Analysing the Impact of the GCM in Canada Through the Lens of Mobility Facilitation: An Invitation to Rethink the GCM’s Potential to Advance the Human Rights of Migrants

Abstract

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) has been presented as a milestone in embedding migration governance within an international human rights framework. This article critically examines the extent to which this ambition has translated into concrete effects by analysing the Canadian case. Drawing on a legal doctrinal and contextual policy analysis, informed by the concept of mobility facilitation, the article shows that the GCM has had a limited impact on Canadian migration policies. Despite sustained international commitment to the Compact, recent developments reveal a regression in the facilitation of mobility and the protection of migrants’ rights. This regression has not been reflected in Canada’s international reporting, exposing a disjunction between national practices and international positioning and calling into question the GCM’s capacity to generate international accountability. This article argues that the limited effectiveness of the GCM cannot be explained solely by the shortcomings of its implementation and review mechanisms but must also be understood in light of the unfavourable political context. Moving beyond a compliance-centred perspective, it contends that the GCM should also be understood as lending itself to an indirect form of mobilisation, capable of functioning as a counter-narrative to dominant criminalising and securitising approaches.

1. Introduction

Despite an increasingly grim global context for the protection of the human rights of migrants, marked by the tightening of national immigration policies and a strong emphasis on securitisation in international cooperation (Atak and Simeon 2018; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Vedsted-Hansen 2016), the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (“GCM”) (UN General Assembly 2018b) by 152 United Nations (“UN”) Member States in December 2018, brought a “ray of hope” (Kälin 2018). Several scholars have rightly highlighted the GCM’s surprisingly progressive and human-centred philosophy (ibid; Crépeau 2018; Gest et al. 2019). While not without flaws (Desmond 2020; Cholewinski 2019), the Compact indeed introduces a new framework for international cooperation, anchored in the international human rights system (Guild et al. 2019). Seven years on, as the second global assessment of the GCM’s implementation approaches—the second edition of the International Migration Review Forum (“IMRF”) is scheduled to take place in the first half of 2026 (United Nations Network on Migration (UNNM 2025b))—it is time to seriously question the tangibility of this ray of hope, particularly as the global context continues to deteriorate at an alarming pace (Ganty and Kochenov 2024; Bose 2022; Galloway 2021).

The GCM promotes the integration of the human rights of migrants into migration governance, both at the international and domestic levels (Guild 2018; Guild et al. 2019; Chetail 2023, pp. 6–7). Although not legally binding, it is grounded in a significant and pre-existing body of binding international norms protecting the human rights of migrants (Guild et al. 2018; Weissbrodt 2008). It has been praised as a meaningful advancement in a field that has historically resisted the integration of a human rights discourse (Guild 2018; UN General Assembly 2013). However, its non-binding nature (Desmond 2020) and its necessarily consensual character, shaped by contested negotiations (Chetail 2023, p. 3), have also attracted criticism. Thus, while many authors have emphasised the GCM’S potential, others have warned that it may instead function as a form of “social theodicy”, preserving the status quo in international migration law (Grey 2021). Despite these sometimes-conflicting analyses, there is broad agreement on the decisive importance of States’ and other stakeholders’ engagement in the implementation of the GCM if it is to generate tangible and positive change (Newland 2018; Cholewinski 2019; Chetail 2020; Gottardo and Rego 2021). Although these initial reviews and analyses are helpful in contextualising the relationship between the GCM and the promotion of the human rights of migrants, it should be noted that they were based primarily on the letter of the GCM, its negotiation process, and the broader context surrounding its adoption. Several years have now passed. In light of the widespread consensus regarding the centrality of implementation as a measure of the GCM’s relevance, it now appears necessary to assess its effectiveness not only by reference to its inherent potential but also through an examination of its early successes and shortcomings.

Although the GCM is still in its early stages, several studies have already assessed the initial phases of its domestic implementation, notably through an analytical lens focused on the enhancement of migrants’ rights. These first assessments are far from flattering. Early reviews point to a significant degree of domestic non-compliance with the human rights standards articulated in the GCM, thereby raising concerns as to its limited impact on national legal systems. In Canada in particular, this observation has been made with regard to detention (Lefebvre and Cocan 2024; Atak et al. 2023b), access to asylum procedures (Atak et al. 2023b), refugee resettlement and complementary protection pathways, gender equality, and capacity building in migration governance (Atak et al. 2023a). Comparable findings have emerged in other specific areas and countries—France (Lefebvre and Cocan 2024), Mexico (Campos-Delgado 2024), Morocco (Arbaoui 2022), South Africa (Atak et al. 2023b), etc.—as well as within the European Union (“EU”) (Atak et al. 2023b; Ovacık and Crépeau 2025). Some scholars have denounced what they describe as a “hypocrisy in global migration governance” (Micinski and Lefebvre 2024), while others have emphasised the growing disconnect between “euphemistic rhetoric” and “dysphemistic practices” (Campos-Delgado 2024). While room for optimism remains, with many reviews emphasising the significant potential for improvement in implementation and review processes (Atak et al. 2023b; Farahat and Bast 2022), it must be acknowledged that the general optimism which accompanied the adoption of the GCM has now largely dissipated.

When the analytical focus is placed on Canada, a pronounced scepticism emerges regarding the GCM’s concrete impact. Drawing on various case studies, three articles identify a general stagnation in the advancement of the human rights of migrants following the adoption of the GCM and the initial phase of its domestic implementation. Atak et al. (2023a) conclude that the Global Compacts “have not been mobilised for domestic policy reform with a view to addressing the human rights challenges faced by migrants in Canada”. Atak et al. (2023b) point out that “both immigration detention practices and access to asylum procedures in Canada […] are clearly at odds with the relevant standards contained in the GCs”. Focusing specifically on immigration detention, Lefebvre and Cocan (2024) note that “[o]ngoing national practices demonstrate how no change has been put in place since 2018”. Viewed collectively, these three articles underscore a lack of political will to implement the GCM at the domestic level. Rather, the Compact appears to be perceived primarily as a strategic instrument for international influence in migration governance (Atak et al. 2023a; Lefebvre and Cocan 2024), with the shortcomings of the GCM’s review process facilitating a form of à la carte implementation (Atak et al. 2023b).

The Canadian case is particularly salient for two interrelated reasons. First, Canada is one of the GCM’s “champion countries” and has demonstrated a high degree of goodwill and proactivity, both in the GCM’s review process and in its broader engagement with the emerging framework of global migration governance (Atak and Nakache 2021; Esses et al. 2021, pp. 738–39; Atak 2022). It is generally portrayed as a model of good migration governance (Esses et al. 2021, pp. 738–39; Triadafilopoulos 2021, pp. 3–4). As such, Canada might reasonably be expected to be among the countries in which the GCM has had the most tangible impact. Second, Canada is not immune to contemporary dynamics of criminalisation and securitisation that generate restrictions on mobility and lead to structural violations of the rights of vulnerable migrants (Lefebvre and Cocan 2024; Atak 2019; Atak and Crépeau 2013). The convergence of these two characteristics renders the Canadian case particularly well-suited to assessing the GCM’s capacity to advance the human rights of migrants within an unfavourable context.

Against this backdrop, and in line with the first assessments, the present article seeks to evaluate the impact of the GCM on the enhancement of the human rights of migrants at the domestic level, and to offer explanations for this impact. It argues that, to date, the GCM has had a limited effect on domestic policies, owing both to an unfavourable political context and to shortcomings in its implementation and review processes, which limit the international accountability of States. The article further proposes an alternative mode of mobilisation of the Compact: not as an instrument directly securing compliance with the human rights of migrants, but rather as a counter-narrative to the dominant political context.

The article combines a legal doctrinal and a contextual policy analysis. In assessing the advancement or regression of Canadian policies relating to the human rights of migrants, it draws on the theoretical notion of mobility facilitation, a broad and flexible concept referring to “making mobility and migration less complex, less costly, and less risky for migrants” (Crépeau 2018, p. 652). The GCM itself is strongly premised on the facilitation of mobility, with the notion permeating nearly all of its objectives (Crépeau 2018; Delas and Jouzier 2022; Chetail 2023, p. 3). In the current context, characterised by the dominance of a criminalisation-based and securitising approach to migration (Simeon and Atak 2018), this concept appears particularly relevant (Delas and Jouzier 2022; Crépeau and Atak 2024).

On this basis, the article concentrates on GCM Objectives 5 (Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration), 7 (Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration), 11 (Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner) and 12 (Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral). While the notion of facilitation runs throughout the whole Compact, these objectives—centred on the opening of regular migratory pathways and smooth management of borders—are especially relevant to advancing mobility facilitation. Materially, the article compares these objectives with recent Canadian reforms that have restricted mobility within Canada, affecting both vulnerable migrants seeking access to protection procedures and economic migrants seeking employment or access to permanent status. It examines a past measure—the tightening of the Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”) with the United States; an ongoing trend—the substantial and unpredictable reduction in legal migration pathways; and forthcoming initiatives—Bills C-2 (Parliament of Canada 2025b) and C-12 (Parliament of Canada 2025a), which envisage stricter border controls and raise significant concerns regarding migrants’ rights. To better understand the discrepancy between the GCM and these recent reforms, the article also analyses relevant Canadian reports and governmental documents relating to the implementation of the Compact, including the most recent ones (UNNM 2024a, 2025a). It draws on both the existing literature on the GCM and its implementation—particularly that focused on Canada—and the legal and political science literature addressing the specificities of the Canadian migration context, its recent evolution and the external pressures it faces.

