1. Introduction
The Blue Nile River has its source in the Ethiopian Highlands in the Lake Tana catchment. These highlands are considered as the water tower of East Africa providing Ethiopia with an estimated hydropower potential of 45,000 MW [
1], which is the second largest potential in Africa after the DR Congo. Yet, in 2001, only 3% of this potential had been developed [
2], and only 13% of the Ethiopian households had access to electricity [
3]. Due to an electricity access program, established in 2005, the number of households in rural towns and villages connected to the grid increased to over 40% in 2011 [
1,
3], but one year later, Ethiopia had 57 kWh per capita and year, still at a very low consumption level, where the global average is 7000 kWh per capita and year [
4]. To meet the growing electricity demand that increased with improved access and challenged the provision, Ethiopia’s power corporation commissioned three large hydropower plants in 2010 with a capacity above 2000 MW [
1]. In the course of the Climate-Resilient Green Energy strategy, the Ethiopian Government is planning to expand its hydroelectric capacity further [
5] and to become a regional power hub [
1], by implementing several hydropower projects and building power transmission and distribution lines to neighboring countries [
4]. A major step in this regard was the announcement in 2011 to construct the largest reservoir in Africa near the border to Sudan [
6], the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will account for more than 40% of the installed generation capacity in the country [
3] and may produce more electricity than Ethiopia can use in the medium term [
7]. The GERD project, presumably finalized in the coming years, is supposed to support the economic development of Ethiopia, to secure the energy supply, to make Ethiopia less dependent on oil imports and to provide electricity to a number of neighboring countries [
3]. To satisfy the firm energy requirements also during dry periods, the reservoir will have an over-year storage volume of about 74 billion m
(BCM) [
8], corresponding to about 1.5 years of the long-term mean discharges of the Blue Nile River.
The primary use of the GERD will be the generation of hydroelectric power, and therefore, the World Bank and other international donors have refused to support the project [
5], because funding is normally granted for multi-purpose dams only and Ethiopia has failed to create partnerships with power companies in neighboring countries [
9]. Hence, the Ethiopian Government mainly finances the construction by urging citizens and private companies to buy bonds to support the project [
4,
9,
10,
11,
12], where turbines and technical equipment are financed by Chinese banks [
9].
Like many large-scale projects, the GERD is subject to a number of concerns and criticism with regard to jeopardizing downstream water security and livelihoods [
4], which created tension particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia [
7]. The large capacity of the reservoir will certainly shift the geopolitical balance in the Eastern Nile Basin for which Egypt has fears about its water supply [
6,
13]. According to Beyene (2013) [
14], the dam is oversized and will never produce what is being promised (6000 MW). During the filling period, it is assumed that water discharges to Egypt may be cut by 12–25% [
15]. Other concerns are the lack of transparency of the planning process (quality of project documents) or issues not sufficiently considered or reported, such as dam safety, downstream changes of discharges, environmental impacts, climate risks, sediment and water quality issues and missing dam operation strategies [
16].
As the completion of the dam construction is getting closer, more and more studies are being published that controversially discuss the likely consequences of the GERD on the environmental, economical, political and management issues [
4,
7,
10,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21]. Transboundary cooperation in managing the Eastern Nile water infrastructure to safeguard future water supply in the riparian countries seems to be the most important keyword in this connection. Where Sudan’s interests may be largely aligned with Ethiopia, because regulated flows into Sudan are beneficial for hydropower generation, flood protection and irrigated agriculture (due to limited water storage capacities in Sudan) [
20], it is important that Ethiopia agrees with Egypt and Sudan on rules during reservoir filling and operation, particularly during a sequence of drought years [
7]. Many of the recent studies see large economic potential and benefits for all countries, or at least more pros than cons, once the GERD is online and on the condition that full cooperation is achieved [
4,
7,
10,
20].
