Does the Role of Media and Founder’s Past Success Mitigate the Problem of Information Asymmetry? Evidence from a UK Crowdfunding Platform
Abstract
:1. Introduction
Does the level and type of used media and successful track record of previous projects influence the success/reward rate of crowdfunding campaigns?
2. Literature Review
2.1. Role of Information Asymmetry in Crowdfunding
2.2. Problems of Information Asymmetry in Crowdfunding
2.3. Possible Determinants of Information Asymmetry on Crowdfunding Platforms
3. Research Hypotheses
3.1. Role of Media
3.2. Founder’s Past Experience
4. Data and Methods
4.1. Context Construction and Data Sample
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Dependent Variables
4.2.2. Independent Variables
4.2.3. Control Variables
4.3. Methods
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Multicollinearity Analysis
5.2. Descriptive Statistics
5.3. Correlation Matrix
5.4. Multivariate Analysis
5.5. Discussion and Contributions
5.6. Robustness Tests
6. Conclusions Limitations, and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Author of the Paper | Focus Area | Research Gap | Theoretical Stance | Paradigm/Method | Sample | Findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Mollick [20] | Exploring the dynamics of crowdfunding and how it operates (drivers of success, the impact of geography, post-funding behaviors) | Using a large dataset, an attempt to avail an analytical understanding of the dynamics of crowdfunding. | The role of key quality signals. Impact of network size in providing connections and endorsing quality. The influence of geography on crowdfunding parameters. | Analyze the data through logistic regression and used STATA for distance information and the Cox model for delays in delivery. | A total of 48,526 projects for a time period of two years (2009 to 07/2012) have been extracted from the crowdfunding platform called Kickstarter across all categories. | Project quality (such as the presence of video, updates and spelling correctness) and personal networks (Facebook friends) are positively related to the success of fundraising. Both project type and funding success are influenced by geography. The majority of founders try to fulfill their promise to funders, but mostly not in a timely manner, with longer delays found in larger and overfunded projects |
Courtney et al. [11] | Examines when signals and third-party endorsement, obtained from multiple sources that improve or diminish one another’s effect. | Signals through start-up actions and characteristics can mitigate information asymmetry concerns about project quality and founder credibility. | Signals originating from the start-up, endorsement originating from third parties, the interplay of signals and third-party endorsement. | Analyze the data through logistic regression, two-stage Heckman procedure, and first stage probit model. | A total of 170,248 projects from 4/2009 to 12/2015 were extracted from the crowdfunding platform called Kickstarter across all categories. | Both start-up originating signals and third-party endorsement mitigate information asymmetry concerns about project quality and founder credibility. |
Crosetto and Regner [48] | Exploring the dynamics of funding and pledgers’ motivations. | An attempt to avail an analytical understanding about project-level and pledge-level variables in crowdfunding. | Crowdfunding and innovation, empirical studies on crowdfunding. | Normalized project time, descriptive statistics, linear regression, questionnaire, and interviews. | A total of 2254 projects extracted from German platform called Startnext from 10/2010 to 2/2014. | Majority of the projects that eventually succeed are not on a successful track at 75% of their funding period. And late successes are basically boosted by an information cascade during the final 25% of the funding duration. Results from interviews and questionnaires prove that project communication efforts play a role in making a project successful. |