The analytical framework of the article is set out in its Section 2. The Section 3 examines the discrepancy between recent Canadian migration policies and the commitment to facilitating mobility and explores the reasons underlying this discrepancy. It reveals the GCM’s limited impact on Canadian migration policies. The Section 4 focuses on the GCM’s limited impact on Canada’s international accountability, highlighting and seeking to explain a marked disjunction between Canada’s positioning and reporting within global migration governance frameworks and its domestic migration policies. The final section draws conclusions from the preceding findings and hypotheses. Acknowledging the GCM’s limited impact, both in inducing positive change in Canadian migration policies and in contributing to the development of a robust international compliance system, the article argues that the Compact should, first and foremost, be mobilised as a tool to counter prevailing political dynamics that drive the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of migration. Such a mobilisation would create greater leeway for integrating the GCM’s objective of mobility facilitation at the domestic level, thereby indirectly strengthening the protection of migrants’ rights.

2. Analytical Framework: Mobility Facilitation and the Protection of Migrants’ Rights

2.1. Mobility Facilitation in International Migration Law

While the existence of a national competence of States to determine the admission of migrants to their territory is widely recognised (Nafziger 1983), this does not entail that the competence to regulate the movement of people is unlimited. In several areas, “the rules of international law confine and structure the competence of States” (Goodwin-Gill 2015, p. 4; Chetail 2019). These rules, often referred to as international migration law, generally fulfil a dual function: on the one hand, they define and protect the rights of persons in situation of migration; on the other, they delineate the rights and duties of States in the governance of migration (Perruchoud 2005, pp. 83–85). The overarching purpose of this body of law remains unclear (Ramji-Nogales 2017, p. 626), and its precise determination lies well beyond the scope of this article. It may nevertheless be argued that international migration law seeks to reconcile a structural tension between, on the one hand, the aspirations of people on the move—by enshrining the protection of migrants’ rights—and, on the other, the aspiration of local populations—by affirming the sovereign right to regulate the movement of people (Weckel 2015). In this respect, international migration law imposes limits on the power of States to regulate the movement of people and, in certain areas, prescribes “the manner of its exercise” (Goodwin-Gill 2015, p. 4), thereby integrating the protection of the human rights of migrants into migration governance.

Recent trends in migration governance have intensified the confrontation between migrants’ rights and State policies aimed at restricting mobility. Globalisation, which has challenged the capacity of nation-States to regulate international flows (Ost and Van de Kerchove 2002, pp. 125–82), has induced States to adopt a critical focus on the regulation of the movement of people (Dauvergne 2004; Thomas 2013). This focus materialises through two complementary dynamics. First, the assertion of sovereign control over the movement of people is projected beyond national borders through the development of externalisation policies aimed at limiting access to State territory (Nicolosi 2024; Shachar 2022; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015)—and to its territorial jurisdiction, which gives rise to human rights obligations (Besson 2015). Second, sovereign control is expanded internally through the proliferation of illegalisation and criminalisation policies (Dauvergne 2004, pp. 598–602; Stumpf 2006). Together, these policies contribute to the “thickening” of borders and significantly affect the human rights of migrants, by restricting both their agency and the responsibility of States for human rights violations (Basilien-Gainche 2021, 2024): As Basilien-Gainche (2024, pp. 94–95) observes, “[m]aintained within the borders in a situation of irregularity that takes precedence over any other legal qualification, exiles have a non-status imposed on them, forcing them to be totally dominated […], they are plunged into a situation of superfluity, in a submission to arbitrariness, even as they seek to regain their ability and agency”.

This erosion of mobility and agency affects migrants and refugees alike. The focus of nation-States on controlling the movement of people has also undermined the effective application of the principle of non-refoulement, notably through sustained efforts to restrict access to asylum procedures (Hathaway and Neve 1997; Dauvergne 2004; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Mathew 2019). States have thus indirectly been “resiling from refugee law”, “making asylum illegal” without explicitly denouncing the refugee regime established in the aftermath of the Second World War (Dauvergne 2008). This adverse interaction between non-refoulement and mobility restriction has led scholars to characterise the current architecture of international migration law—centred on a narrow interpretation of non-refoulement—as an aggravating factor in contemporary migration crises, notably through the creation of a “dangerous path dependence” (Ramji-Nogales 2017). In this context, the movement of people—the geographical and legal pathways through which migration occurs—has emerged as the central locus of concern for the protection of migrants’ rights, thereby mitigating the once-dominant distinction between refugee protection and migrant protection (Costello 2020).

Against this backdrop, the emerging notion of mobility facilitation appears particularly promising as a means of alleviating the limitations imposed by securitising and criminalising policies on the effective realisation of the human rights of migrants. As Ramji-Nogales (2017, p. 648) suggests, “an appropriately designed legal system would anticipate migration flows as a part of modern reality” by “enabl[ing] safe and lawful journeys as part of a coherent and comprehensive approach to global migration”, “offer[ing] labor migration routes sufficient to meet labor market needs” and “focus[ing] on protecting the most vulnerable”. While international norms protecting migrants’ rights already impose limits on the exercise of States’ regulatory competence over the movement of people, an emerging obligation to facilitate mobility could further structure this competence, by prescribing “the manner of its exercise” (Goodwin-Gill 2015, p. 4). As Crépeau and Atak (2024, p. 7) put it, “‘[f]acilitating mobility’ means progressively banking on the migrants’ agency and making migration simpler, safer, faster and cheaper, for both migrants and host societies”. The underlying objective is that of empowering migrants through a strengthened protection framework and the alleviation of constructed vulnerabilities (Atak et al. 2018), often produced by criminalising or marginalising national policies. Mobility facilitation should therefore be understood not only as an approach to enhancing global migration governance, but also as an indirect avenue for mitigating the human rights-restrictive effects of national securitisation and criminalisation policies.

The shift towards the facilitation of mobility in global migration governance appears largely consolidated following the adoption of the GCM and is reflected in the positions of both the UN Secretary General (UN General Assembly 2024) and the International Organization for Migration (“IOM”) (IOM 2024), designated as “the global lead agency on migration” (UN General Assembly 2016, para. 49). Nevertheless, the legal content and normative force of this commitment to mobility facilitation remain highly uncertain. An analysis of the GCM offers a first insight, as it provides an initial “conceptual framework for facilitating mobility” (Crépeau 2018, p. 7), outlining the substantive content of the legal concept of mobility facilitation.

2.2. Mobility Facilitation Within the GCM

While diffuse and at times marked by internal tensions, the GCM nonetheless expresses a clear commitment by States to facilitating mobility (Crépeau 2018), thereby sketching the initial legal contours of this concept. Its overarching aim is to promote “safe, orderly and regular migrations”. To this end, States acknowledge the need to expand existing pathways for regular migration and to revise border management practices so as to better integrate human rights considerations. Although the presence of security-related elements within the GCM is undeniable, the emphasis placed on migrants’ security appears to prevail (Guild 2021). Materially, the Compact contains a wide range of obligations of means, guiding States towards a predictable and human-centred exercise of their migratory competence. These obligations remain, however, particularly soft when assessed against the three “dimensions of legalization”—namely obligation, precision, and delegation—identified by Abbott et al. (2000). This softness must be borne in mind when examining the conformity of State behaviour with these commitments. Non-compliance does not entail a breach of international law, but rather a failure to honour a political commitment. As observed by Guild and Wieland (2020, p. 199), while the GCM is not legally binding, it is nonetheless “politically binding on those states that have adopted it”.

Objective 5 of the GCM explicitly seeks to “[e]nhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration”. To this end, States commit

“to adapt options and pathways for regular migration in a manner that facilitates labour mobility and decent work reflecting demographic and labour market realities, optimizes education opportunities, upholds the right to family life, and responds to the needs of migrants in a situation of vulnerability, with a view to expanding and diversifying availability of pathways for safe, orderly and regular migration.”

(UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 21)

This provision reflects a genuine commitment to expanding regular migration pathways, with due regard to labour market considerations, the right to family life, and the specific needs of vulnerable migrants.

The GCM further places strong emphasis on the revision of national procedures to ensure that excessively restrictive immigration policies or precarious migratory statuses do not exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability. Objective 7, for instance, calls on States to “[r]eview relevant policies and practices to ensure that they do not create, exacerbate or unintentionally increase vulnerabilities of migrants” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 23(a)), and to “[d]evelop accessible and expedient procedures that facilitate transitions from one status to another and inform migrants of their rights and obligations, so as to prevent migrants from falling into an irregular status in the country of destination, to reduce precariousness of status and related vulnerabilities” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 23(h)). Accessibility is closely linked to predictability, with States further committing to “[s]trengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 28). Taken together, these commitments reflect a strong emphasis on improving the availability, accessibility, and predictability of migration procedures and migratory statuses, particularly for migrants in situations of vulnerability. States thus pledge to streamline domestic mobility frameworks to better safeguard migrants’ rights and reduce constructed vulnerabilities.

