The Weak Engagement Paradox: Public Support and Pro-Environmental Behavior in Bulgaria

Abstract

This article analyzes the determinants of public support for environmental policies in Bulgaria—a post-socialist context marked by low salience of ecological issues, socio-economic pressures, and fragile institutional trust. Based on descriptive statistical analysis of a nationally representative face-to-face survey conducted in 2023 (N = 1002), it explores environmental awareness, motivations, and readiness for pro-environmental behavior (PEB). The findings reveal a distinctive pattern—a weak engagement paradox—where low awareness nonetheless coexists with high declared willingness to act. This readiness is mainly shaped by financial motives, local contexts, and generational differences, while trust remains concentrated in scientific expertise rather than political institutions. The study argues that declarative support, even when influenced by social desirability, can serve as a policy resource. Low-cost behavioral interventions, such as nudging, could leverage this latent willingness by making sustainable choices more visible and socially rewarding, gradually strengthening trust and engagement.

1. Introduction

Environmental policies are a key instrument for addressing global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and resource depletion [1,2]. Their effectiveness depends not only on expert decisions and international commitments but also on public support, which legitimizes policies and enables implementation through individual and community action [3,4]. Institutional trust and perceived legitimacy are crucial in determining whether citizens translate concern into behavior [5,6].

In recent years, however, geopolitical tensions, economic insecurity, and social inequalities have shifted public attention toward short-term concerns, thereby reducing the salience of ecological issues [7]. This decline follows well-documented agenda-setting and attention cycle dynamics [8]. Even the European Union’s Green Deal, hailed as a landmark initiative in 2019, has since been overshadowed by multiple crises [9]. The result is a persistent paradox: awareness of environmental risks does not consistently translate into policy support or behavioral change [10,11,12].

Despite growing international recognition of the need for public engagement in environmental action, empirical evidence on how awareness, trust, and motivation interact to shape pro-environmental behavior (PEB) remains uneven across contexts. In post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), these dynamics are particularly underexplored, as socio-economic insecurity and fragile institutional legitimacy often constrain civic participation. This study therefore addresses the problem of how contextual factors—especially low salience of environmental issues and limited institutional trust—affect citizens’ readiness to engage in PEB in Bulgaria, a case that offers valuable insights into regional patterns of engagement.

Research on the determinants of PEB highlights the combined influence of individual attitudes, socio-demographic factors, institutional trust, and cultural value change [3,4]. Classical theories of cultural change remain influential, with Ronald Inglehart [13] demonstrating how post-materialist values foster ecological sensitivity. Environmental concern is thus shaped not only by rational risk assessments but also by underlying value orientations. At the same time, personal factors—such as efficacy, norms, and beliefs—play an equally important role.

Comparative analyses [14] confirm that trends toward greater environmental awareness are neither uniform nor unidirectional. National context is decisive: economic development and institutional trust shape both the effectiveness of environmental policies and their public acceptance [15,16]. Yet a gap persists between awareness and action [10,17]. Citizens often express concern but fail to adopt concrete practices, a discrepancy influenced by normative, financial, or informational motivations. Moreover, social desirability bias can distort self-reports, as declarations of readiness sometimes reflect a wish to appear “responsible” rather than genuine intent [18,19].

These dynamics characterize the broader CEE region [20,21,22] yet are especially evident in Bulgaria. Eurobarometer surveys [23,24] show that while declared concern is close to the European average, perceptions of seriousness and personal responsibility remain markedly lower. Data from the EIB Climate Surveys [25,26] similarly suggest weak engagement, although methodological limitations—such as the overrepresentation of younger, urban groups in online panels and the use of standardized questions not always relevant to Bulgaria—limit their reliability. Historically, Bulgaria hosted a strong ecological movement during the late socialist period [27,28], among the earliest forms of civic mobilization in Eastern Europe. Today, however, environmental arguments play only a marginal role in legitimizing policy. As already observed in recent research, public institutions invest minimal effort in fostering civic participation in environmental matters [29].

Taken together, these factors make Bulgaria a critical case for examining the determinants of PEB within the broader CEE context. The present study aims to analyze public support for environmental policies, focusing both on barriers to engagement and on potential entry points for stimulating it. Specifically, the research seeks to answer the following questions: How do Bulgarians prioritize environmental problems relative to other public concerns? Which socio-demographic and informational factors influence awareness and readiness for action? Which motivations (financial, normative, informational) are more effective in the Bulgarian context? How does readiness vary across different forms of engagement? And which institutions, actors, and information sources are perceived as the most trustworthy?

The study contributes in three main ways. First, it provides nationally representative data for a context characterized by weak engagement. Second, it shows how declarative readiness—even when affected by social desirability—can serve as a policy resource. Third, it assesses the potential of nudging strategies to stimulate PEB under conditions of institutional weakness and limited trust.

The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops a conceptual framework linking awareness, motivation, and action. Section 3 presents the methodology and describes the nationally representative survey conducted in 2023. Section 4 reports the key results on public attitudes regarding priorities, trust, motivations, and forms of action. Finally, the Section 5 connects these findings to theoretical debates, emphasizing social desirability as a potential lever for behavior and the role of nudging in low-trust contexts.

