Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct: The Moderating Effect of the Director Network Position
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis
2.1. Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct
2.2. Moderating Role of Directors’ Network Position
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data and Sample Selection
3.2. Variable Measurement
3.2.1. Dependent Variable
3.2.2. Independent Variable
3.2.3. Moderation Variables
3.2.4. Control Variable
3.3. Model Setting
3.3.1. Basic Regression Model
3.3.2. Modeling the Moderating Effects of Director Network Position
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Basic Regression Results
4.3. Moderation Effect Test
4.4. Endogeneity Test
4.4.1. Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct
4.4.2. Director Network Position and Corporate Misconduct
4.5. Robustness Test
5. Further Analysis
5.1. Effect of Type of Director
5.2. Modeling and Results of the Mediating Effect of External Audit Quality
6. Conclusions
7. Contributions
8. Implications
9. Limitations and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Type | Name | Symbol | Definitions |
---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | Corporate misconduct | Violation | Violation is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm engages in a violation and 0 otherwise. |
Independent variable | Director tenure | Tenure | Director tenure is calculated as the natural logarithm of the average tenure of all directors on the board. |
Moderator variable | Degree centrality | Degree | Degree centrality is the measure of the extent to which a node is connected to other nodes in a network. |
Betweenness centrality | Betweenness | Betweenness centrality is the extent to which a node acts as a bridge between other nodes in a network. | |
Closeness centrality | Closeness | Closeness centrality is the inverse of the sum of the shortest distances from a node to all other nodes in a network. | |
Control variable | Leverage ratio | Lev | The ratio of total liabilities at the end of the year to total assets at the end of the year. |
Enterprise value | Tobin’s Q | The ratio of the market value of an enterprise’s assets to their replacement cost. | |
Ownership concentration | Top 1 | The shareholding of the largest shareholder among all shareholders. | |
Return on net assets | ROE | The ratio of a firm’s net profit to its average net worth, reflecting the level of compensation received via owners’ equity. | |
Company size | Size | The natural logarithm of the company’s total assets. | |
Company listing age | Age | The number of years since the company was listed on the stock exchange. | |
Board size | Board | The total count of individuals serving on the board of directors of the company. | |
State ownership | SOE | A dummy variable that equals 1 for state-owned firms and 0 for non-state-owned firms, depending on the nature of the company’s beneficial owner. | |
Institutional investor ownership | Indsh | The percentage of total equity held by institutional investors. | |
CEO duality | Dual | A dummy variable that equals 1 if the Chairman and CEO are the same person and 0 otherwise. | |
Year dummy variables | Year | Assigned a value of 1 for the relevant year and 0 for all other years. | |
