Justice Delayed in the COVID-19 Era: Injunctions, Mootness, and Religious Freedom in the United States Legal System

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed critical deficiencies in the United States’ legal system’s handling of emergency injunctions, particularly concerning religious freedom. This article examines the challenges courts faced in balancing public health measures with constitutional rights, focusing on the use of shadow dockets and the frequent dismissal of cases due to mootness. Analyzing key Supreme Court decisions and lower court rulings, we highlight the inconsistencies and delays that arose when addressing First Amendment challenges to pandemic-related restrictions. Arguments for procedural reforms, including expedited hearings and avoiding mootness dismissals in cases of national importance, are provided to protect fundamental rights during future public health crises.

1. Introduction

Few would disagree that the checks and balances system established in the United States Constitution benefits its citizens by preventing the consolidation of power by any of the three branches of government (Fulton 2021). Nowhere is that more evident than when a law or regulation passed at the state or municipal level violates the Constitution. When such events occur, the court system allows aggrieved parties to present their case to the judiciary for interpretation and rulings of the laws in question. While there are clear benefits to the trial and appellate court systems, the drawbacks inherent in the system are evident. Those requiring expedited decisions are left with few options, often resulting in drawn-out and costly processes that frustrate those seeking relief. Recently, the problems of the system were highlighted during the COVID-19 era (Viglione et al. 2022). The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic led to the implementation of policies that restricted interactions and often quarantined individuals to prevent infection and the spread of the disease (Fulton 2021). These regulations, which ordered the full or partial closing of churches, schools, government offices, and businesses, were met with challenges to their constitutionality (Davisson 2021; Garland et al. 2024). The violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights was a key issue (Fulton 2021). This paper focuses specifically on the First Amendment right to freedom of religion, which was significantly impacted by these regulations.

Under normal circumstances, a case reaches the Court only after complete hearings and rulings by the trial and appellate courts. Still, in these instances when “time is of the essence,” the party seeking immediate relief will file an injunction to prevent the enforcement of an ordinance or law. These types of hearings can encompass a wide range of matters, including family law issues (e.g., custody determinations, parental relocation) and contractual matters (e.g., orders to prevent company mergers, injunctions to prevent the demolition of a building). Such requests may be heard on a “shadow docket” as they operate outside of the normal scope without a full briefing and are often utilized by state supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court (Burling 2022). While the need for emergency relief in some instances is apparent, the shadow docket has become a venue for addressing significant legal issues, including those related to religious liberty (Romoser 2020). Courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and consider the effect of granting or withholding the requested relief, paying particular regard to the public consequences.”1 For preliminary injunctions, “a plaintiff must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”2 However, as this paper will demonstrate, the current handling of injunctions and shadow dockets by the legal system is insufficient in resolving Constitutional issues that may pose an immediate threat during a public health crisis. As such, this analysis will examine the problems associated with injunctions involving COVID-19 cases. The authors reviewed existing US Supreme Court and lower court rulings involving COVID-19 restrictions that were challenged on the grounds of religious beliefs at both the state and federal levels. There were a significant number of cases filed by restaurant owners challenging occupancy restrictions (County of Allegheny v. Cracked Egg, L.L.C., 2021) and bar owners challenging bar closure restrictions3, prisoners filing suit alleging the jails were “deliberately indifferent to prisoners’ health”4, and voters alleging that Ohio’s restrictions did not allow them to obtain signatures to amend ordinances.5 While these cases are essential in addressing injunctive relief, these issues fall outside the scope of the focus on the religious aspect of the appeals. For clarity, the authors primarily focused the analysis on Supreme Court COVID-19 cases, as they allowed for legal vetting of lower-level cases while emphasizing the importance of expedited hearings. More specifically, we discuss the cases and subsequent court rulings surrounding vaccinations, the events leading up to the COVID-19 regulations, the government’s power to regulate vaccination requirements and order medical quarantines, and existing First Amendment Supreme Court cases that address religion in various contexts. Particular focus will be given to the response and need for change, addressing injunctive relief during a public health crisis.