A comparable concern is apparent in the objective relating to border management. While State security considerations are explicitly acknowledged, they are balanced against the imperative of ensuring migrant safety. States commit to implementing border management measures that respect “national sovereignty [and] the rule of law,” but also “[their] obligations under international law, and the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 27). In practical terms, Objective 11 proposes, inter alia, strengthening cooperation “on proper identification, timely and efficient referral, assistance and appropriate protection of migrants in situations of vulnerability at or near international borders, in compliance with international human rights law” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 27(a)), as well as reviewing and revising “relevant national procedures for border screening, individual assessment and interview processes to ensure due process at international borders and that all migrants are treated in accordance with international human rights law” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 27(c)).

While a comprehensive analysis of the GCM’s provisions relating to the protection of the human rights of migrants through mobility facilitation lies outside the scope of this article, it may nonetheless be observed that the Compact reflects a substantive commitment to such facilitation. Canada’s renewed and significant engagement in the implementation of the GCM (see Section 4.1.1. A Strong Commitment to Implementation despite the Regression on Mobility Facilitation, below), therefore, conveys the appearance of a political commitment to rendering the domestic mobility framework more flexible and less detrimental to migrants’ rights. Moreover, within the securitising and criminalising context outlined above, particular attention must be paid to the fact that the GCM expressly affirms that it is “based on international human rights law and upholds the principles of non-regression and non-discrimination” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 15(f)), thereby enshrining—arguably for the first time—the principle of non-regression in an international instrument specifically devoted to migration governance. This principle entails that “the law at the time of the entry into force of the commitment must be maintained or changed only in the direction of the political commitment which has been undertaken” (Guild and Wieland 2020, p. 197). It is against the backdrop of these numerous obligations of means undertaken by Canada, combined with the incorporation of the principle of non-regression into migration governance, that recent Canadian policies must be assessed in order to evaluate the domestic impact of the GCM.

3. A Limited Impact of the GCM on Canadian Migration Policies

Despite the relevance of mobility facilitation for upholding the human rights of migrants within a global context marked by securitisation and criminalisation, the various obligations of means contained in the GCM do not appear to have had a significant impact on Canadian policies. A clear regression in the facilitation of mobility can be observed, both in relation to access to protection procedures for vulnerable migrants and the opening of pathways for regular migration (Section 3.1). This article advances a potential explanation rooted in particularly restrictive national and international contexts, which have limited progress in the facilitation of mobility within Canadian migration policies (Section 3.2).

3.1. Findings: A Regression in the Facilitation of Mobility

3.1.1. Restricting Access to Protection Procedures for Vulnerable Migrants

While the GCM does not directly address the issue of refugees or subsidiary protection, it does encompass a set of commitments aimed at facilitating access to protection procedures, as part of its broader objective of mobility facilitation. Indeed, it contains a substantial number of obligations of means geared towards facilitating “humanitarian migration”, a broad concept that “includes humanitarian visa, permanent residency granted under humanitarian considerations, refugee and asylum protection, temporary protected status, granted on ‘humanitarian grounds as specified in the applicable national or regional law, often aimed at complying with relevant human rights and refugee law.’” (Mondélice 2022, p. 154) Assessing potential discrepancies between Canadian policies and the objectives of the GCM and the Global Compact for Refugees (“GCR”) (UN General Assembly 2018a), Atak et al. (2023b, p. 7) observed that “Canada has […] adopted policies with a view to deterring and punishing some groups of asylum-seekers by limiting their access to procedures”. They specifically highlighted the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third countries, known as the “Safe Third Country Agreement” (“STCA”) (Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries 2002), and its extension in 2023 through the adoption of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third countries (“STCA Additional Protocol”) (Additional Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries 2022). The tightening of access to protection procedures from the United States—adopted in direct response to the deteriorating American context (Smith 2023; Paquet and Xhardez 2025, p. 196)—offers a first illustration of the apparent regression in Canada’s commitment to protecting migrants’ rights through the facilitation of mobility.

The notion of safe third country was incorporated into Canadian law in 1989 (An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and to Amend Other Acts in Consequence Thereof 1988, art. 14). Today, paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001) establishes the ineligibility of refugee claims where asylum seekers “came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country designated by the regulations, other than a country of their nationality or their former habitual residence”. This provision remained theoretical until 2004, when the STCA entered into force. Pursuant to this international agreement, Section 159 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (“IRPR”) (Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 2002) designated the United States as a safe third country. From Canada’s perspective, the agreement enabled the creation of an internal mechanism rendering asylum claims ineligible—with limited exceptions—for individuals arriving from the United States, together with an external component under which the United States agreed to take back claimants whose claims were deemed ineligible. The STCA was structured in a way that risked channelling asylum seekers towards irregular and unsafe routes, since the ineligibility provision applied only to those entering Canada at official ports of entry (Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries 2002, art. 4(1); Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 2002, 159.4(1)(a), as in force between 22 March 2006 and 24 March 2022).

While not a major concern during the early years of its implementation, the significant deterioration in the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers following the first inauguration of President Donald Trump in 2017 brought renewed attention to the STCA. A growing number of asylum seekers began crossing irregularly into Canada, most notably at the unofficial point of entry known as “Roxham Road”, in Quebec, in order to apply for asylum outside the restrictive framework of the STCA (Smith 2023; Boyd and Ly 2021). In this context, the Canadian government’s response must be regarded as a regression with respect to the GCM’s objective of facilitating mobility. The government renegotiated the agreement, and the STCA Additional Protocol was ultimately adopted in 2022, extending the ineligibility provisions to the entire border (art. 1). Under the new regulations, ineligibility now applies “to a claimant who enters Canada at a location along the Canada—United States land border—including the waters along or across that border—that is not a port of entry and makes a claim for refugee protection less than 14 days after the day on which the claimant enters Canada” (Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 2002, sec. 159.4(1.1)). The purpose of these new provisions was to close the unofficial entry point at Roxham Road, which had been adapted to receive asylum seekers. They have been criticised as redirecting asylum seekers towards less open and riskier routes, and into clandestinity, forcing them to wait for the 14-day period to expire before submitting a claim (CCR 2023).

More recently, the government introduced in the House of Commons a new bill, Bill C-2 (Parliament of Canada 2025b), which could further reduce access to protection procedures for vulnerable migrants, both at the border and from within the territory. Bill C-2 would considerably restrict access to protection claims by introducing two new grounds of ineligibility in the IRPA. Section 78(1) of the bill provides for the insertion into Section 101(1) of the IRPA of the following paragraphs:

“(b.1) the claimant entered Canada after 24 June 2020 and made the claim more than one year after the day of their entry;

(b.2) the claimant entered Canada at a location along the Canada–United States land border—including the waters along or across that border—that is not a port of entry and made the claim after the end of the time limit referred to in subsection 159.4(1.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.”

Section 101(1)(b.2) of the IRPA would, if enacted, eliminate the 14-day limit stipulated in the STCA Additional Protocol, thereby effectively closing off the possibility of seeking asylum from the United States, save in limited cases involving, notably, family ties or an existing immigration status. Once again, Canada responds to the deteriorating immigration context in the United States (Frelick 2025; CCR 2025a) by sealing its border. While Canada remains bound by its international obligations under the 1951 Genevra Convention (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951) and the United Nations Convention against Torture (Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984), the proposed measure would essentially shift the burden from refugee claim assessment to Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, thereby reducing legal safeguards (Waldman 2025) and limiting access to a more durable status.

The projected Section 101(1)(b.1) of the IRPA, for its part, appears to be a response to the abrupt closure of legal migration pathways, which will be discussed in the following paragraph (see Section 3.1.2. Reducing the Availability, Predictability and Flexibility of Pathways for Regular Migration, below). As Waldman (2025) puts it, “[t]his section is geared toward the hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals who came to Canada as students or temporary workers and who now find the doors to permanent residency have closed”. It aims to complete the closure of economic migration pathways by also closing off access to asylum procedures from within Canada, thereby preventing individuals at risk of persecution in their country of origin—but who entered Canada on a study or work permit—from transitioning from one status to another.

The controversy surrounding Bill C-2 and its difficult progression through the parliamentary process led the Liberal Party to introduce an alternative bill, expunged of some of the most contentious provisions of Bill C-2: Bill C-12 (Parliament of Canada 2025a). Bill C-12 does not aim to replace Bill C-2 in the long term, but rather “to enable Parliament to pass these priorities to protect Canadians while permitting additional time to evaluate the other measures announced in June 2025” (Public Safety Canada 2025). The government has been explicit about its intention to adopt the more controversial provisions contained in Bill C-2 at a later stage (Bergeron 2025). Moreover, the contentious provisions of Bill C-2 discussed in this article are fully retained in Bill C-12 (Parliament of Canada 2025a, s 72 and 73(1)). Bill C-12 reflects a firm determination to advance the securitisation of migration and to restrict mobility, rather than a genuine openness to adopting legislation less detrimental to migrants’ rights.

