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Article

Intuitionistic Implication and Logics of Formal Inconsistency

Department of Logic and Methodology of Science, Institute of Philosophy, University of Łódź, Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź, Poland
Axioms 2024, 13(11), 738; https://doi.org/10.3390/axioms13110738
Submission received: 6 September 2024 / Revised: 23 October 2024 / Accepted: 24 October 2024 / Published: 28 October 2024
(This article belongs to the Section Logic)

Abstract

:
Logics of Formal Inconsistency ( L F I for short) are a class of paraconsistent logics that validate the principle of gentle explosion, meaning that any formula can be derived from the set of formulas: α , α and α . A unique feature of L F I is the use of the symbol ‘∘’ to represent notions of consistency at the object-language level. These logics are simple in essence, built upon all the axiom schemas of positive classical logic, axioms for negation and the so-called ‘consistency operator’ ∘, with the only inference rule being detachment. In this paper, we propose an alternative foundation for L F I , which is the positive fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic. We present bi-valuational ‘Loparić-like’ semantics for the resulting logics and discuss their potential extensions.

1. Introduction

Let V a r denote the denumerable set of all propositional variables: p, q, p 1 , p 2 , …. The set F of formulas is standardly defined using propositional variables from V a r and the symbols ∼, ∨, ∧ and → for negation, disjunction, conjunction and implication, respectively. The connective of equivalence, α β , is definable through implication and conjunction in the standard way. We expand the language with a unary connective ‘∘’. By placing the symbol ‘∘’ in front of a formula α , we indicate that ‘ α is consistent’. The fundamental idea behind this is not significantly different from that given to the law of non-contradiction in da Costa’s C-systems (see [1,2,3,4], for details). However, in contrast to da Costa’s systems, consistency is represented using a single connective (see [5,6] for a philosophical discussion on the topic).
We say that a calculus C (identified with the triple F , A C , C and determined by its set of axioms A C which is included in F ) is paraconsistent if (1) the principle of explosion, { α , α } C β , does not hold in C , and (2) C is not trivial. We say that C is trivial iff for any formula α , α is a thesis of C . Logics of Formal Inconsistency satisfy these conditions. They also validate the principle of gentle explosion: { α , α , α } β . ‘A fundamental example of L F I (…) where consistency is rendered expressible by means of a specific new primitive connective’ ([6], p. 3) is m b C . The calculus m b C contains all the axiom schemas of the positive fragment of classical propositional calculus (abbreviated as C P C + ), specifically all instances of the following schemas:
( A 1 ) α ( β α )
( A 2 ) ( α ( β γ ) ) ( ( α β ) ( α γ ) )
( A 3 ) ( α β ) α
( A 4 ) ( α β ) β
( A 5 ) α ( β ( α β ) )
( A 6 ) α ( α β )
( A 7 ) β ( α β )
( A 8 ) ( α γ ) ( ( β γ ) ( α β γ ) )
( P L ) ( ( α β ) α ) α ,
and, additionally:
( E x M ) α α ;
( b c l )   α ( α ( α β ) ) .
The only inference rule is the detachment rule (MP) α β , α / β .
Remark 1.
( P L ) is independent in m b C .
Proof. 
It is easy to check that the matrix M P L = { 1 , 2 , 0 } , { 1 } , , , , with 1 as the sole designated value, and the connectives given by the truth-tables:
120 120 120
100 1120 1111 1120
210 2110 2122 2220
010 0111 0120 0000
verifies the axioms ( A 1 )–( A 8 ), ( E x M ), ( b c l ) and (MP), but not ( P L ) when α is assigned the value 2 and β takes the value 0. □
The intuitionistic variant of m b C , which is obtained by removing the axiom ( P L ) from m b C , was examined in Section 5.1.4 of [7]. However, it would be more interesting to extend m b C with one of the following formulas: ( c l )   ( α α ) α or ( c i )   α ( α α ) (cf. Remarks 3 and 7 below) and subsequently discuss the intuitionistic variants of some well-known L F I (see Section 3 and Section 4 below).