2. Coronavirus

Initially detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China, Coronavirus 2019, an extremely contagious zoonotic infection, was first transmitted from animals to humans and then from human to human. As a result, COVID-19 rapidly mutated and spread amongst the human population, resulting in a worldwide pandemic. Due to the infectious nature of the disease, federal and state governments in the United States began to take action, guided by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). As governmental officials nationwide declared states of emergency and issued “shelter-in-place” orders, businesses, schools, churches, and other organizations were forced to cease activities (Carlos et al. 2020; Garland et al. 2024; Rothan and Byrareddy 2020). Moreover, voluntary and involuntary regulations limiting or preventing contact, including medical quarantines, were implemented (Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 2020; Garland et al. 2024). Although vaccines became available in late 2020 (e.g., Pfizer), and initially, all adult citizens in the U.S. were theoretically meant to be vaccinated by mid-2021, many citizens opted out of being vaccinated. Many considered the vaccine unsafe, as several companies had developed vaccines using mRNA technology, in addition to the perceived “shortcuts” in the FDA approval process (Allen et al. 2021; Torreele 2020). Moreover, mandates were not well-received, with many critics citing the required vaccinations as a Constitutional violation of the First Amendment freedoms of religion and assembly (Garland et al. 2024). In response to these claims, governmental entities relied on prior Supreme Court opinions to validate the regulations.

3. The State of Exception During COVID-19

In 2020, a prominent critic of governmental use of emergency powers, Giorgio Agamben, argued that government intervention in the COVID-19 pandemic were “frantic, irrational, and completely unjustified” resulting in “a climate of panic, causing a true state of exception, with serious limitations on movements and a suspension of the normal functioning of living and working conditions in entire regions” (cited in Duque Silva and Higuera 2021, p. 501). According to Agamben (2005), the state of exception is the governmental suspension of the law in the name of necessity while simultaneously existing within the legal order. As such, extraordinary measures can circumvent constitutional protections, creating a zone of indistinction in a delicate balance of legality (Agamben 2005). Public health emergencies such as COVID-19 that threaten society at large allow for constitutional protections to be suspended (Agamben 2005; Humphreys 2006). Critics argue that this has become the norm rather than the exception (Agamben 2005). Such policies enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic not only restricted individual rights through lockdowns and curfews but also through the use of mandatory vaccinations, which were considered a violation of religious freedom. Using executive decree, critics argued that this public health emergency was used as a permanent state of exception, in which political ideology, shrouded under the guise of public interest, replaced individual autonomy, thereby infringing on civil liberties. While these exceptions are typically associated with the executive and legislative branches within the USA, they may also be furthered by the judicial branch, as seen in the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on habeas corpus rights in Rasul v. Bush (2004) (Humphreys 2006).

Although such executive mandates and judicial rulings are controversial, proponents of mandates have noted that fear-based arguments of government overreach in the name of public health and safety are not a new phenomenon. What we see is a reemergence of fear that fails to take into account the public health needs and legal history of vaccination use within the United States, and is more akin to conspiracy theorizing based on distrust of the government (Gorby 2023). According to Sekalala et al. (2020), the restriction of rights is something that is not taken lightly under international law and must be proportionate, necessary, and non-discriminatory. Although the rules for proportionality in the United States differ from those of the international community, the Supreme Court has been clear that judges weigh the costs and benefits of government prohibitions (Movsesian 2022). See Employment Division v. Smith, 1990. While governments may overstep in their attempts to balance public safety and citizens’ rights, legal precedents necessitating public health mandates, including vaccinations, have long been established in the USA. This, however, does not prevent judges from making value-laden judgments that have often been linked to their own political identities (Movsesian 2022). However, as will be discussed below, these decisions are not without structure, as the legal precedent has been clear on the parameters within which judges may operate. For instance, compulsory vaccination of the public, including K-12 students and university students, has been commonplace since the early 1900s (DeSilver 2021; Fawole et al. 2018; Garland et al. 2024). Although some have challenged the legality of such requirements, exemptions have enabled them to be implemented, thereby allowing the public to have access to healthcare without them being considered unconstitutional (Sekalala et al. 2020). However, recent challenges to vaccination requirements have not led to exemptions, resulting in court intervention.

