Next Article in Journal
Leveraging Big Data Tools and Technologies: Addressing the Challenges of the Water Quality Sector
Previous Article in Journal
Stability of Deep Underground Openings through Large Fault Zones in Argillaceous Rock
Article Menu
Issue 11 (November) cover image

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Sustainability 2017, 9(11), 2148;

Coordination Contracts in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

Academy of Chinese Energy Strategy, China University of Petroleum-Beijing, 18 Fuxue Road, Changping, Beijing 102200, China
Mathematical Sciences, University of Southampton, University Road, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
School of Industrial Management Engineering, Korea University, Anamdong 5-ga, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul 136-713, Korea
School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 7 October 2017 / Revised: 18 November 2017 / Accepted: 19 November 2017 / Published: 22 November 2017
Full-Text   |   PDF [1449 KB, uploaded 22 November 2017]   |  


Dual channels have become popular strategies for manufacturers due to the development of innovative selling platforms. Examples in practice also show that the lack of relationship management, such as cooperation and sharing, may cause an unsustainable supply chain performance. However, previous studies on coordination of dual-channel supply chains always focus on the contribution to profits and neglect the sustainability of relationship development between channel members. In this paper, we study the coordination of a dual-channel supply chain including a direct channel and a traditional channel. Under the fact that sustainable economy, instead of profit maximization, is the more appropriate objective in channel members’ decision making, we consider the retailer’s risk exposure and assume the risk degree is also a factor that impacts decision making. We assume the manufacturer is risk-neutral and the retailer is risk-averse, and measure the risk attitude with Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) approach. Two traditional contracts widely used in single-channel supply chains, i.e., revenue-sharing contract and buy-back contract, are analyzed first. Although some researchers have discussed that traditional contracts cannot coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, our results show that traditional contracts can still come into play with restrictions on the risk-averse degree. Then we propose a risk-sharing contract which could distribute profits between two channel members and coordinate the system under varied risk-averse degrees with a fixed risk-sharing degree. Finally, we analyze the sensitivity of different parameters to illustrate the stable coordinating outcomes of this contract, and prove its generalization with more powerful channel members. The results provide important managerial insights. View Full-Text
Keywords: supply chain coordination; CVaR; dual channel; risk-averse; sustainable economy supply chain coordination; CVaR; dual channel; risk-averse; sustainable economy

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Zhu, L.; Ren, X.; Lee, C.; Zhang, Y. Coordination Contracts in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer. Sustainability 2017, 9, 2148.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics



[Return to top]
Sustainability EISSN 2071-1050 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top