House Demolitions
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. A Problematic Measure
- A.
- Effectiveness—The main justification for the policy of house demolitions is deterrence. According to this justification, those who have not yet committed an offence of terrorism will acknowledge its harsh consequences and will refrain from committing it. In addition, people who live with a potential suspect will try to prevent them from committing the crime or report them to the authorities ([5], p. 320). One important issue that rises from this justification is the measure’s effectiveness. This is a complex issue, without any clear consensus. In a nutshell, even if we assume that the measure is in fact effective in creating deterrence, it is clear that because of its unjust character ([4], p. 13; [10]) 8, it also engenders hatred toward the authorities and encourages acts of revenge and violent responses. Member of Knesset Amnon Rubinstein also criticized the effectiveness of the measure and stated: “You can blow up one more home, you can blow up ten more homes—it just won’t do any good” ([4], p. 14; [11]). According to this approach, the harm that the policy creates exceeds its benefits ([4], p. 14; [7], p. 269) 9.
- B.
- Property Rights—The demolition measure also violates the property rights of residents’ of occupied territories under international law. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention [12] states that “Any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations” (emphasis added). Punitive demolition of houses for deterrence purposes is not related to a “military operation” and is not absolutely necessary, and is therefore prohibited under international law ([3], pp. 371–72; [13]) 10. The premise of this article is that the human rights law continue apply in non-international armed conflict as well as international conflict, including situation of occupation. the UN human rights committee ([14], pp. 310, 324, 326) and the International Court of Justice [15] confirmed this approach (although Israel’s government formal approach opposes the application of human rights law in times of conflict, in practice, the Supreme Court in its decisions applies human rights law extraterritorially in the occupied territories [16]. Therefore, the government objection does not reflect the state practice [14].
- C.
- Discrimination—Demolitions have been used solely against Palestinians’ houses, and no demolitions have been carried out against Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza or against the homes of Jews’ within Israel who committed acts of terrorism, despite the fact that Article 119 applies also in Israel. It seems that the use of this sanction was not even considered in such cases, since the measure is only seen as fit for treating the “other”, and not for Jewish Israeli citizens.
3. Penal Sanction or Deterrent Measure
- A.
- The Israeli Supreme Court, Israeli military and political leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s characterized house demolitions as a “punishment” [17,18,19] 11. Former brigadier general Shlomo Gazit argued that “the punishment must be immediately visible in order to achieve deterrence and that destroying the offender’s home one day after the event produces a ‘pillar of smoke’ that everyone sees, hears and understands” ([4], p. 10) 12.
- B.
- Article 119 falls within a section of the Emergency Regulations, which deals with “miscellaneous penal provisions” (emphasis added) ([9], p. 481). Moreover, in several cases, Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak analyzed the reasonableness of the commander’s decision by examining the relationship between the severity of the offense and the severity of the applied measure [20]. This relationship between an action and the sanction’s severity is one of the main characteristics of a punishment system ([5], p. 322).
4. Demolition of Houses—An Illegal Penal Sanction
- (1)
- According to the principles of criminal law, it must be imposed by a court, following a fair trial.
- (2)
- The punishment must be based on personal liability.
- (3)
- A.
- The demolition sanction may be imposed in addition to any another judicial sanction that might be inflicted on the suspect after their conviction. When it is imposed, there is no consideration of a possible additional punishment in the future. It is therefore possible that once the later punishment is given, the combination of the two sanctions will be too harsh, as in such cases where the court later on sentences the suspect to life imprisonment.
- B.
- As far as we know, this method of punishment is unique to Israel and is not employed in any other place in the world [29].
- C.
- A person’s home can be seen as an extension of a person’s body—there is an intimate closeness between a person and their home. The person’s home can be described as a space that covers the body and provides it with shelter and safety. Destroying this safe haven is akin to a physical punishment.
- D.
- Demolitions affect different people in different ways. If the suspect is only a tenant in the house, the impact of the demolition on them is less severe than demolition of a house that the suspect invested all their life in building. Because of this inherent inequality, the sanction is arbitrary.
- E.
- Moreover, the demolition of a person’s house is akin to uprooting the person from their land. It is similar to eradicating the roots of a tree. This argument is augmented when dealing with Palestinians, where the land is an extremely important element in their identity, and uprooting them from the land is therefore especially traumatic.
