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Open AccessCommunication

A Note on Disbelief in Others regarding Backward Induction

by 1,2,* and 1
1
Institute of Sociology, Leipzig University, 04107 Leipzig, Germany
2
Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2017, 8(3), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030033
Received: 17 July 2017 / Revised: 2 August 2017 / Accepted: 4 August 2017 / Published: 8 August 2017
We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player’s own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so. We find that behavior is responsive to the dependence on others who might fail in backward induction as well as information regarding their backward induction skills. View Full-Text
Keywords: backward induction; iterative thinking; beliefs backward induction; iterative thinking; beliefs
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Tutić, A.; Grehl, S. A Note on Disbelief in Others regarding Backward Induction. Games 2017, 8, 33.

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