industry dummy variables | Ind | Binary indicators based on the standard industry classification, assigned a value of 1 for companies in a specific industry and 0 for all others. |
Variable | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Median | Max | VIF |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Violation | 43,473 | 0.235 | 0.424 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |
Tenure | 43,473 | 4.393 | 2.128 | 1.000 | 4.300 | 13.765 | 1.31 |
Lev | 43,473 | 0.455 | 1.295 | −0.195 | 0.415 | 178.345 | 1.40 |
Tobin’s Q | 43,473 | 2.551 | 71.783 | 0.000 | 1.592 | 14,810.306 | 1.39 |
Top1 | 43,473 | 34.162 | 15.220 | 0.000 | 31.810 | 100.000 | 1.26 |
ROE | 43,473 | 0.031 | 4.405 | −207.397 | 0.069 | 713.204 | 1.00 |
Size | 43,473 | 22.079 | 1.373 | 11.348 | 21.899 | 28.636 | 1.05 |
Age | 43,473 | 13.930 | 8.502 | 0.000 | 12.000 | 32.000 | 1.57 |
Board | 43,473 | 10.446 | 3.696 | 4.000 | 10.000 | 58.000 | 1.06 |
SOE | 43,473 | 0.340 | 0.474 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.44 |
Indsh | 43,473 | 38.913 | 25.540 | 0.000 | 38.920 | 144.675 | 1.30 |
Dual | 43,473 | 0.286 | 0.452 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.00 |
Variable | Non-Corporate Misconduct Companies | Corporate Misconduct Companies | Test of Difference |
---|---|---|---|
N = 33,242 | N = 10,231 | ||
Mean | Mean | ||
Tenure | 4.352 | 4.527 | −7.30 *** |
Lev | 0.432 | 0.529 | −6.65 *** |
Tobin’s Q | 2.551 | 2.550 | 0.00 |
Top1 | 35.349 | 30.306 | 29.60 *** |
ROE | 0.087 | −0.148 | 4.70 *** |
Size | 22.112 | 21.970 | 9.15 *** |
Age | 13.671 | 14.771 | −11.45 *** |
Board | 9.914 | 12.177 | −56.10 *** |
SOE | 0.367 | 0.254 | 21.30 *** |
Indsh | 40.026 | 35.300 | 16.40 *** |
Dual | 0.288 | 0.280 | 1.45 |
Variable | (1) | (2) |
---|---|---|
Tenure | 0.285 *** | 0.195 *** |
(13.50) | (7.50) | |
Lev | 0.184 *** | |
(5.29) | ||
Tobin’s Q | −0.002 *** | |
(−4.58) | ||
Top 1 | −0.011 *** | |
(−11.53) | ||
ROE | −0.028 *** | |
(−3.08) | ||
Size | −0.000 *** | |
(−8.32) | ||
Age | 0.018 *** | |
(8.51) | ||
Board | 0.167 *** | |
(45.36) | ||
SOE | −0.742 *** | |
(−22.29) | ||
Indsh | −0.005 *** | |
(−7.89) | ||
Dual | −0.013 | |
(−0.47) | ||
Year | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control |
Constant | −1.409 | −2.473 |
(−8.74) | (−13.54) | |
R2 | 0.032 | 0.116 |
Observations | 43,473 | 43,473 |
Variable | Violation | Violation | Violation |
---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
Tenure | 3.164 *** | 0.763 *** | 0.349 *** |
(18.39) | (10.21) | (8.22) | |
Interaction | −0.935 *** | −5.134 *** | −303.389 *** |
(−17.35) | (−8.28) | (−5.51) | |
Degree | 0.869 *** | ||
(11.61) | |||
Closeness | 6.225 *** | ||
(6.12) | |||
Betweenness | 375.167 *** | ||
(4.02) | |||
Lev | 0.183 *** | 0.183 *** | 0.186 *** |
(5.28) | (5.25) | (5.30) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** |
(−4.47) | (−4.52) | (−4.59) | |
Top 1 | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** |
(−11.34) | (−11.49) | (−11.65) | |
ROE | −0.028 *** | −0.028 *** | −0.028 *** |
(−3.07) | (−3.07) | (−3.06) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(−7.15) | (−7.83) | (−7.83) | |
Age | 0.020 *** | 0.019 *** | 0.019 *** |
