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Nudging Climate Change Mitigation: A Laboratory Experiment with Inter-Generational Public Goods

1
Department of Psychology, Department of Economics, and Copenhagen Center for Social Data Science (SODAS), University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 2a, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark
2
Faculty of Law, Social Sciences, & Economics, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany
3
Erfurt Laboratory for Empirical Research, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2020, 11(4), 42; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042
Received: 20 July 2020 / Revised: 16 September 2020 / Accepted: 28 September 2020 / Published: 9 October 2020
To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second, they face an inter-generational conflict that stems from the higher costs for long-term mitigation measures, particularly helping future generations, compared to the short-term actions aimed at adapting to the immediate effects of climate change, benefiting mostly the current generation. We devise a novel game to study this multi-level conflict and investigate individuals’ behavior in a lab experiment. We find that, although individuals reach sufficient cooperation levels to avoid adverse consequences for their own generation, they contribute more to cheaper short-term than to costlier long-term measures, to the detriment of future generations. Simple “nudge” interventions, however, may alter this pattern considerably. We find that changing the default contribution level to the inter-generational welfare optimum increases long-term contributions. Moreover, providing individuals with the possibility to commit themselves to inter-generational solidarity leads to an even stronger increase in long-term contributions. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that nudges alone may not be enough to induce inter-generationally optimal contributions. View Full-Text
Keywords: climate change; experiment; social dilemma; inter-generational; nudging climate change; experiment; social dilemma; inter-generational; nudging
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MDPI and ACS Style

Böhm, R.; Gürerk, Ö.; Lauer, T. Nudging Climate Change Mitigation: A Laboratory Experiment with Inter-Generational Public Goods. Games 2020, 11, 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042

AMA Style

Böhm R, Gürerk Ö, Lauer T. Nudging Climate Change Mitigation: A Laboratory Experiment with Inter-Generational Public Goods. Games. 2020; 11(4):42. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042

Chicago/Turabian Style

Böhm, Robert, Özgür Gürerk, and Thomas Lauer. 2020. "Nudging Climate Change Mitigation: A Laboratory Experiment with Inter-Generational Public Goods" Games 11, no. 4: 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040042

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