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Article

The Concept of ‘Equilibrium’ in the Belgian Family Pact: An Illustration of Tailor-Made and Inclusive Inheritance Law

by
Hannelore Thijs
1,2,* and
Alain-Laurent Verbeke
1
1
Rector Dillemans Institute for Family Property Law, KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
2
Brussels Research Institute on Development, Governance and Empowerment, Through Law (BRIDGE), Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1050 Ixelles, Belgium
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Laws 2026, 15(4), 59; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws15040059 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 14 April 2026 / Revised: 10 June 2026 / Accepted: 14 June 2026 / Published: 23 June 2026

Abstract

Since 2018, the Belgian legislator has created several substantial exceptions to the traditional prohibition on agreements concerning future estates. Succession agreements make it possible to create, modify or terminate rights to a person’s future estate among the parties involved. A central innovation of the 2018 Belgian reform is the ‘global succession agreement’, also referred to as a family pact, which allows parents to establish and agree upon an individualized and subjective equilibrium with all of their children, taking into account both prior and present donations to the children, and several other elements deemed relevant to them. The equilibrium is subjective as it is not defined by objective, quantitative criteria, but rather by how the parties qualitatively, together as a family, feel about what constitutes a fair and balanced solution for them. This family confirmation of their own specific equilibrium constitutes a core condition for the validity of the global succession agreement. This contribution first examines how this equilibrium should be understood and how families can effectively attain it in practice, with particular attention to the role of family dynamics. Second, this article explores how global succession agreements can accommodate non-traditional family structures and complex family situations, with the aim of achieving a fair and equitable regulation that reflects the specific wishes and needs of all family members involved.

1. The Possibility to Conclude a Succession Agreement

The opening of an inheritance often gives rise to conflicts among heirs, or between heirs and third parties. For instance, a child may seek to challenge a donation made by their parent to a third party if it infringes upon their compulsory portion (forced heirship, réserve héréditaire), or heirs may be confronted with a last will that places them in a less favorable position than expected (Schonewille 2024, p. 20). Growing awareness of such potential disputes has led individuals to seek ways of settling their future estate in a binding manner during their lifetime (Casman and Verbeke 2024, p. 9, no. 10; Van Doormalen 2024, p. 11). This outcome cannot be fully achieved through a last will, as a last will remains revocable at the testator’s discretion (Dekkers et al. 2025, pp. 325–26, no. 334; Kapma 2024, p. 6).1 A binding settlement is only possible through a succession agreement. The European Succession Regulation defines this as ‘an agreement, including an agreement resulting from mutual wills, which, with or without consideration, creates, modifies or terminates rights to the future estate or estates of one or more persons party to the agreement’.2
In Belgium, many individuals likewise were in search of binding instruments to settle their future estates in advance, in order to avoid potential conflicts.3 In addition, tailored succession and estate planning has attracted increasing attention (Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 460, no. 475). These considerations explain why the legislator duly examined the possibility of allowing succession agreements more broadly during the inheritance law reform of 2017–2018.4 Prior to this reform, a general prohibition on succession agreements prevailed, subject only to very limited exceptions. Following the reform, this general prohibition was retained as the main rule,5 justified by the risks inherent in succession agreements. These risks relate to the fact that succession agreements stipulate rights and obligations that only take effect upon death, often years after their conclusion, making it difficult for parties to fully anticipate all long-term consequences (Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 460, no. 475). Furthermore, family members may be pressured into waiving rights through a succession agreement, which can lead to regret or expose them to unanticipated adverse consequences (Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 460, no. 475; Röthel 2017, p. 480, no. 709). To balance these risks with an increased need for tailored estate planning, the 2017–2018 reform introduced two measures. First, to accommodate individuals’ desire to regulate their future estate in advance, the list of permitted succession agreements was extended, as exceptions to the principal prohibition. Data indicate that, since 2018, a significant number of succession agreements have been concluded, with a total of 17,560 agreements between September 2018 and September 2023. Notably, the first nine months of 2023 saw 39% more succession agreements than the same period in 2022.6 As a second measure, to protect individuals against the risks associated with such agreements, strict procedural requirements were imposed for their validity.
A central innovation among the newly permitted agreements is the ‘global succession agreement’.7 This agreement is termed ‘global’ because it is concluded by a parent or both parents together with all their children, and concerns all donations made by the parent(s) to their children (Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 461, no. 476). A core requirement for the validity of a global succession agreement is that an equilibrium is achieved among all children, through the agreement. This equilibrium constitutes a subjective notion and is not explicitly defined by law. It must reflect what the family members party to the agreement consider fair and equitable, taking into account the specific and personal circumstances of all future heirs (Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 484, no. 501).
The global succession agreement and its core requirement of achieving an equilibrium represent a significant innovation within Belgian law, where the prohibition of succession agreements continues to prevail as the main principle. This type of agreement is equally innovative from a comparative perspective as many jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, still prohibit succession agreements without any notable exceptions.8 However, in the Netherlands, several scholars are currently advocating the abolition of this general prohibition (De Rooij-Stevenhaagen 2024; Schonewille 2024; Van Doormalen 2024; Yesilkir 2019), although some are more careful (Schipper 2024). Some jurisdictions are gradually moving away from a strict prohibition, introducing limited or broader acceptance of such agreements. For example, France, Italy, and Poland allow limited exceptions,9 while Greece recently issued a draft bill introducing succession agreements.10 In jurisdictions such as Germany and Switzerland, succession agreements are widely permitted and used in practice (see below, Section 3.2). However, none of these jurisdictions provides a framework comparable to the Belgian global succession agreement with its requirement of equilibrium.
These developments in Belgium and the central mechanism of the global succession agreement raise several questions. In the absence of a clear statutory definition, how should the notion of equilibrium be understood, and how can it be achieved? Furthermore, is the equilibrium within the global succession agreement truly innovative in comparison with permitted succession agreements in neighboring jurisdictions? Lastly, what opportunities does the Belgian mechanism create for non-traditional family structures and complex family situations? Following a detailed assessment of the global succession agreement (Section 2), these questions will be addressed in greater depth in Section 3, Section 4 and Section 5. Through this approach, this contribution aims to shed a light on the Belgian global succession agreement and its equilibrium requirement, highlighting both opportunities and limitations that may inspire other jurisdictions considering succession law reforms.