5. Demolition of Houses—A Collective Punishment
“The concept of collective punishment…should be understood in its widest sense, and concerns not only penalties imposed in the normal judicial process, but also any other kind of sanction (such as confiscation of property) as the ICRC had originally intended. The prohibition of collective punishments was included in the article relating to fundamental guarantees by consensus (as opposed to the penal provisions). That decision was important because it is based on the intention to give the rule the widest possible scope, and to avoid any risk of a restrictive interpretation…In fact, to include the prohibition on collective punishments amongst the acts unconditionally prohibited by Article 4 is virtually equivalent to prohibiting ‘reprisals’ against protected persons”.
5.1. Definition
“Punishment which has been rendered without regard to due process of law and is imposed on persons who themselves have not committed the acts for which they are being punished”.[30]
- (1)
- There must be a palpable connection between the offence and the punishment imposed.
- (2)
- The suffering caused to innocent parties must be significant and not an inevitable side effect of the suffering of those persons guilty of the offense ([9], p. 491).
The prohibition on collective punishment is anchored in both international law and Israeli law.([7], p. 268)
5.2. International Law
5.3. Domestic Law
“The mere possibility of imposing a collective sanction in a general manner on residents of a certain area, offends notions of justice as well as the fundamental postulates of contemporary legal culture”.
5.4. The Court’s Approach to the Collective Punishment Argument
- (1)
- Even assuming the measure is not punitive, it still constitutes a collective punishment [see Chapter 3].
- (2)
- As shown above, it is a punitive sanction. The main purpose of house demolitions is to cause suffering to the offender’s family, in the hopes that this suffering will deter others from committing similar crimes in the future ([5], p. 320).
- (3)
- Justice Rubinstein’s interpretation of the article does not match the wording of the article according to which destruction is rendered “absolutely necessary by military operations” (emphasis added). Punitive demolition of houses for deterrence purposes is not related to a “military operation” and is not absolutely necessary. It is therefore prohibited under international law.
- (4)
- As for Justice Solberg’s remark, the frequency of application of a measure has no effect on its nature.
- (5)
- Justice Hayot’s explanation is also not convincing. Granting the commander non-obligatory discretion does not neutralize the collective nature of the sanction. The measure remains applicable in cases where there was no involvement of family members.
6. The Principle of Personal Responsibility
7. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
Author Contributions
Conflicts of Interest
References and Notes
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- 1Escalation happened, for example, during the first and second intifadas (1987–1991, 2000–2005), and during the recent deterioration in Arab-Israeli relations (2014).
- 2“A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture the Government of Palestine of any house, structure, or land from which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary article illegally thrown, or of any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission of, any offence against these Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court offence; and when any house, structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military Commander may destroy the house or the structure or anything growing on the land.”
- 3The legislation was enacted when Great Britain administered Palestine under a mandate arrangement with the League of Nations. Besides demolition of houses, the defense regulation includes other broad powers such as detention, expulsion, and confiscation of property without a fair procedure.
- 4In practice, the commander rarely waits until the suspect is convicted in court to carry out the demolition. Most of the demolitions take place right after the suspect’s arrest, and in some cases even before their arrest.
- 5Article 119 does not set a standard regarding the severity of the offense that must be met. Thus, it gives the commander almost limitless authority in determining the circumstances in which they can order home demolition. Nonetheless, the military normally employs it only in serious cases.
- 6The option to petition the decision was only available for a few hours, making it practically impossible to implement.
- 7In such circumstances, early detection through intelligence was impossible, hence the increased need for deterrence.
- 8Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban described the policy as a “desecration of Israel’s heritage and a blatant violation of the legal and societal rules of the civilized world”.
- 9According to Simon, “The demolition policy may do more to inflame Palestinian defiance than to deter it. Palestinians perceive it as a gross injustice; it precipitates anger and humiliation rather than respect for the rule of law. Instead of providing a healthy basis for maintaining peace and order, the policy tends to reaffirm people’s belief that they will not receive justice from an alien government”. This was also the position of the professional committee, discussed above, that investigated the demolitions measure (the Shani Committee).
- 10Moreover, the right to protection of property constitutes part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property”.
- 11In a case involving the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the Court repeated this approach and indicated that “everybody agrees that a demolition of a building is a tough and severe penalty measure. The preventive power which is concealed inside property demolition does not change the fact that the sanction is punitive” [20].
- 12Former Brigadier General Shlomo Gazit served as Coordinator of Governmental Activities in the Administered Territories and worked closely with Moshe Dayan in the first years of the occupation.