(9.44) | (9.13) | (9.04) | |
Board | 0.191 *** | 0.169 *** | 0.167 *** |
(46.51) | (45.53) | (45.35) | |
SOE | −0.705 *** | −0.730 *** | −0.735 *** |
(−21.05) | (−21.87) | (−22.04) | |
Indsh | −0.004 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.005 *** |
(−6.92) | (−7.69) | (−7.56) | |
Dual | −0.016 | −0.016 | −0.014 |
(−0.55) | (−0.56) | (−0.51) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −5.976 | −3.311 | −2.742 |
(−19.74) | (−15.55) | (−14.43) | |
R2 | 0.123 | 0.117 | 0.116 |
Observations | 43,312 | 43,312 | 43,312 |
Variable | First Stage | Second Stage | First Stage | Second Stage |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | Violation | Tenure | Violation | |
Tenure | 0.101 *** | 0.094 *** | ||
(15.07) | (14.69) | |||
IV1 | 0.725 *** | |||
(150.71) | ||||
IV2 | 0.705 *** | |||
(163.25) | ||||
Lev | 0.001 | 0.006 *** | 0.002 | 0.005 *** |
(0.59) | (3.56) | (1.41) | (2.74) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.000 | −0.000 ** | −0.000 | −0.000 * |
(−0.70) | (−2.05) | (−0.96) | (−1.71) | |
Top 1 | −0.002 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.001 *** |
(−15.31) | (−9.81) | (−13.51) | (−9.17) | |
ROE | 0.000 | −0.001 *** | 0.000 | −0.001 ** |
(0.56) | (−2.83) | (0.66) | (−2.48) | |
Size | 1.690 *** | −0.000 *** | 1.940 *** | −0.000 *** |
(6.34) | (−7.40) | (7.51) | (−7.25) | |
Age | 0.024 *** | 0.000 | 0.022 *** | 0.000 |
(78.11) | (0.78) | (72.56) | (0.40) | |
Board | −0.005 *** | 0.030 *** | −0.006 *** | 0.029 *** |
(−11.13) | (55.42) | (−10.55) | (52.58) | |
SOE | −0.055 *** | −0.129 *** | 0.037 *** | −0.118 *** |
(10.82) | (−25.16) | (7.48) | (−22.92) | |
Indsh | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | −0.000 |
(0.78) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (−0.06) | |
Dual | −0.023 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.022 *** | −0.001 *** |
(−5.39) | (−7.72) | (−5.22) | (−8.14) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Ind | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 43,345 | 43,345 | 42,301 | 42,301 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.549 | 0.118 | 0.582 | 0.108 |
Variable | Violation | Violation | Violation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Heckman | Lag One Phase | Fixed Effect | ||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | 0.195 *** | 0.010 * | 0.072 *** | |
(7.50) | (1.68) | (13.35) | ||
Lev | 0.002 | 0.184 *** | 0.005 ** | 0.001 |
(0.33) | (5.07) | (0.61) | ||
Tobin’s Q | 0.001 | −0.002 *** | −0.000 | −0.000 |
(0.98) | (−4.58) | (−0.24) | (−1.30) | |
Top 1 | 0.007 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.001 *** |
(14.36) | (−11.53) | (−13.14) | (−4.90) | |
ROE | −0.005 | −0.028 *** | −0.001 * | −0.000 |
(−1.52) | (−3.08) | (−3.30) | (−0.72) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 |
(−6.06) | (−8.32) | (−5.77) | (−0.99) | |
Age | −0.077 *** | 0.018 *** | 0.002 *** | −0.001 |
(−64.19) | (8.51) | (4.52) | (−0.96) | |
Board | 0.019 *** | 0.167 *** | 0.028 *** | 0.026 *** |
(9.86) | (45.36) | (12.33) | (43.53) | |
SOE | −0.242 *** | −0.742 *** | −0.117 *** | −0.056 *** |
(−13.16) | (−22.29) | (−16.84) | (−4.47) | |
Indsh | 0.000 | −0.005 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.001 *** |
