1. Introduction
According to classical corporate finance theory, matching the investment period with the financing period is a basic principle, that is, using short-term funds to support current assets and long-term funds to support long-term assets [
1]. However, the cost of long-term debt is generally higher than that of short-term debt. After weighing financing costs, some companies actively raise long-term funds needed for development through short-term debt [
2]. Meanwhile, in China, this is not the case. China’s bond and stock markets are still underdeveloped, and corporate long-term financing mainly relies on bank credit, which limits the availability of long-term financing. Additionally, under the long-standing interest rate control, banks cannot adjust interest rates according to debt risks, further hampering the supply of long-term funding [
3]. In China, the liabilities of listed companies are mainly bank loans, most of which are short-term, and some listed companies have almost no long-term liabilities [
4]. Thus, Chinese companies passively adopt short-term funds to support long-term assets, namely, short-term financing for long-term investment. Because short-term debt must be repaid in the current year, high short-term debt and maturity mismatches bring serious liquidity risks. If the investment cannot generate sufficient cash flow to repay the outstanding debt, it will most likely break the capital chain, even causing financial distress. Moreover, the financial risk will be transmitted to the entire financial system [
5]. In other words, matching investment and financing period is the basis for the healthy and sustainable development of enterprises. Enterprises create tax revenues, and their sustainable development also helps the sustainability of local finance.
In China, the risk of maturity mismatch between investment and financing is growing, and has attracted special attention in recent years. Previous studies focus on the characteristics of enterprises, the development of the financial market, and external economic policies to explore the driving mechanism for corporate maturity mismatch between investment and financing. However, the existing studies ignore the important impact of local governments, which intervene in the allocation of financial resources. In China, local governments actually operate or participate in the routine activity of local financial institutions. Thus, financial resources are preferentially allocated to local government. Because the Chinese financial market is dominated by banks, both local government debt and corporate debt mostly originate from the banking sector. Moreover, the increasing issuance of government debt can drive up its expected return, and further crowd out the financing resources available to the private sector [
6]. In light of the preceding discussion, this study seeks to answer the following questions: Does local government debt exacerbate or alleviate companies’ maturity mismatch between investment and financing? What are the mechanisms that affect maturity mismatches? Furthermore, what economic consequences do they bring?
Based on the above considerations, using a dataset of all Chinese A-share listed companies and local government debt from 2009 to 2018, we discover that local government debt exacerbates companies’ short-term financing for long-term investment. The impact mechanism shows that local government debt crowds out bank loans for companies with long-term funding gaps and exacerbates their maturity mismatches. According to further analyses, the real impact of local government debt is more pronounced in regions with more local government debt and lower levels of financial development, and for companies with greater financing demand and non-SOEs. Moreover, maturity mismatches further aggravate companies’ underinvestment and increase default risk, which ultimately affects local sustainable economic development. These results deepen our understanding of the balance between local government debt and corporate growth, and the allocation efficiency of financial resources.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, by focusing on a transitional economy with Chinese characteristics, this study expands the research on the influencing factors behind corporate short-term financing for long-term investments, citing local government fiscal policy, which supplements maturity mismatch between investment and financing. Second, this study enriches research on the microeconomic consequences of local government debt and clarifies the impact mechanism of local government debt on corporate maturity mismatches. Third, this study validates the theory that local government debt has brought about unexpected distortions in corporate investment and financing, thus, providing enlightenment for economic security and high-quality development.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 is the literature review and develops the hypotheses;
Section 3 provides background information on local government debt in China and introduces the sample, variables, and empirical methodology used in the study;
Section 4,
Section 5 and
Section 6 present the empirical results, including robustness tests, mechanism tests, and further analyses; and
Section 7 concludes.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Institutional Background
Since 1994, China’s financial system has transitioned from a “financial contract system” to a “tax sharing system”, which has helped the central government restore its fiscal power. Since then, financial power has been transferred upwards while administrative power has been delegated. Local government expenditures do not match fiscal revenues, thereby resulting in a large fiscal gap. Additionally, the Budget Law of China, which came into effect in 1995, clearly stipulates that local governments and their departments cannot directly assume debt. However, indirect borrowing through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) is not explicitly prohibited. LGFVs are state-owned enterprises with the corresponding local government as the only or dominant shareholder, and are used to raise funds for public expenditure. Moreover, the land system and financial system facilitate the development of LGFVs. In the early stage, such LGFVs remain tightly controlled, and only a few local governments can obtain resources through this channel.
In response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, China’s central government issued the “four trillion yuan” economic stimulus plan, which led to the rapid development of LGFVs. As a supporting policy for implementing the stimulus plan, in 2009 China’s Banking Regulatory Commission encouraged local governments to set up compliant LGFVs, while on the other hand, attracting and motivating the credit support of banking financial institutions. In the same year, the Ministry of Finance urged local governments to use various sources of funding to finance investment projects, including budgetary revenues, land revenues, and borrowing funds through LGFVs. At the end of 2010, after raising funds for the stimulus plan, the development of LGFVs has not weakened, and they have shifted from passive to active debt issuance. Coupled with the loose financial environment from 2011 to 2014, LGFVs remain an important channel for local government borrowing and the scale of local government debt continues to expand [
3]. There are three sources of financing for LGFVs: bank loans, bond issuance, and shadow bank credit, and bank loans are the main source [
41]. According to the National Audit Office, bank loans accounted for 79.01% and 78.07% of local government debt at the end of 2010 and 2012, respectively, and LGFVs’ debt accounted for 46.38% and 45.67% of local government debt at the end of 2010 and 2012, respectively. Bank loans are the most important source of financing, and LGFVs are the most important borrowers.
