Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. The Evolutionary Game Model of Government and Construction Unit
2.1. Model Assumptions
- (a)
- Game both sides
- (b)
- Behavioral strategy is to take the probability
- (c)
- Assumptions and explanations of profit and loss parameter values as shown in Table 2.
2.2. Model
3. Stability Analysis of Evolutionary Game Model
3.1. Stability Analysis of Evolutionary Game Model
3.2. Stability Analysis of the Unilateral Strategy of the Construction Unit
3.3. Analysis of the Evolvement Stability of Mixed Strategy of Government and Construction Unit
- (1)
- System analysis
3.4. Model Simulation Analysis
- (1)
- Initial simulation analysis
- (2)
- One side of the game adopts the initial hybrid strategy Nash equilibrium
- (3)
- The impact of the subsidy on the model
- (4)
- The influence of punishment intensity on the model
- (5)
- The government checks the influence of cost and indirect income of construction units on the model
4. Discussion and Recommendations Based on Simulation Results
- We will reasonably adjust the number of subsidies through the simulation analysis of the influence of the change in government subsidy on the application strategy of construction units. It can be seen that a blind increase in the financial subsidy by the government will not encourage construction units to choose the application strategy but will reduce the enthusiasm of construction units to apply and hinder the development of construction industrialization. On the other hand, excessive financial subsidies will also pressure the government and restrict the development of other activities. In addition, the government’s appropriate reduction of financial subsidies can stimulate the construction units to choose the application strategy regarding market competition, but the high volatility is not conducive to the government’s control. Therefore, the government should measure the subsidy amount scientifically and adjust the subsidy strategy in time according to the market changes to ensure the interests of construction units and realize the functions of the government.
- Improve the punishment mechanism. Through changes in the government punishment line a5 simulation analysis on the impact of the construction unit application strategy, increasing the intensity of punishment for the construction unit can improve the utilization ratio of the construction unit, but contributed to the construction unit’s instability in the process of evolution and volatility. Therefore, the government should consider tax policy, land policy, fiscal policy, and approval link angles such as the workforce, taken together, to form a dynamic effective punishment mechanism.
- Reduce development costs. Through the simulation analysis of the influence of the change in government inspection cost on the application strategy of the construction unit, it can be seen that the increase in the development cost or government inspection costs will directly or indirectly affect the probability of the construction unit applying green building. This is because improving regulatory efficiency and reducing regulatory costs, on the one hand, can strengthen the level of the self-discipline of enterprises; on the other hand, it is also an extension of government functions. In addition, reducing the incremental cost of development using large-scale production and technological upgrading is also an important means of accelerating green building.
- Step up publicity. Through the simulation analysis of the influence of the change in the indirect income of the construction unit on the application strategy of the construction unit, it can be seen that with the increase in the indirect income of the construction unit, the probability of the application of green building will also increase. Therefore, from the perspective of construction units, they should pay attention to improving their brand and image. From the two aspects of the government and the construction unit, strategies such as increasing the construction of pilot cities and pilot projects, constantly expanding the market, forming a good public opinion environment, and improving consumers’ cognition of green building are suggested.
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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Game Both Sides | The Construction Unit | ||
---|---|---|---|
Application of y | 1 − y Is Not Applied | ||
The government | Incentive x | (Stimulation, application) | (Incentive, not applied) |
1 − x is not energized | (Disincentivize, apply) | (No incentive, no application) |
Game Subject | Parameter Setting and Interpretation (Unit: 10,000 yuan) |
---|---|
The construction unit | a1: The direct economic benefits of the construction unit when choosing traditional cast-in-place buildings a2: The direct economic benefits when the construction unit chooses the green building a3: Cost of the construction unit when choosing a green building (such as technology investment, transportation cost, etc.) a4: Indirect benefits brought by the construction unit when choosing a green building (such as enterprise image, brand value, green building market benefits, etc.) a5: A fine imposed on a construction unit for failing to implement government incentive policies |
The government | b1: When the construction unit chooses the traditional cast-in-place building, the government’s revenue b2: When the construction unit chooses the traditional cast-in-place building, the government pays the management cost b3: The cost paid by the government when choosing incentive strategies (policy publicity, policy research, etc.) b4: When the construction unit chooses a green building and meets the subsidy standard, the subsidy amount of the government b5: The benefits of the government (economic growth, resource conservation, environmental protection, government credibility, etc.) when the construction unit chooses green buildings |
Game Both Sides | The Construction Unit | ||
---|---|---|---|
Application of y | 1 − y Is Not Applied | ||
The government | Incentive x | [−b3 − b4 + b5, A + b4] | [B − b3 + a5, a1 − a5] |
1 − x is not energized | [b5, A] | [B, a1] |
Equilibrium Point | det (J) | Symbol | tr (J) | Symbol | Result |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
(0,0) | L × M | - | L + M | Uncertain | saddle point |
(0,1) | −(L − M) × N | - | −(L − M) × N | Uncertain | saddle point |
(1,0) | −L × (M + N) | - | −L + M + N | Uncertain | saddle point |
(1,1) | −(N − L) × (N + M) | - | −L − M | Uncertain | saddle point |
(x,y) | xy(1 − x) (1 − y) × N2 | - | 0 | 0 | centre |
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Li, X.; Wang, C.; Kassem, M.A.; Liu, Y.; Ali, K.N. Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit. Sustainability 2022, 14, 10155. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141610155
Li X, Wang C, Kassem MA, Liu Y, Ali KN. Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit. Sustainability. 2022; 14(16):10155. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141610155
Chicago/Turabian StyleLi, Xiaojuan, Chen Wang, Mukhtar A. Kassem, Yishu Liu, and Kherun Nita Ali. 2022. "Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit" Sustainability 14, no. 16: 10155. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141610155
APA StyleLi, X., Wang, C., Kassem, M. A., Liu, Y., & Ali, K. N. (2022). Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit. Sustainability, 14(16), 10155. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141610155