Climate Change Politics through a Global Pledge-and-Review Regime: Positions among Negotiators and Stakeholders
2. Perspectives on Pledge-and-Review
2.1. Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Approaches
2.2. Advocates and Opponents of Pledge-and-Review
2.3. The Need for Examining Opinions
3. Method and Data
|Primary role at COP-17||A1||NA1||Total|
|Negotiator in national delegation||36||53||89|
|UN or intergovernmental organisation||15||14||29|
4. Analyzing the Empirical Findings
4.1. Which Critiques Are Considered Most Serious?
4.2. Comparing A1 and NA1
4.3. Comparing A1 and NA1 Negotiators and ENGOs
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix I. Survey Question in English and French
- The pledges are voluntary
- Many pledges are conditional
- The pledges have been calculated on different assumptions
- No common guidelines for measuring, reporting and verification exists
- Not all parties have submitted a pledge
- The pledges fall short of meeting the 2 °C target
- Les engagements sont volontaires
- De nombreux engagements sont soumis à des conditions
- Les engagements ont été fondés sur la base de différentes suppositions
- Il n’existe aucune directive commune pour les calculs, rapports et vérifications
- Toutes les Parties n’ont pas présenté d’engagement
- Les engagements n’ont pas été suffisants pour atteindre l’objectif des 2 °C
Appendix II. Elaboration of Alternatives Included in the Survey
- The pledges are voluntary”: Pledge-and-review is based on parties’ voluntary pledges for mitigation action. These are subject to review, but are not inscribed in any formally binding commitments.
- Many pledges are conditional”: Most pledges, both emissions targets and nationally appropriate mitigation actions, were made subject to certain conditions. In other words, the proposed mitigation actions are dependent on one or several conditions being fulfilled, for example other parties’ mitigation commitments or financial, technical and capacity-building support.
- The pledges have been calculated on different assumptions”: The instructions for formulating the pledges were highly flexible and parties have used different calculations and assumptions to derive emissions targets. Assumptions have for example been made about economic developments and emissions scenarios. In addition, there are differences in whether the emissions targets are economy-wide or limited to certain sectors, include or exclude land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) and if flexible mechanisms are accounted for.
- No common guidelines for measuring, reporting and verification exist”: Measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) mitigation action was a key feature in the Bali Action Plan, which launched a road plan to finalize an agreement at COP-15 (which subsequently resulted in the Copenhagen Accord). MRV quantifies mitigation action and improves transparency. Common guidelines can clarify mitigation action and facilitate comparability.
- “Not all parties have submitted a pledge”: 66 parties representing 89 countries out of 195 parties to the UNFCCC submitted a pledge in response to the Copenhagen Accord [8,9]. However, almost all A1 parties and all large NA1 emitters have done so. Consequently, most parties that have not submitted a pledge are NA1 parties responsible for a relatively small share of greenhouse gas emissions.
- “The pledges fall short of meeting the 2 °C target”: A number of studies have come to the conclusion that the emissions targets in the aggregate are not sufficient to put the world on trajectory towards the 2 °C target (e.g., [7,50,51,60,61]). This is also referred to as an ambition gap, i.e., the difference between what science suggests needs to be done to avoid dangerous climate change and the sum of pledges currently on the table.
Appendix III Data and Summary Statistics
|Variable||Obs||Mean||Std. Err.||95% Conf. Interval|
|No guideline MRV||306||5.336601||0.09887||5.142047||5.531155|
|Not all parties||308||5.431818||0.099683||5.23567||5.627966|
|2 degree target||316||6.006329||0.086686||5.835773||6.176886|
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Buhr, K.; Roth, S.; Stigson, P. Climate Change Politics through a Global Pledge-and-Review Regime: Positions among Negotiators and Stakeholders. Sustainability 2014, 6, 794-811. https://doi.org/10.3390/su6020794
Buhr K, Roth S, Stigson P. Climate Change Politics through a Global Pledge-and-Review Regime: Positions among Negotiators and Stakeholders. Sustainability. 2014; 6(2):794-811. https://doi.org/10.3390/su6020794Chicago/Turabian Style
Buhr, Katarina, Susanna Roth, and Peter Stigson. 2014. "Climate Change Politics through a Global Pledge-and-Review Regime: Positions among Negotiators and Stakeholders" Sustainability 6, no. 2: 794-811. https://doi.org/10.3390/su6020794