2. Calculi Ci and Cil

The calculus C i as introduced in [6] (see Definition 102, p. 62) is defined by the postulates of m b C , ( c i ) , ( N N 1 ) α α and (MP). Since C P C + , ( E x M ), ( N N 1 ) and (MP) define the logic C m i n (see [8] for details), C i can be viewed as an extension of C m i n by two axioms involving the consistency connective: ( b c l ) and ( c i ) .
Definition 1.
For any α F and any Γ F , we say that α is provable from  Γ  within  C i  (in symbols: Γ C i α ) iff there is a finite sequence of formulas, β 1 , β 2 , ⋯, β n such that β n = α and for each i n , either β i Γ , or β i ia an axiom of C i , or for some j , k i , we have β k = β j β i . A formula α is a thesis of C i iff α is provable from within C i .
Before proceeding, let us review some results regarding C i . Some of these results are quite evident, while others are well-established; therefore, they will be presented without proofs.
Remark 2.
The following formulas are provable in C i :
( I L ) α α
( L o C ) ( α ( β γ ) ) ( β ( α γ ) )
( H S ) ( α β ) ( ( β γ ) ( α γ ) )
( C ) ( α ( α β ) ) ( α β )
( L o E ) ( α β ) γ ) ( α ( β γ ) )
( L E ) ( α ( β γ ) ) ( α ( γ β ) )
( I D ) ( α β ) ( α β )
( C M 1 ) ( α α ) α
( C M 2 ) ( α α ) α
( C M )   ( ( α α ) α ) α .
Lemma 1.
For every Γ ,   Δ F and α , β F , we have:
(1) Γ C i α iff for some finite Δ Γ , Δ C i α
(2) If α Γ , then Γ C i α
(3) If Γ Δ and Γ C i α , then Δ C i α
(4) If Δ C i α and, for every β Δ such that Γ C i β , then Γ C i α
(5) If Γ { α } C i β and Δ C i α , then Γ Δ C i β ,
in particular, if Γ { α } C i β and α is a thesis of C i , then Γ C i β .
Lemma 2.
For any Γ F and α , β F , we have:
( D I S ) if Γ { α } C i γ and Γ { β } C i γ , then Γ { α β } C i γ
( D T ) Γ { α } C i β iff Γ C i α β .
( R A 1 ) if Γ { α } C i { β , β , β } , then Γ C i α
( R A 2 ) if Γ { α } C i { β , β , β } , then Γ C i α ,
where Γ C i { β , β , β } stands for ‘ Γ C i β , Γ C i β and Γ C i β ’.
The results, with the exception of ( R A 1 ) and ( R A 2 ) from Lemma 2, apply to every calculus discussed in this paper
Remark 3.
The axiom ( P L ) is dependent in C i .
Proof. 
Note first that ( α α ) ( ( ( α α ) α ) α ) is a thesis of C i (this can shown by applying ( D T ), ( c i ) , ( A 3 ) , ( H S ) and (MP)). Then, we have: ( α β ) α by ( D T ); α α ( α β ) by ( b c l ) , ( L o C ) , ( L o E ) , (MP); α ( α α ) by ( H S ) , ( L o E ) , (MP); α α by ( C M 1 ) , ( H S ) , (MP); α α by ( I D ) , (MP); ( α α ) α by ( A 8 ), ( L o C )   ( I L ) , (MP); α by the thesis of C i , (MP); and finally, ( ( α β ) α ) α by ( D T ). Notice, in passing, that the same proof can be provided to show that ( P L ) is derivable in m C i (see Definition 75, [6], p. 52.) □
This suggests that C i may be regarded as a calculus ‘built upon’ C ω of da Costa, defined by ( A 1 ) ( A 8 ) , ( E x M ) , ( N N 1 ) and (MP) (see [2,9,10], for details), rather than C m i n .
Definition 2
([6], p. 63). A C i -valuation is a function v : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of C m i n -valuation, i.e.,:
( v 1 ) v ( α β ) = 1 iff v ( α ) = 1 and v ( β ) = 1
( v 2 ) v ( α β ) = 1 iff v ( α ) = 1 or v ( β ) = 1
( v 3 ) v ( α β ) = 1 iff v ( α ) = 0 or v ( β ) = 1
( v 4 ) if v ( α ) = 0, then v ( α ) = 1
( v 5 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 1,
and the following clauses:
( v 6 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 0 or v ( α ) = 0
( v 7 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = v ( α ) = 1.
Definition 3.
A formula α is a C i -tautology iff for every C i -valuation v, v ( α ) = 1. For any α F and Γ F , α is a semantic consequence of Γ (in symbols: Γ C i α ) iff for any C i -valuation v: if v ( β ) = 1 for any β Γ , then v ( α ) = 1.
Theorem 1.
For all Γ F and α F : Γ C i α iff Γ C i α .
By adding ( c l )   ( α α ) α to the postulates of C i , we obtain the calculus C i l (see [6] Definition 105, p. 64). C i l has some interesting properties:
Remark 4.
The axiom ( c i ) can be replaced by ( D S )   α ( α β ) .
Proof. 
( c i ) ( D S ) : α , α by ( D T ); α α by ( c i ) , (MP); α , α by ( A 3 ), ( A 4 ), (MP); β by ( b c l ) , (MP); α ( α β ) by ( D T ).
( D S ) ( c i ) : α by ( D T ); α ( α α ) by ( D S ) , ( L o C ) , (MP); ( α α ) ( α α ) by ( c l ) , ( H S ) , (MP); α α by ( C M 1 ) , (MP); α ( α α ) by ( D T ). □
Remark 5.
The axiom ( c l ) can be replaced by ( b c l )   ( α α ) ( α ( α β ) ) .
Proof. 
( c l ) ( b c l ) follows from applying ( D T ), ( c l ) , ( b c l ) and (MP).
( b c l ) ( c l ) : ( α α ) by ( D T ); ( α α ) α by ( b c l ) , ( L o C ) , ( L o E ) , (MP); α α by ( c i ) , ( H S ) and (MP); α by ( C M 1 ) , (MP); and finally ( α α ) α by ( D T ). □
As noted in the remarks above, C i l can be defined by the axioms of C ω , ( b c l ) , (MP) and one of the following pairs of formulas: ( D S ) and ( c l ) or ( b c l ) and ( c i ) .
Definition 4.
A C i l -valuation is a function v : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of C m i n -valuation, and additionally:
( v 6 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 0 or v ( α ) = 0
( v 7 ) if v ( ( α α ) ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 1
( v 8 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 0.
Definition 5.
A formula α is a C i l -tautology iff for every C i l -valuation v, v ( α ) = 1. For any α F and Γ F , α is a semantic consequence of Γ (in symbols: Γ C i l α ) iff for any C i l -valuation v: if v ( β ) = 1 for any β Γ , then v ( α ) = 1.
Remark 6.
Given that v is a C i l -valuation. Then, v has the following properties: ( v 4 )’ if v ( α ) = 0, then v ( α ) = 1; ( v 6 )’ v ( α ) = 1 iff v ( α ) = 0 or v ( α ) = 0; ( v 8 )’ v ( α ) = 1 iff v ( α ) = 0.
A slightly different bivaluation semantics for C i l was proposed in [6], p. 67, where a C i l -valuation is defined as a function v : F { 1 , 0 } that meets, for any α , β F , all the conditions of C m i n -valuation, along with the following additional clauses:
( v 6 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 0 or v ( α ) = 0
( v 8 ): if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 1 and v ( α ) = 1.
It is easy to see that the formula ( p p ) p being an instance of the axiom ( c l ) is not valid for every C i l -valuation v . This indicates that the semantics proposed in [6] is an adequate semantics for C i , but not for C i l .
Theorem 2.
For all Γ F and α F : if Γ C i l α , then Γ C i l α .
The proof of soundness proceeds in the standard way, by induction on the length of a derivation in C i l . For the proof of completeness, we will employ a method based on the concept of maximal non-trivial sets of formulas (see, e.g., Section 2.2 of [7]). We begin by recalling the basic definitions and lemmas. The latter are generally well-known; therefore, they will be presented without proofs (see, e.g., [11,12], for further details).
Definition 6.
Let C = F , A C , C be a calculus satisfying Tarskian properties and Δ F . We say that Δ is a closed theory of C if, and only if for any β F : Δ C β iff β Δ . We say that Δ is maximal non-trivial with respect to α F in C , if, and only if (1) Δ   / C α , and (2) for every β F , if β Δ then Δ { β } C α .
Lemma 3
(Lemma 2.2.5 of [7]). Every maximal non-trivial set with respect to some formula is a closed theory.
Notice that the lemma holds for C i l . We also have:
Lemma 4.
For any maximal non-trivial set Δ with respect to α in C i l the mapping v : F { 1 , 0 } defined, for any δ F , as ( ): v ( δ ) = 1 iff δ Δ , is a C i l -valuation.
Proof. 
The proof is by cases. The cases ( v 1 ) to ( v 5 ) are those of C m i n and are thus omitted.
( v 6 ): Assume, for a contradiction, that v ( β ) = 1, v ( β ) = 1 and v ( β ) = 1. Then, by ( ), we have β Δ , β Δ and β Δ , which entails, by Lemma 1(2), that Δ C i l β , Δ C i l β and Δ C i l β , that is, Δ C i l { β , β , β } . Since C i l is transitive, ( b c l ) is an axiom of C i l and ( D T ) of Lemma 2 holds true, then Δ C i l α . Recall that Δ is a closed theory, so α Δ . But, from the main assumption, we have α Δ . This leads to a contradiction.
( v 7 ): Assume that v ( ( β β ) ) = 1. Then, by ( ), we have ( β β ) Δ , which entails, by Lemma 1(2), that Δ C i l ( β β ) . Since C i l is transitive, ( c l ) is a thesis of C i l and ( D T ) holds in C i l , then Δ C i l β . Given that Δ is a closed theory, we have β Δ , which implies, by ( ), that v ( β ) = 1.
( v 8 ): Suppose, for a contradiction, that v ( β ) = 1 and v ( β ) = 1. Then, by ( ), we have β Δ and β Δ , which entails Δ C i l β and Δ C i l β , that is, Δ C i l { β , β } . Since C i l is transitive, ( D S ) is a thesis of C i l and ( D T ) holds true, then Δ C i l α . Given that Δ is a closed theory, we have α Δ . But, from our main assumption, we know that α Δ . This leads to a contradiction. □
Lemma 5
(Theorem 3.31 of [11]). For any Γ F and α F such that Γ C α , there is a maximal non-trivial set Δ with respect to α in C such that Γ Δ .
Notice that Lindenbaum–Łoś theorem holds for any finitary calculus C . Hence, the completeness for C i l follows:
Theorem 3.
For all Γ F and α F : if Γ C i l α , then Γ C i l α .
Proof. 
The proof is by contraposition. Suppose that Γ C i l α and Δ is a maximal non-trivial set with respect to α in C i l such that Γ Δ . Then, we obtain that α Δ . By Lemma 4, there is a C i l -valuation v such that v ( α ) = 0 and v ( β ) = 1, for any β Δ , which implies that Δ     | C i l α and, in particular, Γ     | C i l α . This completes the proof. □
As a final remark in this section, let us observe that ( P L ) is redundant not only in C i (and in C i l ), but also in an alternative weakening of C i l .
Remark 7.
( P L ) is dependent in the calculus obtained by dropping ( c i ) from the set of axioms of C i l .
Proof. 
The proof follows a similar structure to that of Remark 3. The only significant difference is that after deriving α α by ( C M 1 ) , ( H S ) and (MP), we obtain ( α α ) α by ( c i ) , ( H S ) , (MP); α by ( C M ) , (MP); and finally, we derive ( ( α β ) α ) α using ( D T ). □

3. Intuitionistic Implication and C i l

Although C i l is axiomatized over the positive fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic, the negation-free fragment of C i l corresponds to positive classical logic. Here, we suggest, by the example of C i l , how to ‘fix the asymmetry’. First, we will establish some auxiliary results.
Remark 8.
The axiom ( b c l ) is equivalent to the triple of postulates: ( D S )   α ( α β ) and ( i c )   α α α and ( c c )   α α α .
Proof. 
( b c l ) ( D S ) : See ( c i ) ( D S ) of Remark 4; ( b c l ) ( i c ) and ( b c l ) ( c c ) follow from ( R A 2 ), ( A 3 ), ( A 4 ), ( N N 1 ) , ( b c l ) and (MP).
( D S ) , ( i c ) , ( c c ) ( b c l ) : α , α , α by ( D T ); α α by ( A 5 ), (MP); α by ( c c ) , (MP); α α by ( A 5 ), (MP); α by ( i c ) , (MP); β by ( D S ) , (MP); and finally α ( α ( α β ) ) by ( D T ). □
Lemma 6.
The axioms of C ω , ( c l ) , ( D S ) , ( i c ) , ( c c ) and (MP) axiomatize C i l .
Remark 9.
The postulate ( c c ) is independent of the other axioms.
Proof. 
The matrix M = { 1 , 2 , 0 } , { 1 , 2 } , , , , with 1 and 2 as the designated values, and the connectives defined by the truth-tables:
120 120 120
101 1120 1111 1120
211 2120 2122 2220
011 0111 0120 0000
verifies the axioms of C ω , ( c l ) , ( D S ) , ( i c ) and (MP), but not ( c c ) when α is assigned the value 2. □
Let i C i l denote the calculus obtained by dropping ( c c ) from the set of axiom schemas of C i l (see Lemma 6). Observe that a weaker version of ( c c ) , i.e., α α α , is still provable in i C i l .
Remark 10.
Neither ( P L ) , nor ( D L )   α ( α β ) , nor ( b c l ) is provable in i C i l .
Proof. 
The matrix M = { 1 , 2 , 0 } , { 1 } , , , , with 1 as the sole designated value; negation, consistency connective, conjunction and disjunction interpreted as in M , and implication defined by the truth-table:
120
1120
2110
0111
validates the axioms of i C i l and (MP), but it falsifies ( P L ) , ( D L ) and ( b c l ) when α and β are assigned the values 2 and 0, respectively. □
Remark 11.
( c i ) and ( b c l )   α ( α ( α β ) ) are provable in i C i l .
Proof. 
( c i ) : α by ( D T ); α ( α α ) by ( D S ) , ( L o C ) , (MP); ( α α ) ( α α ) by ( c l ) , ( H S ) , (MP); α α by ( C M 1 ) , (MP); α ( α α ) by ( D T ).
( b c l ) : α , α , α by ( D T ); α α by ( A 5 ), (MP); α by ( i c ) , (MP); β by ( D S ) , (MP); and finally, α ( α ( α β ) ) by ( D T ). □
Remark 12.
The axiom ( i c ) can be replaced by ( b c l ) .
Proof. 
( i c ) ( b c l ) : See the proof of Remark 11; ( b c l ) ( i c ) follows from applying ( D T ), ( b c l ) , ( L o C ) , ( C M 2 ) , ( D S ) and (MP). □
Clearly, i C i l can be defined by the axioms of C ω , ( c l ) , ( D S ) , ( b c l ) and (MP). Moreover, i C i l enjoys intuitionistic (not classical) implication. A semantics for i C i l is established by reproducing the axiom schemas of i C i l in ‘Loparić-like’ semantics. The idea behind it traces back to the 1986 paper by Loparić, in which the semantics for C ω was first introduced.
Definition 7
(cf. [9], p. 74). An i C i l -semi-valuation is a function s : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of C ω -semi-valuation, that is,
( s 1 ) s ( α β ) = 1 iff s ( α ) = 1 and s ( β ) = 1
( s 2 ) s ( α β ) = 1 iff s ( α ) = 1 or s ( β ) = 1
( s 3 ) if s ( α β ) = 1, then s ( α ) = 0 or s ( β ) = 1
( s 4 ) if s ( α β ) = 0, then s ( β ) = 0
( s 5 ) if s ( α ) = 0, then s ( α ) = 1
( s 6 ) if s ( α ) = 1, then s ( α ) = 1,
and the following clauses:
( s 7 ) if s ( α ) = 1, then s ( α ) = 0 or s ( α ) = 0
( s 8 ) if s ( α ) = 1, then s ( α ) = 0
( s 9 ) if s ( ( α α ) ) = 1, then s ( α ) = 1.
Definition 8
(cf. [9], p. 74). An i C i l -valuation is an i C i l -semi-valuation for which the following holds: if v ( α 1 ( α 2 ( α n 1 α n ) ) ) = 0, where n { 1 , 2 , 3 , } and α n β γ , then there is an i C i l -semi-valuation s such that, for 1 i < n , s ( α i ) = 1 and s ( α n ) = 0.
Definition 9.
A formula α is an i C i l -tautology iff for every i C i l -valuation v, v ( α ) = 1. For any α F and Γ F , α is a semantic consequence of Γ (in symbols: Γ i C i l α ) iff for any i C i l -valuation v: if v ( β ) = 1 for any β Γ , then v ( α ) = 1.