With the rapid expansion of LGFVs and aggregate debt, local government debt risk has attracted the attention of various sectors. In 2014, the State Council issued the “Opinions on Strengthening Local Government Debt Management” (hereinafter referred to as Guo Fa (2014) No. 43) [
42], which clearly require that LGFV financing for local governments should be eliminated and the disorderly expansion of LGFVs should be curbed. In addition, the new “Budget Law” that came into effect in 2015 also stipulated systematic and clear regulations concerning local government debt lending entities and borrowing methods to regulate the debt-raising behaviors. However, since then, some LGFVs still borrow illegally for local governments, and local governments provide guarantees for LGFVs.
3.2. Sample Selection and Data Sources
In accordance with Huang et al. (2020) [
6], this study uses the interest-bearing debt of LGFVs to measure local government debt. This measurement can eliminate the impact of operating debts such as payables and advance receipts, and includes nonpublic issuance debts. Xu et al. (2020) [
43] redefine the list of LGFVs and form a corresponding interest-bearing debt database, which has been widely used in recent years [
44,
45]. Additionally, considering that listed companies have implemented new accounting standards since 2007 and the debt borrowed by LGFVs was minimal before 2009, we employ local government debt [
43] and Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as the empirical sample.
Both companies’ financial data and city-level macroeconomic data come from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). The following are then excluded from the sample: (1) specially treated (ST, ST*) and other companies with abnormal trading statuses; (2) financial industry samples; (3) samples with missing data; and (4) cross-listed samples. Furthermore, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers.
3.3. Variable Definitions
3.3.1. Dependent Variable
Referring to Zhong et al. (2016) [
29] and Wang et al. (2021) [
26], we measure short-term financing for long-term investment (SFLI) using the following formula:
In the formula, CAP represents capital expenditure; LTL represents increase in long-term loans; NEF represents net proceeds from equity financing; NCFO represents net cash flow from operations; FAD represents disposal of fixed assets; and ASSET represents total assets in the previous year.
3.3.2. Independent Variable
Following Huang et al. (2020) [
6], we measure the local government debt as interest-bearing debt of LGFVs, which includes short-term loans, notes payable, short-term bonds payable, noncurrent liabilities due within one year, other current liabilities, long-term loans, and bonds payable. Specifically, this study adds the interest-bearing debts of all LGFVs at the year–city level and takes its natural logarithm as the local government debt at the city level where the company under consideration is located (LDEBT).
3.3.3. Control Variables
Following previous studies [
3,
15,
26,
29], GDP growth rate (GDPgr), fixed asset investment ratio (Finvest), asset size (SIZE), company age (AGE), operating cash flow (COA), net fixed assets (PPE), investment opportunities (TobinQ), the separation of control and ownership rights (DIVERT), and board size (DIRNUM) may affect corporate investment and financing activity and further impact the maturity match. Thus, this study controls these variables.
Table 1 presents the definitions of all the aforementioned variables.
3.4. Model Specification
We construct the following model to estimate the impact of local government debt on corporate short-term financing for long-term investment:
represents the short-term financing for long-term investment of firm i in city c and year t. The main explanatory variable is the local government debt in city c and year t − 1. and represent control variables at firm and city levels, respectively. To better control fixed effects, this study also includes year (Year), industry (Ind), and province (Province) dummy variables. We use the pooled OLS, and all regressions cluster the standard errors at the city level, and ε is the random error item. According to the preceding arguments, if the expansion of local government debt increases corporate short-term financing for long-term investment, will be expected to be significantly positive.
3.5. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analyses. The sample minimum of corporate short-term financing for long-term investment (
SFLI) is −2.002, the maximum is 0.308, and the standard deviation is 0.298, thus, indicating that SFLI fluctuates greatly and only some companies have enough long-term financing to support long-term investment. The sample minimum of local government debt (
LDEBT) is 0.000, the maximum is 8.875, and the standard deviation is 1.805, thus, indicating that local government debt in different cities varies greatly. In addition, the mean of GDP_gr and Finvest at the city level are 0.109 and 0.608, respectively. Other control variables are also within a reasonable range.
7. Conclusions
This study incorporates local government debt into an analysis framework of corporate maturity mismatch between investment and financing. Using a dataset of all Chinese A-share listed companies and local government debt from 2009 to 2018, we discover that local government debt exacerbates corporate short-term financing for long-term investment. The results show that this effect is mainly due to bank loans being crowded out for companies with a long-term funding gap. Thus, the Chinese government should continue to optimize the issuance of local government bonds, obtain long-term funds through the public capital market, and avoid crowding out bank loans. According to our further analyses, the real impact of local government debt is more pronounced for non-SOEs and firms with high financing demand, located in cities with more local government debt and low financial development. That is, controlling the level of local government debt, promoting financial deepening, and treating financing entities fairly are crucial to the sustainable development of enterprises. Moreover, maturity mismatches further aggravate underinvestment and increase default risk, which ultimately affects local sustainable economic development. As for enterprises, it is reasonable to match the investment and financing period and prohibit aggressive investment strategies, otherwise it will lead to huge financial risk. From this study, it can be seen that there are inextricable links between local governments and enterprises. With the development of the capital market and the governance of local government bonds, under different macro-environments, it’s necessary to compare the crowding-in or crowding-out effects of local government debts on the sustainable development of enterprises. Related research provides policy recommendations for China’s economic reform.