Market Efficiency under the Arrangement of Transaction Rules of the RCCL Market from the Supply-Side Perspective
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
2.1. Theoretical Framework
2.2. Hypothesis
3. Study Area, Data, and Methodology
3.1. Study Area
3.2. Data Collection
3.3. Variables
3.3.1. Input–Output Index
3.3.2. External Environment Variables
3.4. Methods
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Results and Discussion
4.1.1. Analysis of Empirical Results
4.1.2. Influence of Environmental Factors on Output
4.1.3. Analysis of the Results of the Third Stage
4.1.4. Factors Influencing Market Efficiency
4.2. Policy Implications
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Definition | |||
---|---|---|---|
Asset specificity | Human assets | Education level (Z1) | Primary school = 1, junior high school = 2, senior high school = 3, university = 4, postgraduate = 5, doctor = 6 |
Leaders (Z2) | Number of collective leaders | ||
Shareholders (Z3) | Number of villager shareholders | ||
Physical assets | Land scale (Z4) | Actual value (m2) | |
Geographic location | Distance (Z5) | Distance from land traded to town center (km) | |
Transaction uncertainty | Openness | Degree of disclosure of information about plot (X1) | Village level = 1, town level = 2, district level = 3, national standard = 4, information platform = 5 |
Degree of disclosure of information about results (X2) | Village level = 1, town level = 2, district level = 3, national standard = 4, information platform = 5 | ||
Manner of bidding (X3) | Explicit bidding = 1, implicit bidding = 0 | ||
Equity | Income distribution (X4) | 5:5 = 1; 4:6 = 2; 3:7 = 3; 2:8 = 4; 1:9 = 5 | |
Supervision mode (X5) | No supervision = 1, platform internal supervision = 2, government participation in platform supervision, offline = 3, government and villager participation in platform supervision, online = 5, government, villager, and public participation in platform supervision, online = 5 | ||
Justice | Manner of determining price (X6) | Government evaluation = 1, third-party intermediary evaluation = 2, government and third-party intermediary together = 3, third party, village representatives, and government intermediary together = 4, third party, village representatives, and enterprises = 5 | |
Service charge (X7) | ≥10,000 = 1; 9999–6000 = 2; 5999–2000 = 3; 1999–101 = 4; ≤100 = 5 | ||
Other transaction uncertainty | Influence of external environmental factors | Industrialization level (E1) | Total industrial output |
Level of foreign investment (E2) | Foreign investment funds (RMB 108) | ||
Transaction costs | Other transaction costs (E3) | Other transaction costs (RMB 102) |
Number | Region | First Stage (before Adjustment) | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
TE | PTE | SE | Scale | ||
1 | Guicheng Street | 0.151 | 0.425 | 0.355 | Inc |
2 | Dali Village | 0.136 | 0.410 | 0.332 | Inc |
3 | Lishui Village | 0.112 | 0.406 | 0.276 | Inc |
4 | Shishan Village | 0.141 | 0.438 | 0.322 | Dec |
5 | Xiqiao Village | 0.106 | 0.398 | 0.266 | Inc |
Total efficiency | 0.129 | 0.415 | 0.310 | Inc |
Slack | X1 | X2 | X3 | X4 | X5 | X6 | X7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Industrialization level | −0.892 *** | −0.712 *** | −0.746 *** | −0.678 *** | −0.899 *** | −0.616 *** | 0.225 *** |
Level of foreign investment | −0.550 *** | −0.422 *** | −0.409 *** | −0.301 *** | −0.488 *** | −0.315 *** | 0.105 *** |
Plot location | −0.006 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.051 *** | −0.189 *** | −0.526 *** | −0.327 *** | 0.169 *** |
