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School Choice with Hybrid Schedules

Quantile Stable Mechanisms

Analysis Group, Chicago, IL 60601, USA
Airbnb, Oakland, CA 94611, USA
Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland
Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
The authors contributed equally to this work.
Academic Editor: Antonio Nicolò
Games 2021, 12(2), 43;
Received: 15 April 2021 / Accepted: 27 April 2021 / Published: 17 May 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants. View Full-Text
Keywords: matching; contracts; auctions; mechanisms; incentives matching; contracts; auctions; mechanisms; incentives
MDPI and ACS Style

Chen, P.; Egesdal, M.; Pycia, M.; Yenmez, M.B. Quantile Stable Mechanisms. Games 2021, 12, 43.

AMA Style

Chen P, Egesdal M, Pycia M, Yenmez MB. Quantile Stable Mechanisms. Games. 2021; 12(2):43.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Chen, Peter, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia, and M. B. Yenmez 2021. "Quantile Stable Mechanisms" Games 12, no. 2: 43.

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