Military Assistance to Ukraine and Its Significance in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The paper's topic is relevant and timely. It has the potential to be of interest to various audiences, both academic and practitioners. The article offers a useful summary especially of the volume and variety of weapons systems provided by Western states to Ukraine. It also describes how this equipment was used in various phases of the war. The article concludes that the provision of Western military equipment to Ukraine has been significant for the latter's defence against Russian aggression.

The article could be stronger in linking the subject to relevant academic debates. It is unclear what exactly the article's analytical focus is. When discussing the significance and effectiveness of Western technological assistance to Ukraine, is the focus on the tactical, operational or strategic level? The article implies that more quantity and quality of weapons systems could be a 'game changer' in war. However, it is well known that wars are not won by technology alone. In this respect, some engagement with debates related to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or the question of technology and strategy might give the article more analytical focus. Are there other factors, besides technology, that might have favoured the Ukrainian side in the war so far? What about other elements of Western military assistance to Ukraine in the run-up to the Russian invasion in February 2022? For example, tactical training and advice on leadership, command and control?

The article is thoroughly referenced, but I was surprised to see that the author(s) did not use some of the most well-known platforms and outlets that have assessed most aspects of the war (including Western military assistance and Ukraine's use of Western technology) in detail over the last few years: these include War on the Rocks, publications by RUSI, the RAND Corporation and the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Engagement with this material could give the article additional depth.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

I have the following thoughts:

A.  Within your2.1 Phase One evaluation detailing the Obama aid. As you rightly point out it was non-lethal. A question, which could be for some other paper, it was it non-lethal due to the politics of the Obama admin or was it due to the limitations of the Ukrainian Military at that time. Often described as even more soviet than the soviets with a long list of limitations from unfunded maintenance, to massed corruption, and all the rest associated with the limited government at the time. Was the characteristics of the aid due to the politics or due to the inability of the Ukrainians in 2013/14 to utilize modern military arms?

b. Further this discussion with the influx of javelin anti missiles. Often an over hyped weapon and do you agree with the argument that by the Trump admin the war was stagnant and hence anti-armor weapons had only limited usefulness as both sides were no longer pushing against fortified positions? Beyond that 300+ missiles aren’t enough to change the outcome of a large-scale conflict.

c. “: The FGM-148 Javelin proudly stood in the spotlight as the tool to crack all problems 144 that come on tracks and weigh 50 tons.” Great line!

d. Considerations on again within Phase 1 of the continued usefulness of the Soviet era anti air defenses? I know that it isn’t the core of your paper but again I do wonder if we are overhyping western short-range missiles while not giving the due credit to ancient Buk/S300 and artillery.  Was the hype in the early war realistic or a propaganda technique to pull additional support by claiming vast victories in a war that was thought to be unwinnable by much of the intelligence apparatus.   

E. Within Phase 2 discussion.

f. “The missiles the UK sent were UGM-84 Harpoons, on which the Ukrainian-developed 250 Neptune missile is based, also played a role in deterrence for the future. In June Harpoons 251 were used to strike armed tugboat Vasily Bekh (Ozberk 2022) and several offshore oil 252 drilling rigs (Krutov and Prince 2022)” The harpoon and Neptune share similar characteristics as they are both radars guided anti-ship missiles but strictly speaking, they aren’t based upon one another. It would seem the Neptune is a modernization of old soviet missiles like the Russian Kh 35.

g. “They themselves 257 were using the same Soviet systems but had less guns and ammunition than the Russians.” It is my understanding that many of the Soviet era munitions factories are in the Donbas region and no longer accessible by the Ukr.

h. “y. By midsummer, Ukraine had had over 300 artillery guns donated by the West” they are even buying the very first artillery modules for the Boxer armored vehicle in 155m. This is a great example of the limitations of the western system. Extremely expensive Excalibur rounds, even more expensive mobile artillery, the combo causes small fleets of high maintenance and boy do they need those rounds to hit. Even with all this, much of the fighting is with dumb artillery.  Additionally, do you think it would be worth it to have more details about the capacity of the differing M113 or t72s? There is a wide range of capabilities between countries even with similar sounding equipment as is again the limitations of western manufacturers to be able to scale up production.

I. Thoughts on the current effectiveness of HIMARs or the future glide bombs given the increase in anti GPS electronic warfare?

J. Phase 3 and discussion.

k. It isn’t far to ask given this is a finalized paper yet with the new DoD leaks such intensive detailed discussions of armament could be so helpful to this section. From specifics on anti-air missiles and the specific vehicles used in the new Ukraine brigades the depth of the information is vast. One part I really liked was using ESSM navy missiles on soviet Buk, the frankisam.

l. I think the addition of discussion on planes from Rafale, f16, f15, and old Mig29s would be a useful addition. They’re the big-ticket items with the most amount of political disagreement on their donation. With the worse case of Ukraine running out of high and long-range defenses the Russian Airforce could gain the air which would be highly problematic and what’s worse not something that a handful of short-range iris sl, mica, or aim120 based air defense would be able to handle neither would 2-3 patriots and 2 aster 30 batteries.

M. Lastly, what is the hold up for countries like France? Or should you even add some discussion on why so many nations are so terrified of one weapon vs. another after already donating missiles and artillery? Tanks, fighters, anti-air, I am truly not able to understand the ‘why’ of the anti-support discussion. Do countries really think that somehow Russia can escalate because of a few fighters from the 80s?

In short this paper continues the long important tradition within political science of giving up to date discussion on conflict as it happens. I would only suggest more on the politics behind the limiting of equipment for a broader range of nations, a small paragraph is problem at most needed, and more on the future support such as f16. The new dod leaks would be heavily useful even if I do not know the legality of that. 

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf