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Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation

by , and *,†
School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
These authors contributed equally to this work.
Academic Editor: Ulrich Berger
Games 2021, 12(3), 64;
Received: 25 May 2021 / Revised: 10 August 2021 / Accepted: 11 August 2021 / Published: 17 August 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Behavioral Coalition Formation: Theory and Experiments)
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects’ decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor’s choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally. View Full-Text
Keywords: laboratory experiment; coalition formation; non-cooperative games laboratory experiment; coalition formation; non-cooperative games
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MDPI and ACS Style

Abe, T.; Funaki, Y.; Shinoda, T. Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation. Games 2021, 12, 64.

AMA Style

Abe T, Funaki Y, Shinoda T. Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation. Games. 2021; 12(3):64.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Abe, Takaaki, Yukihiko Funaki, and Taro Shinoda. 2021. "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation" Games 12, no. 3: 64.

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