- 13The claim was raised for the first time by Justice Barak in Abu Allan Case and was presented later on in the Shukri Case, and since then has been used consistently by the court: “The authority which is given to the military commander by Article 19 is not an authority to execute a collective punishment; its activation is not designed to punish the appellant family members. The authority is administrative and its activation is meant to prevent and by this to maintain the public order”.
- 14This argument was raised by the court in the Daghlas case as follows: “The objective of Article 119 is to achieve the effect of deterrence, and such an effect, by nature, should be applied not only to the terrorist himself but also to those who surround him, certainly to the members of his family who reside with him…He should bear in mind that his despicable actions will not only harm himself, but they may also cause grave suffering to his family. In this respect there is no difference between the demolition sanction and the imprisonment of the head of the family, a father of young children who will be left without a guardian and provider. Here too family members get hurt”.
- 15The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (Hereinafter: ICCPR) includes such a prohibition. Israel ratified the ICCPR in 1991. Article 7 of the ICCPR cannot be derogated from under any circumstances. According to article 16 of the Convention against Torture, state parties to the convention “shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.
- 16Even if we consider the Israeli Palestinian conflict an international one, the ICRC commentaries similarly stated in the parallel article in the first protocol of the Fourth Geneva Convention, regarding the protection of victims of international armed conflicts: “The concept of collective punishment must be understood in the broadest sense: It covers not only legal sentence but sanctions and harassment of any sort, administrative, by police action or otherwise”.
- 17In the Qarabsa Case, the demolition left 27 people homeless.
- 18The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention states, “This paragraph then lays a prohibition on collective penalties. This does not refer to punishments inflicted under penal law, i.e., sentences pronounced by a court after due process of law, but penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity, for acts these persons have not committed”.
- 19“Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.”
- 20“Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.”
- 21The prohibition on collective punishment can be found in other international law provisions such as: Article 87 of the Third Geneva Convention, which protects prisoners of war, which prohibits “collective punishment for individual acts”. In addition, the two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions prohibit the imposition of collective punishment “at any time and in any place whatsoever”. Moreover, Article 4(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda expressly enumerates collective punishment as a crime for which persons may be prosecuted for by the tribunal.
- 22The UN Human Rights Committee stated: “States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence”.
- 23The law authorized administrative bodies to impose collective fines on communities or town.
- 24“The damage to liberty and dignity, in the administrative detention of a person who himself does not pose a threat to national security, is extremely severe, to the point where the interpreter is not entitled to presume that the statute intended to achieve such severe harm…the transition from the administrative detention of a person from whom a danger is posed to national security to the administrative detention of a person from whom no danger is posed to national security is not a ‘quantitative’ transition but a ‘qualitative’ transition. The state detains, via the executive branch, a person who committed no crime, and from whom no danger is posed, and whose entire ‘wrongdoing’ is in being a ‘bargaining chip’. The harm to liberty and dignity is so substantive and deep, that it is not to be tolerated in a liberty and dignity seeking state, even if the rationales of national security lead to undertaking such a step…Each person will be detained based on their wrongdoing and each will be held in administrative detention based on their offense. One is not to detain in administrative detention any other than one that himself poses a risk, with his own actions, to national security…” (emphasis added).
- 25In Justice Heshin’s dissent opinion [42], he argued that the claim against damage to residential units of the extended family that is beyond the area that the perpetrator themselves lived in “deserves a further study and discussion”. Heshin began his discussion of this issue by establishing that “the guiding principle” is that “one must not impose collective punishment or collective sanctions”, that “each of the petitioners, and himself alone, should be punished for his crime”. His final conclusion was, however, less determined. Heshin in his final decision interpreted the prohibition on collective punishment as preventing the punishment of residents in separate living unit but not on persons who share one housing unit.
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Kremnitzer, M.; Saba-Habesch, L. House Demolitions. Laws 2015, 4, 216-228. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws4020216
Kremnitzer M, Saba-Habesch L. House Demolitions. Laws. 2015; 4(2):216-228. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws4020216
Chicago/Turabian StyleKremnitzer, Mordechai, and Lina Saba-Habesch. 2015. "House Demolitions" Laws 4, no. 2: 216-228. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws4020216
APA StyleKremnitzer, M., & Saba-Habesch, L. (2015). House Demolitions. Laws, 4(2), 216-228. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws4020216