Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Evolutionary Dynamics
2.1. Selecting the Strategy Set
3. Dynamic Behaviour and Stability Analysis
3.1. Dynamics with the Simple and the Extended Strategy Set
3.2. Existence of Stable Fixed Points
3.3. Recurring Phases of Cooperation
3.4. Co-existence between Fixed Point Existence and Recurring Cooperation
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. Stability of fixed point in the simple strategy set for small mutation rates
- 1. An instance of the dynamics was counted as oscillating when the average payoff A repeatedly returns to at least 5% above full defection, i.e. A > 1.05N P . Frequently, it was the case that the oscillations had phases of cooperation well above the 5% threshold.
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Lindgren, K.; Verendel, V. Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play. Games 2013, 4, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4010001
Lindgren K, Verendel V. Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play. Games. 2013; 4(1):1-20. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4010001
Chicago/Turabian StyleLindgren, Kristian, and Vilhelm Verendel. 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play" Games 4, no. 1: 1-20. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4010001