In China, hydropower development is an important strategic initiative for the structural reform of energy supply and the development of poor areas. With technology at a mature stage, hydropower development is now constrained by relocation issues. Building a mechanism to balance the interests of all the stakeholders is the key to realizing the shared benefits of hydropower development. This paper takes reservoir-displaced people, hydropower developers, and government departments as the research objects, combines the relationship between them, and constructs two evolutionary game models: “reservoir-displaced people versus hydropower developer” and “reservoir-displaced people versus hydropower developer versus government department.” We then analyze strategy selection and evolution for reservoir-displaced people and hydropower developers, as well as the changes in the evolutionarily stable strategies of both players under the government’s macro-control and determine the boundary conditions for stable behavior of each player. Based on the results of the evolutionary analysis, the initial willingness and parameters of the players can be input into a simulation, and the evolutionary paths under different scenarios are calculated in MATLAB to further verify and analyze the evolutionary results. According to the boundary conditions of the different strategies they adopt, the equilibrium point of benefits for the three players can be calculated, which provides a new research framework for the formulation of land acquisition compensation policy, and also provides an idea and scientific basis for the macro regulation of the distribution of the benefits of hydropower development.
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