2. The Global Succession Agreement or Family Pact

The global succession agreement identifies which donations a parent or both parents have already made to their children and determines which children will receive additional donations through the agreement. Accordingly, the global succession agreement relates exclusively to donations; it does not regulate the transfer of the future deceased’s assets or his entire succession, with the consent of the children (Aughet 2018, p. 352, no. 33).
There are two categories of parties to the global succession agreement, structured around the vertical relationship between parent(s) and children (Goossens 2025, p. 461). The first category consists of the parents who have already made a donation to a child. This may be one parent or both parents if each has made donations. The relationship between the parents is irrelevant: they may be married, cohabiting, separated or divorced at the time of the agreement (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 4, no. 8). The current spouse of a parent may also intervene in the agreement. This spouse may be the parent of the children who has not made any donations, a parent who has made donations but does not wish to enter into a succession agreement regarding these donations, or a stepparent (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 5, no. 11; Goossens 2025, p. 461). As such, they do not form part of the previously mentioned first category of parties to the global succession agreement. However, the spouse’s intervention and signature does generate legal consequences, as it leads to a waiver of the right to challenge the donations mentioned in the agreement if these infringe upon their compulsory portion.11 If this consequence is not desired, the parties may agree that the spouse retains this right, even after signing the agreement.
The second category comprises all the children. The children of a predeceased child take their parent’s place.12 In addition, children may voluntarily involve their own children in the agreement, thereby making them beneficiaries of the global succession agreement.13 The law requires all children to participate in the agreement, which explains why this type of agreement is termed ‘global’ (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 5, no. 14). For example, it is not possible to conclude a global succession agreement with only two out of three children.14 If a child chooses to involve their own children, they must include all of them,15 although they are not obliged to pass on the entire donation they receive under the agreement (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 7, no. 18). A parent may also involve stepchildren, that is, the children of their spouse or registered partner.16 The children of a de facto cohabiting partner cannot be included in a global succession agreement, as the legislator argues that de facto cohabitation is inherently more difficult to establish with certainty.17 With regard to stepchildren, differentiation is permitted, as the law does not require all stepchildren to be involved.18 Through their involvement, stepchildren become a party to the global succession agreement, which means they can also receive donations as part of the pact. This possibility offers advantages for both stepchildren and the parent’s own children (Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 482, no. 495). For stepchildren, it provides certainty that biological children cannot challenge a donation the parent made to them. For biological children, it ensures transparency regarding donations made to stepchildren, thereby reducing the risk of future conflicts.
As previously mentioned, a global succession agreement entails multiple risks, including the risk of undue pressure and the difficulty of fully anticipating and understanding its long-term effects. Indeed, a validly concluded global succession agreement binds all parties and cannot be unilaterally revoked.19 More specifically, the value of all donations and other advantages included in the agreement for the purpose of determining the equilibrium is fixed definitively and is binding on all parties.20 Children who are parties to the agreement can no longer claim that another child’s intestate share should be adjusted in light of the donations they already received from their parents,21 nor can they challenge donations made to another child that infringe upon their compulsory portion22. Consequently, no further rights or obligations can be asserted regarding the donations mentioned in the global succession agreement. The direct effect of the agreement is, therefore, that all children start from a clean slate.23
With such fargoing legal consequences, as with all succession agreements,24 strict formal and procedural requirements therefore apply. A first requirement concerns form: the global succession agreement must be executed before a notary.25 In Belgium, a notary is a public official who acts as independent and impartial legal adviser, who is also responsible for drafting legally valid and binding notarial deeds. All other requirements relate to procedure and can be grouped into three stages: the communication of the draft agreement, the information meeting, and the signing of the agreement. First, the draft agreement must be communicated to each party,26 and the notary must simultaneously inform each party that an information meeting will be convened.27 The notary must also inform each party of their right to seek separate counsel, as well as to request an individual meeting with the notary.28 The information meeting may only take place after a period of fifteen days has elapsed since the communication of the draft agreement, and it may be held online.29 Second, during the information meeting, the content and consequences of the agreement are explained to all parties.30 At this stage, the notary reiterates the parties’ right to separate counsel and to request an individual meeting.31 Third, the global succession agreement may only be signed after one month has passed since the information meeting.32 Each party33 may request that a different notary assist them during the execution of the deed.34 The agreement must indicate the dates of both the communication of the draft agreement and the information meeting.35 The statutory periods of fifteen days and one month are mandatory and cannot be shortened, even with the unanimous consent of all parties.36

