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Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden
Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, Lund 220 07, Sweden
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2013, 4(3), 497-507;
Received: 13 June 2013 / Revised: 16 August 2013 / Accepted: 22 August 2013 / Published: 30 August 2013
PDF [125 KB, uploaded 30 August 2013]


This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free. View Full-Text
Keywords: free-riding; communication; coordination free-riding; communication; coordination

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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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Andersson, O.; Holm, H.J. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games 2013, 4, 497-507.

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