Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Mobility Comparisons
3. The Questionnaire Experiment
3.1. The Questionnaire
3.2. The Sample
4. Results
5. Concluding Remarks
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Appendix A.1. Instructions
Appendix A.2. Questions Q1bis–Q7bis
1 | Some recent studies have focused on combining evaluations of structural and exchange mobility. Ray and Genicot (2023) analyse the conditions under which economic growth provides greater benefits to individuals who are relatively worse off than to those who are better off, and call this condition upward mobility. In a similar vein, Van de gaer and Palmisano (2021) studied the conditions for positive welfare gains from economic development, dividing them into growth, mobility, and fluctuation aversion effects. Here, we are only concerned with the measurement of mobility, not its valuation from a welfare perspective. (For a discussion of the issues involved in assessing multidimensional well-being; see Decancq et al., 2015). |
2 | Dardanoni et al. (2012) provides empirical justification for monotonicity, describing it as a “fact of life”, as monotone transition matrices characterize most observed mobility processes. Theoretical properties of monotone mobility matrices are discussed in Dardanoni (1995). |
3 | See Bartolucci et al. (2001) for statistical inference on this ordering. |
4 | In the example below, we adopt this representation for simplicity, where Society A always displays greater mobility. However, in the experimental questionnaire, we randomize both the order of the questions and which society exhibits greater mobility in each question. |
5 | People who are repeatedly flagged for lack of attention and care in answering questionnaires (incomplete surveys, failure on control questions, or responding too quickly) may be removed from the subject pool. |
6 | We present the aggregate sample, as we did not find statistically significant differences between respondents assigned to the two questionnaire versions. |
7 | Nevertheless, some argue that a relatively well-educated sample could be useful for abstract questions that require reasoned judgments, such as assessing whether people’s perceptions are consistent with theoretical predictions (Amiel & Cowell, 1992; Gaertner & Schokkaert, 2012). |
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Society A | |||
---|---|---|---|
Parent Status | Child Status | ||
Low | High | ||
Low | a | ||
High | |||
Society A | |||
Parent Status | Child Status | ||
Low | High | ||
Low | a | ||
High | |||
Society B | |||
Parent Status | Child Status | ||
Low | High | ||
Low | b | ||
High | |||
Society A | |||
Parent Status | Child Status | ||
20,000 | 80,000 | 100,000 | |
20,000 | |||
80,000 | |||
100,000 | 1 | ||
Society B | |||
Parent Status | Child Status | ||
20,000 | 80,000 | 100,000 | |
20,000 | |||
80,000 | |||
100,000 | 1 |
Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max | N | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
Demographics—(D) | |||||
Age | 35.29 | 10.62 | 19 | 73 | 242 |
Gender (1 = female, 0 = male) | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 242 |
Ethnicity (1 = white, 0 = otherwise) | 0.72 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 | 242 |
Education (1 = master’s degree, 0 = less) | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 242 |