3. The Equilibrium as Core Requirement for the Validity of a Global Succession Agreement

3.1. The Equilibrium Constitutes a Subjective Notion

As previously mentioned, achieving an equilibrium among all children is essential to the global succession agreement. Article 4.254, § 1 in fine BCC determines that the agreement must mention how the parties have interpreted and accepted this equilibrium. If no equilibrium can be reached, the agreement cannot be validly concluded. Article 4.254 BCC explicitly refers to the notion of an equilibrium (‘evenwicht’ or ‘équilibre’), deliberately avoiding the quantitative term ‘equality’. As such, the global succession agreement does not require mathematical equality to be established among all children. While mathematical equality may constitute an equilibrium in a given situation, it is not essential.37 Rather, the equilibrium is a subjective notion, unique to the family concerned: it is their personal and unique equilibrium. The agreement must also explicitly state how the parties understand this equilibrium and confirm that all of them have accepted it.38
Article 4.254 BCC identifies five elements that parties may take into account when determining the equilibrium. The parties must also explicitly indicate in the agreement which of these elements were taken into account in order to reach an equilibrium (Article 4.254, § 1 in fine BCC).
The first element is every donation made by a parent to one of the children prior to the agreement. All existing donations should be mentioned in the agreement, even though the law does not explicitly impose this requirement (Casman and Verbeke 2023, pp. 9–10, no. 27).39 As such, a global succession agreement can provide a solution when parents have made various donations to their children over the years without duly considering the consequences, resulting in inequalities among the children (Bael 2019, p. 136, no. 264). Full transparency is essential for establishing and accepting the equilibrium (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 10, no. 48; Dekkers et al. 2025, p. 485, no. 501). It is irrelevant whether a donation was made as an advance on a child’s inheritance share.40 Even in the absence of prior donations, it remains possible to conclude a global succession agreement.41
Second, additional donations may be made under the agreement to achieve an equilibrium.42 In accordance with general gift law, these donations may be accompanied by obligations that the recipient child must fulfill or may be subject to resolutive conditions. In such cases, the parties may include reservations, stipulating that an equilibrium exists only insofar as these donations are not resolved (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 13, no. 37).
Third, as an alternative to an additional donation from a parent to a child as part of the agreement, the parties may agree that a child who has already received donations compensates the other child(ren) by paying them a sum of money.43 In such cases, the agreement must specify all modalities of the claim from one child on the other, including the timing and manner of payment and any interest applicable in case of delay (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 14, no. 39). This solution may be particularly useful where a parent who previously donated to one child is no longer financially able to make an equal donation (or rather, a donation necessary to establish an equilibrium) to the other child(ren). Another possibility is that parents donate the family business to the child who will take over its management. Under the global succession agreement, this child may be required to compensate their siblings for this donation, potentially through installment payments (Bael 2019, p. 146, no. 280).
Fourth, the agreement may take into account not only actual donations but also other advantages obtained by the children from their parents.44 These advantages may include costs of food, maintenance, upbringing, and education, as well as occasional gifts, such as those given to celebrate events like weddings, which the law explicitly excludes from the definition of donations.45 For example, one child may have lived rent-free with their parents until their forties, while the other children left home at eighteen.46 Although such an advantage is not technically a donation, it can be considered in a global succession agreement. Similarly, if a parent was able to afford a wedding gift for one child but, due to reduced financial capacity, could not provide a similar gift to another, this disparity may be addressed in the global succession agreement. As such, possible advantages may include gratuitous services, assistance, or housing.47
This possibility introduces an important nuance to the principle that gratuitous services are not classified as donations under Belgian law. For instance, under intestate inheritance law, upon a parent’s death, a child cannot claim a larger inheritance share solely because a sibling benefited from years of free housing or parental help in their household and child-rearing. A global succession agreement allows such advantages to be equated with donations, provided they are explicitly identified and described to avoid ambiguity (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 11, no. 31). For all donations and advantages mentioned in the agreement, it is advisable to include a value (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 15, no. 43). As previously noted, the parties are bound by the agreed value,48 but they are free to determine it, and make use of subjective valuations.49 This possibility also explains why an objectively inaccurate valuation does not undermine the existence of an equilibrium between the parties, provided that a valuation has been transparently identified and accepted by all parties.
Fifth, the parties may take into account the personal situation of each child.50 The relevant provision does not define what constitutes a party’s situation, leaving them free to determine which elements are relevant. These may include earning capacity, financial position, personality, talents, ambitions, physical or mental impairments, opportunities, misfortunes, and similar factors (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 18, no. 51). For example, a child may agree to receive less than their siblings because their personal circumstances have enabled them to accumulate significant wealth.51 In assessing personal situations, the parties may also consider donations made by a parent to their grandchildren.