4. Constitutional Challenges to Vaccination Requirements

Constitutional challenges to the use of vaccinations are not a recent phenomenon; however, Western nations, such as the United States, have not been subject to questioning of the legal protections that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic (Martínez-Torrón 2021). The case that initially addressed the government’s right to require vaccinations of its citizens was Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.6 Citing the safety and health of the community, the Court ruled that unless the state regulations were “arbitrary and oppressive,” the police power of the state allowed for these regulations. See also Crowley v. Christensen.7 After Jacobsen, the Supreme Court held in Zucht v. King that compulsory vaccinations for school attendance were appropriate, citing the public’s interest (Zucht v. King 1922). While Jacobsen (nor Zucht) addresses freedom of religion, Justice Harlan stated that vaccines could not be mandated for those who could be negatively impacted (Blackman 2022). In October 2021, the Supreme Court denied injunctive relief to a challenge to Maine’s vaccine mandate for healthcare workers (Does v. Mills 2021). This denial to provide relief is consistent with the spirit of Jacobsen as “the liberty secured by the Constitution…does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint (Does v. Mills 2021). These cases demonstrate that although U.S. citizens do not relinquish all Constitutional rights when the health and safety of the community are at risk, Constitutional protections may be restricted for the greater good.

5. Authority to Impose Medical Quarantines and Vaccinations

The federal government’s authority to impose medical quarantines is based on the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.8 The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 1937; Perez v. United States 1971). As the Commerce Clause has been broadly interpreted, the power to use it as a mechanism for restriction has been repeatedly upheld by Congress and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), under the Public Health Service Act, may create and administer regulations “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession” (42 U.S.C. § 264 (a) 2018). In 2000, the HHS delegated its authority to order quarantines to the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. With this authority, the CDC can detain, medically examine, or conditionally release individuals reasonably believed to carry a communicable disease.9 Those diseases, such as infectious tuberculosis, smallpox, cholera, and diphtheria, are specifically listed in an Executive Order by the President based on HHS recommendations (42 U.S.C. § 264 (b) (2018). Only recently has the use of the Commerce Clause come into question. Instances of this shift in perspective include United States v. Lopez, 1995, where the federal government passed a law forbidding a person who owns a gun from possessing it in a school zone, United States v. Morrison, 2000, where the federal government passed a law giving women harmed by gender-based violence standing to sue their assailant in federal court, and the Affordable Care Act cases in 2012,10 as the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government overstepped its authority or limited the application of the Commerce Clause. However, in 2005, the Court in Gonzales v. Raich upheld a federal law under the Commerce Clause, saying Congress could pass a law prohibiting marijuana use even if states’ laws allow it.11 Under the authority of the Jacobson case and the Commerce Clause, the federal, state, and local governments began requiring vaccinations and limiting human contact. Some regulations provided medical or religious exceptions. However, many did not. Petitioners alleged that these mandates interfered with their First Amendment religious beliefs and practices and, therefore, required Constitutional consideration. Since these cases could not have hearings on the merits promptly, plaintiffs requested injunctive relief. A few of these injunctions made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court. With the United States Supreme Court Justices changing every few years, the application of religious freedom to the Commerce Clause and the C.D.C. guidelines would create critical legal decisions in the United States.