(0.03) | (−7.89) | (−2.50) | (−4.34) | |
Dual | 0.047 *** | −0.013 *** | −0.003 | −0.001 |
(3.19) | (−0.47) | (−1.85) | (−0.22) | |
IMR | 0.393 *** | |||
(4.05) | ||||
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | 1.102 | −2.473 | 0.097 | 0.033 |
(10.51) | (−13.54) | (2.31) | (−0.34) | |
R2 | 0.185 | 0.116 | 0.124 | 0.078 |
Observations | 43,473 | 43,473 | 38,250 | 43,345 |
Variable | First Stage | Second Stage | First Stage | Second Stage | First Stage | Second Stage |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Degree | Violation | Closeness | Violation | Betweenness | Violation | |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
IV3 | −0.582 *** | |||||
(−139.62) | ||||||
Degree | −0.095 *** | |||||
(−12.79) | ||||||
IV4 | −0.073 *** | |||||
(−211.91) | ||||||
Closeness | −0.349 *** | |||||
(−5.24) | ||||||
IV5 | −0.001 *** | |||||
(−204.46) | ||||||
Betweenness | −22.228 *** | |||||
(−4.65) | ||||||
Lev | −0.005 *** | 0.006 *** | −0.001 | 0.236 *** | 0.000 ** | 0.238 *** |
(−2.76) | (3.49) | (−0.80) | (20.62) | (2.19) | (20.78) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.000 | 0.000 ** | 0.001 *** | 0.016 *** | 7.560 *** | 0.016 *** |
(0.96) | (−2.02) | (7.68) | (7.55) | (3.42) | (7.3) | |
Top 1 | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.001 *** | 8.860 | −0.001 *** |
(−11.88) | (−13.22) | (−3.24) | (−8.2) | (0.54) | (−8.12) | |
ROE | 0.001 | −0.001 ** | −0.006 *** | −0.612 *** | 0.000 *** | −0.606 *** |
(1.59) | (−2.51) | (−3.38) | (−26.23) | (4.82) | (−25.91) | |
Size | 1.100 *** | 0.000 *** | 1.550 *** | 0.000 *** | 2.840 *** | 0.000 *** |
(4.23) | (−5.83) | (10.40) | (−10.13) | (13.20) | (−10.08) | |
Age | 0.006 *** | 0.005 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.003 *** | 1.030 *** | 0.003 *** |
(22.33) | (16.24) | (4.70) | (8.42) | (3.23) | (8.34) | |
Board | 0.016 *** | 0.033 *** | 0.001 *** | 0.031 *** | −3.900 | 0.031 *** |
(29.65) | (55.13) | (14.69) | (42.79) | (−0.52) | (42.62) | |
SOE | 0.053 *** | −0.112 *** | 0.003 *** | −0.131 *** | 0.000 *** | −0.132 *** |
(10.75) | (−21.72) | (7.11) | (−25.5) | (2.94) | (−25.78) | |
Indsh | −0.001 *** | −0.001 *** | −8.480 | −0.001 *** | 1.580 | −0.001 *** |
(−7.05) | (−8.9) | (−1.26) | (−6.15) | (1.62) | (−6.01) | |
Dual | −0.006 | −0.003 | 0.000 | −0.003 | 2.470 | −0.003 |
(−1.53) | (−0.75) | (0.51) | (−0.71) | (0.55) | (−0.71) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Ind | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 43,345 | 43,345 | 43,345 | 43,345 | 43,345 | 43,345 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.472 | 0.120 | 0.587 | 0.134 | 0.537 | 0.133 |
Variable | Violation | Violation | Violation |
---|---|---|---|
Lag One Phase | Lag One Phase | Lag One Phase | |
(1) | (2) | (3) | |
Degree | −0.615 *** | ||
(−14.24) | |||
Closeness | −155.431 *** | ||
(−6.25) | |||
Betweenness | −2.6 *** | ||
(−8.06) | |||
Lev | 0.574 *** | 0.577 *** | 0.572 *** |
(10.39) | (10.53) | (10.41) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.002 |
(−0.94) | (−0.76) | (−0.7) | |
Top 1 | −0.013 *** | −0.013 *** | −0.013 *** |
(−12.9) | (−12.72) | (−12.76) | |
ROE | −0.023 ** | −0.024 ** | −0.024 ** |
(−2.44) | (−2.49) | (−2.5) | |