Area size | −0.267 *** | −0.242 *** | −0.201 *** | −0.299 *** | −0.466 *** | −0.258 *** | 0.206 *** |
Education level | −0.157 *** | −0.112 *** | −0.101 *** | −0.029 | −0.191 *** | −0.118 *** | 0.020 |
Number of collective leaders | −0.396 *** | −0.552 *** | −0.497 *** | −0.368 *** | −0.329 *** | −0.171 * | 0.355 |
Number of village shareholders | −0.772 *** | −0.850 *** | −0.702 *** | −0.609 *** | −0.881 *** | −0.599 *** | 0.506 |
Other transaction costs | 0.155 ** | 0.107 ** | 0.102 * | 0.220 | 0.091 *** | 0.046 | 0.110 |
Constant | −0.691 *** | −0.466 *** | −0.253 *** | −0.365 *** | −0.512 *** | −0.389 *** | 0.089 *** |
γ | 0.866 *** | 0.759 *** | 0.789 *** | 0.855 *** | 0.912 *** | 0.806 *** | 0.722 *** |
LR | 28.92 *** | 26.15 *** | 19.86 *** | 15.08 *** | 12.11 *** | 9.77 *** | 8.63 *** |
Number | Region | Third Stage (after Adjustment) | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
TE | PTE | SE | Scale | ||
1 | Guicheng Street | 0.105 | 0.382 | 0.275 | Inc |
2 | Dali Village | 0.099 | 0.396 | 0.250 | Inc |
3 | Lishui Village | 0.108 | 0.430 | 0.252 | Inc |
4 | Shishan Village | 0.120 | 0.419 | 0.286 | Inc |
5 | Xiqiao Village | 0.103 | 0.415 | 0.248 | Inc |
Total efficiency | 0.107 | 0.408 | 0.262 | Inc |
Variable | Coef. | Std. Err | t | p > t | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Transaction uncertainty | Openness | Degree of disclosure of information about plot X1 | 0.014 *** | 0.012 | 2.96 | 0.009 |
Degree of disclosure of information about results X2 | 0.217 | 0.002 | 1.36 | 0.103 | ||
Manner of bidding X3 | 0.062 | 0.011 | 1.15 | 0.118 | ||
Equity | Income distribution X4 | 0.081 *** | 0.001 | 4.50 | 0.006 | |
Mode of supervision X5 | 0.395 ** | 0.004 | 2.46 | 0.045 | ||
Justice | Means of determining price X6 | 0.026 ** | 0.026 | 2.51 | 0.039 | |
Service charge X7 | −0.017 | 0.023 | −1.04 | 0.162 | ||
Other uncertainties | Industrialization level | Total industrial output value E1 | 0.006 *** | 0.015 | 5.08 | 0.005 |
Level of foreign investment | Foreign investment E2 | 0.057 | 0.013 | 1.17 | 0.116 | |
Transaction costs | Other transaction costs E3 | −0.045 * | 0.012 | −2.29 | 0.056 | |
Asset specificity | Education level | Education level Z1 | 0.028 * | 0.011 | 2.22 | 0.069 |
Level of self-organized governance | Number of collective leaders Z2 | 0.045 ** | 0.002 | 2.64 | 0.029 | |
Number of village shareholders Z3 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.96 | 0.651 | ||
Area size | Size of trading area Z4 | 0.017 ** | 0.002 | 2.71 | 0.022 | |
Location | Plot location Z5 | 0.012 | 0.004 | 0.66 | 0.803 | |
Constant | 0.106 ** | 0.046 | 2.56 | 0.036 | ||
Log likelihood | 309.351 | |||||
Pseudo R2 | −0.118 | |||||
LR chi2 | 52.65 | |||||
Prob > chi2 | 0.000 |
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Deng, M.; Zhang, A. Market Efficiency under the Arrangement of Transaction Rules of the RCCL Market from the Supply-Side Perspective. Sustainability 2020, 12, 7660. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187660
Deng M, Zhang A. Market Efficiency under the Arrangement of Transaction Rules of the RCCL Market from the Supply-Side Perspective. Sustainability. 2020; 12(18):7660. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187660
Chicago/Turabian StyleDeng, Meie, and Anlu Zhang. 2020. "Market Efficiency under the Arrangement of Transaction Rules of the RCCL Market from the Supply-Side Perspective" Sustainability 12, no. 18: 7660. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187660