There are two key distinctions between a C i l -valuation and an i C i l -valuation (excluding the clause ( v 6 ) (resp. ( s 7 )) where ‘ α ’ is assigned the value 1). Firstly, when the implication connective is assigned the value 0, Definition 4 states that the antecedent is assigned the value 1, while the consequent is assigned the value 0. In contrast, for an i C i l -semi-valuation, if the implication is assigned the value 0, the consequent takes the value 0, but the antecedent is not assigned any logical value. Secondly, an i C i l -valuation is established through a two-step process. This approach is significant because it allows for saving many useful tautologies that would otherwise be ‘lost’ without Definition 8. This two-step method is not required for a C i l -valuation.
Theorem 4.
For all Γ F and α F : if Γ i C i l α , then Γ i C i l α .
Proof. 
We proceed in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4 in [9]. □
For completeness, we will apply the method based on the concept of saturated sets. To begin, we will review some auxiliary results.
Definition 10.
Let C = F , A C , C be a calculus and Δ F . We say that Δ is saturated with respect to α F in C , or simply Δ is an α-saturated set, if (1) Δ   / C α , and (2) for every β F , if β Δ then Δ { β } C α .
Lemma 7
([9], Lemma 3.2). If Γ   / C α , then there is an α-saturated set Δ such that Γ Δ .
Lemma 8
([9], Lemma 3.3). If Δ is an α-saturated set, then β Δ iff Δ C β , for every β F .
It follows from the lemmas that:
Lemma 9
([9], Lemma 3.5). If Δ an α-saturated set and α 1 ( α 2 ( α n 1 α n ) ) Δ , where n { 1 , 2 , } , then there is an α n -saturated set Δ * such that Δ { α 1 , α 2 , α n 1 } Δ * .
Now, we need to prove an auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 10.
If Δ is α-saturated, then for any β , γ F , we have:
( 1 ) if β γ Δ , then β Δ and γ Δ
( 0 ) if β γ Δ , then β Δ or γ Δ
( 1 ) if β γ Δ , then γ Δ or γ Δ
( 0 ) if β γ Δ , then γ Δ and γ Δ
( 1 ) if β γ Δ , then β Δ or γ Δ
( 0 ) if β γ Δ , then γ Δ
(∼) if β Δ , then β Δ
( ) if β Δ , then β Δ
( 1 ) if β Δ , then β Δ or β Δ
( 0 ) if ( β β ) Δ , then β Δ
( 1 ) if β Δ , then β Δ .
Proof. 
Cases ( 1 )–( ) are those of C ω and hence omitted.
Case ( 1 ): Assume, for a contradiction, that β Δ , β Δ and β Δ . This implies, by Lemma 8, that Δ i C i l β , Δ i C i l β and Δ i C i l β . By ( D T ), ( b c l ) and the transitivity of i C i l , we obtain Δ i C i l α , which results in α Δ . But Δ is an α -saturated set, so Δ   / i C i l α and consequently, α Δ . This leads to a contradiction.
Case ( 0 ): Suppose that ( β β ) Δ . Then, by Lemma 8, we have Δ i C i l ( β β ) . By applying ( D T ), ( c l ) and by the transitivity of i C i l , we obtain that Δ i C i l β . Since Δ is an α -saturated set, then β Δ .
Case ( 1 ): The proof is analogous to the proof of ‘Case ( 1 )’. It requires ( D S ) to be used. □
By applying Lemma 10, we obtain the following:
Lemma 11.
The characteristic function of an α-saturated set is an i C i l -semi-valuation.
From Lemmas 9 and 11, along with the definition of i C i l -valuation, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 12.
The characteristic function of an α-saturated set is an i C i l -valuation.
Theorem 5.
For all Γ F and α F : if Γ i C i l α , then Γ i C i l α .
Proof. 
Assume that Γ   / i C i l α . By Lemmas 7 and 8, there is an α -saturated set Δ such that Γ Δ and α Δ . Given that Lemma 12 holds for i C i l , there is an i C i l –valuation v such that v ( α ) = 0 and v ( β ) = 1, for any β Δ , which means that Δ     | i C i l α and in particular Γ     | i C i l α . This completes the proof. □
As shown, removing ( c c ) from the set of axiom schemas of C i l yields a calculus with the positive intuitionistic basis. Now, consider an extension of i C i l by ( P L ) , C i l for brevity.
Remark 13.
( c c ) and ( b c l ) are not provable in C i l .
Proof. 
( c c ) : See the proof Remark 9; ( b c l ) : Likewise, the matrix M invalidates ( b c l ) if α and β are assigned the values 2 and 0, respectively. □
Definition 11.
A C i l -valuation is a function v : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of C m i n -valuation, and additionally:
( v 6 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 0 or v ( α ) = 0
( v 7 ) if v ( ( α α ) ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 1
( v 8 ) if v ( α ) = 1, then v ( α ) = 0.
Definition 12.
A formula α is a C i l -tautology iff for every C i l -valuation v, v ( α ) = 1. For any α F and Γ F , α is a semantic consequence of Γ (in symbols: Γ C i l α ) iff for any C i l -valuation v: if v ( β ) = 1 for any β Γ , then v ( α ) = 1.
Theorem 6.
For all Γ F and α F : Γ C i l α iff Γ C i l α .
Proof. 
The proof is similar to the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2. □