Marital status (1 = married or domestic partnership, 0 = otherwise) | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | 242 |
Economic prospects—(P) | |||||
(P1) Standard of living vs. US average | 2.71 | 0.75 | 1 | 5 | 242 |
(1 = much lower, …, 5 = much higher) | |||||
(P2) Standard of living vs. parents | 2.86 | 0.96 | 1 | 5 | 242 |
(1 = much lower, …, 5 = much higher) | |||||
(P3) Income opportunities vs. parents | 3.00 | 1.03 | 1 | 5 | 242 |
(1 = much lower, …, 5 = much higher) | |||||
Values—(V) | |||||
(V1) Value of independence in economic positions | 3.77 | 0.74 | 1 | 5 | 242 |
(1 = strongly disagree, …, 5 = strongly agree) | |||||
(V2) Independence as equality of opportunity | 3.75 | 0.83 | 1 | 5 | 242 |
(1 = strongly disagree, …, 5 = strongly agree) |
Q4 | Q10 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | B | = | A | B | = | ||||
Q1 | A | 48.82% | 4.72% | 1.57% | Q1 | A | 44.88% | 6.30% | 3.94% |
B | 15.75% | 3.15% | 3.94% | B | 11.81% | 7.87% | 3.15% | ||
= | 10.24% | 4.72% | 7.09% | = | 11.81% | 5.51% | 4.72% | ||
Q4 | A | 62.60% | 8.66% | 3.94% | |||||
B | 3.15% | 8.66% | 0.79% | ||||||
= | 3.15% | 2.36% | 7.09% |
Q4bis | Q10bis | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | B | = | A | B | = | ||||
Q1bis | A | 54.78% | 2.61% | 4.35% | Q1bis | A | 55.65% | 3.48% | 2.61% |
B | 7.83% | 8.70% | 6.09% | B | 7.83% | 13.04% | 1.74% | ||
= | 5.22% | 4.35% | 6.09% | = | 6.96% | 3.48% | 5.22% | ||
Q4bis | A | 59.13% | 6.96% | 1.74% | |||||
B | 3.48% | 7.83% | 4.35% | ||||||
= | 7.83% | 5.22% | 3.48% |
Q6 | Q7 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | B | = | A | B | = | ||||
Q5 | A | 40.94% | 5.51% | 3.94% | Q5 | A | 28.35% | 7.09% | 14.96% |
B | 9.45% | 16.54% | 3.94% | B | 9.45% | 14.96% | 5.51% | ||
= | 1.57% | 4.72% | 13.39% | = | 5.51% | 3.94% | 10.24% | ||
Q6 | A | 28.35% | 8.66% | 14.96% | |||||
B | 9.45% | 12.60% | 4.72% | ||||||
= | 5.51% | 4.72% | 11.02% |
Q6bis | Q7bis | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | B | = | A | B | = | ||||
Q5bis | A | 53.04% | 4.35% | 3.48% | Q5bis | A | 38.26% | 10.43% | 12.17% |
B | 9.57% | 11.30% | 1.74% | B | 4.35% | 14.78% | 3.48% | ||
= | 3.48% | 2.61% | 10.43% | = | 5.22% | 1.74% | 9.57% | ||
Q6bis | A | 38.26% | 14.78% | 13.04% | |||||
B | 4.35% | 9.57% | 4.35% | ||||||
= | 5.22% | 2.61% | 7.83% |
Q3 | Q9 | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | B | = | A | B | = | ||||
Q2 | A | 24.41% | 10.24% | 3.94% | Q8 | A | 29.92% | 23.62% | 5.51% |
B | 11.81% | 19.69% | 4.72% | B | 5.51% | 18.11% | 6.30% | ||
= | 5.51% | 7.87% | 11.81% | = | 1.57% | 3.15% | 6.30% |
Q3bis | Q9bis | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | B | = | A | B | = | ||||
Q2bis | A | 27.83% | 7.83% | 4.35% | Q8bis | A | 34.78% | 19.13% | 7.83% |
B | 8.70% | 24.35% | 7.83% | B | 3.48% | 16.52% | 3.48% | ||
= | 6.09% | 6.09% | 6.96% | = | 2.61% | 2.61% | 9.57% |
Greater Mobility in | Test | ||
---|---|---|---|
Society A | Society B | ||
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
Q1 (2 × 2—stochastic independence) | 1.076 *** | −0.207 | 1.283 *** |
(0.287) | (0.333) | (0.283) | |
Q2 (as Q1 with income decline) | 0.562 * | 0.121 | 0.440 |
(0.297) | (0.315) | (0.272) | |
Q3 (as Q1 with income growth ) | 0.858 *** | 0.378 | 0.480 * |
(0.307) | (0.325) | (0.267) | |
Q4 (2 × 2—immobility) | 1.978 *** | −0.233 | 2.211 *** |
(0.329) | (0.416) | (0.330) | |
Q5 (3 × 3—mobility between middle-top classes) | 1.097 *** | 0.182 | 0.915 *** |
(0.300) | (0.341) | (0.274) | |