3.2. The Equilibrium as Unique Requirement from a Comparative Perspective?

At first sight, the Belgian global succession agreement, and, in particular, its requirement of a subjective, non-mathematical equilibrium, appears rather unique from a comparative standpoint. In examining other jurisdictions that permit certain types of succession agreements, no comparable requirement is found in the relevant legislation. For instance, the most notable exception to the general prohibition on succession agreements in Italy is the patto di famiglia.52 Although this instrument is, like the Belgian global succession agreement, designated a ‘family pact’, both its scope and its conditions differ significantly. The Italian family pact is limited to the lifetime transfer of a family business, or shares thereof, to the next generation, that is, to one or more descendants. Its rationale is to prevent the fragmentation of family enterprises and to safeguard their continuity and stability (Braun 2020, p. 126). All future heirs entitled to a compulsory portion must participate in the agreement, including the entrepreneur’s children and spouse.53 Moreover, the Italian regime contains no requirement of a subjective equilibrium among the parties. On the contrary, it appears to prioritize mathematical equality between heirs: beneficiaries must compensate the other contracting parties by paying a sum equivalent to the value of the transferred shares, calculated in accordance with the rules on the compulsory portion, unless those parties waive their rights in whole or in part.54 In this way, the pact is argued to introduce an advance mechanism of division, since the value of the shares should be calculated as if the entrepreneur’s estate had opened at the time of the conclusion of the family pact (Bonilini 2022, pp. 229–30).
In Germany and Switzerland, binding agreements concerning a future estate are widely permitted. A general distinction is made between positive and negative agreements. Positive agreements confer an appointment as heir or as legatee. In Germany, Erbverträge allow for the appointment of heirs, the creation of legacies, the imposition of conditions, and the choice of the applicable inheritance law.55 Similarly, in Switzerland, an Erbzuwendungsvertrag enables an individual to leave (a share of) their estate to another contracting party or to a third party,56 and more broadly, it is possible to stipulate in a binding agreement anything that may be stipulated in a last will (Wolf and Spichiger 2018, pp. 14–15). Both Germany and Switzerland also permit negative agreements, particularly those through which a future heir waives all future inheritance rights, or their compulsory portion (Erbverzichtsvertrag in Switzerland; Erbverzicht or Pflichtteilverzicht in Germany).57 In neither jurisdiction, however, do the applicable statutory provisions impose an explicit requirement that a succession agreement establish an equilibrium between the contracting parties.
These limited comparative reflections already underscore the distinct nature of the Belgian global succession agreement. As in the German and Swiss approaches, the Belgian global succession agreement may encompass both positive elements—i.e., the allocation of additional entitlements, in the form of donations granted to one or more contracting parties—and negative elements—i.e., a waiver of the right to challenge donations listed in the agreement that would infringe upon one’s compulsory portion, as well as a waiver of the right to request that donations made as an advance on another child’s inheritance share be taken into account when calculating that share. Nonetheless, the Belgian mechanism is more constrained in several respects. With regard to the positive elements, the global succession agreement does not permit the inclusion of binding testamentary dispositions. As previously noted, the agreement concerns only donations (and advantages) made prior to its conclusion, together with any additional donations made as part of the agreement. With respect to negative elements, the global succession agreement does not allow children or the intervening spouse to waive all inheritance rights or their compulsory portion in its entirety. While the practical effect of a global succession agreement may be that a compulsory portion can no longer be invoked, the children and intervening spouse retain the right to challenge donations made to third parties, donations made to other participating family members after the agreement, and any testamentary disposition that would infringe upon their compulsory portion.
In any case, the Belgian legislator is primarily concerned with permitting only those agreements that establish an equilibrium between the parties, even though only the parties themselves can determine whether such an equilibrium exists. By departing from the quantitative, mathematical approach for assessing the fairness of a deal, leaving this to the mere judgment and feelings of all parties involved, the Belgian legislator felt the clear need for more procedural protection. Indeed, when parties do give up certain rights based on purely subjective elements, it is all the more important to have guarantees that parties act with full consent, free of any pressures, and in full understanding and comprehension of all consequences, now and in the future. That is why the strict legal formalities go far beyond the mere demand for a notary deed. And that is why for some, they should even go further (Verbeke 2017–2018, p. 1101; Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, pp. 82–84).58 If one gives up quantitative rights and entitlements on the basis of a subjective fairness, we should be sure and certain that such party fully understands what they are doing. Otherwise, the equilibrium would be void. Precisely because of the strong procedural protection to make sure that the subjective, qualitative equilibrium is consented, the Belgian legislator does not permit the notary, nor the courts in the event of a dispute, to undertake a substantive review of whether the agreement genuinely produces an equilibrium. Indeed, allowing this would ignore the unique subjective character of the equilibrium within that particular family. As no one may intervene on material or substantive grounds, the only protection is found in very strict and far-reaching due process rules.
As a general rule, neither is such substantive control exercised in the other jurisdictions (Röthel 2012, pp. 190–91; Schotten 2022, no. 369). However, in Germany and Switzerland, for example, succession agreements involving a waiver of inheritance rights or specifically of the compulsory portion commonly include a counter performance, such as compensation awarded to the party waiving their rights (Schotten 2022, no. 227; Wolf and Spichiger 2018, pp. 14–15). In these cases, the waiving party expresses agreement with an advance settlement of their entitlements. The awarded compensation in fact creates the classic quantitative equilibrium, as the agreement must ultimately be acceptable to all parties involved. That is exactly why certain counterexamples can be found where judicial substantive control has led to the annulment of a succession agreement in the context of German law.59
For instance, the Munich Court of Appeal held invalid an agreement between a father and a son in which the son, at nineteen years old, waived his compulsory portion in exchange for a lump-sum payment of 19.500 DM.60 The payment had been presented as a generous compensation compared to what the son might receive on the basis of a calculation of the presumed inheritance assets. However, the court found the agreement invalid because the compensation was not in fact based on such a calculation but merely represented a statutory maintenance lump sum, and because the son was in a weaker bargaining position, being only nineteen at the time of the agreement and not having received independent legal advice. On the basis of a similar reasoning, the Ravensburg court of first instance invalidated clauses in a marital agreement relating to a maintenance waiver and to waivers of inheritance rights and of the compulsory portion.61 The court held that the agreement resulted in an unjustified distribution of burdens to the detriment of the surviving spouse, who had been unemployed and financially dependent on his wife during the marriage. The surviving spouse was deprived of any statutory maintenance claim, and this loss was not offset by claims to an inheritance or a compulsory portion, leaving him without any post-marital protection. The court further emphasized the spouse’s inferior position, noting, among other factors, that only his wife had received legal advice when concluding the agreement. Although such cases are exceptional, they illustrate that a quantitively unequal deal that is, for instance, reflected in a wholly one-sided allocation of burdens may be an indication of lack of consent or due process and may even be subject to judicial assessment. That is not the case in Belgium because due process and consent are guaranteed by very strict and extensive procedural requirements.
Hence, the explicit requirement of a subjective equilibrium in the Belgian legal framework reflects an added layer of caution that is less evident in the other jurisdictions examined. This caution must be understood in light of the underlying principle that succession agreements are prohibited unless a statutory exception is provided. It is therefore unsurprising that this heightened vigilance is also expressed through the strict procedural requirements that must be followed in Belgium. And it is then, by contrast, also understandable that other jurisdictions where the quantitative approach prevails, such as Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, do not impose comparable procedural safeguards. In these jurisdictions, the only formal requirement is that the succession agreement be notarized; no additional procedural conditions accompany the conclusion of such agreements.62