2. Theoretical and Conceptual Model

The topic of public support for environmental policies typically falls within the multidisciplinary research field of PEB. Without engaging in definitional debates, we adopt a broad understanding of PEB as actions taken by individuals or groups to minimize harm to the environment and/or to benefit environmental sustainability [30,31,32,33]. Such behavior may take place in the private sphere (lifestyle and household practices) or the public sphere (civic engagement and activism) and may include both direct actions with immediate effects (e.g., giving up a private car in favor of public transport) and indirect actions with mediated effects (e.g., signing a petition against environmentally harmful construction).

2.1. Awareness and Behavior

A classic reference for the awareness–behavior relationship is Kollmuss and Agyeman [10], who made three central observations:

• Environmental awareness does not automatically translate into PEB.
• Intentionality is an important characteristic of PEB.
• Support for environmental policy is itself a form of indirect PEB.

First, awareness of environmental problems rarely mobilizes action on its own. Even when reliable information is widely available, behavioral change depends on diverse circumstances, including prioritization of the problem and cultural or political incentives [17] (pp. 27–30). Second, intentionality remains debated. Stern [19] distinguished between intent-oriented definitions (behavior undertaken “for the environment”) and impact-oriented definitions (behavior that affects the environment regardless of intent). Finally, awareness is closely tied to policy support, which connects the behavioral and political dimensions.

Recent research has refined these insights. Mannoni [34] shows that in some cases individuals adopt sustainable practices without strongly aligned attitudes. Hoffmann et al. [35] and Frick et al. [36] highlight structural constraints, perceived efficacy, and self-regulation mechanisms that explain why awareness does not reliably translate into behavior. This confirms that awareness is necessary but not sufficient for PEB, and that intention–behavior gaps persist across contexts.

2.2. Political and Institutional Determinants

People act not only in natural and social but also in institutional environments, where incentives, rules, and legitimacy play a critical role. Institutional trust in particular is a powerful determinant: when citizens trust their government and perceive policies as fair and effective, they are more likely to comply with regulations and adopt sustainable practices voluntarily [6,37]. Conversely, low trust acts as a “behavioral cost,” discouraging engagement even among environmentally aware citizens, especially in post-socialist democracies marked by legacies of weak governance and corruption [21].

Political elites and parties also shape attitudes and expectations. Their public statements influence partisan belief climates [38], while the presence of green parties tends to increase the salience of environmental issues in political discourse [39,40]. More broadly, support for political actors committed to environmental agendas correlates with higher levels of individual engagement in PEB, especially in collective forms such as petitions or protests. This highlights the important connection between political support and PEB.

2.3. Individual and Collective Dimensions

Kollmuss & Agyeman [10] also point to the need to distinguish between individual PEB (recycling, meat reduction, water/energy conservation, reduced car use) and collective PEB (voting, protesting, signing petitions, joining organizations). Two psychological models are often invoked: the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory [41], which roots behavior in values, awareness, and moral obligation, and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) [42], which highlights the role of intention and perceived control.

However, this distinction should not be treated as a disciplinary divide (psychology vs. political science). Individual and collective behaviors are interrelated. Those who recycle may also become politically active, though this is mediated by context [43]; others “outsource responsibility” to institutions and avoid political action [44]; still others reject lifestyle changes as insufficiently radical [45]. Research warns of weak or inconsistent “behavioral spillover” [46], while collective activities may be reduced when governments impose “controlled” PEB through top-down measures [47].

The broader picture is captured by social dilemmas. Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons [48] illustrates how individual rationality can deplete collective resources. Ostrom [49] demonstrates that institutions and trust enable cooperation. Participation increases when individuals believe others will also act and that rules are fair [50]. Similarly, free-riding constrains collective action [51], while perceptions of efficacy and fairness remain critical motivators [52,53,54].

2.4. Sources of Influence

Environmental attitudes and behaviors are shaped by multiple social influences. These may be grouped into three broad categories:

• Expert and knowledge-based sources: Scientists and experts are generally trusted and associated with stronger concern and support for policies [55]. NGOs play a bridging role by translating science into accessible language, mobilizing citizens, and linking environmental issues with justice [56,57]. Mass media frame issues and set agendas, with framing effects shaping perceptions [58,59].
• Social and personal sources: Families and peers transmit values across generations [60] and shape everyday practices [61]. Social norms exert strong effects, but peer pressure can discourage action when norms are unsupportive. Influencers and celebrities mobilize younger and lower-status groups, though long-term impacts remain debated [62,63].
• Political sources: Political leaders and parties provide cues, legitimize issues, and set the agenda [38,39,40]. Yet their absence in associating themselves with environmental policy (as in Bulgaria) weakens their potential role.

The effectiveness of these influences depends on credibility, social context, and predispositions such as ideology or prior concern.

2.5. Structural Preconditions and Policy Interventions

Governments employ both instrumental measures (taxes, subsidies, sanctions) and informational/normative interventions (education, campaigns, nudges). Economic incentives can be effective [64] but may crowd out intrinsic motivation if overused [65,66]. Convenience and infrastructure (e.g., transit, recycling systems) often drive uptake more than awareness alone [67], consistent with the Attitude–Behavior–Context (ABC) model [19].