Q6 (3 × 3—mobility between bottom-middle classes) | 1.050 *** | −0.009 | 1.059 *** |
(0.294) | (0.339) | (0.282) | |
Q7 (3 × 3—mobility between all classes) | 0.478 * | −0.419 | 0.897 *** |
(0.288) | (0.324) | (0.281) | |
Q8 (2 × 2—changes generations’ size) | 1.857 *** | 0.773 ** | 1.084 *** |
(0.338) | (0.376) | (0.272) | |
Q9 (as Q8 with income growth) | 0.857 *** | 0.678 ** | 0.179 |
(0.320) | (0.327) | (0.266) | |
Q10 (2 × 2—immobility) | 1.948 *** | 0.281 | 1.666 *** |
(0.336) | (0.394) | (0.286) | |
Q1bis (2 × 2—stochastic independence) | 1.492 *** | 0.093 | 1.399 *** |
(0.326) | (0.373) | (0.291) | |
Q2bis (as Q1 with income decline) | 0.822 ** | 0.480 | 0.342 |
(0.322) | (0.332) | (0.274) | |
Q3bis (as Q1 with income growth ) | 0.888 *** | 0.414 | 0.474 * |
(0.325) | (0.339) | (0.275) | |
Q4bis (2 × 2—immobility) | 1.538 *** | −0.332 | 1.870 *** |
(0.319) | (0.396) | (0.320) | |
Q5bis (3 × 3—mobility between middle-top classes) | 1.421 *** | 0.037 | 1.384 *** |
(0.323) | (0.371) | (0.291) | |
Q6bis (3 × 3—mobility between bottom-middle classes) | 1.566 *** | −0.122 | 1.687 *** |
(0.324) | (0.385) | (0.306) | |
Q7bis (3 × 3—mobility between all classes) | 0.724 ** | −0.225 | 0.949 *** |
(0.307) | (0.338) | (0.285) | |
Q8bis (2 × 2—changes generations’ size) | 1.550 *** | 0.189 | 1.361 *** |
(0.330) | (0.378) | (0.298) | |
Q9bis (as Q8 with income growth) | 0.754 ** | 0.324 | 0.431 |
(0.313) | (0.331) | (0.278) | |
Q10bis (2 × 2—immobility) | 2.140 *** | 0.474 | 1.666 *** |
(0.385) | (0.431) | (0.303) | |
Age | −0.007 | −0.005 | −0.002 |
(0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | |
Gender (1 = female) | 0.094 | 0.202 | −0.108 |
(0.129) | (0.139) | (0.107) | |
Ethnicity (1 = white) | 0.420 *** | 0.451 *** | −0.031 |
(0.138) | (0.150) | (0.120) | |
Education (1 = master degree) | 0.672 *** | 0.700 *** | −0.028 |
(0.216) | (0.229) | (0.149) | |
Marital status (1 = married) | −0.622 *** | −0.047 | −0.574 *** |
(0.127) | (0.136) | (0.106) | |
(P1) Standard of living relative to average in the US | −0.119 | 0.008 | −0.126 ** |
(0.074) | (0.079) | (0.060) | |
(P2) Standard of living relative to parents | 0.227 *** | 0.246 *** | −0.019 |
(0.084) | (0.092) | (0.074) | |
(P3) Income opportunities relative to parents | −0.053 | −0.057 | 0.003 |
(0.079) | (0.085) | (0.067) | |
(V1) Independence preferable | 0.059 | 0.097 | −0.038 |
(0.076) | (0.081) | (0.063) | |
(V2) Independence as equality of opportunity | 0.260 *** | 0.112 | 0.148 ** |
(0.072) | (0.073) | (0.062) | |
Observations | 2420 |
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Bernasconi, M.; Cinquanta, G.; Dardanoni, V.; Prete, V. Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions. Games 2025, 16, 24. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030024
Bernasconi M, Cinquanta G, Dardanoni V, Prete V. Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions. Games. 2025; 16(3):24. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030024
Chicago/Turabian StyleBernasconi, Michele, Giulio Cinquanta, Valentino Dardanoni, and Vincenzo Prete. 2025. "Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions" Games 16, no. 3: 24. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030024
APA StyleBernasconi, M., Cinquanta, G., Dardanoni, V., & Prete, V. (2025). Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions. Games, 16(3), 24. https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030024