4. The Role of Family Dynamics

It has become clear that the equilibrium as part of the Belgian global succession agreement constitutes a rather unique explicit requirement. The subsequent question that arises is how a notary, tasked with guiding a family through the process of a global succession agreement, should determine whether, indeed, a subjective equilibrium exists among the family members. Since the legislator provides no objective, substantive criteria for establishing such equilibrium, and even prohibits the notary from assessing it on that basis, the notary must refrain from imposing personal views or notions of what constitutes an equilibrium (Bael 2019, p. 140, no. 270; Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, p. 79). This absence of objective substantive criteria is counterbalanced by strict procedural safeguards designed to ensure that each party can genuinely agree that an equilibrium has been reached from their own perspective (see above, Section 2).63
A key question therefore emerges: does the current strict procedure actually suffice to guarantee that each party is fully aware of the content and scope of their obligations? During the legislative preparations, the Council of State (Raad van State/Conseil d’Etat) already expressed concerns, noting that the procedure may not offer sufficient guarantees.64 Consequently, it has been argued that two additional requirements should be imposed (Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, pp. 82–84).65 A first additional requirement that is proposed is a mandatory individual meeting with the notary for each participating family member.66 Under the current procedure, parties may request such a meeting if they deem it necessary. Yet, in this view, this option is insufficient, as children may refrain from making this request due to parental pressure, fearing it could be perceived as a form of ingratitude or disrespect. A mandatory meeting would eliminate these concerns. The second proposed measure is a ‘full-awareness check’. This check would require the notary to ensure that each party fully understands the content and implications of their obligations by conducting a two-step verification. First, the notary must confirm the existence of free consent in the present, ensuring that no party feels pressured or unduly influenced by another family member. Second, the notary must verify that each party comprehends the long-term consequences of their commitment. This can be achieved by discussing realistic future scenarios and assessing whether the party still accepts the agreement’s consequences under such circumstances. For example, a child who agrees to a smaller donation than their sibling because they have built a fortune and hold a well-paying job should be confronted with the possibility of losing that job and their wealth. Even in such circumstances, the child would still be unable to claim that their sibling’s intestate share should be adjusted on account of the larger donation, in order to restore equality between them.67 To ensure awareness of such consequences, the notary should ask each party to explain the agreement’s essential content and implications, both present and future, in their own words, rather than relying on simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions.
The role of the notary in preparing and concluding a global succession agreement cannot be underestimated. Acting as a ‘procedural gatekeeper’ (Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, p. 84), the notary must oversee the entire process, ensuring compliance with the prescribed procedure and safeguarding that each participating family member truly understands the content and consequences of the agreement (Bael 2019, p. 141, no. 272). This includes verifying that all parties receive sufficient information and independent advice, and that they have the opportunity to ask questions and provide input. Such procedural gatekeeping is closely connected to the theory of organizational justice: when the process is perceived as fair, the outcome is more likely to also be accepted and regarded as fair (Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, p. 85). Accordingly, the notary must assess whether the process meets three dimensions of justice: informational justice (does each party receive all relevant information?), procedural justice (is each step clearly explained and does each party have the opportunity to intervene?), and interpersonal justice (is each party treated with equal professionalism and respect as the others?).
It is evident that sufficient time must be allocated to guide a family through the process of seeking an equilibrium that forms the foundation of a global succession agreement. Because this equilibrium is inherently subjective and deeply personal, the advisor enters the intimate sphere of the family. Consequently, the advisor must develop a sound understanding of the family’s dynamics, which relate to the interactions among family members who each have their own concerns, wishes, fears, and ambitions (Verbeke et al. 2022). To obtain such an understanding, a global succession agreement will often require a preliminary phase, which allows the legal agreement to be prepared in emotional and humane terms (Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, p. 86).
The attention to family dynamics also serves an important preventive function: reducing the risk of future disputes. Such disputes frequently arise upon the death of a parent who, during their lifetime, may have imposed their will and views in a top–down manner, paying little attention to the individual wishes and needs of their children. These children may have avoided conflict while the parent was alive, but the parent’s death can trigger unresolved tensions, transforming them into open disputes. An alternative and recommendable approach is not to suppress conflicts until it is too late, but to address them proactively, and even to celebrate them. Constructively managing conflicts can play a crucial role in preventing later disputes. By considering the individual wishes and needs of all family members in an empathetic manner, the family can be adequately prepared for the next steps, which can then be legally formalized in a global succession agreement. This process of navigating family dynamics will inevitably involve ups and downs. Families often require ‘family facilitation’: the involvement of a neutral third party who fosters communication among members and guides them in addressing conflicts positively (Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, p. 88).
The necessity of a preliminary phase focused on family dynamics explains why a global succession agreement is not, from the outset, a strictly legal exercise. Legal professionals do not always possess the skills required to guide families through this phase; rather, the expertise of a facilitator or mediator may be crucial. When a notary does not consider such involvement necessary nor organizes a preliminary phase, and instead limits their role to conducting check-the-box meetings in accordance with statutory requirements, the global succession agreement remains legally valid (Bael 2019, p. 141, no. 271). Children who did not fully understand the long-term consequences of the agreement, or who felt pressured by other family members, will not be able to initiate legal proceedings after the parent’s death. Yet, in such cases, the emotional and interpersonal consequences can be even more detrimental.
For this reason, the statutorily prescribed information meeting is of critical importance. During this phase, the notary has the opportunity to prevent these negative outcomes. However, this is only possible if the notary goes beyond the strict legal requirements by convening individual meetings and conducting the full-awareness check. Through this process, the notary may conclude that no equilibrium has been reached, or at least not for all participating family members. In such circumstances, the notary may suggest that the family has not yet reached the level of maturity of a fully supported equilibrium and should advise against the conclusion of a global succession agreement.
As such, the information meeting must allow for deep conversations among all family members about the draft agreement. A four-step approach to this information meeting is proposed (Verbeke and Delbroek 2019, p. 94). The first step is a collective explanation and dialog. The draft agreement is explained in detail, and the notary encourages each party to ask questions and discuss the agreement with one another. The second step is an individual meeting with each party, as previously mentioned. The third step is a final collective meeting. During this session, the notary reports on the individual meetings and explains to what extent an equilibrium has already been achieved. As a last step, once the notary is satisfied that an equilibrium has been found and all parties agree, the agreement can be finalized. After the information meeting, the parties must wait one month before signing the agreement (see above, Section 2). During this period, no substantive changes can be made to the agreement.

