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Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation
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Article

The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

1
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria
2
Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, 141-8602 Tokyo, Japan
3
Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, 192-8577 Tokyo, Japan
4
Research Center for Ethiculture Studies, RINRI Institute, 102-8561 Tokyo, Japan
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Attila Szolnoki
Games 2017, 8(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010008
Received: 14 September 2016 / Revised: 26 December 2016 / Accepted: 13 January 2017 / Published: 21 January 2017
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Games and Statistical Physics of Social Networks)
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules—shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple standing—and base the model on the giving game in regular networks for Cooperators, Defectors, and Discriminators. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are differently characterized in terms of how cooperation evolves, depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio, the network-node degree, and the observation and error conditions. Our findings show that the most tolerant rule—simple standing—is the most robust among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; indirect reciprocity; structured population; social norm; private information evolution of cooperation; indirect reciprocity; structured population; social norm; private information
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MDPI and ACS Style

Sasaki, T.; Yamamoto, H.; Okada, I.; Uchida, S. The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks. Games 2017, 8, 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010008

AMA Style

Sasaki T, Yamamoto H, Okada I, Uchida S. The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks. Games. 2017; 8(1):8. https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010008

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sasaki, Tatsuya, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, and Satoshi Uchida. 2017. "The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks" Games 8, no. 1: 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010008

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