Since 2022, despite its commitment to implementing the GCM, Canada has progressively reduced existing regular pathways to apply for protection after entry into its territory, and this closure could soon become almost complete. The progressive closure of regular pathways to access protection in destination states—whether through the externalisation of migration control or through recourse to the safe third country concept—has been analysed as one of the most pressing challenges in upholding the rights of vulnerable migrants, driving them towards less open and riskier routes, from a geographical standpoint, and toward “legal black holes” (Tan and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2020; De Boer 2015), from a legal standpoint (see, e.g., UN General Assembly 2025; Shachar 2022; Frelick et al. 2016; Nessel 2009; Borchelt 2002). The progressive closure of the border to asylum seekers carries the risk of directing vulnerable migrants toward clandestinity (Triandafyllidou et al. 2019), while the GCM contains an explicit objective to adopt border management practices that allow for “timely and efficient referral, assistance and appropriate protection of migrants in situations of vulnerability” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 27(a)), as well as to “[r]eview relevant policies and practices to ensure that they do not create, exacerbate or unintentionally increase vulnerabilities of migrants” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para 23(a)). Similarly, Bill C-2 appears in direct contradiction with the objective of “[d]evelop[ing] accessible and expedient procedures that facilitate transitions from one status to another […] so as to prevent migrants from falling into an irregular status in the country of destination” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 23(h)). More broadly, while the closure of borders to vulnerable migrants in need of protection—notably through asylum externalisation and the safe third country concept—has been widely denounced for its negative impact on the human rights of migrants, and while the GCM contains the objective of “adapt[ing] options and pathways for regular migration in a manner that […] responds to the needs of migrants in a situation of vulnerability” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 21), the progressive restriction of access to asylum procedures in Canada constitutes a clear regression with respect to the objective of facilitating the mobility of vulnerable migrants, notwithstanding the Compact’s explicit upholding of the principle of non-regression.

3.1.2. Reducing the Availability, Predictability and Flexibility of Pathways for Regular Migration

Alongside the reduction in regular pathways allowing vulnerable migrants to access protection, Canada has also abruptly reversed its policy of creating new legal migration pathways, thereby undermining the commitment to mobility facilitation contained in the GCM. As noted by Trebilcock (2019, p. 836), “Canada’s immigration policies […] have always been driven to an important extent by the perceived need to adjust both the volume and composition of the immigrant intake to the prevailing needs of the Canadian economy”. Since the late 1960s, Canadian immigration policy has been based on a “non-discriminatory point system geared to the admission of immigrants thought likely to contribute to the Canadian economy” (ibid, p. 824). Triadafilopoulos (2021, p. 4) notes that “Canadian admission targets have steadily increased since the global economic crisis of 2008–2009, regardless of the party in power”. With most immigration policies in the Global North now shaped by electoral considerations and short-term political calculations (Trebilcock 2019, p. 824; Besco 2021, pp. 144–45), the distinctiveness of Canadian immigration policy—anchored in the intersection of economic and demographic considerations, and largely insulated from politicisation (Esses et al. 2021, pp. 738–41)—has been described as “Canadian exceptionalism” (Trebilcock 2019).

This “exceptionalism”, which must admittedly be nuanced (Triadafilopoulos 2021; Boyd and Ly 2021), was prominently emphasised by the Canadian government during the first IMRF and its preparatory process. Building on the ambitious objectives set for both temporary and permanent economic immigration following the border closures linked to the COVID-19 pandemic (IRCC 2024b; Paquet and Xhardez 2025, pp. 193–94, 198), Canada highlighted in its reports to the IMRF its continued commitment to expanding regular migration pathways (see Section 4.1. Findings: A Clear Disjunction Between the International Position of Canada and its National Practices, below). Official statistics indicate that the number of international students (study permit holders) and temporary foreign workers (work permit holders) rose from 1,156,038 in 2022 to 1,632,159 in 2023, representing an increase of 41% (IRCC 2024a, pp. 11–13). With regard to permanent immigration, Canada welcomed 471,808 immigrants in 2023, representing a 7.8% increase compared to 2022 (ibid, p. 14).

A significant reversal nevertheless occurred in 2024. The Government announced a reduction in immigration levels in order “to help align intake with Canada’s welcoming capacity, which includes housing, health care planning and other services” (UNNM 2025a, p. 4). As explained by IRCC, the 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan

“will pause population growth in the short term to achieve well-managed, sustainable growth in the long term. For the first time ever, the levels plan includes controlled targets for temporary residents, specifically international students and foreign workers, as well as for permanent residents”

(IRCC 2024b)

This policy reversal is reflected in two principal directions. With respect to access to temporary residence, it materialises in a freeze on the growth in the issuance of study permits between 2025 and 2027, coupled with a substantial reduction in the number of temporary work permits issued (IRCC 2024a, pp. 48–49). With respect to access to permanent residence, it entails a progressive decrease in the number of permanent residencies granted, from 395,000 in 2025 to 365,000 in 2027 (ibid, pp. 49–50). Overall, the Canadian government anticipates the departure of 891,523 temporary residents over the course of 2025 and 2026 (ibid, p. 51).

In this increasingly uncertain context for temporary migration, Bill C-2 would further entrench unpredictability by allowing for the discretionary suspension or revocation of both pending applications for migratory status and existing statuses, ranging from study permits to permanent residence (s. 77). In effect, the bill would create “governmental authorities to cancel, suspend and change immigration documents as well as cancel, suspend or stop accepting new applications” (Schmitz 2025). Section 77 of the bill, for example, proposes the insertion into the IRPA of Section 87.302 (1), which provides that:

“If the Governor in Council is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, the Governor in Council may, by order,

• (a) cancel or vary documents, including permanent resident visas, permanent resident cards, temporary resident visas, electronic travel authorizations, temporary resident permits, work permits or study permits;
• (b) suspend such documents for the period set out in the order or, if a period is not set out, during the period for which the order is in force
• (c) impose or vary conditions on such documents […]”

Although not yet enacted, these measures have been widely criticised by civil society actors as creating a significant risk of arbitrariness in migratory procedures (Dayal 2025; CCR 2025b). They appear to stand in direct contradiction to the commitment to predictability in migration procedures.

As recalled above, States committed, under Objective 5 of the GCM, “to adapt options and pathways for regular migration in a manner that facilitates labour mobility and decent work reflecting demographic and labour market realities, optimizes education opportunities, upholds the right to family life, and responds to the needs of migrants in a situation of vulnerability, with a view to expanding and diversifying availability of pathways for safe, orderly and regular migration” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 21). The strong opposition expressed by both businesses (CFIB 2024; Bergeron 2025) and academic institutions (Colleges and Institutes Canada 2024; Lévesque 2025) to the significant reduction in migration thresholds suggests a disjunction between economic migration policies and labour market needs, in contradiction with the GCM (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 21(c)). Moreover, the projected departure of 891,523 temporary residents translates, for the individuals concerned, into the abrupt termination of their migratory status, leaving them with no realistic alternative but either to depart from a country in which they may have resided for several years or to fall into clandestinity (Brown 2025). While the full extent of the human consequences associated with this contraction of migration pathways remains to be seen, reports already point to significant hardship and heightened vulnerability (CCR 2024; Toronto Star 2024). This abrupt reversal of Canadian immigration policy thus constitutes a major regression in terms of both predictability (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 28) and the commitment to reducing the constructed vulnerability of migrants (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 23(a)). The erosion of predictability would be further aggravated by the adoption of Bills C-2 and C-12, which would confer wide discretionary powers on the Government to suspend or revoke migratory statuses, in direct tension with the GCM’s emphasis on certainty and predictability in migration procedures (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 28).

While the GCM does not contest the sovereign right of States to control the admission of migrants, expressly reaffirming “the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para 15(c)), it nonetheless contains a range of obligations of means by which States committed to orient the exercise of that competence, together with an explicit reference to the principle of non-regression. In light of these commitments, recent Canadian policies appear to have reduced the availability, predictability, and flexibility of pathways for regular migration, in direct contradiction with the GCM’s objectives and with the principle of non-regression. While such developments do not amount to a breach of international law, they nonetheless call into question the conformity of Canadian national policies with the political commitments undertaken on the international stage.

3.2. Explaining the Findings: The Significance of National and International Contexts

3.2.1. The Fragility of “Canadian Exceptionalism”

Previous analyses of Canada’s limited domestic implementation of the GCM have largely focused on the agency of the Canadian government, emphasising its instrumentalisation of the Compact (see Section 4.2.2. The Risk of a Strategic Use of the GCM by States, below). While this dimension must be acknowledged, the broader context in which the GCM is implemented should not be overlooked (Farahat and Bast 2022, p. 17). For example, although Lefebvre and Cocan (2024) underline Canada’s “absence of political willingness” and the presence of an “instrumentalised political discourse”, they also point to a national context in which “the rise of the right and xenophobia has played a greater role in migration policy these past years”, coupled with a tangible fear of “political backlash” constraining domestic action. This contextual dimension assumes particular importance given its increasingly negative trajectory, which poses growing challenges to the effective implementation of the GCM. While several authors have already argued that the adoption of the GCM in a climate largely unfavourable to migrants’ rights constituted, in itself, a notable achievement (Guild et al. 2019, p. 55; Chetail 2023, p. 5), the situation appears to have deteriorated further since 2018. Although this context cannot serve as a justification for governmental inaction (Chetail 2023, p. 5), it must nonetheless be factored into the complex equation explaining the GCM’s limited impact on the facilitation of mobility in Canada. Moving beyond a sole focus on political unwillingness, it therefore becomes necessary to examine “the specific historico-political context in which [the GCM] operates” (Farahat and Bast 2022, p. 17).