5. Opportunities for Non-Traditional Family Forms and Complex Family Structures: Three Possible Applications of the Global Succession Agreement

The previous sections have clarified the concept of a global succession agreement, including its substantive and procedural requirements, and have explained in detail how the equilibrium between the parties should be understood and can be achieved. While the family pact has proven an important instrument for family peace building and estate planning in traditional families, the concept of ‘equilibrium’ may also open the door for a more inclusive and tailor-made inheritance law, equally accommodating a broad range of non-traditional and complex family forms and structures. A global succession agreement provides a proactive mechanism to manage these complexities. We illustrate this with three typical situations.
A first possible application arises in the context of a blended family. Consider Mary, who has two children, John and Olivia. Shortly after Olivia’s birth, Mary separates from her husband, who is the father of both children. Several years later, Mary marries Steven, who has three children. Over time, Mary has come to raise Steven’s children as her own. Upon retiring, Mary begins to reflect on her future estate. Because she regards all five children as her own, she wishes to treat them equally. If Mary were to make donations to each of the five children, there is a risk that John and Olivia could challenge the donations made to their stepsiblings if these infringe upon their compulsory portion. Such a challenge could lead to a partial reversal of Mary’s intentions and create considerable uncertainty for her stepchildren regarding the validity of these donations. In this scenario, Mary may opt for a family pact. It is mandatory to include John and Olivia in the agreement, while it is permissible to include one, two, or all of her stepchildren.68 A global succession agreement provides transparency for John and Olivia concerning the donations made to their stepsiblings, while offering certainty to the stepchildren that these donations cannot be contested. In addition, by participating, John and Olivia have the possibility of obtaining additional donations if this is required to reach an equilibrium, or at least of influencing an overall equilibrium, all of which would not be available to them if they remained outside the agreement. Steven, Mary’s current husband, may also participate in the agreement. His signature would ensure that he cannot challenge any donation mentioned in the agreement upon Mary’s death.
A second illustration concerns the situation of a child with an impairment.69 Consider Sally and James, parents of three children: Nick, Tom, and Phoebe. Tom is a pediatrician, and Phoebe works in human resources. Both are financially stable and have established families. Nick’s circumstances are less fortunate. Due to a mental impairment, he struggles to maintain steady employment and often faces financial difficulties. Sally and James wish to support Nick by donating a sum of money, subject to conditions ensuring that the funds can be used only for specific purposes. At the same time, they want to guarantee that Tom and Phoebe cannot require Nick to compensate them for this donation after their death. Sally and James believe they have already provided Tom and Phoebe with sufficient opportunities and support during their studies and careers. For example, they financed Tom’s lengthy medical studies and his year abroad in Cambridge. Nick, by contrast, was unable to pursue higher education. In this situation, the family can conclude a global succession agreement. To establish an equilibrium, they must account for the donation made to Nick. The family may also consider other factors, such as the parents’ financial support for Tom’s and Phoebe’s studies which also represent significant advantages, as well as Nick’s ongoing struggles compared to his siblings’ financial stability and accumulated wealth. For instance, if the donation to Nick is valued at 500, Phoebe might agree to a donation of 300 in light of her parents’ contributions to her education, while Tom could agree to a donation of 100, given his longer studies, his year abroad, and his more favorable financial position. If an equilibrium is reached in this manner, the example illustrates the inherently subjective nature of the equilibrium, which differs fundamentally from any notion of mathematical equality. As a result of the succession agreement, the children will have no claims against one another regarding these donations upon their parents’ death.
A final application concerns the situation of Marc, father of two daughters, Jessica and Lila. Jessica is a widowed mother who lives next door to Marc and is raising 16-year-old twins. Lila, by contrast, works in the city and has no children. Since the birth of the twins, Marc has regularly stepped in to assist Jessica, enabling her to maintain full-time employment. For years, he has babysat several days a week, shopped for groceries, cooked meals, and more recently, taken the twins to their volleyball matches every weekend. Marc values treating his children equally. By their 25th birthdays, each daughter had already received a substantial and equal donation. However, Lila recently remarked that her sister has benefited enormously from their father’s ongoing support, while she has managed everything independently. Marc fears that such sentiments could escalate into conflict after his death, particularly if his remaining estate is divided equally despite the significant assistance he has provided to Jessica. In this scenario, a global succession agreement may offer a solution. It allows the family to account for the gratuitous services Marc has provided over many years, which do not technically qualify as donations that are taken into account in the division of Marc’s estate upon his death. An equilibrium could be achieved by assigning a value to these advantages and arranging for Marc to make an equivalent donation to Lila. If Marc is no longer financially able to make such a donation, an alternative is to grant Lila a compensation claim against Jessica. The family may also agree on an equilibrium that does not fully equate the value of Marc’s assistance with a new donation, taking into consideration the daughters’ specific circumstances. For example, they might factor in Jessica’s misfortune following her husband’s early passing, or recognize that Jessica offsets Marc’s help by frequently keeping him company and accompanying him to medical appointments, which are activities Lila cannot undertake due to her demanding job.