Colombo et al. [49] | Why early contributions are so necessary for crowdfunding success? What are the core factors that attract early contributions? | Investigating the relationship between early support (in forms of capital and backers) and final success. Furthermore, examining the role of social capital in crowdfunding via fascinating early contributions. | Uncertainties and information asymmetries at the initial stage of crowdfunding. The role of early contributions and internal social capital in attracting initial funding. | Analyze the data through the Probit and Tobit model. | Extracted a total of 669 projects in four categories, namely design, technology, film, and video and also video games from Kickstarter, covering the time period from 10/2012 to 01/2013. | Concluded that internal social capital is critical in raising funds and engaging funders in the initial phase of crowdfunding of a project. It is reported that there is a positive relationship between early contributions and probability of final success hence, they mediate the influence of internal social capital on project success. |
Polzin et al. [50] | How does the type of information used by crowdfunders vary with the strength of their ties to the project? | Empirically tested the heterogeneity between in-crowd and out-crowd funders by analyzing large scale data through a survey among project funders. | Signaling in early-stage finance and information cascades, in-crowd information needs and out-crowd information need. | Descriptive Statistics, factor analysis and logistic regression. | A total of 283 observations assessed through 5-point Likert scale questionnaire. | Concluded that in-ward investors rely more on information about the project creator than out-crowd investors. Out-crowd investors do not give more importance to the information about the project itself than in-crowd investors. |
Ahlers et al. [17] | How do venture quality (human, social, and intellectual capital) and uncertainty level (equity share, financial projections) impact crowdfunding success? | Empirically examine the impact of signals used by entrepreneurs to motivate investors, and to contribute an equity-based crowdfunding project. | Information asymmetries in crowdfunding. Signaling values of venture quality attributes and indicators of uncertainty that impact on the probability of success. | Analyze the data through Univariate analysis, binomial regression, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, and exponential hazard models. | A total of 104 campaigns published on ASSOB from 10/2006 to 10/2011. | Regarding venture quality signals, human capital is positively related to funding success; whereas less evidence available in supporting the role of social capital and intellectual capital. Retaining equity and providing detailed financial forecasts can act as effective signals to decrease information asymmetry and therefore increase the likelihood of success. |
Bi et al. [23] | What is the impact of online information on investing decisions in reward-based crowdfunding? | Introducing the elaboration likelihood model to crowdfunding literature and investigating which type of online information has a resilient impact on investment behavior. | Elaboration likelihood model: central route (project quality signals) and peripheral route (electronic word-of-mouth). Which route, and information can influence the decision to invest? | Hierarchical multiple regression for the full sample and for each project category. | A total of 999 projects extracted from a Chinese platform called zhongchou.com in the categories of Science & Technology, Art, Entertainment, and Agriculture. | Explanatory description of texts and higher video counts higher project quality signals; more “Like” and reviews suggest better electronic word-of-mouth. Generally, the effects of the central route and peripheral factors on investors’ funding decisions are almost equal. |
Oba et al. [8] | If a project is successful, then it creates a value proposition and signals it effectively. | Analyze the platform reputation, reward attributed and characteristics of project owner. | Signaling theory and information asymmetry, ecosystem of crowdfunding in Turkey. | Descriptive statistics, univariate analysis (t-test), ANOVA, regression analysis. | A total of 354 campaigns extracted from three Turkish crowdfunding platforms e.g., Fongogo, Fonlabeni and crowdFON. | They concluded that platform reputation and entrepreneurial capacity of the project owner are strongly associated with success of the project. |