6. Politicizing COVID-19 in the USA

Although partisan politics has become an increasingly prevalent reality in the US, as both the Democratic and Republican parties have established ideological differences, historically, there has been overwhelming bipartisan support for vaccinations across the USA, including southern states that have traditionally supported states’ rights (Garland et al. 2024). While this bipartisan support can be attributed to the history of infectious disease outbreaks throughout the 20th century, which often resulted in significant fatalities, the general public has generally agreed that vaccinations were necessary and that balancing public health protections with individual rights was a necessity (Martínez-Torrón 2021). However, with the emergence of COVID-19 and the subsequent government restrictions and requirements aimed at protecting the public from harm, a significant shift occurred in the public’s acceptance of vaccination mandates (Martínez-Torrón 2021). Although President Trump had proclaimed that COVID-19 was under control and the shutdown would be temporary, the pandemic continued to bring the nation to a standstill, with only essential personnel returning to work (Haynes 2021). What can largely be attributed to a lack of understanding of the dangers of the disease and how to prevent its spread, the nation was placed on lockdown, resulting in loss of jobs, a declining economy, individual mental health concerns, and an ever-increasing distrust of the government (King et al. 2023). Despite these closings, over 400,000 people had succumbed to COVID-19 by the beginning of 2021 (Haynes 2021). While lockdowns and public gathering restrictions mitigated virus transmission and inevitably saved lives (King et al. 2023), the fallout from their implementation was extraordinary, as communication regarding the best way to approach the ongoing virus was contradictory (Haynes 2021). While federal mandates were clear that lockdowns, social distancing, and other COVID-19 restrictions must be implemented, the responsibility for enacting such plans fell on state governors (Haynes 2021). As places of worship (e.g., churches, mosques, synagogues) were closed at the behest of state governments, what was clear was that “public health can take supremacy over religious freedom in today’s America” (Haynes 2021, p. 12).

Once a fringe movement aligned with political extremists or Christian denominations that emphasized prayer and faith healing over medical intervention (e.g., Christian Scientists), anti-vaxxers have seemingly become normalized and inextricably linked to right-wing politics especially among the Christian right (Bolsen and Palm 2022; Garland et al. 2024; Roberts et al. 2022). Largely a result of the temporary prohibition of religious services and mandatory vaccinations, the Christian right viewed these prevention policies as an affront to religious freedom (Haynes 2021). Despite the use of technology to broadcast sermons and the eventual lessening of restrictions allowing services to be held outside, such measures were not viewed as a public health initiative but rather as a means for a secular government to control the practice of religion (Haynes 2021). Coupled with right-wing conspiracy theories broadcast across varying social media outlets claiming that the virus was not real, pastors and politicians alike began to advocate for a return to in-church activities. The dangers were ignored, resulting in an increasing number of deaths within congregations. Although Christianity is not inherently tied to political ideology, recent years have seen a shift in which acquiring political power by aligning with a religious group has yielded benefits at the polls (Haynes 2021). Research has indicated that conservative and evangelical Christians are increasingly linked with the Republican Party. While many Christians have been found to embrace policies that support the sick and the vulnerable, right-wing Christians, specifically Christian Nationalists have noted that they do not trust medical experts or Centers for Disease Control and are unlikely to use precautionary measures to prevent disease (Bailey 2020; Haynes 2021; Perry et al. 2020). According to David Broniatowski, “framing vaccine refusal as a civil right allows vaccine opponents to sidestep the science and instead debate about values” (cited in Donovan 2020). As such, religious freedom becomes a key argument in the debate over COVID-19 restrictions. Data indicate that individuals with more conservative attitudes and higher approval ratings of Trump are more likely to hold anti-vaccination attitudes (Roberts et al. 2022). Hence, it is no surprise that the Christian right voted for President Trump in 2016 (Haynes 2021; Perry et al. 2020) and has become closely aligned with the Trump administration in his second term, as President Trump has increasingly promoted policies that prioritize religious freedom and oppose vaccination (Haynes 2021). Using the fear associated with COVID-19 as a continuous rallying cry to promote religious freedom amongst these groups and maintain a conservative political mandate is apparent with the appointment of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., an outspoken proponent of the anti-vaccination movement, as the US Secretary of Health and Human Services by the Trump administration. However, as has been seen, legal precedent is not necessarily aligned with political attitudes or current trends. The Supreme Court has established clear rules for determining whether petitioners have a legally recognized argument in establishing whether a policy violates religious freedom.

7. Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Association Standards

The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const., amend. I, § 1). In 1993 Congress passed U.S.C. § 2000, also known as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, stating that the “government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from rule of generally applicability except…if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.” In religious cases, the Court must determine if the regulation or law will substantially burden the plaintiff’s exercise of religion. This can be achieved by challenging the neutrality (directed explicitly at a religious practice) or applicability (discriminates on its face) of the policy or law. If this burden is met, the Court will find a violation of the First Amendment unless the policy meets the strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny test is a two-part test with separate inquiries into the weight of the government interest and the narrowness of the tailoring of the regulation. If the burden is not met, the Court will apply the rational-basis test, where the challenged law or regulation must serve a legitimate government interest and have a rational link between the law and that interest. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. (2022), a high school football coach lost his job when he knelt at midfield after games to pray alone. The coach sued the school district, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights to freedom of religion and free speech. The school district argued that he was an employee and, while on duty, he was prohibited from engaging in religious conduct. Utilizing their precedents, the Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff must show that a government entity has burdened a sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.” In this case, the Court found that the plaintiff met this first burden by proving that the prohibition of the coach’s activity was due to its religious nature and that other activities (e.g., visiting with friends, taking personal phone calls) by other similarly situated employees were allowed. This finding then required the defendant to demonstrate that this policy served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest in the least restrictive way. The school argued that any religious conduct should be deemed impermissibly coercive on students. The Supreme Court found the logic flawed and ruled that religious expression was indispensable, concluding that the school’s policy was discriminatory. Of note, this case had two concurring opinions and three dissenting opinions. Depending on the composition of the Court, application of these standards can result in different rulings that may have to be distinguished in future cases.

The U. S. Supreme Court has also held that expressive association is the “right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees (1984). Expressive association is not, however, an absolute right, because “there may be countervailing principles that prevail over the right of association” (Walker v. City of Kansas City 1990). The Supreme Court has also cautioned that “[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms” (Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 1984). Similarly to the freedom of religion, the strict scrutiny standard can apply to freedom of association if the challenged regulation imposes “severe burdens” on association rights. (See Slattery v. Hochul, 61 F. 4th 278, 288 (2nd Cir. 2023), citing Jacoby& Meyers v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Depts., App. Div. of the S.C. of N.Y., 852 F.3d 178 (2nd Cir. 2017))12. If the regulation or law does not result in a severe burden on the right to association, the rational basis test would apply.

8. Supreme Court Freedom of Religion Decisions

When interpreting cases involving freedom of religion, the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of religious freedom if the law is not neutral and of general applicability, even if most citizens disapprove of the religious practice, as was the case where a particular religion practiced animal sacrifices.13 The Court has distinguished cases where parties espoused their beliefs (proselytizing) and where parties acted upon their beliefs (bigamy).14 The Supreme Court has continued to uphold religious freedom when ruling for the right of ministers to serve as elected officials, finding that children did not have to recite the pledge of allegiance in school, stating that a South Carolina statute disallowing unemployment benefits, when a Seventh-Day Adventist employee was fired for not being able to work on Saturdays, was unconstitutional, and deciding that compulsory attendance laws after the 8th grade violated the Amish First Amendment rights (McDaniel v. Paty 1978; Sherbert v. Verner 1963; West Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette 1943; Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972). However, when the social security tax payment was challenged for being against a person’s religious belief, the Court upheld the law and found this an overriding governmental interest (United States v. Lee 1982).

In recent Supreme Court rulings, the Court has reiterated the requirement that laws be applied neutrally. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm., holding that bakery owners did not have to make a cake for a gay couple against their religious beliefs,15 Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist.,16 and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Penn., where the Court did not require Catholic Social Services to certify same-sex couples as foster parents against their religious beliefs when contracting with the city of Philadelphia.17 The Court also affirmed the requirement that the laws must be the least restrictive means of serving the government’s interest when it ruled that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was violated by regulations requiring the defendant corporations to provide health insurance coverage for methods of contraception that contradict their religious beliefs (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 2014). Having referenced several Supreme Court cases interpreting the First Amendment freedoms, it is evident that many of those challenging the COVID-19 restrictions have valid legal arguments for doing so, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of various policies was essential to address present and future issues.