Since 2018, and despite initial optimism, the fragility of the “Canadian exceptionalism” in migration matters has become increasingly apparent. While Canada is frequently portrayed as a model of migration governance, both domestically and internationally (Triadafilopoulos 2021, pp. 3–4; Esses et al. 2021, pp. 738–41), it is essential not to underestimate the significance of its geographic, demographic and economic particularities in sustaining this narrative (Triadafilopoulos 2021). Demonstrating a strong commitment to international solidarity and refugee resettlement (Lenard 2021) is more readily achievable for a country that is only minimally exposed to the direct and sustained arrival of asylum seekers. Recent studies have examined both the specificity and the inherent fragility of Canadian exceptionalism, thereby shedding light on the backlash that has recently affected Canadian migration politics.

In analysing the foundations of this exceptionalism, Boyd and Ly (2021, p. 96) notably identify the existence of a broad consensus among major political parties regarding the benefits of immigration for Canada, alongside high levels of public support for migration. As the following subsection will show, both elements have recently come under significant strain as a result of converging external and internal pressures. Canadian exceptionalism is further grounded in a strong “emphasis on legal migration” and on “the use of laws and regulations by governments to achieve well-managed immigration policy goal” (ibid), a feature that helps explain the possibility of particularly swift and severe governmental responses whenever perceived control over migration appears threatened—as illustrated by recent developments in Canadian migration policies (see Section 3.1. Findings: A Clear Regression in Mobility Facilitation, above). As Boyd and Ly observe:

“The emphasis on legal migration is a cornerstone of Canada’s sense of exceptionalism; the corollary is that irregular, illegal, or unwanted migration must be rigorously controlled. Public support for migration declines and strong federal government intervention occurs with the unanticipated arrival of migrants seeking to bypass existing rules and regulations.”

(Boyd and Ly 2021, p. 96)

The underlying assumption is that these Canadian specificities generate a virtuous circle, enabling a progressive and strategic approach to migration: well-managed migration fosters public support for regular economic migration, which in turn reinforces well-managed migration. This virtuous circle has historically allowed Canada to assume a leadership role in global migration governance. Yet it remains inherently fragile. When governmental control over migration is perceived as weakened, this fragile equilibrium can be readily disrupted, creating the conditions for a sharp regression in the protection of migrants’ human right—an explanatory dynamic that helps account for the regression observed in Canadian policies, in light of the current hardening of State control over mobility and prevailing fears of a loss of control (see Section 2.1. Mobility Facilitation in International Migration Law, above).

3.2.2. Political Responses to Internal and External Constraints

Building on the premise of the fragility of Canadian exceptionalism, this subsection argues that the GCM’s failure to produce tangible—or even stabilising—effects on the protection of the human rights of migrants in Canada must be understood against the backdrop of an interplay of significant external and internal pressures. Analysing Canadian immigration policies under the Trudeau Governments since 2019, Paquet and Xhardez (2025, pp. 197–99) highlight the impact of “two historic external shocks: the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021) and the invasion of Ukraine (February 2022)”. While the Canadian response to the Ukrainian crisis does not appear to have generated adverse consequences in this regard (ibid, p. 199), the recent backlash against the expansion of legal migration pathways can, to some extent, be traced back to the temporary border closures associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.

During this period, the Government’s temporary inability to attract economic migrants prompted adaptive measures aimed at mitigating the effect of the crisis by maintaining substantial levels of temporary and permanent immigration (Niraula et al. 2022; Paquet and Xhardez 2025, p. 198). Although rapid governmental responses enabled a swift return to high admission levels (IRCC 2023, p. 7), they also contributed to heightened uncertainty regarding the future orientation of Canadian immigration policy, illustrating a reactive and crisis-driven mode of migration governance (Delas and Jouzier 2022). Paquet and Xhardez (2025, p. 200) observe that “while the Liberals have raised permanent immigration targets to unprecedented levels, they are facing a backlash on this issue in the midst of the housing crisis”, pointing to a growing politicisation of migration in the lead-up to the next federal elections. While the COVID-19 pandemic alone cannot account for the abrupt curtailment of legal migration pathways in Canada, the exceptional character of policy responses adopted in its aftermath helps to explain the sharp alternation between phases of openness and restriction—an oscillation that appears largely disconnected from the GCM. Moreover, the pandemic contributed to bringing immigration to the forefront of public and political debate, thereby narrowing the Canadian Government’s room for manoeuvre in the domestic implementation of the GCM, particularly with respect to its objective of facilitating mobility.

To these external shocks must be added the impact of the first (2017) and second (2025) inaugurations of President Donald Trump, which have generated considerable “collateral damage” in the management of Canada’s border and asylum system (Muller and Guthrie 2020). The security-oriented response to the sharp deterioration in the protection of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights following the 2017 inauguration of President Donald Trump has already been examined above (see Section 3.1.1. Restricting Access to Protection Procedures for Vulnerable Migrants, above). It illustrates the regression of Canadian policies in the face of external pressures. What is of particular relevance here is the degree of constraint imposed on Canada’s capacity to shape its migration and asylum policies autonomously, especially in light of the defining elements of Canadian exceptionalism. Unsurprisingly, several analyses have emphasised the influence of United States migration policies under the Trump administration on Canadian policymaking (Muller and Guthrie 2020; Boyd and Ly 2021; Smith 2023). Drawing on the specific features of Canadian exceptionalism and earlier responses to comparable external pressures, Boyd and Ly note that the federal Government’s reaction was largely predictable: as in the past, “[t]he federal government firmly intervenes to maintain [the principle that immigration refers to well-managed legal entries and not ad hoc irregular ones] when unwanted and uninvited migrants bypass existing admission rules and regulations” (Boyd and Ly 2021, p. 114). The increase in irregular border crossings resulting from United States policies triggered a series of interrelated consequences, including the hardening of public opinion toward irregular migration (ibid, pp. 105–7); mounting pressure from the Quebec provincial Government (ibid, 107–8; Paquet and Xhardez 2025, p. 196); and the erosion of the long-standing political consensus on migration (Boyd and Ly 2021, pp. 111–12; Hill 2019). Taken together, these developments point to a considerable degree of political constraint weighing on the Canadian Government. While the consequences of President Trump’s re-election in 2024 remain to be fully assessed, it may reasonably be anticipated—given the rapidly deteriorating context in the United States—that Canada will once again be confronted with pressures and will respond through security-oriented and restrictive measures. President Trump’s second inauguration has immediately led to a growing militarisation of the border, with the deployment of drones and helicopters “in response to concerns about border security, migrants and illegal drugs” raised by President Trump (Tunney 2025). Moreover, the fact that Bills C-2 and C-12 are currently under parliamentary consideration, with the express objective of strengthening border control and further restricting access to asylum for individuals arriving from the United States, is indicative of this trajectory.

These external shocks must, finally, be situated within a broader transformation of the Canadian domestic context. Although Canada has long been praised for the relatively low level of politicisation surrounding migration, particularly in comparison with other Western liberal democracies (Gagnon and Larios 2021, p. 687; Besco 2021, pp. 143–44; Esses et al. 2021, p. 738), this characteristic now appears increasingly fragile. As defined by Gagnon and Larios (2021, p. 168), politicisation refers to “the process of political actors bringing issues from private discussions and decision making in closed circles to public debates and scrutiny”, a process that “increases public visibility of issues, intensifies public debates about them and enhances their electoral importance”. The degree of politicisation of migration can be assessed in terms of both salience and polarisation (ibid, p. 701). While this article does not seek to offer a comprehensive account of the politicisation of migration in Canada, it appears nonetheless relevant, in explaining the limited domestic implementation of the GCM, to note the rapid increase in both dimensions. The contraction of mobility facilitation and the regression in the protection of migrants’ rights analysed above coincide temporally with a marked rise in the salience and polarisation of migration.

As Boyd and Ly (2021) document, irregular migration has gained significant prominence in both public opinion and political party platforms. Regular migration has likewise become a highly salient issue, particularly following the construction of a perceived link between migration and the housing crisis (Boulianne 2024). Migration increasingly appears as an unavoidable and divisive topic in federal elections, whereas it was previously characterised by broad cross-party consensus. Turning to public opinion, Besco’s (2021) analysis shows that while aggregate stability appeared to prevail from 2005 onwards, this masked a growing polarisation “below the surface”. Once relatively uncontentious, migration has therefore undergone a process of accelerated politicisation in recent years, marked by polarised public attitudes and the fragmentation of political consensus among major parties. The convergence of external shocks and internal politicisation thus appears to have significantly constrained the rationality of Canadian immigration policymaking (Crépeau 2018; Crépeau and Atak 2024), thereby limiting the capacity of the GCM to effectively shape domestic migration governance.