Nudging has emerged as a prominent tool. Meta-analytical studies confirm its effectiveness across domains [68], while field experiments demonstrate the power of social-norm and communication nudges [69,70]. However, their effectiveness depends on institutional trust [71].

Education and awareness campaigns are crucial for long-term change [72]. Enforcement mechanisms such as fines are effective when perceived as fair but can provoke resistance in low-trust environments [73]. Appeals by trusted figures can enhance legitimacy and mobilize wider publics [74].

2.6. Cross-National Evidence and Intention–Behavior Gaps

Comparative studies underscore how context shapes behavior. High institutional trust is consistently linked to stronger PEB across Europe and globally [75]. Osberghaus et al. [76] demonstrate that Europeans often express readiness to adopt adaptation measures but implementation lags. Cantillo et al. [20] show how governance and socio-economic contexts condition both attitudes and behavior across the EU.

Cultural values and policy traditions further mediate effectiveness: collectivist cultures respond more strongly to social-norm appeals, while individualist societies emphasize personal benefits [77]. These findings highlight that structural and institutional factors largely determine whether environmental intentions translate into real action.

2.7. Toward an Integrated Model

Taken together, the literature points to three interconnected dimensions:

• The relationship between awareness and behavior.
• The balance between individual and collective forms of PEB.
• The interplay between agency and structural/institutional conditions.

Analyzing PEB requires integrating psychological, political, and institutional perspectives. This integrated model provides the theoretical foundation for our empirical survey, justifying its focus on how Bulgarian citizens perceive, prioritize, and act upon environmental issues.

3. Method

3.1. Research Design

Empirical data on the incentives and determinants of PEB in Bulgarian society were collected through a nationally representative quantitative survey using semi-standardized face-to-face interviews. This method was selected to ensure representativeness and response quality, given the diversity of the Bulgarian population and the limited reach of online survey instruments. Nationally representative face-to-face surveys are a well-established tool in public opinion research, offering wide coverage, complex questionnaire design, and opportunities for quality control [78,79]. They are commonly used in large-scale international programs such as the Eurobarometer, the World Values Survey, and the European Values Survey. Interviewer-administered surveys also help clarify questions, reduce item non-response, and increase engagement, which is particularly important for topics involving value-laden or socially desirable behaviors [80,81].

Despite these advantages, the method entails several limitations, most notably the risk of social desirability bias—the tendency of respondents to provide socially acceptable rather than entirely truthful answers [82,83]. This bias is relevant for topics such as political attitudes, race relations, or PEB, where responses may be shaped by perceived social norms rather than personal conviction [18,19]. Face-to-face settings are known to amplify this effect compared to self-administered modes [84]. Previous studies demonstrate that interviewer presence increases the likelihood of overreporting PEBs or support for climate policies [85,86]. Moreover, susceptibility to social desirability bias varies across question types and national contexts, highlighting the need for cross-cultural awareness when interpreting results [87,88].

All procedures involving human participants complied with national and institutional ethical standards for social research. Respondents were fully informed about the study’s purpose, the voluntary nature of their participation, the anonymity of their responses, and their right to withdraw at any point. Informed consent was obtained prior to each interview.

3.2. Research Questions and Hypothesis

The study addressed the following research questions:

(1)

What is the level of environmental awareness among Bulgarian citizens?

(2)

To what extent do citizens express motivations and orientations toward PEB?

(3)

What are the patterns of self-reported ecological practices across socio-demographic groups?

Based on previous research and the Bulgarian context, we hypothesized that both environmental awareness and readiness to engage in PEB would be relatively low.

3.3. Sampling and Sample Determination

Bulgarian survey practice establishes a sample of about 1000 respondents as sufficient for representativeness of the 18+ population. Our sample was stratified by gender, age, administrative region (28 districts), and type of settlement (capital, regional centers, small towns, villages) using the latest data of the National Statistical Institute. Interviewers followed a random route method, with only one respondent per household allowed. Refusals were recorded only when the contacted person matched the quota but declined participation. The final sample included 1002 adult Bulgarian citizens, and comprised 48% men and 52% women, with age, education, and settlement-type distributions closely matching national statistics. The maximum sampling error was ±3.1% at 50% shares. Fieldwork was carried out by the Trend Research Center between 1 and 8 September 2023.

3.4. Questionnaire and Response Scales

The questionnaire combined different types of scales, chosen according to the purpose of each item. To measure readiness to change habits, we used a four-point scale (“definitely would change,” “rather would change,” “rather would not change,” “definitely would not change”). The use of a four-point scale without a neutral midpoint is an established approach in survey research, as it reduces central tendency bias and encourages clearer differentiation of attitudes. Such scales also capture nuances in responses, e.g., degrees of readiness to change behavior or evaluations of institutional performance, while balancing categorical clarity with attitudinal sensitivity. This is especially important in the Bulgarian context, characterized by comparatively low ecological salience and elevated risk of socially desirable responding. The full questionnaire is provided in the Supplementary Materials (File S1).