9. COVID-19 Case Issues

9.1. Standards

In the COVID-19 cases considered, the Supreme Court initially examined whether the laws/regulations were applied neutrally, thereby allowing for the rational-basis test to determine whether the state action was rationally related to a legitimate state objective. If the Court determined the law was not applied neutrally, the test would be under strict scrutiny, where the Court presumed the policy to be invalid unless the government showed a compelling interest in justifying it. In some instances, the Court found that the application was not neutral to religion and failed to meet the strict scrutiny test when restrictions limited attendance at houses of worship, thereby violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment’s Freedom of Religion. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo.18 In another example, the State of California imposed restrictions that prohibited most of the state from holding indoor worship services during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the State allowed most retail operations to proceed indoors with 25% occupancy and other businesses to operate at 50% or more. The Court found that a 25% capacity restriction was permissible for all groups based on the circumstances. Still, the total prohibition on indoor religious worship violated the First Amendment and did not meet the strict scrutiny burden. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsome.19 The Court also granted injunctive relief when a state’s restrictions did not allow gatherings of at-home worshippers, but the state allowed gatherings of a secular nature. See Tandon v. Newsome.20 Finally, in the case of Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak (2020), the Supreme Court denied an injunction regarding the capacity restrictions in the church. Still, the 9th Circuit later ruled on the merits of the case and found for the plaintiffs because businesses were not treated similarly.es21 However, as noted by Haynes (2021), religious challenges to COVID-19 restrictions (e.g., church gatherings) and vaccination mandates “were not usually successful, demonstrating that religious freedom in America may be secondary in the face of a pressing public health emergency.”

9.2. Vaccine Mandates

As the COVID-19 epidemic spread, the Supreme Court and the lower courts were forced to address whether vaccine mandates were legal under the First Amendment. In Dr. A. v. Hochul, the Court denied an injunction when there was no exception for religious reasons to the state of New York’s requirement that healthcare workers receive vaccinations. While the mandate did allow for medical exemptions, the Court did not view a religious exemption as necessary, as the state’s need to maintain public safety outweighed individual religious objections. Upon appeal, the Court ultimately denied a hearing. In response, Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito dissented, noting that the issue needed to be heard “before the next crisis forces us again to decide complex legal issues in an emergency posture.”22 The dissent demonstrates the need for expedited hearings in matters of national importance. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several cases addressing vaccination mandates and religious exemptions were heard in the lower courts. Such cases, which ruled for and against injunctions, did not meet the standards to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Doe v. San Diego Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied injunctive relief to a student claiming SDUSD’s vaccination mandate violated the student’s First Amendment protections. Due to religious reasons, the student challenged the school district’s vaccination policy, as other exemptions were being made, and the staff had a religious exemption. Similar to Hochul, the court ruled that public health safety outweighed religious objections. Moreover, not only was the policy reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests, but the plaintiff did not demonstrate that irreparable harm would occur without the injunction. Upon denial, the student petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to issue an injunction preventing the enforcement of the school’s mandated vaccination policy. The Court denied the injunction against the school district because the challenged policy was not implemented, and at present, emergency relief was not warranted.23 It should be noted that SDUSD’s vaccination mandate was struck down by the San Diego County Superior Court and affirmed by the Fourth Appellate District, holding that the policy conflicted with state law. (See Let Them Choose v. San Diego School Dist. 2022).

As demonstrated by the injunctions brought by various parties in multiple states, the issues surrounding these restrictions require resolution at the federal level, and most likely, at the Supreme Court level. However, even if some cases reached the Supreme Court for consideration based on injunctive relief, many were summarily dismissed for mootness, as vaccinations were widely available and restrictions had been lifted. See Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals I-26.24