4. The Limited Impact of the GCM on Canada’s International Accountability

If the GCM does not appear to have produced a tangible impact on the domestic governance of migration in Canada—consistently with the first studies on the subject (Atak et al. 2023a, 2023b; Lefebvre and Cocan 2024)—this outcome may seem unsurprising given the Compact’s soft law nature. Yet this observation is less self-evident at the international level, where the GCM, in light of its central role in global migration governance and the breadth of its obligations of means, could have been reasonably expected to generate more substantial effects. Shifting the focus to Canada’s positions and reporting at the international level nevertheless reveals a similarly limited impact. Despite a weak domestic record, Canada continues to present itself internationally as strongly committed to the implementation of the Compact, submitting uniformly positive reports on its progress. This contrast points to a pronounced disjunction between Canada’s international positioning and its national practices, thereby calling into question the extent to which the GCM’s review process effectively generates international accountability (Section 4.1). This disjunction appears to be facilitated by shortcomings in the Compact’s implementation and review mechanisms (Section 4.2), which, in turn, invite a reconsideration of how the GCM may be mobilised to advance the human rights of migrants.

4.1. Findings: A Disjunction Between Canada’s International Position and Its National Practices

4.1.1. Sustained International Commitment Despite Regression in Mobility Facilitation

From the outset of the GCM negotiations through the initial phases of its implementation, and despite recurring doubts regarding its domestic implementation (Atak and Nakache 2021; Atak 2022; Atak et al. 2023a), Canada has consistently projected an image of exemplary engagement with the Compact (Atak and Nakache 2021; Atak 2022). Unsurprisingly, Canada agreed to become a “Champion Country” of the GCM, pledging to “continu[e] to work with the United Nations Network on Migration and other States in the promotion of the Compact’s 23 objectives and the positive benefits of managed migration” (UNNM 2020b). Although the limited impact of the GCM on the domestic governance of migration has now been established, Canada’s outward commitment to the Compact and its implementation has not diminished in the seven years following the GCM’s adoption.

During the first IMRF and its preparatory process, Canada demonstrated notable proactivity. It submitted a first “submission of voluntary inputs” in 2020 (UNNM 2020a), as part of the Regional Review Process of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”) Region, followed by an updated version in 2022 (UNNM 2022a), which notably incorporated additional elements relating to the COVID-19 crisis. On that occasion, Canada emphasised that “[r]egular migration pathways create fairer, more transparent and predictable opportunities for migrants, and allow states to address their unique economic and labour market needs” (ibid, p. 2), thereby expressly acknowledging the importance of facilitating mobility. During the general debate of the IMRF, Canada reiterated its strong commitment to the implementation of the GCM, again explicitly referring to mobility facilitation. While reaffirming that “Canada remains a steadfast supporter of the Global Compact for Migration”, it concluded by underscoring the need for a more flexible and humane approach to migration: “we can collectively promote a more effective and compassionate system of immigration globally, meet the needs of countless displaced persons around the world, and at the same time, come to understand that in welcoming newcomers, we serve not only their interests, but our own” (UNNM 2023, p. 3). Canada further endorsed the first Progress Declaration (UN General Assembly 2022), reiterating that “Canada remains a steadfast supporter of the Global Compact for Migration, and fully supports the Progress Declaration” (UNNM 2022b).

Although the second edition of the IMRF has not yet taken place, Canada has thus far displayed a comparable level of engagement in the preparatory process. It submitted a first voluntary report in 2024 for the Regional Review Process of the UNECE Region (UNNM 2024a), followed by a slightly revised version in 2025 for the Regional Review Process of the Latin America and the Caribbean Region (UNNM 2025a). While acknowledging the absence of a formal national implementation plan since 2018 (UNNM 2024a, p. 1)—a choice repeatedly justified by the assertion that “Canada is well-aligned with the 23 objectives of the GCM” (UNNM 2020a, p. 5) or that “Canada is generally well-aligned with the 23 objectives of the GCM” (UNNM 2024a, p. 1)—Canada has nonetheless maintained a discourse of sustained commitment to implementing the Compact and its objective of facilitating mobility. Even though a less favourable policy orientation towards the expansion of regular migration pathways has emerged between 2020 and 2024 (UNNM 2025a, p. 4), Canada’s most recent reports suggest some progress in the organisation of its domestic review process, notably through a commitment to undertake “another alignment review” and “to identify gaps and challenges that may require further attention” (UNNM 2024a, p. 1).

The limited domestic impact of the GCM, analysed in Section 3, must therefore be read in conjunction with this sustained and visible international engagement. The contrast between Canada’s consistently positive international positioning and the regression observed in its domestic migration policies reveals a marked disjunction between discourse and practice, thereby calling into question the capacity of the GCM to generate meaningful peer pressure in favour of mobility facilitation. This disjunction further raises doubts as to the GCM’s ability to concretely advance mobility facilitation and to mitigate the human rights violations stemming from securitising and criminalising migration policies. It is reinforced by the content of the reports submitted by Canada in preparation for the next IMRF, which do not acknowledge any regression in this regard—quite the contrary.

4.1.2. The Continuous Presentation of Positive Assessments Despite Regression in Mobility Facilitation

As the Canadian case illustrates, a strong commitment to implementing the GCM—at least at the level of international positioning—does not preclude a regression in the facilitation of mobility. Yet no reference to this retrogressive development is made in Canada’s most recent official reports, a silence that underscores the superficial character of the review process (see Section 4.2. Possible Explanation: The Limits of the GCM and the Allowing for its Strategic Use, below). While the GCM makes reference, for the first time, to the principle of non-regression in international migration law (Guild and Wieland 2020, pp. 196–97; Chetail 2023, p. 6), the analysis of the Canadian case suggests an inability of the Compact to effectively safeguard the human rights of migrants against domestic backsliding by generating meaningful international accountability.

First qualitative studies indicate that the GCM, which has been criticised for its ambivalence and limited operationalisation, has not been effectively mobilised by civil society actors or legal practitioners as an advocacy tool (Atak et al. 2023a, p. 472; Arbaoui 2022, pp. 30–33). Canada’s voluntary reports exemplify this dynamic, as the flexibility inherent in the Compact permits the projection of a uniformly favourable international narrative, irrespective of domestic regression. This is particularly evident in Canada’s treatment of its abrupt contraction of legal migration pathways. Whereas earlier reports emphasised Canada’s strong commitment to “[s}upporting regular migration pathways”, capitalising on the recent increases in the number of temporary resident permits (UNNM 2022a, p. 2), more recent submissions portray the curtailment of such pathways as progress towards the implementation of Objective 15. This shift is framed as a necessary adjustment aimed at aligning the number of temporary residents with national housing and healthcare capacities (UNNM 2025a, p. 4). Significantly, Objective 5—central to the facilitation of regular migration pathways—disappears entirely from the analysis. In other words, regardless of whether Canadian policies operate to expand or restrict mobility, they are consistently presented as advancing the objectives of the GCM. Moreover, the restriction of access to protection procedures following the adoption of the 2022 STCA Protocol is not mentioned at all, despite its profound implications for the effective realisation of the GCM’s objective of facilitating access to protection for vulnerable migrants.

Turning to the 2024 report of the UN Secretary-General, Canada’s international engagement is portrayed in notably positive terms. Canadian practices are cited as examples of good practice on five occasions, in relation to the objectives of “[e]nhancing regular migration pathways and minimizing adverse drivers” (UN General Assembly 2024, para. 11), implementing “[r]ights-based border management and protecting migrants in vulnerable situations” (ibid, para. 25, 34 and 36), and “[e]nhancing data, international cooperation and partnerships” (ibid, para. 55). It is particularly striking that Canada is praised in precisely those areas—regular migration pathways, rights-based border management, and the protection of vulnerable migrants—in which a regression in domestic policy has been identified in recent years.

The Secretary-General’s report does not ignore the troubling environment within which the GCM is currently being implemented. It expressly warns of a “worrying tendency to externalize migration governance and intensify border controls, coupled with increasing securitization and deterrence measures that often expose migrants to risks of human rights violations” (ibid, para. 24). Yet this depiction frames such developments as diffuse and self-reinforcing “trends”, with no explicit attribution to concrete State practices. As the Canadian case demonstrates, these “tendencies” and “trends” are, in fact, the product of identifiable national policy choices. Where neither States, in their voluntary inputs, nor the Secretary-General, in his reports, meaningfully identify the challenges faced by migrants, and where civil society participation in the IRMF process remains marginalised (Atak et al. 2023b, p. 12), the GCM review mechanism risks failing to uphold its professed anchorage in international human rights law.

A stark discrepancy thus emerges between the reality of regression in Canadian migration policies and the narrative of sustained goodwill and continuous progress portrayed on the international stage. Insofar as the GCM is rarely mobilised domestically to confront restrictive State practices, and insofar as its review process functions primarily as a vehicle for positive self-reporting disconnected from national realities, the Compact appears ill-suited to holding governments accountable and to meaningfully advancing the human rights of migrants through mobility facilitation.