3.5. Quality Control Procedures

Several mechanisms were applied to ensure data quality. All interviewers underwent a one-month training program that included both professional instruction and multiple simulations with test questionnaires. Prior to the fieldwork, the instrument was pre-tested with 15 respondents to identify potential difficulties in implementation. During data collection, quotas by gender, age, and settlement type were monitored in real time through the survey software. The tablet-based system also incorporated built-in logical controls, such as checks on interview duration and GPS coordinates, which signaled inconsistencies and flagged cases for additional review. Finally, after completion of the fieldwork, 10% of respondents were re-contacted by telephone for verification, ensuring that at least one interview by each fieldworker was verified.

3.6. Analytical Methods

The analysis relies on descriptive statistics, including frequency distributions and cross-tabulations by socio-demographic characteristics. Analyses were conducted using SPSS (v. 28). Given the cross-sectional design and the aim of mapping distributions rather than modeling causal effects, no multivariate regressions were applied, consistent with the study’s descriptive, mapping aim. Instead, the focus was on identifying patterns relevant to the study’s research questions.

4. Results

This section presents selected findings from the nationally representative survey on incentives for PEB among adult Bulgarian citizens.

Before turning to the substantive findings, it is important to outline the composition of the survey sample. The study included 1002 respondents, reflecting the socio-demographic structure of Bulgaria’s adult population. Women represented 52% of participants and men 48%. The age distribution was as follows: 18–29 years—14%, 30–39 years—17%, 40–49 years—19%, 50–59 years—18%, 60–69 years—18%, and 70 years and above—14%. Regarding education, 31% of respondents had completed higher education, 58% secondary education, and 10% primary or lower education. Settlement type was also proportionally represented, with 25% living in villages, 22% in small towns, 33% in regional cities, and 20% in the capital, Sofia. This structure ensures adequate coverage of key socio-demographic groups across gender, age, education, and settlement categories.

The analysis focuses on respondents’ knowledge, motivations, orientations, and practices related to ecology. The survey includes questions on people’s principal views regarding specific issues. These reflect declarative attitudes, which must be interpreted with caution, as they are not always reliable indicators of actual behavior. This corresponds to warnings in the literature about the influence of various biases. Nevertheless, these principal views are taken into account here, since biases themselves affect behavior, especially in the transition from general attitudes to concrete actions.

For clarity and conciseness, the results are first presented as univariate distributions, showing the percentage shares of the respective answers within the general population. To highlight specific groups with distinct understandings and practices that either facilitate or hinder PEB, the analysis is periodically supplemented with additional distributions based on standard socio-demographic indicators, including gender, age, education, income, socio-professional group, ethnic background, settlement type, and electoral behavior.

A central issue in this study is the significance and weight of environmental problems in people’s perceptions. A higher degree of perceived importance can be assumed to reflect both greater awareness and stronger readiness for action. Respondents were asked to rank, by importance, a set of predefined problems facing contemporary Bulgarian society (

Table 1. Ranking of the importance of problems facing Bulgarian society. Response “Environmental problems”.

Ranking	Share of Those Giving the Answer on Each of the Positions Between 1 and 7	Final Ranking of Environmental Issues on Each of the Positions Between 1 and 7
1st place (most important)	2%	7
2nd place	5%	6
3rd place	5%	7
4th place	9%	7
5th place	16%	4
6th place	31%	1
7th place (least important)	33%	2

Note: Question wording available in Supplementary File S1 (item Q1).

): low incomes (poverty), inflation, corruption, quality of healthcare, demographic crisis, environmental problems, and the war in Ukraine. The table shows, first, what share of the population places environmental problems at each of the seven possible levels of importance, and second, the overall position of environmental problems in this ranking—from 1 (most important) to 7 (least important)—among the challenges facing Bulgarian society.

At the top of the list of problems facing Bulgarian society are economic issues—first low incomes, followed by inflation. In comparison, environmental problems remain last, identified as the most serious issue by only 2% of respondents. When ranking the four leading problems, respondents consistently place ecology either last or second-to-last. Notably, one third of respondents—the largest relative share overall—ranked environmental issues as the least important among the listed options.

Among those who assign primary importance to environmental problems, no substantial socio-demographic differences emerge. There is a slight overrepresentation of women, older people, university graduates, individuals employed in higher positions, those with middle incomes, and residents of the capital city. However, these differences are too small, and the number of actual respondents is very limited, making it inappropriate to draw strong conclusions. In no socio-demographic group does the share of people ranking ecology as the top problem exceed 4%.

By contrast, the profile of those who place ecology at the very bottom of the list is much clearer. These are more often individuals with secondary or lower education, manual workers or those employed in low- and mid-level positions, people with lower incomes, members of the Roma minority, and residents of villages. Overall, this suggests a stronger representation of lower-status groups within this category.

Few adult Bulgarians live with environmental problems in mind. But where does knowledge of such problems originate? Standard assumptions can be made about the channels through which environmental information spreads. For example, it may be expected that older people and those in smaller settlements more often follow news and current events, even on topics they do not consider a priority. Environmental awareness, however, is shaped not only by exposure to information channels but also by the level of trust placed in them. For this reason, the next table presents the distribution of responses regarding different channels of information and the trust associated with each (

Table 2. Sources of environmental information and associated trust.

	Mass Media	Scientists and Experts	NGOs	Friends and Acquaintances	Green Parties	Political Leaders	Celebrities/ Influencers	Family
Share in %	54%	38%	29%	28%	24%	22%	15%	13%
Trust in the respective source of information, in %	25%	41%	13%	22%	12%	4%	6%	12%

Note: Question wording available in Supplementary File S1 (items Q2–Q3).

).

The media hold a dominant position as a source of environmental information, challenged only among groups with lower levels of education, who are generally more skeptical and distanced from the media environment. Of particular interest is the role of information provided by scientists and experts. This source ranks second overall but rises to the top among the most active and high-status groups. Forty-nine percent of people aged 30–39, 51% of university graduates, 52% of those with the highest incomes, and 52% of residents of the capital follow what specialists in the environmental field report and warn about. A similar share is observed among employed professionals (51%), suggesting that this group—relying on professional qualifications for career advancement—also favors scientifically grounded information on environmental matters.

The data reveal another intriguing feature: the demographic profile of respondents who rely on scientists and experts is similar to that of those who seek information from non-governmental organizations and green parties. In all three cases, a specific form of expertise is involved. Whether contested or not, this expertise attracts high-status groups.

The family, as a source of environmental information, correlates with general interest in ecology. Those engaged with environmental topics are highly likely to discuss them within their families and to draw knowledge from that context. Thus, the family should not be seen as an expression of pre-modern or conservative attitudes but as the most immediate environment of communication. Commentary and explanations by political leaders attract older people and those with middle incomes, but also university graduates, managers, and residents of the capital, to a greater extent than average. This indicates a specific combination of political interest and interest in environmental topics, rather than a straightforward expression of trust in political views.

Celebrities and influencers provide environmental information for 21% of the youngest age group (18–29), but they are also mentioned by people with very low incomes and by village residents. This reflects not only generational differences but also a culture of informal opinion leaders, which is particularly pronounced among lower-status groups.

Nineteen percent of respondents could not identify any source of environmental information. This uninformed group largely overlaps with the roughly one-fifth of adult Bulgarians who remain consistently distanced from the public agenda and focused on private life. Although small in absolute terms, this group is disproportionately represented among the youngest respondents (26% of those aged 18–29), among those with basic or lower education (48%), among people without income or with the lowest incomes (33% and 36%, respectively), and among Roma respondents (47%).

Environmental awareness involves not only information about environmental policies but also about their initiators. Political parties are the key actors in developing and promoting environmental measures in central and local government institutions. The next table illustrates respondents’ perceptions of environmentally oriented parties—those remembered for environmentally focused rhetoric. Included are the political parties represented in the Bulgarian National Assembly at the time of the survey and thus directly capable of influencing legislation. These are: the governing parties—the right-conservative GERB and the liberal coalition of We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria—and opposition parties: the center-left Bulgarian Socialist Party, the nationalist Vazrazhdane (“Revival”), the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and the populist There Is Such a People. Since We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria sometimes pursue different agendas and until recently were represented separately in parliament, the survey treats them as distinct entities. The table differentiates between overall public assessments of a party’s environmentalism and the evaluations given by its own supporters (

Table 3. Perceptions of political parties’ contributions to environmental policies and environmental protection.

Political Party	Status in Parliament & Ideological Affiliation	Share of Those Indicating That Party (Out of All Respondents, in %)	Share of Those Indicating That Party (Out of the Party Supporters, in %)
GERB	In government; right-conservative	8%	38%
Bulgarian Socialist Party	In opposition; social-democratic	5%	37%
“We Continue the Change”	In government; centrist-liberal	3%	31%
“Democratic Bulgaria”	In government; right-liberal	3%	13%
“Vazrazhdane”	In opposition; nationalist	2%	24%
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	In opposition; ethnic-liberal	2%	25%
“There is Such a People”	In opposition; populist	2%	26%

Note: Question wording available in Supplementary File S1 (item Q4).

).

The data are unambiguous: no political party is perceived by respondents as embodying environmental policies in Bulgaria. Environmental issues are not seen as part of political debate but rather as the responsibility of relevant institutions, situated outside the arena of party confrontation. The proportion of respondents pointing to particular parties largely mirrors the electoral balance between them. A partial exception is the Socialist Party, which receives a slightly higher share of positive responses than its electoral strength would suggest. However, this remains a small proportion (5%), whose significance should not be overstated. It may reflect random variation as well as the legacy of the party’s long-standing role in Bulgarian democratic politics.

As expected, the highest shares of references to a given party appear not within socio-demographic groups but among the party’s own supporters. What is striking, however, is that even among supporters no majority identifies their party with environmentalism. Party loyalty does not translate into conviction about environmental commitment. Electoral behavior is therefore not associated with environmental expectations: voters do not perceive it as problematic that their chosen party is not linked with environmental policies. The most significant result is that 73% of respondents did not identify any party at all. This figure is several times higher than the share of politically inactive citizens and cannot be explained simply by political apathy.

The transition from environmental awareness to PEB involves recognizing the need to change one’s own practices. Such recognition does not always lead to action and often remains at a declarative level, but it is nevertheless a precondition for the formation of different behavioral patterns. The following table presents this readiness for behavioral change (

Table 4. Readiness to change personal habits for environmental protection.

Definitely Yes	Rather Yes	Rather Not	Definitely Not	DK/NA
17%	57%	12%	4%	10%

Note: Question wording available in Supplementary File S1 (item Q5). Shares of all respondents, in %.