9.3. Mootness and Standing

The United States Constitution, Article III restricts the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies,” so when issues are no longer “live” or the parties do not have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the case, the case becomes moot, and the court will not hear it (Harris v. UMass. 2022). In Murthy v. Missouri (2024) citing their earlier decisions, the Supreme Court stated that, “Federal courts can only review statutes and executive actions when necessary “to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by … official violation of law.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009). They went on to say, “[i]f a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it or expounding the law in the course of doing so.” Daimler Crysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). Similarly, standing is based on the traditional understanding of a “case” or “controversy”. Standing defines those who are allowed to bring a lawsuit to address legal wrongs. To satisfy standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiff needs to establish, “(1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, but he must also seek (3) a remedy that is likely to redress that injury” (Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 2016). In essence, to avoid the dismissal of a case, the plaintiff must have a “live” issue and have standing. If those do not exist, the Court opinion can be viewed as advisory, and the Court could be seen as exceeding its authority. To avoid mootness, a party cannot rely on alleged harm that is not impossible of repetition; the party must show, “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to the cessation or expiration, and there [i]s a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party w[ill] be subjected to the same action again” (Harris v. UMass. 2022). As created, listed, and described in Scott MacGuidwin’s note in the Michigan Law Review (2023), there are several general categories of mootness: (1) the plaintiff ends the lawsuit (e.g., settlement, plaintiff wants to stop litigating), (2) the court cannot grant relief due to unforeseen circumstances (e.g., person essential to the claim dies), (3) the parties’ identity or motives change causing the parties to mot be adverse (e.g., collusion), (4) the status of the plaintiff changes (e.g., student in admission case gets admitted to school), and (5) the defendant ends the litigation by giving the plaintiffs what they want.

When the courts applied these requirements to requests for injunctive relief during COVID-19, many cases were never heard due to mootness and lack of standing. In the cases of Harris v. UMass (2022), challenging a university vaccination requirement, and Resurrection School v. Hertel (2022), challenging a statewide mask mandate, the courts ruled the matters moot because the students involved had transferred or graduated in the first instance, and the mask mandate was lifted in the second instance. In a private school case involving the governor of Kentucky, who was sued for First Amendment violations after ordering school closings due to COVID-19, the Supreme Court ruled that since the order expired that week and there was no indication it would be renewed, the injunction would be denied without prejudice. The Court effectively ruled the case moot (Danville Christian Academy v. Beshear 2020). In Hawse v. Page (2021), when church members challenged the county’s emergency orders restricting church activities to no more than 10 people, the appeals court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and even if they could show standing, the action was moot because there was no reasonable expectation that the county would reinstate the order. Similarly, in Monclova Christian Academy v. Toledo-Lucas County Health Department, although the 6th Circuit Court agreed that regulations closing a religious school were not applied neutrally when reviewed again, the Court found the matter to be moot.25

Instead of risking the case being dismissed for mootness, many cases were voluntarily dismissed even though a hearing on the merits would have probably had favorable results for the plaintiffs. See Dahl v. Bd. Trustees of Western Michigan University,26 and Harvest Rock Church v. Newsome.27 Although it might be beneficial for the plaintiffs to continue, even with a risk of dismissal, the cost of litigation and the time expended are prohibitive for most litigants.

10. Decisions on the Merits of Cases Are Essential

Based on various court rulings from district courts, courts of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court, it is apparent that although lawmakers have received some guidance on the boundaries of state regulations when they conflict with religious freedom, further clarification is needed. One function of the Supreme Court is to clarify Constitutional provisions when lower courts across the country have varying interpretations of their meanings. Hearing these cases can provide the needed clarification. As argued by Mark Movsesian in his essay, Law, Religion, and the COVID-19 Crisis, “The Court’s inconsistent decisions in the COVID-19-related cases reflect a cultural and partisan divide respecting religion and religious freedom (Movsesian 2022).” Although the article was examining the court rulings in the U.S. and other countries and looked specifically at religious worship, the noted inconsistent decision-making during the pandemic, combined with political differences, further demonstrates the need for cases such as these to be heard.

Although many cases were dismissed for mootness and/or lack of standing, these should not be barriers for judicial decision-making. Recently, in the Supreme Court case of Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, the Court held that a request for nominal damages satisfied the “redressability” required for Article III standing where a plaintiff’s claim was based on a completed violation of a right. In this case, former college students who sought to exercise their freedom of religion by distributing literature and speaking about their faith on campus grounds after obtaining the required permit were ordered to stop and threatened with disciplinary action. The lawsuit was then filed in this case. The students sought injunctive relief and nominal damages, but because the school discontinued the policy, the court dismissed the case for lack of standing and mootness. The Supreme Court ruling in this case defeated the standing/mootness argument. Although this ruling may not save all such cases, it further demonstrates the need for judicial action (Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski 2021).

Additionally, as argued by Matthew Hall in his article, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, the courts have been hearing moot cases for many years so long as the claim is inherently short-lived, and the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation that the wrong would recur. Also, he states that there are other “exceptions” when federal courts allow the rights of non-parties to be considered to avoid dismissal and when the court does not want to dismiss claims based on discretionary factors such as costs or evidence of gamesmanship (Hall 2009). Although he ultimately argues for two distinct doctrines for mootness, which is beyond the scope of this paper, his recognition of different interpretations of mootness by the courts sheds more light on the need for continued review of these issues.

Additionally, if a case is dismissed for mootness or standing, there is little incentive for the defendant to change their policy or practices. Even if that were to happen, it is unclear whether the change would comply with the law, given that the case was never fully heard. Furthermore, although some argue that dismissals save judicial time, the authors contend that future lawsuits on similar issues do not ultimately save judicial resources or time in the long term. Finally, the argument that these court decisions would be advisory opinions is lacking. These are not imaginary facts and situations; they are real. However, for a policy change, a settlement, or due to a similar event, at the end of the pandemic, they would likely be heard in the courts.

While no clear-cut answer exists to the problem of injunctive relief, considering these cases legally and utilizing new procedures could help alleviate concerns. The courts (lower and appellate) could develop strict timelines for injunctions and possibly allow for full hearings. As the attempted containment of COVID-19 was enacted promptly, it is not unquestionable that the same should be expected of court hearings. A significant lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic was that not all business must be conducted face-to-face, including court hearings. While many courts were willing to use video conferencing (e.g., Zoom) to conduct proceedings online, others did not, resulting in court proceedings coming to an abrupt halt. The importance of judicial rulings, especially U.S. Supreme Court rulings, requires extraordinary measures, often in exceptional times. While this article does not suggest that all injunctions be treated as emergencies, challenges to the constitutionality of laws and ordinances should be addressed rapidly in instances such as a pandemic. However, with the need for expedited hearings comes criticism of quick hearings such as those on shadow dockets.28 (See also Vladeck 2022). Many critics claim that these decisions are not transparent, opinions are formed at unpredictable times, the hearings lack a full briefing, there is no amicus participation, and oral argument is lacking.29 Having full hearings on these cases would alleviate these criticisms. Suppose logistically, it is not possible for the Court to have full hearings immediately. In such cases, these should not be dismissed due to mootness, particularly in instances filed during the COVID-19 pandemic, even if the immediate issue is moot, as interpreting Constitutional rights under religious freedom is vital to the United States. It is just a matter of time before a similar problem arises, and the country will need guidance from the Court.

11. Conclusions

In conclusion, the COVID-19 pandemic drew attention to the shortcomings of the current legal system in addressing urgent constitutional issues during a public health crisis. Although injunctions and the shadow docket were intended to provide prompt relief, their use often resulted in inconsistent decisions and the dismissal of cases as moot, leaving unresolved essential issues regarding religious freedoms. The federal courts’ efforts to navigate these issues underscore the need for a more streamlined and efficient process that balances fundamental rights under the Constitution with the urgency of public health emergencies. Actions include implementing stricter timelines for injunction hearings, adopting innovations such as virtual court proceedings, and ensuring that cases of national importance are not dismissed due to mootness. Since exceptions to mootness already exist, and arguments such as saving court time and money do not hold up in the long term, the need for hearings is apparent. Furthermore, if critical Constitutional decisions such as these were decided after the emergency subsided, it would potentially result in better decision-making since the court could avoid a rush to judgment. Although the complexities of the judicial system pose significant challenges, protecting constitutional rights, particularly during times of crisis, necessitates reevaluating current practices. As the nation prepares for future emergencies, the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic must be applied to ensure that the legal system can effectively and justly address the delicate balance between public safety and individual liberties.