Size | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** |
(−7.56) | (−7.96) | (−8.02) | |
Age | 0.026 *** | 0.025 *** | 0.025 *** |
(12.96) | (12.56) | (12.51) | |
Board | 0.148 *** | 0.127 *** | 0.129 *** |
(37.5) | (35.88) | (36.29) | |
SOE | −0.626 *** | −0.657 *** | −0.647 *** |
(−18.28) | (−19.29) | (−18.98) | |
Indsh | −0.004 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.004 *** |
(−6.17) | (−6.84) | (−6.83) | |
Dual | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
(0.24) | (0.18) | (0.19) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Ind | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Constant | −0.378 | −1.952 | −1.839 |
(−1.74) | (−10.54) | (−9.88) | |
R2 | 0.099 | 0.095 | 0.096 |
Observations | 38,211 | 38,211 | 38,211 |
Variable | Violation Event | Violation Event | Violation Event | Violation Event |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | 0.010 *** | 2.370 *** | 0.476 *** | 0.222 *** |
(2.92) | (17.23) | (7.65) | (6.04) | |
Interaction | −0.707 *** | −2.946 *** | −177.146 *** | |
(−16.29) | (−6.01) | (−3.62) | ||
Degree | 0.137 *** | |||
(2.65) | ||||
Closeness | 1.519 ** | |||
(2.11) | ||||
Betweenness | 80.013 | |||
(1.08) | ||||
Lev | 0.008 *** | 0.157 *** | 0.158 *** | 0.162 *** |
(5.41) | (4.76) | (4.76) | (4.80) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.000 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** |
(−2.76) | (−3.48) | (−3.65) | (−3.72) | |
Top 1 | −0.001 *** | −0.007 *** | −0.007 *** | −0.007 *** |
(−5.74) | (−6.41) | (−6.48) | (−6.56) | |
ROE | −0.002 *** | −0.028 *** | −0.028 *** | −0.028 *** |
(−5.43) | (−3.07) | (−3.13) | (−3.11) | |
Size | 0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(−6.49) | (−6.70) | (−7.58) | (−7.56) | |
Age | 0.003 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.025 *** | 0.025 *** |
(11.56) | (10.78) | (10.44) | (10.38) | |
Board | 0.035 *** | 0.207 *** | 0.182 *** | 0.180 *** |
(77.71) | (48.42) | (47.06) | (46.81) | |
SOE | −0.11 *** | −0.663 *** | −0.701 *** | −0.709 *** |
(−25.67) | (−17.30) | (−18.40) | (−18.64) | |
Indsh | −0.001 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.005 *** |
(−8.71) | (−6.59) | (−7.43) | (−7.34) | |
Dual | 0.004 *** | −0.010 | −0.009 | −0.008 |
(1.01) | (−0.30) | (−0.28) | (−0.23) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −0.180 | −4.766 | −3.775 | −3.547 |
(−7.06) | (−18.11) | (16.69) | (−16.39) | |
R2 | 0.174 | 0.141 | 0.132 | 0.131 |
Observations | 43,345 | 43,276 | 43,276 | 43,276 |
Variable | Violation | Violation | Violation | Violation | Violation |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
Tenure_med | 0.228 * | 2.624 *** | 0.924 *** | 0.255 * | |
(1.78) | (4.84) | (3.79) | (1.74) | ||
Tenure | 0.192 *** | ||||
(5.48) | |||||
Interaction | −0.758 *** | −6.158 *** | −51.449 | −0.192 *** | |
(−4.56) | (−3.40) | (−0.40) | (−9.74) | ||
Degree | 0.852 *** | ||||
(3.77) | |||||
Closeness | 6.893 *** | ||||
(2.78) | |||||
Betweenness | −48.581 | ||||
(−0.28) | |||||
Centrality | 0.206 *** | ||||
(6.26) | |||||
Lev | 0.189 *** | 0.184 *** | 0.186 *** | 0.189 *** | 0.181 *** |
(5.36) | (5.26) | (5.30) | (5.34) | (5.21) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** |
(−4.67) | (−4.55) | (−4.60) | (−4.65) | (−4.47) | |