Although socio-political consequences, like the resettlement of people or potential conflicts among riparian countries, or engineering risks and hazards, like water quality or dam failures, are of outmost importance, these issues are not the subject of this study. The main purpose is to investigate the likely impacts of the GERD on downstream discharges during the filling process and under regular operation, the latter also under climate change projections using an ensemble of ten global and regional climate models. Moreover, five different reservoir operation strategies to generate hydropower are investigated once the reservoir is filled to a certain level. Reservoir filling strategies were recently analyzed by Zhang et al. [
17] and Wheeler et al. (2016) [
18], but regular operation rules were not investigated in either study. An assessment of the likely impacts of a dam such as the GERD, which is not in operation mode yet, comes along with a number of uncertainties. It is for instance unknown how the reservoir will be managed during the period of filling, at what filling state the dam becomes finally operational, if the system will be operated to maximize the generation of hydroelectric power or if release rules to preserve ecological targets downstream are considered, how the hydro-climatic boundary conditions will either challenge or facilitate the management during filling and regular operation and the amount of water lost via seepage and evaporation.
Scenarios are thus the only suitable method to capture the range of uncertainties of these unknown variables in order to answer the following questions that are central to our research: (1) How will dam operations alter the natural flow regime (annual cycle) of the Blue Nile River? (2) What impacts on downstream discharges can be expected during the reservoir filling process? (3) What are the implications of different reservoir operation strategies for hydroelectric power generation assuming historical and future climatic conditions projected by an ensemble of ten climate models? By answering these questions, it is intended to provide some useful information on possible operation strategies that may reduce negative environmental impacts by satisfying water resources use of the involved countries of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
4.1. Filling Scenarios
The construction of the GERD at the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia will be finished in the coming years, and the process of reservoir filling will therefore start soon. According to the simulations conducted in this study, the filling of the dead storage with a capacity of 14.8 BCM may take at least half a year, but could endure up to about eight years. The final duration depends basically on filling strategies (minimal discharges to be released downstream), inflows (depending on hydro-climatic conditions during filling) and on losses from the reservoir due to evapotranspiration and seepage, where the latter are difficult to quantify. Where simulated evaporative losses during the filling process correspond to 6.5–8.7% of average annual inflows or 3.8 BCM, seepage losses are negligible if assumed to be low, but could amount to 24–32% of inflows if assumed to be high. The contribution of rainfall onto the reservoir’s surface area is not negligible and reduces the losses of to 3.4% of average annual inflows, because the climatic water balance of the reservoir is −1.6 BCM.
Mulat and Moges (2014) [
21] argue that there will be only a small impact during a six-year filling period on irrigation management of the High Aswan Dam (HAD) in Egypt. According to Whittington et al. (2014) [
7], the filling of the GERD may adversely affect Egypt if it takes place in a sequence of dry years. In this case, the agricultural water demands might be higher than the water supply. Based on the results generated in this study, the reduction of Blue Nile flows during the filling process might be considerable, and Sudan and Egypt may face shortages of water supply. However, the severity of shortages will depend on filling strategies (minimal flows released) and hydro-climatic condition, such as rainfall in the Upper Blue Nile catchment, and the amount of storage losses via evapotranspiration and seepage. With a release rule that corresponds to monthly
discharges, the flows might be reduced by 10–19% compared to average flows during the reference period. Releasing discharges corresponding to
during the filling period may produce a drought that would normally occur every fourth year, and the reduction may be in the order of 16–44%. To minimize the number of years with low discharges downstream, an alternative to these two scenarios could be a rule releasing monthly
discharges to fill the
, taking up to almost eight years while cutting the flows by only 5–13% and changing the strategy under regular operation afterwards. This strategy would be in line with the assumption that water shortages in the range between 5% and 15% would be the maximum allowable amount for Egypt [
15].