).

Examples of behavioral change were provided to make the question more concrete for respondents: refraining from the use of plastic shopping bags, reducing meat consumption, and using public transport instead of a private car. The groups giving the highest share of firmly positive answers are the “usual suspects”: people aged 30–39, those with higher education and students, respondents with medium to relatively high incomes, and—somewhat unexpectedly—residents of small towns.

When aggregated, positive answers (“definitely yes” and “rather yes”) reveal a leveling across socio-demographic groups. With very few exceptions, positive attitudes are expressed everywhere, ranging between 65% and 80%. This represents the majority of the adult population of Bulgaria. Thus, there is no socio-demographic category in which a clear opposition to changing habits has emerged. At this stage, however, the answers reflect a general, principled position rather than actual practice.

The question itself does not capture the motivations behind the answers. The interesting case of small towns, where willingness for environmentally oriented behavior is stronger than expected, invites a specific interpretation. In many such settlements, local environmental problems are visible, widely acknowledged, and directly motivate pro-environmental practices. Habit change here appears less a matter of global consciousness or solidarity than of necessity, dictated by immediate risks and threats.

The weakest readiness for behavioral change is found among the lower levels of the social hierarchy and vulnerable groups: the oldest, the least educated, the unemployed, the poorest, and ethnic Roma.

The drivers of changes in personal and household habits deserve special attention, as they move the analysis beyond declarations and toward the determinants of actual behavior. The following table sheds light on these hypothetical motivations (

Table 5. Factors that could convince respondents to change their habits for environmental protection.

Type of Incentive	Financial Incentives (Tax breaks, Discounts)	Creating Convenient Alternatives for an Eco-friendly Lifestyle	Broader Dissemination of Information and Education on the Topic	Imposing Higher Fines/Sanctions	Examples and Appeals from Influential Figures	Nothing Could Persuade Me
Share of all respondents (in %)	47%	40%	30%	20%	10%	6%

Note: Question wording available in Supplementary File S1 (item Q6). Multiple answers possible.

).

The presence of financial incentives—presumably provided by public institutions—dominates the structure of responses. The need for material motivation suggests that PEB is not primarily conceived as a response to the global, national, or local environmental situation but as a change requiring additional stimulation. This trend aligns with the perception that the most important societal problems are socio-economic in nature. The highest shares of “financial answers” come from people aged 40–49 (52%), those with secondary education (53%), individuals in managerial positions (58%), respondents with middle incomes (53%), and residents of small towns (52%). These groups are not necessarily the poorest or most vulnerable. Rather, they are those who carry the main burden of household maintenance and rely on their own efforts in life and career. They appear to view PEB through the prism of a realistic assessment of how it would affect their household budget.

The creation of convenient alternatives to existing “non-environmental” habits also presupposes initiative by public institutions, though without direct financial interactions with citizens. Choosing this option points more to active and progressively oriented respondents. It was selected by 51% of those aged 30–39, 51% of university graduates, 51% of the highest-income respondents, and 46% of residents of the capital. Knowledge about available alternatives, the ability to adjust one’s budget toward them, and the evaluation of where such alternatives could work likely serve as motivating factors.

A similar demographic profile is observed among those who selected “more information and education on the topic.” Relatively high shares of this answer, compared to the overall picture, are found among respondents aged 30–39 (35%), university graduates (35%), the highest-income respondents (40%), and residents of the capital (36%). This reflects the authority of expertise established among such groups, already visible in their reliance on scientific information regarding environmental issues.

Fines and sanctions as stimuli are more evenly distributed across socio-demographic groups, but nowhere do they reach one-third of the respective segment. Clearly, the majority of respondents do not accept punitive measures and emphasize the voluntariness of behavioral change.

The examples and appeals of influential figures unite the youngest respondents with lower-status groups, where personalized authority carries greater weight in decision-making. In such circles, optimal influence requires performativity—that is, not only speech but also visible action.

It should be noted that the share of respondents rejecting any possibility of influence toward stronger environmental engagement is negligible and markedly smaller than the share of those who did not declare readiness to change their habits (see Table 4). This suggests that behavioral change is not rejected in principle but only under current conditions, which respondents consider insufficiently stimulating. About one-tenth of respondents state that they would not change their habits under existing circumstances but would consider doing so if conditions changed.

PEB encompasses both private and public life. Changing personal habits is one aspect, but participation in transforming the broader social environment is another, equally important, dimension.

Table 6. Readiness for collective pro-environmental commitment.

Type of Activity	Yes	No
Participation in a protest related to an environmental cause	26%	53%
Vote for a political party only because it defends an environmental cause that is important for you	18%	58%
Support for the introduction of an additional tax, the proceeds of which would go towards environmental policies and environmental protection	9%	30%

Note: Question wording available in Supplementary File S1 (items Q7–Q9). The remainder of the shares in the first two categories up to 100% are due to the answer “I don’t know” or “I can’t estimate”. The third category for the answer “yes” includes the answers of those respondents who agree with the introduction of a tax for absolutely everyone, and not just for businesses or proven polluting industries.

summarizes respondents’ declarative readiness to engage in social change.

