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Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

1
Energy Institute, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria
2
Institute of Economics, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2010, 2(12), 3710-3734; https://doi.org/10.3390/su2123710
Received: 4 October 2010 / Revised: 15 November 2010 / Accepted: 22 November 2010 / Published: 30 November 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy and Sustainability)
There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them. View Full-Text
Keywords: public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58] public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58]
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MDPI and ACS Style

Kollmann, A.; Schneider, F. Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis. Sustainability 2010, 2, 3710-3734. https://doi.org/10.3390/su2123710

AMA Style

Kollmann A, Schneider F. Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis. Sustainability. 2010; 2(12):3710-3734. https://doi.org/10.3390/su2123710

Chicago/Turabian Style

Kollmann, Andrea, and Friedrich Schneider. 2010. "Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis" Sustainability 2, no. 12: 3710-3734. https://doi.org/10.3390/su2123710

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