4.2. Regular Operation and HPP
The point in time when the GERD can start its regular operation depends on the targeted filling level of the active storage
and the same processes that apply to fill the
. Based on the scenarios investigated in this study, the GERD may be taken into regular operation after less than two to five years assuming an operation level of 30% of the
. In case the GERD starts operation when the
is half-full, it may take 2.5 years to almost nine years. Full supply level may be reached earliest after about four years assuming that monthly discharges released downstream correspond to
and low to medium seepage losses. With a release rule of
, it may take up to 11 years or will never be reached at all if discharges corresponding to
are released, independently of the seepage rates. Simulated evaporative losses under regular operation are in the range between 7% and 8% of average annual inflows (3.8 BCM
) under reference climate conditions, corresponding to 5.6 mm
or 2044 mm
. The volume evapotranspirating from the reservoir area under RCP 8.5 in 2070–2099 is projected by the ensemble mean to increase by 0.1 BCM
with average daily evapotranspiration of 5.7 mm or 2080 mm
or by 0.2 BCM
, 5.8 mm
and 2120 mm
if the ensemble median is considered. Regarding the increasing temperature (between 3.0 to 6.5 K) at the end of the 21st Century [
28], this is unexpectedly low. However, the model range is between 4.9 mm (1788 mm
) and 6.2 mm (2267 mm
). Note that the climatic water balance
reduces the losses of
considerably to −1.6 BCM
. The
projected by the model ensemble is in the range of −1.3 BCM
and −2.7 BCM
in 2070–2099 and does not significantly change compared to the reference period. In the low seepage scenario, losses are almost negligible and are comparable to evaporative losses assuming medium seepage rates, but can amount to ~25% assuming high seepage rates. The latter is controvertible, but was taken into consideration, because due to rock formations, Noureddin (2013) [
13] assumes seepage losses of 25%. Nevertheless, an unknown, but possibly large fraction may contribute to groundwater discharges downstream and would thus not necessarily be considered as a loss from the hydrological system, but as a loss for HPP.
According to the simulations investigated in this study, the GERD reservoir will be on average half-full, if it is operated similar to the 1500 MW scenarios. Arjoon et al. (2014) [
20] come to the same results, arguing that this is a trade-off between HPP and releasing flow regulation downstream. The exploitation of the reservoir capacity is much lower in the other scenarios. The risk that the
runs dry is only observed in the 1800 MW scenarios, where the HPP target is obviously too high, causing frequently extreme low water levels in the dry season. It does not happen in any other scenario, not even under very dry conditions in the 1980s and assuming very high seepage losses. Arjoon et al. (2014) [
20] found that the reservoir may completely drain under very dry conditions, where the “very dry conditions” were not precisely defined. This situation does not occur in the climate change 1500 MW scenarios, although the models project a wide range of inflows and reservoir filling states, including a rather dry simulation (HadGEM, 1200 MW) and a rather wet simulation (EC-EARTH/RACMO >1900 MW). The results confirm that an operation rule targeting at an average daily HPP of 1500 MW is robust under various climatic conditions.
The maximum capacity of the power plants installed in the GERD will be 6000 MW with the aim to produce 15,692 GWh
[
8]. This corresponds to a production of 1817 MW. According to Beyene (2013) [
14], assuming average annual discharges of 1456 m
s
, the dam will provide less than 2100 MW. In the study at hand, the HPP potential was investigated by analyzing five operation rules prioritizing different aims. From an economic perspective, the most likely and reasonable target is to generate reliable and constant hydropower throughout the year. This goal could be achieved due to the over-year storage capacity of the GERD. Basically, three operation scenarios with slightly different targets of HPP show that a constant supply of about 1200 MW–1700 MW (depending on the assumptions of seepage losses and climatic conditions) is theoretically possible throughout the year. Hence, even under optimistic conditions, the target is not reached under reference climate conditions, where 13,000 GWh
are generated on average. In the RCP 8.5 climate scenario at the end of the 21st Century, the ensemble mean projects HPP potentials increasing by 650 GWh
, but the ensemble median a decrease by 340 GWh
. The model range, however, is rather large, where minimal average annual HPP is ~9600 GWh
, and the maximum is ~18,600 GWh
. Compared to the model’s reference climate, the potentials increase by 450 GWh
and 3750 GWh
in the minimal and maximal averages, respectively.
An interpretation of changes in time is difficult, because some models project a wet period, for instance in the far future, whereas the same period is projected to be dry by other models. For example, three models project increasing, two models decreasing and five models no change in HPP potentials in the near future. In the far future, only one model projects no significant change, six models a positive and three models a negative trend for HPP.
