adding interview or survey data is feared to change the focus of the research. Meanwhile, for the selection of research objects, according to a number of experts, Habib Rizieq is considered an important figure who rolled out political identity. Although not only rolling, Habib Rizieq is also considered capable of carrying out mass mobilization related to this issue. So to see the development of political identity in Indonesia can be seen through the text of Habib Rizieq Shihab's preaching. This improvement can be seen in the introduction, especially paragraph 8 lines 1-4
Comments 5: The argument that political-economic interests drive identity politics is compelling but at times appears reductive. Identity politics may also be shaped by ideological, cultural, or grassroots social movements, which deserve further consideration beyond elite manipulation. While the critical hermeneutics approach is robust, the paper could provide more details on how the videos were analyzed (e.g., coding methods, thematic categories) to enhance replicability.
Response 5: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. Historically, identity politics is indeed a social movement that originates from a minority culture or society. We have explained this through the historicity of identity politics in the section "What is identity politics?" paragraphs 1-2. However, after that, we also explained in the section "What is identity politics?" paragraphs 7-10 that as a result of social construction, this identity politics can change its conceptualization and actualization in society. To find out the use of identity politics and the political economic interests that surround it, which result in changes in political trends in Indonesia, we analyzed 21 videos selected based on the elements of identity in them. Methodologically, we have explained this in the research method section paragraph 3
Comments 6: The paper largely associates religious populism with negative outcomes (e.g., division, authoritarianism). However, studies on populism often highlight its role in social and political transitions. Could the paper balance its perspective by considering cases where populist leaders catalyze transformations within political systems? While there is broad academic consensus on populism as a recycling of identity politics, some studies suggest that populist leaders can serve as catalysts for significant political change, and these perspectives could enrich the paper's argument.
Response 6: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. To answer this comment, we have revised in the section of "Identity Politics and Shifting Political Trends: Global Context". There we explain that globally the use of political identity is also accompanied by political economic interests. However, behind that, there is the use of political identity that actually has a positive impact on society, such as the social actions carried out by the Orthodox Church in Russia. Although the initial steps taken by the church actually legitimized Putin's power, socially they became a catalyst for significant political change in Russia. This revision is in the section "Identity Politics and Shifting Political Trends: Global Context" paragraph 7
Comments 7: For the clarity of paper, there is a need to give more details about the empirical investigation (why did the author choose this corpus? The scientific exploitation of the speeches needs to be explained albeit some details that were given on the 21 videos.
Response 7: Thank you for pointing this out. I agree with this comment. For the reasons behind why choosing these 21 videos, we have explained in the methodology section that not all da'wah narratives are assessed in this study. This study emphasizes thematic analysis based on identity elements, such as race, ethnicity, sexuality or gender, and religion. In addition, we also look at Shihab's gestures and tone of voice when conveying the issue of identity politics to determine his seriousness in influencing society
Comments 8: There seems to be a good knowledge of the field (mirroring my lack of competence on this topic) and the arguments are clear (maybe, the author should review the paper to see if all given information on the background is necessary). These changes won't require a lot of time but they would reinforce the consistency of the paper.
Response 8: Thank you for your feedback. We are trying to improve and maximize this article according to the direction and instructions of the reviewer. Hopefully this improvement will be an important consideration so that our article can be published in a social science journal.
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsIn my first review, I asked that the author clarify:
(1) What they meant with the term "identity politics" in this specific context and how this current iteration of identity politics fit into the longer genealogy of the phenomenon
(2) How the case that the author was examining compared with similar cases in other contemporary societies
(3) Where and how different ethnic groups and religions groups (especially different factions and sects of Islam) within Indonesia fit into the political landscape and identity politics that the author examines.
Having read the re-write of the article, I feel that the author has adequately addressed my questions and recommendations.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsAccept in present form. The author provided many changes although the structure is still incoherent.
