Games 2013, 4(3), 329-338; doi:10.3390/g4030329
Article

Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

1 CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium 2 CEREC, Saint-Louis University, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 28 March 2013; in revised form: 27 May 2013 / Accepted: 13 June 2013 / Published: 27 June 2013
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Abstract: We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
Keywords: relative concerns; alternating-offer bargaining; private information; maximal delays

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MDPI and ACS Style

Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information. Games 2013, 4, 329-338.

AMA Style

Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V. Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information. Games. 2013; 4(3):329-338.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. 2013. "Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information." Games 4, no. 3: 329-338.

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