4.2. Explaining the Findings: The Limits of the GCM and the Risk of Strategic Use

4.2.1. The Inherent Limitations of the GCM’s Implementation and Review Mechanisms

First assessments of the GCM’s implementation, particularly in the Canadian context, have highlighted both significant shortcomings in the Compact’s review process and a broader lack of political willingness among States to implement its objectives domestically. The interaction between these two factors helps to explain the discrepancy observed between Canada’s sustained international commitment and its regressive domestic practice. With the benefit of seven years of hindsight, it has become increasingly apparent that the implementation and review mechanisms established by the GCM suffer from a number of structural deficiencies. This article does not revisit the extensive debate surrounding the nature of the GCM as a soft law instrument. That issue was addressed briefly in Section 1 and, more broadly, reflects the long-standing debate on the role of soft law in international law generally, and in international migration law more specifically (Chetail 2023, p. 2). The GCM is what it is. The more pressing question lies not in reiterating its non-legally binding character, but in examining the specific conditions under which it is implemented and reviewed. As noted by Atak et al. (2023b, p. 10), certain soft law instruments have proven highly influential, and the GCM’s soft law status alone cannot account for all of its deficiencies.

A number of weaknesses can be identified in the very wording of the Compact. With respect to implementation, States declare that they will implement the GC at national and regional levels “taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting national policies and priorities” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 41), in line with the recognition of national sovereignty as one of the Compact’s guiding principles (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 15(c)). As regards follow-up and review, the GCM merely “encourages” States “to conduct regular and inclusive reviews of progress at the national level, such as through the voluntary elaboration and use of a national implementation plan” (UN General Assembly 2018b, para. 53). These provisions are explicitly designed to afford States considerable flexibility in both implementation and the review of the Compact. As a result, the GCM imposes no obligation to adopt a national implementation plan, thereby allowing even “Champion countries”, such as Canada, to dispense with this mere “encouragement”. Moreover, by expressly inviting States to prioritise their own national visions when implementing the Compact, the GCM opens the door to selective and largely unaccountable forms of implementation. Taken together, these features give rise to a process that rests predominantly on State goodwill, with few corrective mechanisms available in cases of implementation failure.

Unsurprisingly, the first cycle of reporting leading up to the 2022 IMRF revealed a number of significant limitations. Drawing on an analysis of national reports and related outcome documents, Atak et al. (2023b, pp. 11–12) identified four principal shortcomings: an overly broad focus that prevents a concrete assessment of national practices; an emphasis primarily on positive developments and successful measures; a predominantly qualitative and anecdotal approach that enables the avoidance of contentious issues; and an uncertain integration of civil society inputs. More broadly, the entire review process—from voluntary national inputs to the reports of the UN Secretary-General—appears marked by a lack of precision and a tendency towards “cherry-picking”, whereby attention is overwhelmingly directed at positive actions (see, e.g., ibid; Chetail 2023; Farahat and Bast 2022; Arbaoui 2022). As illustrated by the Canadian case, this dynamic substantially weakens the review process’s capacity to identify regressions or address structural shortcomings in State practice. In line with these observations, the first IMRF Progress Declaration (UN General Assembly 2022) has been characterised as “weak and disappointing” (Chetail 2023, p. 4). The second cycle of follow-up and review, which will culminate in the forthcoming second edition of the IMRF, does not appear to substantially depart from this pattern. As shown above, Canada’s most recent reports further entrench the logic of positive self-assessment. Moreover, echoing criticisms already formulated with respect to previous reports (Atak et al. 2023b, p. 11), the 2024 report of the UN Secretary-General devotes disproportionate attention to positive measures adopted by States, while confining its critique of the broader context—one that remains deeply unfavourable to the protection of the human rights of migrants—to a limited number of general statements (UN General Assembly 2024, para. 4 and 24).

4.2.2. The Risk of a Strategic Use of the GCM by States

In the Canadian case, both the findings developed in Section 3 and a review of the existing literature on the domestic implementation of the GCM point to a lack of political willingness to align national policies with the standards articulated in the Compact. In light of the structural shortcomings identified in the GCM’s implementation and review mechanisms, it may therefore be argued that the Compact facilitates a form of selective and strategic use by States, an instrumentalisation of the newly adopted international framework that has already been identified in the literature.

The notion that the GCM may be primarily mobilised for diplomatic purposes features prominently in the first assessments of Canada’s engagement with the Compact (Atak et al. 2023a; Lefebvre and Cocan 2024). Atak et al. (2023a, p. 454) observe that Canadian initiatives related to the GCM appear driven by “foreign policy considerations rather than domestic alignment efforts”. Similarly, Lefebvre and Cocan (2024, p. 110) argue that the Compact is “used to push a certain image on the international level, while hiding an absence of domestic implementation, concurrently shaming other states to do their part”. Considered together, these analyses suggest that the shortcomings of the GCM—whether stemming from its soft law nature or from deficiencies in its implementation and review mechanisms—may be strategically leveraged to reinforce Canada’s leadership in global migration governance and to exert pressure on countries of origin and transit to curb migratory flows towards Canada, even as it limits its engagement in substantive domestic implementation (Atak et al. 2023a; Lefebvre and Cocan 2024).

This notion gains further support when the Canadian case is situated within a broader comparative perspective. Campos-Delgado (2024) and Arbaoui (2022) likewise identify a marked disjunction between States’ international discourse and the reality of domestic legal and policy framework in Mexico and Morocco, respectively. Reflecting on the findings of a special issue devoted to “The Geopolitics in the Global Compacts”, Micinski and Lefebvre (2024, p. 8) go so far as to denounce a “blatant hypocrisy”, concluding that the Global Compacts function less as “ideal-type treaties or humanitarian to-do list” than as “foreign policy tools that pursue strategic goals” (ibid, p. 11). From a broader perspective, Campos-Delgado argues that the GCM embodies a persistent tension—if not a form of hypocrisy—underlying global migration governance. She emphasises that

“the Mexican case is not an exception but instead a showcase of the ambivalence in the global management of migration, which, while promoting euphemistic rhetoric through international agreements that claim to seek the protection of migrants’ human rights, at the same time encourages cobordering partnerships whose raison d’être is to dissuade and restrict mobility and which end up materialising in dysphemistic practices towards the migrant population”

(Campos-Delgado 2024, p. 81)

Canada’s most recent reports further substantiate this line of analysis by openly endorsing a selective approach to the implementation of the GCM. Canada has recently warned that “the wide range of GCM objectives and action items may inadvertently dilute collaborative focus and hinder effective regional actions in support of GCM implementation” (UNNM 2024a, p. 10; 2025a, p. 1), explicitly stating that “[s]equencing or phasing a number of common regional priorities could help improve coordinated actions” (UNNM 2024a, p. 10; 2025a, p. 1). Such language, which did not appear in earlier reports, marks a clear shift towards an explicitly selective conception of GCM implementation. This selective orientation, combined with the Compact’s acknowledged ambivalence (Chetail 2023; Farahat and Bast 2022, p. 11), has already been identified in the literature as a structural risk (Chetail 2023, p. 6), one that threatens to marginalise both the protection of migrants’ rights and the meaningful participation of civil society in the implementation and review processes. The State-driven character of the GCM’s review architecture, coupled with this ambivalence, enables States to privilege those objectives that align with their own agendas—including security-oriented goals that may undermine migrants’ rights. Overall, the 2024 and 2025 Canadian reports reveal a markedly selective pattern of engagement, highlighting positive—and at times inconsequential—measures aligned with specific GCM objectives (see Section 4.1.2. The Continuous Presentation of Positive Assessments despite the Regression on Mobility Facilitation, above). By contrast, no reference is made to regressions affecting the domestic protection of migrants’ rights. The only implementation challenges acknowledged are either presented as external constraints (UNNM 2024a, p. 10; 2025a, p. 1) or are framed as resulting from what Canada portrays as the excessive breadth of the GCM, combined with the inherent complexity of migration itself (UNNM 2024a, p. 1).

5. A Call to Rethink the Use of the GCM to Enhance the Human Rights of Migrants Through Mobility Facilitation

Several studies that have highlighted the limitations of the GCM in effectively enhancing the domestic protection of migrants’ rights have subsequently proposed avenues for strengthening its implementation and review processes (Atak et al. 2023b; Farahat and Bast 2022; Chetail 2023). Such reflections are undoubtedly necessary. The GCM remains a relatively young instrument, and there is little doubt that it will require further consolidation over time. For instance, early criticism concerning the absence of clear indicators was expressly acknowledged in the first IMRF Progress Declaration (UN General Assembly 2022), which prompted the subsequent adoption of a comprehensive set of indicators (UNNM 2024b). While the practical effects of these indicators have yet to materialise, this development nonetheless appears to constitute a step in the right direction. The Canadian case, however, casts a stark light on both the GCM’s limited impact at the domestic level and its inability to hold States accountable—or even to provide meaningful insight into the practical challenges associated with its implementation. In light of this limited capacity to directly advance the domestic protection of migrants’ rights or to strengthen States accountability, and given the particularly adverse context shaping Canadian migration policies, this article argues that the GCM should also be approached as a vehicle for indirect mobilisation. Such mobilisation would operate beyond the conventional remit of human rights compliance instruments (Shelton 2003; Ailincai 2012; Seibert-Fohr and Weniger 2021).