Top 1 | −0.012 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.011 *** |
(−12.10) | (−12.39) | (−12.13) | (−12.08) | (−11.47) | |
ROE | −0.027 *** | −0.026 *** | −0.027 *** | −0.027 *** | −0.028 *** |
(−2.97) | (−2.83) | (−2.91) | (−2.93) | (−3.03) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | 0.000 *** |
(−8.08) | (−7.67) | (−7.80) | (−7.79) | (−7.31) | |
Age | 0.025 *** | 0.027 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.026 *** | 0.020 *** |
(13.04) | (13.70) | (13.28) | (13.30) | (9.24) | |
Board | 0.166 *** | 0.174 *** | 0.169 *** | 0.167 *** | 0.175 *** |
(45.28) | (44.97) | (45.48) | (45.35) | (45.95) | |
SOE | −0.733 *** | −0.722 *** | −0.724 *** | −0.729 *** | −0.719 *** |
(−22.00) | (−21.59) | (−21.68) | (−21.85) | (−21.53) | |
Indsh | −0.005 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.004 *** |
(−8.19) | (−8.15) | (−8.07) | (−7.98) | (−7.24) | |
Dual | −0.020 | −0.023 | −0.021 | −0.021 | −0.016 |
(−0.72) | (−0.81) | (−0.75) | (−0.75) | (−0.55) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −2.667 | −5.581 | −3.522 | −2.667 | −2.767 |
(−10.12) | (7.32) | (9.13) | (9.46) | (−14.68) | |
R2 | 0.115 | 0.116 | 0.115 | 0.115 | 0.12 |
Observations | 43,312 | 43,312 | 43,312 | 43,312 | 43,312 |
Variable | Violation | Violation | Violation | Violation |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | 0.275 *** | 0.783 *** | 0.624 *** | 0.369 *** |
(8.52) | (10.95) | (9.49) | (9.49) | |
Interaction | −0.021 *** | −3.065 *** | −208.176 *** | |
(−7.54) | (−5.92) | (−4.09) | ||
Degree | 0.004 | |||
(0.96) | ||||
Closeness | 2.238 *** | |||
(2.98) | ||||
Betweenness | 187.329 ** | |||
(2.47) | ||||
Lev | 0.349 *** | 0.326 *** | 0.337 *** | 0.345 *** |
(6.31) | (5.96) | (6.10) | (6.24) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
(0.52) | (0.27) | (0.39) | (0.41) | |
Top 1 | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** |
(−8.88) | (−8.88) | (−8.81) | (−8.93) | |
ROE | −0.016 * | −0.015 * | −0.016 * | −0.016 * |
(−1.75) | (−1.69) | (−1.76) | (−1.78) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(−5.27) | (−3.77) | (−4.79) | (−4.80) | |
Age | 0.011 *** | 0.013 *** | 0.011 *** | 0.011 *** |
(3.90) | (4.54) | (4.01) | (3.85) | |
Board | 0.169 *** | 0.194 *** | 0.171 *** | 0.169 *** |
(35.78) | (36.34) | (35.94) | (35.81) | |
SOE | −0.695 *** | −0.667 *** | −0.691 *** | −0.695 *** |
(−16.31) | (−15.58) | (−16.19) | (−16.30) | |
Indsh | −0.004 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.003 *** |
(−5.12) | (−4.42) | (−4.80) | (−4.74) | |
Dual | −0.001 | −0.003 | −0.001 | 0.000 |
(−0.02) | (−0.08) | (−0.03) | (0.01) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −2.868 | −3.576 | −3.221 | −2.946 |
(−18.91) | (−20.24) | (−18.87) | (−19.05) | |
R2 | 0.103 | 0.109 | 0.105 | 0.104 |
Observations | 28,295 | 28,295 | 28,295 | 28,295 |
Variable | Violation | Violation | Violation | Violation |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | 0.179 *** | 0.731 *** | 0.545 *** | 0.289 *** |
(4.34) | (10.65) | (8.62) | (7.69) | |
Interaction | −0.023 *** | −3.265 *** | −224.143 *** | |
(−8.61) | (−6.58) | (−5.10) | ||
Degree | 0.004 | |||
(1.11) | ||||
Closeness | 2.437 *** | |||
(3.38) | ||||
Betweenness | 215.38 *** | |||