6. Conclusions

This contribution has discussed the various opportunities offered by the Belgian family pact or global succession agreement, with its rather unique explicit requirement of establishing a subjective equilibrium among the contracting family members. The Belgian legal framework has already served as valuable inspiration in other jurisdictions. This is particularly true in the Netherlands, where succession agreements are currently prohibited. In considering alternatives for this prohibition, Van Doormalen (2024) proposes a limited authorization of succession agreements in which the parties may bind themselves to having achieved a subjective equilibrium, taking into account all previous and current donations and advantages as well as the specific situation of each contracting party. In considering a possible regulatory framework for succession agreements, De Rooij-Stevenhaagen (2024) likewise refers to the possibility of binding arrangements relating to the overall balance between children that is regarded as fair and reasonable, and which need not correspond to strict equality. In these proposals, the link with the Belgian global succession agreement is apparent.
In considering the opportunities and the possible value of the Belgian global succession agreement as a source of inspiration, the limitations of the current legal framework must also be acknowledged. As previously mentioned, it may be questioned whether the current procedural framework sufficiently ensures that each party consents to the agreement free from undue pressure and fully aware of both the present and future consequences. Improvements may be required.
In addition, substantive limitations exist within the framework of the global succession agreement itself. At present, such agreements may only be concluded between parents and children in a rather traditional sense, possibly with the involvement of a parent’s new spouse or the children from that new relationship. Although the framework does provide opportunities to address needs arising in complex family situations or blended families, some boundaries remain. For instance, it has already been argued that a global succession agreement could be a useful instrument to include other children, such as foster children, or to include children conceived through sperm donation, egg donation, or surrogacy, where the biological parent is not the legal parent (Goossens 2025, p. 461). This approach could offer useful amendments to the existing statutory framework.
In conclusion, the Belgian global succession agreement offers valuable possibilities for families to design a binding arrangement that anticipates and prevents potential conflicts from escalating upon a future death. The current legal framework seeks to strike a careful balance between allowing parties the autonomy to make advance arrangements and safeguarding the interests of all participating family members by requiring the establishment of a subjective, family-specific equilibrium. The form and procedural requirements are designed to ensure that all contracting parties are able to reach such an equilibrium and agree to it freely, both with regard to their present circumstances and their future implications. The notary of the civil law type is uniquely positioned to guide families through this process.
As indicated, we propose additional procedural steps, including a regulated preliminary phase, mandatory individual meetings between the notary and each party, and a full-awareness check. Given that the consequences of a global succession agreement, both legal and emotional, should not be underestimated, it is essential that the process be carefully considered and diligently carried out. Only in this manner can an equilibrium be achieved and truly accepted by all parties, resulting in a family pact that is genuinely supported by all family members.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, H.T. and A.-L.V.; methodology, H.T. and A.-L.V.; validation, H.T. and A.-L.V.; formal analysis, H.T. and A.-L.V.; investigation, H.T. and A.-L.V.; data curation, H.T. and A.-L.V.; writing—original draft preparation, H.T. and A.-L.V.; writing—review and editing, H.T. and A.-L.V.; supervision, A.-L.V.; project administration, H.T. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created in this study. The materials analyzed are available from the sources cited in the article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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1
See also Art. 4.132, § 3 Belgian Civil Code (hereafter: BCC).
2
Art. 3 1. (b) Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession.
3
Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek wat de erfenissen en de giften betreft en tot wijziging van diverse andere bepalingen ter zake (Parl.St. 2016–17), no. 54-2282/001, p. 23.
4
Wet van 31 juli 2017 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek wat de erfenissen en de giften betreft en tot wijziging van diverse andere bepalingen ter zake, Belgian Official Gazette 1 September 2017 and Wet van 22 juli 2018 tot wijziging van de wet van 31 juli 2017 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek wat de erfenissen en de giften betreft en tot wijziging van diverse bepalingen ter zake, Belgian Official Gazette 27 July 2018. The codification of Book 4 of the Belgian Civil Code in 2022 further refined the regulation on succession agreements and implemented the provisions in the (new) Civil Code, without altering the content of this regulation: Wet van 19 januari 2022 houdende boek 2, titel 3, “Relatievermogensrecht” en boek 4 “Nalatenschappen, schenkingen en testamenten” van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, Belgian Official Gazette 14 March 2022.
5
Art. 4.132, § 1 (2) and 4.242 BCC.
6
7
Art. 4.254 BCC, ‘globale erfovereenkomst’ in Dutch and ‘pacte successoral global’ in French.
8
Art. 4:4 Dutch Civil Code.
9
See for France, the possibility to waive one’s right to reduce gifts that infringes upon their compulsory portion in Art. 929 French Civil Code. See for Poland, the possibility to waive one’s inheritance rights in advance in Article 1048 Polish Civil Code. See for Italy, the possibility to conclude a family pact for transfers of companies or company shares in Art. 768bis Italian Civil Code.
10
11
This effect explains why only the spouse can be a possible party to the global succession agreement, and not a parent’s cohabiting partner. Both factually cohabiting partners and cohabiting partners who are in a registered partnership lack a compulsory portion in Belgian law. Since they can never challenge donations made by their partner to their children, their involvement in a global succession agreement would be redundant (Aughet 2018, pp. 356–57, no. 40).
12
In conformity with Art. 4.13 and further BCC. See Wetsvoorstel (n 3), p. 134.
13
Art. 4.255, § 2 BCC. This is termed a global succession agreement with ‘generation skipping’.
14
