Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Results
2.1. Self-Report Measures
2.2. Trust Measures
2.3. Expectation Measures
2.4. Reciprocity Measures
2.5. Association between Trust and Reciprocity
2.6. Earnings
2.7. Rating Measures
3. Discussion
3.1. More Trusting in the Give Than in the Take Frame for Human Partners
3.2. More Reciprocating in the Give Than in the Take Frame
3.3. Limitations, Future Directions, and Strengths
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Participants
4.2. Experimental Tasks
4.3. Procedure
4.4. Statistical Analysis
4.4.1. Self-Report Measures
4.4.2. Trust Measures
4.4.3. Expectation Measures
4.4.4. Reciprocity Measures
4.4.5. Association between Trust and Reciprocity
4.4.6. Earnings
4.4.7. Rating Measures
5. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
- Ostrom, E.; Walker, J. (Eds.) Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research; Russell Sage Foundation: New York, NY, USA, 2003. [Google Scholar]
- Torche, F.; Valenzuela, E. Trust and reciprocity: A theoretical distinction of the sources of social capital. Eur. J. Soc. Theory 2011, 14, 181–198. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Vilares, I.; Dam, G.; Kording, K. Trust and Reciprocity: Are Effort and Money Equivalent? PLoS ONE 2011, 6, e17113. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Schneider, P.A.; Fukuyama, F. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. J. Mark. 1996, 60, 129. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Knack, S.; Keefer, P. Does Inequality Harm Growth Only in Democracies? A Replication and Extension. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 1997, 41, 323. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Uslaner, E.M. Producing and Consuming Trust. Polit. Sci. Q. 2000, 115, 569–590. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zak, P.J.; Knack, S. Trust and Growth. Econ. J. 2001, 111, 295–321. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dincer, O.C.; Uslaner, E.M. Trust and growth. Public Choice 2010, 142, 59–67. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Berg, J.; Dickhaut, J.; McCabe, K. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games Econ. Behav. 1995, 10, 122–142. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Bohnet, I.; Meier, S. Deciding to Distrust. 2005. Available online: https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedbpp/05-4.html (accessed on 15 September 2021).
- Fang, H.; Liao, C.; Fu, Z.; Tian, S.; Luo, Y.; Xu, P.; Krueger, F. Connectome-based individualized prediction of reciprocity propensity and sensitivity to framing: A resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Cereb. Cortex 2022, 2022, 1–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Reimann, M.; Schilke, O.; Cook, K.S. Trust is heritable, whereas distrust is not. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2017, 114, 7007–7012. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 1981, 211, 453–458. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] [Green Version]
- Thaler, R. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 1980, 1, 39–60. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Samuelson, W.; Zeckhauser, R. Status quo bias in decision making. J. Risk Uncertain. 1988, 1, 7–59. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Rousseau, D.M.; Sitkin, S.B.; Burt, R.S.; Camerer, C. Not So Different after All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. Acad. Manag. Rev. 1998, 23, 393–404. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Falk, A.; Fischbacher, U. A theory of reciprocity. Games Econ. Behav. 2006, 54, 293–315. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Du, S.; Nie, T.; Chu, C.; Yu, Y. Reciprocal supply chain with intention. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 2014, 239, 389–402. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- McCabe, K.A.; Rigdon, M.L.; Smith, V.L. Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2003, 52, 267–275. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Toussaert, S. Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2017, 137, 132–144. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kühberger, A. The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 1998, 75, 23–55. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Haigh, M.S.; List, J.A. Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis. J. Financ. 2005, 60, 523–534. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Tovar, P. The effects of loss aversion on trade policy: Theory and evidence. J. Int. Econ. 2009, 78, 154–167. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Johnson, E.J.; Goldstein, D. Do Defaults Save Lives? Science 2003, 302, 1338–1339. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Mercer, J. Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. Int. Organ. 2005, 59, 77–106. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Steiger, A.; Kühberger, A. A Meta-Analytic Re-Appraisal of the Framing Effect. Z. Für Psychol. 2018, 226, 45–55. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Novemsky, N.; Kahneman, D. How Do Intentions Affect Loss Aversion? J. Mark. Res. 2005, 42, 139–140. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Budescu, D.V.; Weiss, W. Reflection of transitive and intransitive preferences: A test of prospect theory. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 1987, 39, 184–202. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Evans, A.M.; van Beest, I. Gain-loss framing effects in dilemmas of trust and reciprocity. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2017, 73, 151–163. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dufwenberg, M. Game theory. WIREs Cogn. Sci. 2011, 2, 167–173. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Burks, S.V.; Carpenter, J.P.; Verhoogen, E. Playing both roles in the trust game. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2003, 51, 195–216. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Sunderrajan, A.; Albarracín, D. Are actions better than inactions? Positivity, outcome, and intentionality biases in judgments of action and inaction. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2021, 94, 104105. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Evans, A.; Krueger, J. Outcomes and expectations in dilemmas of trust. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 2014, 9, 90–103. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Evans, A.M.; Krueger, J.I. Ambiguity and expectation-neglect in dilemmas of interpersonal trust. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 2017, 12, 584–595. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U.; Gächter, S. Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Hum. Nat. 2002, 13, 1–25. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] [Green Version]
- Schutter, M.; van Dijk, E.; de Kwaadsteniet, E.W.; van Dijk, W.W. The Detrimental Effects of No Trust: Active Decisions of No Trust Cause Stronger Affective and Behavioral Reactions Than Inactive Decisions. Front. Psychol. 2021, 12, 643174. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dohmen, T.; Falk, A.; Huffman, D.; Sunde, U. Representative Trust and Reciprocity: Prevalence and Determinants. Econ. Inq. 2008, 46, 84–90. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Chaudhuri, A.; Gangadharan, L. An Experimental Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness. South. Econ. J. 2007, 73, 959–985. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kiyonari, T.; Yamagishi, T.; Cook, K.S.; Cheshire, C. Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note. Soc. Psychol. Q. 2006, 69, 270–283. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Espín, A.M.; Exadaktylos, F.; Neyse, L. Heterogeneous Motives in the Trust Game: A Tale of Two Roles. Front. Psychol. 2016, 7, 728. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Bicchieri, C.; Xiao, E.; Muldoon, R. Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not. Polit. Philos. Econ. 2011, 10, 170–187. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Nass, C.; Moon, Y. Machines and Mindlessness: Social Responses to Computers. J. Soc. Issues 2000, 56, 81–103. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Vermue, M.; Seger, C.R.; Sanfey, A.G. Group-based biases influence learning about individual trustworthiness. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2018, 77, 36–49. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Yamagishi, T.; Akutsu, S.; Cho, K.; Inoue, Y.; Li, Y.; Matsumoto, Y. Two-Component Model of General Trust: Predicting Behavioral Trust from Attitudinal Trust. Soc. Cogn. 2015, 33, 436–458. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yamagishi, T. The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan. Soc. Psychol. Q. 1988, 51, 265. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Costa, P.T.; McCrae, R.R. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R). In The SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment: Volume 2—Personality Measurement and Testing; SAGE Publications, Inc.: Los Angeles, CA, USA, 2008; pp. 179–198. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Banerjee, R. On the interpretation of World Values Survey trust question—Global expectations vs. local beliefs. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 2018, 55, 491–510. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Botsford, J.; Schulze, L.; Bohländer, J.; Renneberg, B. Interpersonal Trust: Development and Validation of a Self-Report Inventory and Clinical Application in Patients With Borderline Personality Disorder. J. Personal. Disord. 2021, 35, 447–468. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Caliendo, M.; Fossen, F.; Kritikos, A. Trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity: Do these traits impact entrepreneurial dynamics? J. Econ. Psychol. 2012, 33, 394–409. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Matejkowski, J.; McCarthy, K.S.; Draine, J. The Personal Norm of Reciprocity among mental health service users: Conceptual development and measurement. Psychiatr. Rehabil. J. 2011, 34, 202–213. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gray, K.; Ward, A.F.; Norton, M.I. Paying it forward: Generalized reciprocity and the limits of generosity. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 2014, 143, 247–254. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Davis, M.H. Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1983, 44, 113–126. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Griffin, D.W.; Bartholomew, K. The metaphysics of measurement: The case of adult attachment. In Attachment Processes in Adulthood, Advances in Personal Relationships; Jessica Kingsley Publishers: London, UK, 1994; pp. 17–22. [Google Scholar]
- Murphy, R.O.; Ackermann, K.A.; Handgraaf, M. Measuring Social Value Orientation. SSRN Electron. J. 2011, 6, 771–781. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
- Wilkins, C.L.; Wellman, J.D.; Babbitt, L.G.; Toosi, N.R.; Schad, K.D. You can win but I can’t lose: Bias against high-status groups increases their zero-sum beliefs about discrimination. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2015, 57, 1–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Aquino, K.; Reed, A. The self-importance of moral identity. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 2002, 83, 1423–1440. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Stawski, R.S. Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling (2nd Edition). Struct. Equ. Model. Multidiscip. J. 2013, 20, 541–550. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
TG (n = 58) | DTG (n = 59) | p-Value | t Value | Cohen’s d | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Single Dimension Scales | |||||
Pay-It-Forward Tendency | 4.11 (0.64) | 4.20 (0.64) | 0.448 | −0.76 | −0.14 |
Social Value Orientation | 32.05 (10.25) | 34.10 (7.71) | 0.225 | −1.22 | −0.23 |
General Distrust | 4.45 (0.67) | 4.07 (0.96) | 0.015 | 2.47 | 0.46 |
Moral Identity | 10.40 (1.72) | 10.18 (1.56) | 0.455 | 0.74 | 0.14 |
General Zero-Sum Beliefs | 2.86 (0.87) | 2.96 (0.83) | 0.550 | −0.60 | −0.11 |
NEO-PI-R-trust | 3.44 (0.51) | 3.54 (0.50) | 0.306 | −1.02 | −0.19 |
Trust strangers | 1.69 (0.60) | 1.76 (0.60) | 0.510 | 0.66 | −0.12 |
Positive and Negative Reciprocity | 9.25 (1.40) | 9.01 (1.40) | 0.340 | −0.95 | 0.19 |
Interpersonal Trust Scenario Questionnaire | 3.28 (0.61) | 3.17 (0.57) | 0.329 | −0.97 | 0.186 |
Self-Reported Trust | 6.00 (2.49) | 6.56 (3.68) | 0.337 | −0.96 | −0.18 |
Interpersonal Reactivity Index | |||||
Interpersonal Reactivity Index | 99.71 (7.97) | 97.76 (11.91) | 0.301 | 1.04 | 0.19 |
Perspective Taking | 25.22 (3.69) | 25.44 (3.80) | 0.755 | −0.31 | −0.06 |
Fantasy | 24.16 (3.76) | 22.92 (4.54) | 0.111 | 1.61 | 0.30 |
Empathic Concern | 26.98 (3.27) | 26.97 (3.66) | 0.979 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
Personal Distress | 23.34 (4.15) | 22.44 (4.30) | 0.249 | 1.16 | 0.21 |
General Trust | |||||
Trust Belief | 5.26 (0.82) | 5.34 (0.88) | 0.597 | −0.53 | −0.10 |
Trust Preference | 3.69 (0.85) | 3.95 (0.68) | 0.061 | −1.89 | −0.35 |
General Trust | 8.94 (1.42) | 9.29 (1.34) | 0.170 | −1.38 | −0.26 |
Personal Norm of Reciprocity | |||||
Belief In Reciprocity | 4.70 (0.72) | 4.50 (0.80) | 0.159 | 1.42 | 0.26 |
Positive Reciprocity | 5.78 (0.71) | 5.48 (0.70) | 0.027 | 2.24 | 0.41 |
Negative Reciprocity | 4.22 (1.04) | 3.93 (0.87) | 0.115 | 1.59 | 0.29 |
Relationship Scales Questionnaire | |||||
Independence | 4.18 (0.56) | 4.25 (0.64) | 0.511 | −0.66 | −0.12 |
Dependence | 3.12 (0.52) | 3.18 (0.61) | 0.604 | −0.52 | −0.10 |
Lack Of Trust | 3.07 (0.55) | 2.95 (0.52) | 0.218 | 1.24 | 0.23 |
Anxiety | 3.10 (0.69) | 2.95 (0.72) | 0.277 | 1.09 | 0.21 |
Desire For Intimacy | 3.00 (0.77) | 2.69 (0.67) | 0.026 | 2.26 | 0.43 |
Avoidance | 3.11 (0.45) | 3.02 (0.56) | 0.380 | 0.88 | 0.42 |
Self-Reported Reciprocity | |||||
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 10 | 52 (16) | 48 (14) | 0.218 | 1.24 | 0.23 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 9 | 50 (15) | 43 (15) | 0.008 | 2.71 | 0.50 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 8 | 48 (15) | 39 (15) | 0.001 | 3.48 | 0.64 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 7 | 48 (14) | 34 (17) | <0.001 | 5.18 | 0.96 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 6 | 46 (14) | 29 (19) | <0.001 | 5.73 | 1.06 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 5 | 46 (15) | 26 (19) | <0.001 | 6.07 | 1.12 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 4 | 42 (15) | 21 (20) | <0.001 | 6.67 | 1.23 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 3 | 37 (16) | 17 (20) | <0.001 | 6.12 | 1.13 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 2 | 31 (17) | 13 (20) | <0.001 | 5.24 | 0.97 |
Self-reported percentage of return when Player 1 trusted 1 | 25 (21) | 9 (19) | <0.001 | 4.51 | 0.84 |
Predictors | Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Beta | SE. | t | p | Beta | SE. | t | p | |
Constant | 0.34 | 0.01 | 27.33 | <0.001 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 12.21 | <0.001 |
Game | 0.02 | 0.01 | 3.89 | <0.001 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 9.08 | <0.001 |
Gender | −0.01 | 0.01 | −1.62 | 0.106 | −0.01 | 0.01 | −1.68 | 0.072 |
Subjects | 0 | 0 | 0.82 | 0.413 | 0 | 0 | −1.47 | 0.257 |
Trust Levels | 0.03 | 0.00 | 32.55 | <0.001 | ||||
R Square | 0.005 | 0.237 | ||||||
F Change | 6.248 | 217.886 | ||||||
Sig. F Change | <0.001 | <0.001 |
Predictors | Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Beta | SE. | t | p | Beta | SE. | t | p | |
Constant | 0.01 | 16.05 | <0.001 | 0.01 | −6.46 | <0.001 | ||
Game Type | 0.14 | 0.01 | 7.79 | <0.001 | 0.23 | 0 | 17.50 | <0.001 |
Gender | −0.01 | 0.01 | −0.35 | 0.726 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.36 | 0.723 |
Subjects | 0.06 | 0 | 3.51 | <0.001 | 0.07 | 0 | 5.62 | <0.001 |
Trust Levels | 0.66 | 0 | 49.53 | <0.001 | ||||
R Square | 0.022 | 0.423 | ||||||
F Change | 24.305 | 2452.678 | ||||||
Sig. F Change | <0.001 | <0.001 |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2023 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Zhang, Y.; Zhang, Y.; Wu, Y.; Krueger, F. Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity. Games 2023, 14, 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010008
Zhang Y, Zhang Y, Wu Y, Krueger F. Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity. Games. 2023; 14(1):8. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010008
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Yao, Yushu Zhang, Yan Wu, and Frank Krueger. 2023. "Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity" Games 14, no. 1: 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010008