(3.28) | ||||
Lev | 0.075 *** | 0.072 *** | 0.071 *** | 0.072 *** |
(3.06) | (2.94) | (2.93) | (2.96) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** |
(−2.36) | (−2.21) | (−2.23) | (−2.28) | |
Top 1 | −0.010 *** | −0.009 *** | −0.009 *** | −0.009 *** |
(−8.48) | (−8.22) | (−8.27) | (−8.38) | |
ROE | −0.029 ** | −0.027 ** | −0.028 ** | −0.029 ** |
(−2.48) | (−2.37) | (−2.45) | (−2.49) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(−7.11) | (−6.14) | (−6.81) | (−6.84) | |
Age | 0.021 *** | 0.021 *** | 0.020 *** | 0.020 *** |
(8.20) | (8.10) | (7.68) | (7.59) | |
Board | 0.171 *** | 0.197 *** | 0.173 *** | 0.171 *** |
(39.71) | (40.35) | (39.84) | (39.65) | |
SOE | −0.740 *** | −0.707 *** | −0.733 *** | −0.739 *** |
(−19.39) | (−18.44) | (−19.17) | (−19.37) | |
Indsh | −0.004 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.004 *** |
(−6.29) | (−5.54) | (−5.97) | (−5.94) | |
Dual | −0.042 | −0.043 | −0.041 | −0.041 |
(−1.28) | (−1.31) | (−1.24) | (−1.25) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −2.392 | −3.058 | −2.672 | −2.430 |
(−11.60) | (−14.03) | (−12.44) | (−11.91) | |
R2 | 0.110 | 0.118 | 0.113 | 0.112 |
Observations | 29,866 | 29,866 | 29,866 | 29,866 |
Variable | Degree | Closeness | Betweenness | |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | 0.328 *** | 0.653 *** | 0.048 | 0.225 *** |
(11.11) | (4.14) | (1.17) | (6.87) | |
Interaction | −0.143 *** | −0.040 *** | −68.641 *** | |
(−3.11) | (−3.50) | (−3.41) | ||
Degree | −0.130 * | |||
(−1.86) | ||||
Closeness | 0.013 | |||
(0.77) | ||||
Betweenness | 42.448 | |||
Lev | 0.237 *** | 0.188 *** | 0.185 *** | 0.188 *** |
(6.42) | (5.36) | (5.30) | (5.34) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** |
(−5.63) | (−4.61) | (−4.56) | (−4.61) | |
Top 1 | −0.013 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** |
(−13.14) | (−11.35) | (−11.44) | (−11.42) | |
ROE | −0.034 *** | −0.035 *** | −0.035 *** | −0.035 *** |
(−3.54) | (−3.17) | (−3.19) | (−3.19) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(−7.53) | (−7.93) | (−8.15) | (−8.06) | |
Age | 0.022 *** | 0.018 *** | 0.018 *** | 0.018 *** |
(10.01) | (8.35) | (8.30) | (8.22) | |
Board | 0.181 *** | 0.176 *** | 0.168 *** | 0.166 *** |
(36.62) | (45.67) | (45.19) | (45.02) | |
SOE | −0.688 *** | −0.723 *** | −0.732 *** | −0.737 *** |
(−20.78) | (−21.61) | (−21.94) | (−22.08) | |
Indsh | −0.004 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.004 *** |
(−7.00) | (−7.14) | (−7.39) | (−7.27) | |
Dual | −0.012 | −0.012 | −0.012 | −0.011 |
(−0.43) | (−0.43) | (−0.42) | (−0.39) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −2.009 | −2.302 | −2.367 | −2.407 |
(−11.04) | (−8.00) | (12.44) | (−12.98) | |
R2 | 0.096 | 0.117 | 0.115 | 0.115 |
Observations | 42,416 | 42,627 | 42,627 | 42,627 |
Variable | Degree | Closeness | Betweenness | |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Tenure | 0.148 *** | 1.028 *** | 0.040 | 0.174 *** |
(6.16) | (5.95) | (0.98) | (6.31) | |
Interaction | −0.319 *** | −0.043 *** | −166.582 ** | |
(−5.22) | (−3.77) | (−2.02) | ||
Degree | −0.679 *** | |||
(−7.02) | ||||
Closeness | 0.017 | |||
(1.01) | ||||
Betweenness | 20.774 | |||
(0.16) | ||||
Lev | 0.246 *** | 0.173 *** | 0.185 *** | 0.185 *** |