Protest readiness on environmental issues is strongly age-related. Higher shares of positive responses are found among the youngest cohorts (up to 39 years old), university graduates, managers, people with middle-to-high incomes, and residents of small settlements—likely due to severe local environmental problems. Overall, this corresponds to the national profile of protest attitudes on environmental issues, which are concentrated mainly among the active population from higher-status groups.

A similar pattern appears in the inclination to vote for a green party, though here readiness is somewhat stronger among students and residents of regional cities. For students, this may reflect their initial search for political representation, unburdened by the inertia of prior electoral behavior. For residents of regional cities, the explanation may lie in the broader crisis of the Bulgarian party system at the regional level, which reduces support for political parties in general and not only for those with an environmental agenda. In any case, these answers describe a purely hypothetical situation. Bulgaria has never had an independent green party in parliament, and earlier survey results (see Table 3) showed that respondents do not associate any of the major political parties—which attract the overwhelming majority of voters—with environmental issues.

Responses to the question on introducing an environmental tax clearly demonstrate the reluctance of Bulgarian society to collectively shoulder the financial costs of a transition toward PEB. Within the minority share who support such a tax, higher-status groups are somewhat overrepresented. Yet in all socio-demographic categories, the proportion of positive answers remains small and never exceeds one-fifth of respondents.

The initial hypothesis of the empirical survey—that both environmental awareness and readiness to engage in PEB would be relatively low—is only partially confirmed. While environmental awareness indeed remains limited, the level of declared readiness to engage in PEB is unexpectedly high, a finding that calls for further explanation in the following section.

5. Discussion

5.1. Empirical Patterns and Regional Context

Two complementary readings emerge from the data of the nationally representative Bulgarian survey. The first broadly confirms existing findings in the literature: Bulgarian society exhibits low environmental awareness and limited prioritization of ecological issues, with economic and social concerns dominating the public agenda. This is evident from the last place assigned to environmental issues in the ranking of societal problems and from the relatively limited interest in environmental information. Although PEB enjoys broad declarative support, this support appears largely rhetorical, without consistent behavioral commitments. Between one-fifth and one-quarter of respondents report being informed and motivated to contribute actively to environmental causes. These more engaged individuals belong primarily to higher-status groups—those with higher education, skilled occupations, and middle-to-high incomes.

This pattern is consistent with post-materialist theory [13], which predicts that environmental commitment rises with affluence and social security. Bulgaria, like many CEE countries, displays the reverse dynamic: lower living standards and greater inequality constrain the expression of post-materialist values and, consequently, ecological concern. Financial incentives are considered the most effective stimuli for PEB, decisively outweighing normative or value-based motivations. This supports behavioral economic evidence that external rewards can dominate over intrinsic motivations when living conditions are insecure [66].

These dynamics are visible across post-socialist CEE. In Hungary, high concern coexists with weak action, with institutional trust predicting both intent and behavior [21]. In Czechia, low trust raises the behavioral cost of supporting climate policy [37]. In Poland, education, income, and urban residence predict stronger commitment [89]. In Romania, local environmental problems dominate perceptions, aligning with higher readiness where threats are visible [90]. Together these cases situate Bulgaria within a regional pattern where institutional fragility, inequality, and low trust restrict the translation of awareness into sustained engagement.

5.2. The Weak Engagement Paradox and Theoretical Contribution

The Bulgarian findings can be interpreted through the three analytical axes proposed in the theoretical framework: awareness–action, individual–collective, and agency–structure. The results confirm the classic observation of an awareness–action gap [10], where knowledge of environmental problems does not automatically translate into behavioral engagement. Only 2% of respondents identify environmental problems as Bulgaria’s most serious challenge, yet 74% declare readiness to change habits. The coexistence of low prioritization and high declarative readiness represents a distinctive paradox in Bulgarian environmental engagement.

Traditionally, the awareness–action gap describes situations where individuals are well informed and express strong concern but fail to act. The Bulgarian case inverts this relationship, revealing what we term the weak engagement paradox—a pattern where low awareness and low salience coexist with high declarative readiness to act. Information is limited but symbolically powerful: environmental behavior is declared not because of deep conviction, but because ecological responsibility functions as a prestige norm (reputational utility). Readiness is driven by social desirability [18,85,86] and by responses to immediate local problems rather than abstract global risks.

Theoretically, this finding refines the awareness–action framework and intersects with recent intention–behavior formulations by showing readiness may precede awareness in low-salience contexts. The classical gap emphasizes barriers that prevent informed individuals from acting [17]; the weak engagement paradox reveals contexts where declarative readiness precedes awareness. It shows that in conditions of low trust and informational scarcity, symbolic identification with “modern” or “responsible” behavior may act as a latent form of engagement, offering a potential entry point for behavioral activation. This perspective also connects to collective action theories [5,51,53]: when individuals doubt others’ participation or institutional efficacy, they compensate through declarative affirmation rather than collective commitment. The paradox, therefore, does not signal apathy but a symbolic adaptation to constrained agency—a performative expression of civic responsibility under limited institutional credibility.