4. iCila , iCilo and More

Here, we consider some extensions of i C i l that differ from those presented in Section 3. The first extension, which refer to as i C i l a from this point forward, is obtained by adding ( c a )   α β ( ( α β ) γ ) , where { , , } , to the postulates of i C i l . It is straightforward to demonstrate that the following two observations are true:
Remark 14
(cf. [6], p. 68). ( c a ) is equivalent to the triple of axiom schemas: ( c a 1 )   α β ( α β ) , ( c a 2 )   α β ( α β ) and ( c a 3 )   α β ( α β ) .
Remark 15.
Neither ( P L ) nor ( c c ) is provable in i C i l a .
The negation-free part of i C i l a is intuitionistic propositional logic. Therefore, a semantics for i C i l a can be established quite easily by adding an additional clause to Definition 7.
Definition 13.
An i C i l a -semi-valuation is a function s : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of i C i l -semi-valuation, and the following clause: ( s 10 ) if s ( α ) = s ( β ) = 1, then s ( ( α β ) ) = 1, where { , , } .
An i C i l a -valuation, i C i l a -tautology and a semantic consequence in i C i l a are defined similarly as in Definitions 8 and 9.
Theorem 7.
For all Γ F and α F : Γ i C i l a α iff Γ i C i l a α .
Proof. 
The proof is carried out similarly as for i C i l (see the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5). The key point is to show that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 13.
If Δ is α-saturated, then we have, for any β , γ F , that all the clauses of i C i l hold (see Lemma 10 above), and additionally: ( ) if β Δ and γ Δ , then ( β γ ) Δ , where { , , } .
This can be performed by means of the axioms of i C i l a . □
The second extension, i C i l o for short, is obtained by adding ( c o )   α β ( ( α β ) γ ) , where { , , } , to the postulates of i C i l .
Remark 16
(cf. [6], pp. 71–72; [13], Section 3). ( c o ) is equivalent to the triple of axiom schemas: ( c o 1 )   α β ( α β ) , ( c o 2 )   α β ( α β ) and ( c o 3 )   α β ( α β ) .
From Remark 16 and the fact that ( α β γ ) ( α γ ) and ( α β γ ) ( β γ ) are provable in i C i l o , we deduce α ( α β ) and β ( α β ) , where { , , } . This leads to counter-intuitive consequences; for example, a single consistent conjunct makes consistent the whole conjunction. Specifically, we have p 1 ( p 1 p i p m ) , for every p i , p m V a r such that i m and i , m { 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . } .
Definition 14.
An i C i l o -semi-valuation is a function s : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of i C i l -semi-valuation, and additionally: ( s 9 ) if s ( α ) = 1 or s ( β ) = 1, then s ( ( α β ) ) = 1, where { , , } .
An i C i l o -valuation, i C i l o -tautology and a semantic consequence in i C i l o are defined similarly as in Definitions 8 and 9.
Theorem 8.
For all Γ F and α F : Γ i C i l o α iff Γ i C i l o α .
Remark 17.
i C i l a is a proper subsystem of i C i l o .
Proof. 
By ( c o ) , ( α β γ ) ( α β γ ) and (MP), we obtain ( c a ) . Conversely, there are theses of i C i l o (see, e.g., Remark 16) that are unprovable in i C i l a . □
Remark 18.
Enriching the set of axiom schemas of i C i l a (resp. i C i l o ) with ( c c ) results in obtaining C i l a (resp. C i l o ).
The calculi C i l a and C i l o are known in the literature and have been studied by various authors (see, e.g., Section 5.2 of [6] and Chapter 8 of [14]). It is important to emphasize that extending i C i l a (resp. i C i l o ) with ( P L ) does not yield C i l a (resp. C i l o ). To clarify, let C i l a (resp. C i l o ) be defined by the postulates of C i l , (MP) and ( c a ) (resp. ( c o ) ).
Remark 19.
( c c ) and ( b c l ) are provable in neither C i l a , nor C i l o .
Proof. 
See the proof of Remark 13. □
A bivaluation semantics for C i l a (and C i l o ) can be obtained from that for C i l .
Definition 15.
A C i l a -valuation (resp. C i l o -valuation) is a function v : F { 1 , 0 } that satisfies, for any α , β F , all the conditions of C i l -valuation, and additionally:
( v 9 ) if v ( α ) = v ( β ) = 1, then v ( ( α β ) ) = 1 (resp. ( v 9 ) if v ( α ) = 1 or v ( β ) = 1, then v ( ( α β ) ) = 1), where { , , } .
The notions of tautology and semantic consequence are defined in the standard manner.
Theorem 9.
For all Γ F and α F : Γ X α iff Γ X α , where X stands for C i l a or C i l o .
Proof. 
The proof is similar to the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2. □