The global succession agreement remains valid if a new child is born after its conclusion. Evidently, the agreement does not affect this child’s rights in the estate of their parents (Art. 4.258 BCC).
15
Art. 4.255, § 2, (1) second sentence BCC.
16
Art. 4.255, § 3 BCC.
17
Wetsvoorstel (n 3), p. 143. Some criticism can be noted with regard to this justification (Bael 2019, p. 158, no. 311).
18
See Art. 4.255, § 3 BCC.
19
However, it is possible to include resolutive conditions or attach certain obligations to a donation. If the condition is fulfilled or if the obligation is not carried out, the global succession agreement can be resolved. This possibility allows to nuance the principal binding character of the global succession agreement.
20
Art. 4.256, (5) BCC.
21
See Art. 4.83 BCC.
22
See Art. 4.150 BCC. Under Belgian law, children are entitled to a compulsory portion, equal to half of the “calculation mass”. This calculation mass is determined by taking into account the deceased’s existing assets, liabilities, and all donations made by them (Art. 4.153 BCC). To the extent that donations exceed the remaining half of the calculation mass, referred to as the disposable portion, the children may challenge such donations. Since these entitlements are expressed in value, the children are only entitled to a monetary claim; Art. 4.256, (1) BCC.
23
Wetsvoorstel (n 3), p. 145.
24
Although punctual exceptions do exist (Thijs 2025).
25
Art. 4.249 BCC.
26
Art. 4.250, § 1 BCC.
27
Art. 4.250, § 2 (1) BCC.
28
Art. 4.250, § 2 (2), first sentence BCC.
29
Art. 4.250, § 3 BCC.
30
see Footnote 27 above.
31
Art. 4.250, § 2 (2), second sentence BCC.
32
Art. 4.251, (1) BCC.
33
Any adult and competent party may be represented, but only by virtue of a special authentic power of attorney granted after the one-month period has elapsed, see Art. 4.251, (3) BCC. This representation concerns only the signing of the agreement and does not extend to a party’s presence at the information meeting. The possibility of being represented can be explained by the fact that a global succession pact does not contain any mortis causa dispositions, but only inter vivos donations. Accordingly, representation follows the general rules governing representation in the context of donations. As regards the waiver of rights, the law establishes that the rights of minors and incapacitated adults cannot be waived, even by means of representation (see Art. 4.244 BCC).
34
Art. 4.251, (2) BCC.
35
Art. 4.251, (4) BCC.
36
Art. 4.251, (5) BCC.
37
Bael (n 31) 139, no. 268.
38
Art. 4.254, § 1 BCC.
39
However, sometimes it is argued that the parties may agree to exclude certain donations from the scope of the global succession agreement (Aughet 2018, pp. 360–61, no. 45; Bael 2019, pp. 147–48, nos. 284–286; De Wulf 2018, p. 162, no. 253; Rousseau 2021, p. 47).
40
Art. 4.254, § 1 (1) BCC.
41
Wetsvoorstel (n 3), p. 142.
42
Art. 4.254, § 1, (1) BCC. Regarding tax consequences, additional donations made in the global succession pact are taxed in accordance with general taxation rules for donations.
43
Art. 4.254, § 1 (3) BCC.
44
Art. 4.254, § 1, (2) BCC.
45
Art. 4.87, § 2 BCC.
46
Wetsvoorstel (n 3), p. 137.
47
Wetsvoorstel (n 3), pp. 137–38.
48
In contrast, third parties are not bound by the agreed upon value.
49
However, this possibility is sometimes contested (De Wulf 2018, p. 164, no. 257). The possibility of subjective valuation indicates that the parties may assign a high sentimental value to a family heirloom of little market worth that was donated from a parent to a child. Conversely, they may agree that valuation is unnecessary, such as when all children have received similar monetary gifts around the same time (Casman and Verbeke 2023, p. 17, no. 48). Sometimes, it is argued that the parties are obliged to stipulate a value for all donations (Aughet 2018, p. 364, no. 49; Rousseau 2021, p. 48).
50
see Footnote 40 above.
51
Wetsvoorstel (n 3), p. 136.
52
Art. 786bis Italian Civil Code.
53
Art. 768quater (1) Italian Civil Code.
54
Art. 758quater (2) Italian civil Code.
55
§ 2278 German Civil Code (BGB).
56
Art. 494 (1) Swiss Civil Code (ZGB).
57
Art. 495 Swiss Civil Code (ZGB); § 2346 German Civil Code (BGB).
58
Compare our recommendation for a similar more heavy procedure to guarantee free consent in opting out of relational property law protection (Verbeke and Thijs, forthcoming).
59
Particularly on the basis of § 138 (1) German Civil Code (BGB). More detailed analyses on this matter already exist (e.g., Flöck 2022; Ludyga 2008).
60
Oberlandesgericht München, 25 January 2006. 2006. Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge: 313. See also, for instance, other recent cases: Oberlandesgericht Hamm, 8 November 2016. 2017. Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge: 576; Landesgericht Nürnberg-Fürth, 23 March 2018. 2018. Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge: 593.
61
Landesgericht Ravensburg, 31 January 2008. 2008. Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge: 598.
62
Art. 512 Swiss Civil Code; § 2276 (1) and § 2348 German Civil Code (BGB).
63
Advies Raad van State van 20 april 2017, no. 60.998/2 (Parl.St. 2016–17), no. 54-2282/002, p. 33.
64
Advies Raad van State (n 63), p. 33.
65
Verbeke (2024, 2025a, 2025b) also proposes to implement the existing procedure for succession agreements, supplemented by the mandatory individual meeting and the full awareness check for other weighty acts, in particular marital agreements. Here, he suggests a more detailed set of steps with precise guidance for the notary.
66
In the same sense: Advies Raad van State van 20 april 2017 (n 64), p. 33.
67
See Footnote 21 above.
68
The involvement of stepchildren may not affect the requirement of an equilibrium between John and Olivia. See explicitly in Art. 4.255, § 3 BCC.
69
See Bael (2019), p. 139, no. 268 for a similar example.
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Thijs, H.; Verbeke, A.-L. The Concept of ‘Equilibrium’ in the Belgian Family Pact: An Illustration of Tailor-Made and Inclusive Inheritance Law. Laws 2026, 15, 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws15040059

AMA Style

Thijs H, Verbeke A-L. The Concept of ‘Equilibrium’ in the Belgian Family Pact: An Illustration of Tailor-Made and Inclusive Inheritance Law. Laws. 2026; 15(4):59. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws15040059

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Thijs, Hannelore, and Alain-Laurent Verbeke. 2026. "The Concept of ‘Equilibrium’ in the Belgian Family Pact: An Illustration of Tailor-Made and Inclusive Inheritance Law" Laws 15, no. 4: 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws15040059

APA Style

Thijs, H., & Verbeke, A.-L. (2026). The Concept of ‘Equilibrium’ in the Belgian Family Pact: An Illustration of Tailor-Made and Inclusive Inheritance Law. Laws, 15(4), 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws15040059

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