Similar discrepancies between declared concern and behavioral follow-through have been documented across diverse contexts. Recent meta-analyses emphasize that behavioral gaps can arise from both structural constraints (limited institutional support, information asymmetry) and psychological factors such as self-efficacy and social norms [35,76]. These studies demonstrate that awareness alone rarely predicts sustainable behavior unless reinforced by trust and perceived collective efficacy. The Bulgarian case therefore expands this debate by showing how symbolic commitment may function as a compensatory mechanism under weak institutional conditions.

5.3. Policy, Behavioral, and Practical Implications

If this weak engagement represents latent potential rather than mere bias, it can be activated through targeted behavioral interventions. In societies characterized by low institutional trust and high inequality, traditional instruments such as regulation, taxation, or punitive measures are unlikely to succeed. The limited willingness to accept environmental taxes (below 10%) and the weak readiness to engage in political action (protests, green voting) reflect these constraints. Yet the minimal rejection of behavioral change (only about 6% unwilling under any circumstances) points to a reservoir of potential readiness that can be mobilized.

Similar conclusions have been reached in recent behavioral research, which shows that latent pro-environmental attitudes can be transformed into action through social-norm activation and the visibility of sustainable choices [69,70]. These studies emphasize that effective interventions depend not only on financial incentives but also on social feedback and recognition mechanisms that make PEB publicly observable.

Social desirability, often seen as a methodological flaw, can thus be reframed as a policy resource. People’s tendency to associate environmental behavior with prestige and modernity can be leveraged through prestige-based nudging. Such interventions do not restrict freedom of choice but make sustainable options the most visible, convenient, and socially rewarding—precisely the logic of choice architecture [68,69,70]. In the Bulgarian context, where trust in scientific expertise is relatively high but trust in political elites is low, effective nudges should draw on credible sources—scientists, community leaders, and local initiatives—rather than political institutions. This is consistent with evidence that lower institutional trust conditions the uptake of nudges, increasing the importance of credible messengers and visible social feedback.

Possible measures include public acknowledgment schemes for sustainable households or neighborhoods, real-time feedback systems that visualize energy savings, and labeling programs that highlight environmentally responsible behavior. Such reputational nudges [70,71] capitalize on social visibility and moral prestige, turning social desirability into a self-reinforcing mechanism for behavioral change. These interventions are low-cost, voluntary, and scalable—attributes critical for fragile institutional environments—and relatively insulated from partisan contestation.

Comparable arguments have been advanced in studies of environmental governance in post-socialist democracies, which show that building symbolic legitimacy and social visibility can precede the restoration of institutional trust [37,75]. More broadly, this approach suggests that the road to behavioral sustainability may not start with increasing awareness but with amplifying visibility, recognition, and social validation of existing declarative readiness. The weak engagement paradox thus transforms from a symptom of apathy into a potential mechanism of mobilization.

5.4. Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Several limitations must be acknowledged. First, the reliance on self-reported data raises the possibility of social desirability bias [18], though in this case the bias itself is analytically significant. Second, the use of descriptive statistics limits causal inference; future analyses should apply logistic or multinomial regression models to test how socio-demographic, informational, and trust-related variables interact. Third, while this study contextualizes Bulgaria among CEE peers, cross-national comparative data could further illuminate how institutional quality, policy design, and cultural norms condition the weak engagement paradox. Longitudinal designs would also help assess whether declarative readiness can evolve into durable behavioral change once appropriate policy signals and social recognition are in place.

Taken together, our findings reveal that Bulgaria’s environmental attitudes are shaped less by deep awareness than by contextual cues of trust, visibility, and social approval. The coexistence of low awareness with high declarative readiness—captured here as the weak engagement paradox—redefines how commitment to environmental causes can emerge in CEE countries. This paradox not only refines the classical awareness–action framework but also provides a conceptual bridge toward practical strategies that transform symbolic willingness into concrete participation. The following conclusion summarizes these theoretical and policy implications and outlines how they may inform future research and governance design in similar CEE contexts.

6. Conclusions

The findings in this study have important theoretical implications. Most frameworks of PEB assume that consistent action arises from strong awareness and stable environmental values. By contrast, our results reveal a different dynamic: in low-awareness contexts like Bulgaria, high levels of declared readiness coexist with limited knowledge or concern. This weak engagement paradox challenges the universality of the classical awareness–action gap and highlights the roles of social desirability and institutional trust as key mediating factors in post-socialist democracies.

Practically, the results suggest that environmental policies should focus on low-cost, visible, and trust-building interventions that activate existing readiness rather than impose strict regulation. Nudging strategies—such as public recognition of sustainable households, social-norm campaigns, or real-time energy feedback—could translate symbolic commitment into concrete behavioral change. Over time, such visible successes may enhance institutional credibility and support for more ambitious policies—perhaps.

This study is limited by its reliance on self-reported behavior, which may be affected by social desirability bias, and by its cross-sectional design, which precludes causal inference. Future research should use longitudinal and mixed-method approaches to trace behavioral dynamics and test generalizability across CEE.

In sum, Bulgaria illustrates a broader regional pattern where low awareness coexists with high declarative readiness, reflecting how structural and cultural constraints shape PEB in post-socialist countries. By revealing this weak engagement paradox, the study adds to existing theories of environmental action and identifies practical avenues—nudges, visibility, and trust-building—for transforming symbolic commitment into sustainable practice.