5. Conclusions

This paper presents theoretical results on L F I (for a discussion on the practical implications of L F I , particularly its potential applications in evolutionary databases, see [15]; for a discussion on paraconsistent reasoning in science, see, for example, [16]). It has been demonstrated that certain L F I , typically regarded as axiomatic extensions of C P C + , can also be considered extensions of the positive fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic (see Appendix A). Although this concept has already been addressed in the literature (see, e.g., [7], pp. 187–191), neither the intuitionistic variant of C i l , C i l a , nor C i l o has been discussed thus far. As shown, the intuitionistic version of m b C is obtained simply by removing ( P L ) from the axioms of m b C . This approach is not applicable to C i or its extensions, as the postulate ( P L ) is dependent on the other axioms (see Remark 3 above). Nevertheless, an alternative approach is available. First, it is essential to recognize that ( b c l ) can be replaced by the triple of formulas: ( D S ) , ( i c ) and ( c c ) . This assertion holds true not only for C i l but also for C i (as evidenced by the proof in Remark 8, which depends solely on the rules of C i ), indicating that the axioms of C ω , ( D S ) , ( i c ) , ( c c ) and (MP) axiomatize C i . The postulate ( c c ) is particularly important in this context: it is independent of the other axioms, and its removal from the set of axioms results in the intuitionistic variant of C i and its extensions: C i l , C i l a and C i l o . Additionally, as demonstrated in [17], a similar approach can be applied to da Costa’s hierarchy of C n -calculi ( 1 n < ω ).

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A

Listed below are the logical calculi discussed in this paper.
*
C ω = ( A 1 ) +…+ ( A 8 ) + ( N N 1 ) + ( E x M ) +(MP)
*
C m i n = C ω + ( P L )
*
C i = C m i n + ( b c l ) + ( c i )
*
i C i l = C ω + ( c l ) + ( D S ) + ( i c )
*
C i l = i C i l + ( P L )
*
C i l = C m i n + ( b c l ) + ( c i ) + ( c l ) = C ω + ( c l ) + ( D S ) + ( i c ) + ( c c )
*
i C i l a = i C i l + ( c a )
*
C i l a = i C i l a + ( P L )
*
C i l a = i C i l + ( c c ) + ( c a ) = C i l + ( c a 1 ) + ( c a 2 ) + ( c a 3 )
*
i C i l o = i C i l + ( c o )
*
C i l o = i C i l o + ( P L )
*
i C i l o = i C i l + ( c c ) + ( c o ) = C i l + ( c o 1 ) + ( c o 2 ) + ( c o 3 ) ,
where ‘ X = a + b + c ’ (or, ‘ X = Y + c ’) means ‘the postulates: a, b and c axiomatize X’ (resp. ‘the postulates of Y and c axiomatize X’).
They all form together the structure shown in Figure A1.
Figure A1. Extensions of i C i l .
Figure A1. Extensions of i C i l .
Axioms 13 00738 g0a1

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