(6.58) | (5.14) | (5.30) | (5.27) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.002 *** |
(−5.82) | (−4.35) | (−4.56) | (−4.55) | |
Top 1 | −0.013 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.011 *** |
(−13.17) | (−12.14) | (−11.40) | (−11.47) | |
ROE | −0.035 *** | −0.033 *** | −0.035 *** | −0.035 *** |
(−3.61) | (−3.03) | (−3.19) | (−3.19) | |
Size | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(−7.50) | (−7.01) | (−8.12) | (−8.00) | |
Age | 0.025 *** | 0.021 *** | 0.018 *** | 0.018 *** |
(10.73) | (9.76) | (8.33) | (8.54) | |
Board | 0.179 *** | 0.233 *** | 0.168 *** | 0.166 *** |
(36.22) | (46.92) | (45.25) | (45.08) | |
SOE | −0.675 *** | −0.672 *** | −0.733 *** | −0.740 *** |
(−20.43) | (−19.82) | (−21.95) | (−22.19) | |
Indsh | −0.004 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.004 *** |
(−7.24) | (−5.34) | (−7.39) | (−7.24) | |
Dual | −0.015 | −0.004 | −0.012 | −0.012 |
(−0.52) | (−0.15) | (−0.43) | (−0.41) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Constant | −1.925 | −1.837 | −2.374 | −3.088 |
(−10.59) | (−5.96) | (−12.89) | (14.52) | |
R2 | 0.094 | 0.128 | 0.115 | 0.115 |
Observations | 42,416 | 42,699 | 42,699 | 42,699 |
Variable | Big4 | Violation |
---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | |
Big4 | −0.319 *** | |
(−4.28) | ||
DBI | ||
Tenure | −0.107 ** | 0.161 *** |
(−2.06) | (6.08) | |
Lev | 0.229 | 1.118 *** |
(1.51) | (16.33) | |
Tobin’s Q | −0.082 *** | 0.037 *** |
(−3.58) | (4.25) | |
Top 1 | −0.003 | −0.009 *** |
(−1.50) | (−9.28) | |
ROE | 0.810 *** | −1.197 *** |
(4.04) | (−17.26) | |
Size | 0.000 *** | −0.000 *** |
(28.83) | (−9.41) | |
Age | −0.003 | 0.010 *** |
(−0.63) | (4.69) | |
Board | −0.001 | 0.164 *** |
(−0.18) | (43.32) | |
SOE | 0.167 *** | −0.784 *** |
(2.63) | (−23.27) | |
Indsh | 0.030 *** | −0.004 *** |
(22.06) | (−6.86) | |
Dual | 0.057 | −0.013 |
(0.99) | (−0.47) | |
Year | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control |
Constant | −3.755 | −2.807 |
(−8.63) | (−15.08) | |
R2 | 0.220 | 0.130 |
Observations | 43,473 | 43,473 |
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Share and Cite
Zeng, S.; Huang, Y.; Xiao, L.; Jiang, X.; Li, Y.; Yuan, C. Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct: The Moderating Effect of the Director Network Position. Sustainability 2025, 17, 919. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17030919
Zeng S, Huang Y, Xiao L, Jiang X, Li Y, Yuan C. Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct: The Moderating Effect of the Director Network Position. Sustainability. 2025; 17(3):919. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17030919
Chicago/Turabian StyleZeng, Sen, Yiqian Huang, Longjun Xiao, Xueyan Jiang, Yanru Li, and Cao Yuan. 2025. "Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct: The Moderating Effect of the Director Network Position" Sustainability 17, no. 3: 919. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17030919
APA StyleZeng, S., Huang, Y., Xiao, L., Jiang, X., Li, Y., & Yuan, C. (2025). Director Tenure and Corporate Misconduct: The Moderating Effect of the Director Network Position. Sustainability, 17(3), 919. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17030919