4.3. Impacts Downstream
There seems to be no consensus in the literature on whether the GERD, once online, will more positively or negatively affect the downstream countries Sudan and Egypt. Some studies emphasize the potential negative impacts of the GERD on downstream discharges and that especially Egypt will suffer from lower hydroelectric power generation potential in the HAD and reduced revenues from irrigated agriculture [
15,
38,
39]. Mulat and Moges (2014) [
21] estimate a reduction of 7% in electricity generation of the HAD, once the GERD is online. Taye et al. (2016) [
4] on the contrary argue that, with the GERD online, the minimum annual net benefit for Sudan and Egypt may increase from
$4.9–
$5.6 billion in the agricultural and energy sector. Besides greater net benefits with increasing storage in Ethiopia, floods and droughts will be reduced, and the hydrological uncertainties will be nullified, particularly during low flow periods [
20]. The study at hand shows that the over-year storage capacity of the GERD may balance single drought years, but would not be able to buffer consecutive drought years. After such events, Egypt may run short of water, if GERD and HAD are not carefully coordinated [
7]. A high level of cooperation, particularly during reservoir filling may significantly reduce the adverse affects on Sudan and Egypt [
7,
21].
Considering the large capacity of the reservoir, which could store approximately 1.5 years of long-term average discharges of the Upper Blue Nile River, and the fact that its main purpose is the generation of hydropower, the GERD will significantly alter the discharge regime downstream. Almost independent of how the dam will be operated, drastic impacts on the annual cycle of discharges can be expected, shifting from a strong seasonal to a completely balanced regime with almost constant discharges each month. Another effect is a reduction of the inter-annual and daily variability of discharges downstream. Years with high discharges will decrease, and years with low discharges will occur less frequently, although the latter depends on reservoir losses via seepage. Assuming medium to high seepage rates, years with low discharges will either remain unchanged, compared to the situation without GERD, or may increase, respectively.
Another option to operate the GERD is to release discharges by preserving the natural discharge regime in a certain way. Although the annual cycle would be smoothed considerably by increasing discharges by 100% (from ~500–1000 m·s) during the dry season (November–May/June) and decreasing peak discharges in the rainy season by 30–70% (July–September), average annual HPP would only be a bit lower compared to operation rules prioritizing HPP. However, monthly HPP production would have a much higher variability, ranging from an average of 900 MW in June to about 2800 MW in September. If Ethiopia wants to realize its plans to play the role of a regional power hub by delivering reliable electric energy to neighboring countries, the deficits in months with low HPP would have to be balanced by other sources in such a management scenario, ideally by renewable sources like wind and solar power.
In any case, the downstream countries Sudan and Egypt have to be prepared to adapt to highly altered conditions. However, there will be opportunities and risks with regard to water management and ecosystem integrity. Sudan may benefit from regulated flows enabling the vast irrigated area (Gezira-Scheme) to be reliably supplied with water throughout the year, probably to the detriment of Egypt where water volumes entering the country would be further reduced in this case [
7].
With regard to transboundary water management and water availability in the eastern Nile River basin, an interesting question is whether it makes sense to store water in regions with lower evaporative demand than in regions with higher evaporation rates. Shifting storage upstream would provide net water savings, because evaporation in the GERD is theoretically lower than in the HAD [
7]. This would be particularly beneficial under projected climate change where temperature in the UBN may increase between 3.0 and 6.5 K at the end of the 21st Century compared to the period of 1970–1999 [
28]. Due to the location of the GERD in a deep gorge, the surface area is relatively small compared to its volume, and the evaporative demand is lower than in the HAD [
4]. Hence, water losses from evaporation in the GERD are much smaller than in the HAD [
4]. Mean annual losses from both reservoirs, HAD and GERD, may be 16% less than the loss from the HAD operating alone [
21]. As projected climate change adds another dimension of uncertainties on future water availability and its variability, since some models project higher other lower rainfall and discharges [
40], water storages may represent another adaptation option allowing for coordinated responses to changing boundary conditions or extreme situations [
7]. Ultimately, a win-win situation can only be achieved for all riparian countries, if a high level of cooperation in managing the Eastern Nile water resources were realized.