A brief detour into compliance theory is instructive at this juncture. The findings set out in Section 3 point to both a lack of effectiveness—understood as “the degree to which a rule induces changes in behavior that further the rule’s goals; improves the state of the underlying problem; or achieves its policy objective” (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, p. 539)—and a lack of compliance—defined as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule” (ibid.)—with respect to the GCM’s objective of facilitating mobility. It must be understood here that effectiveness and compliance, while closely related concepts, are not identical. An international instrument can be effective even if compliance is low: significant non-compliance does not necessarily mean that the instrument has not induced significant changes in States’ behaviour, especially where the international instrument sets particularly high and prospective objectives. Conversely, an international instrument may display high levels of compliance while lacking real effectiveness, notably where it sets low and already respected standards. As summarised by Raustiala and Slaughter: “From an effectiveness perspective more compliance is better, ceteris paribus. But regimes with significant non-compliance can still be effective if they induce changes in behavior.” (ibid.) From this perspective, a particularly ambitious, vague and soft instrument such as the GCM could induce changes in States’ behaviours while not entailing a significant level of compliance: while not changing States’ behaviours sufficiently to induce a high level of compliance with the objective of mobility facilitation, it could nevertheless advance the progressive integration of the GCM framework into the exercise of States’ migratory competence. However, Canadian practice reveals not only an absence of conformity between State behaviour and the objective of mobility facilitation, but also the GCM’s inability to induce changes in States’ behaviour, which must be reflected upon.

The findings presented in Section 4 expose the weaknesses of the GCM as a “compliance system”. As Doelle (2021, p. 975) explains, such a system consists of: a “primary rule system”, encompassing “the substantive obligations, the rules established for meeting them, and the processes set up for the implementation of these rules”; a “compliance information system”, relating to “the development, collection, analysis, and dissemination of information regarding the level of compliance with the obligation”; and a “non-compliance response system”, which “deals with the question of how to respond to incidents of non-compliance”. An examination of the GCM’s objective to facilitating mobility reveals that each component of its compliance architecture remains markedly deficient: the primary rule system remains vague and soft, allowing for selective, à la carte implementation; the compliance information system proves dysfunctional, as domestic regression in Canada is not meaningfully conveyed at the international level; and the non-compliance response system is exceedingly weak, with regression not only failing to trigger corrective measures but instead coinciding with international praise.

To date, the GCM’s lack of effectiveness—and its limited capacity to ensure compliance—has primarily been analysed through the lens of compliance theory, leading most reform proposals to focus on strengthening implementation and review mechanisms. Atak et al., for example, compare the GCM’s compliance system with that of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (“CSCE”) (Schlager 2003), which proved comparatively effective despite its soft law nature, and advance proposals aimed at improving the GCM’s system (Atak et al. 2023b). This article contends, however, that in a context particularly unfavourable to advancing the human rights of migrants through mobility facilitation—a context that simultaneously constrains domestic implementation and limits the prospects for reforms to GCM’s implementation and review mechanisms—it is insufficient to assess the GCM solely through a compliance lens. A broader focus, centred on the concept of effectiveness rather than confined to questions of compliance, is therefore required in order to fully understand why the GCM has thus far failed to induce change in State behaviour.

While the GCM reaffirms the international human rights law framework, that framework was already legally binding prior to the Compact’s adoption. Yet widespread violations of migrants’ rights by national migration policies persisted nonetheless (Chetail 2019, p. 74; Weissbrodt 2008, pp. 197–203). The pre-existing human rights regime remains arguably more relevant as a compliance system for directly confronting harmful migration policies. The GCM, incomplete and fragmented, largely reflects the current state of global migration governance (Campos-Delgado 2024). Perhaps it should not be expected to achieve more than it structurally can. Had States been willing to adopt a binding agreement designed to better protect the human rights of migrants, or even a non-legally binding instrument endowed with an effective compliance system to ensure their realisation, they would have done so, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (“ICRMW”) (International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990) would have been widely ratified (Chetail 2019, p. 70). Despite this observation, should the GCM be entirely dismissed as a tool for advancing the human rights of migrants?

Crépeau and Atak (2024, p. 4) caution against such a conclusion, notwithstanding the current dissonance between the GCM’s principles and States’ practice. A soft law instrument, the GCM may instead be primarily mobilised in the realm of “principles and values” (ibid), challenging dominant narratives surrounding migration. While its inherent ambivalence enables States to promote particular agendas, it equally allows other actors to mobilise its progressive global framework as a counter-narrative (Chetail 2023, p. 7; Delas and Jouzier 2022, pp. 119–22). Viewed in this light, the GCM’s limited effectiveness should be understood not only as a manifestation of its weaknesses as a compliance system, but also as the product of a political environment profoundly hostile to the facilitation of mobility—an environment that remains amenable to transformation. The Compact should therefore first be mobilised to challenge the prevailing order in global migration governance and dominant national perspectives, before it can plausibly contribute to tangible improvements in the protection of migrants’ rights.

A complementary mode of mobilisation would thus consist in using the CGM as a tool for contesting political narratives that directly contradict States’ renewed commitments, by offering an alternative vision of migration governance grounded in planning and cooperation rather than criminalisation and securitisation (Delas and Jouzier 2022). Such mobilisation would, however, require the numerous obligations of means contained in the Compact—despite their vagueness and softness—to be taken seriously by both civil society and political actors. Civil society should embrace the GCM not only as an imperfect compliance system, but also as an imprecise yet ambitious roadmap towards a more open and human rights-centred migration governance. First and foremost, the GCM “is intended to serve as a common framework for the ‘good governance’ of migration” (Roele 2017); it “provides a remarkably strong and coherent—if incomplete—conceptual framework for facilitating mobility” (Crépeau 2018, p. 7). Rather than focusing exclusively on the weak limits that the GCM places on States’ exercise of their migratory competence—limits largely stemming from the pre-existing human rights framework—civil society should also engage with the specific manner, promoted by the GCM, in which that competence is exercised. In other words, the shortcomings of the GCM as an effective compliance system should no prevent its mobilisation at the domestic level, nor the full involvement of civil society actors in its implementation and review processes, insofar as the Compact remains an essential instrument for advancing a global approach to migration governance more centred on mobility facilitation—an advancement that is crucial to achieving a more effective realisation of the human rights of migrants.

Likewise, political parties traditionally associated with more balanced approaches to migration should mobilise the Compact as an authoritative, cooperative framework and forward-looking roadmap, capable of countering the increasingly short-term and election-driven narratives that dominate migration debates in many Western liberal democracies. Migration has become a convenient scapegoat for diverse domestic challenges; reversing this dominant framing appears to be a necessary precondition for strengthening the GCM’s effectiveness over time. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the UN Secretary-General, in concluding the introduction to his 2024 report, explicitly framed the GCM as a counter-narrative to the criminalising and securitising discourse on migration:

“Dehumanizing and divisive narratives on migrants and migration have featured in many recent elections, with migrants cast as scapegoats for broader societal problems and fears. The Global Compact for Migration offers a powerful counter narrative through which migrants are recognized as rights holders and their significant and diverse contributions to our communities are emphasized. The Compact serves to promote balanced, evidence-based dialogue and decision-making and advocate for rights-based and people-centred approaches to migration governance as the most effective means of delivering the best outcomes for all.”

(UN General Assembly 2024, para. 6)

6. Conclusions

In line with the first articles analysing the impact of the GCM on Canadian migration policies, this research concludes that the Compact has not exerted a significant influence on domestic migration policies. On the contrary, recent developments analysed through the lens of mobility facilitation indicate that Canada’s sustained international commitment to promoting the GCM has not prevented a regression in mobility facilitation and the protection of migrants’ rights—despite the explicit reference to the principle of non-regression within the Compact. This domestic regression has not, however, been met with any corresponding adjustment in Canada’s international positioning or reporting within global migration governance frameworks. The resulting disjunction between national practices and international positioning further calls into question the GCM’s capacity to generate meaningful international accountability with respect to States’ domestic migration governance. In this sense, the GCM appears to have established a weak compliance system, a feature that has contributed to undermining confidence in the framework put in place by the Compact, thereby hindering its effective mobilisation by civil society actors.

While initial assessments of the GCM’s capacity to promote migrants’ rights have primarily focused on the shortcomings of this compliance system and have advanced proposals aimed at strengthening the Compact’s implementation and review mechanisms, this article argues that such an approach should be complemented by recognising the necessity of an indirect mobilisation of the GCM. As the Canadian case indeed demonstrates, the GCM’s limited effectiveness can be attributed not only to the structural shortcomings inherent in the Compact itself but also to a largely unfavourable political context. Although the structural shortcomings must not be underestimated, the article contends that the GCM can also be mobilised indirectly, as a means of challenging the dominant criminalising and securitising context that continues to shape migration governance. Rather than being approached solely through the prism of compliance, the GCM can—and should—also be engaged as a “remarkably strong and coherent—if incomplete—conceptual framework for facilitating mobility” (Crépeau 2018, p. 7). Mobilised in this manner, the Compact may contribute to reshaping both international and domestic contexts that currently constrain any prospect of meaningful advancement in the protection of the human rights of migrants.