Gangi and Daniele [32] | How early-late backers and mentors affect reward-based crowdfunding campaigns. | Resolving the information asymmetry barriers among insiders and outsiders in determining the campaign success. | Impact of early-late backers. Impact of project mentor. | Descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis. | A total of 578 campaigns extracted from two Italian platforms e.g., Produzioni dal basso and Eppala. | They concluded that both type of funders are remarkably important for the project success. |
Variables | Mean | Min | Max | Standard Deviation |
---|---|---|---|---|
Fully funded | 0.32 | 0 | 1.00 | 0.46 |
No. of backers | 33.40 | 0 | 4913.00 | 118.98 |
Funding amount | £1782.24 | 1 | 367,200.00 | 8356.76 |
Role of media | 0.84 | 0 | 3.00 | 1.07 |
Founder’s past success | 0.25 | 0 | 1.96 | 0.18 |
Duration (days) | 37.85 | 0 | 1000.00 | 19.20 |
Length of the context | 2238.97 | 0 | 24,506.00 | 2116.32 |
Updates | 0.89 | 0 | 41.00 | 2.44 |
Comments | 0.26 | 0 | 2.50 | 0.39 |
URL links | 0.15 | 0 | 1.86 | 0.27 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Fully Funded (1) | 1 | |||||||||
No. of Backers (2) | 0.218 ** (0.000) | 1 | ||||||||
Funding Amount (3) | 0.180 ** (0.000) | 0.572 ** (0.000) | 1 | |||||||
Role of Media (4) | 0.174 ** (0.000) | 0.117 ** (0.000) | 0.146 ** (0.000) | 1 | ||||||
Founder’s Past Success (5) | 0.112 ** (0.000) | 0.026 ** (0.001) | 0.013 (0.120) | 0.064 ** (0.000) | 1 | |||||
Duration (6) | −0.152 ** (0.000) | −0.007 (0.422) | 0.021 * (0.010) | 0.087 ** (0.000) | −0.019 * (0.022) | 1 | ||||
Updates (7) | 0.242 ** (0.000) | 0.313 ** (0.000) | 0.281 ** (0.000) | 0.238 ** (0.000) | 0.020 * (0.013) | 0.053 ** (0.000) | 1 | |||
Comments (8) | 0.369 ** (0.000) | 0.379 ** (0.000) | 0.299 ** (0.000) | 0.184 ** (0.000) | 0.162 ** (0.000) | −0.057 ** (0.000) | 0.294 ** (0.000) | 1 | ||
URL Links (9) | 0.174 ** (0.000) | 0.152 ** (0.000) | 0.158 ** (0.000) | 0.329 ** (0.000) | 0.062 ** (0.000) | 0.023 ** (0.004) | 0.217 ** (0.000) | 0.153 ** (0.000) | 1 | |
Length of the Context (10) | 0.165 ** (0.000) | 0.202 ** (0.000) | 0.233 ** (0.000) | 0.399 ** (0.000) | 0.022 ** (0.008) | 0.088 ** (0.000) | 0.337 ** (0.000) | 0.245 ** (0.000) | 0.439 ** (0.000) | 1 |
DV Method | I | II | III |
---|---|---|---|
Number of Backers | Funding Amount | Fully Funded | |
Tobit | Tobit | Logistic reg. | |
B(SE) | B(SE) | B(SE) | |
Role of media | 0.076 *** (0.012) | 0.068 *** (0.011) | 0.129 *** (0.020) |
Founders’ past success | 0.457 *** (0.064) | 0.282 *** (0.061) | 0.771 *** (0.109) |
Duration | −1.101 *** (0.052) | −0.832 *** (0.049) | −1.854 *** (0.091) |
Updates | 0.888 *** (0.045) | 0.891 *** (0.040) | 1.533 *** (0.076) |
Comments | 0.983 *** (0.032) | 0.940 *** (0.028) | 1.637 *** (0.054) |
URL Links | 0.393 *** (0.046) | 0.381 *** (0.042) | 0.602 *** (0.077) |
Length of context | 0.060 (0.035) | 0.103 ** (0.034) | 0.123 * (0.061) |
Constant | 0.358 * (0.126) | −0.259 * (0.121) | 0.562 ** (0.217) |
Sigma | 0.404 *** | 1.172 *** | |
Observations | 14,887 | 14,887 | 14,887 |
Uncensored | 10,101 | 10,102 | |
Left-censored | 4786 | 4785 | |
Mean VIF | 1.891 | 3.358 | |
Maximum VIF | 3.267 | 3.928 | |
Likelihood Chi 2 | 9445 | 7,944 | |
McFadden’s pseudo R2 | 0.170 | ||
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 | 0.269 |
Validation Dataset | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Subsample 1 | Subsample 2 | Subsample 3 | Subsample 4 | |
AUC | 0.646 | 0.672 | 0.655 | 0.662 |
SE a | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.010 |
Sig b | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Bootstrap a | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sig. | 95% CI | |||||
B | Bias | SE | (2-tailed) | Upper | Lower | |
Media | 0.129 | 0.000 | 0.021 | 0.001 | 0.090 | 0.171 |
Founders Past Success | 0.771 | 0.004 | 0.113 | 0.001 | 0.565 | 0.994 |
Duration | −1.854 | −0.002 | 0.094 | 0.001 | −2.039 | −1.665 |
Updates | 1.533 | 0.004 | 0.080 | 0.001 | 1.391 | 1.705 |
Comments | 1.637 | 0.002 | 0.055 | 0.001 | 1.529 | 1.747 |
URL Links | 0.602 | −0.001 | 0.080 | 0.001 | 0.451 | 0.768 |
Length of Context | 0.123 | −0.001 | 0.061 | 0.041 | 0.008 | 0.244 |
Constant | 0.562 | 0.002 | 0.221 | 0.015 | 0.112 | 0.978 |
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Usman, S.M.; Bukhari, F.A.S.; Usman, M.; Badulescu, D.; Sial, M.S. Does the Role of Media and Founder’s Past Success Mitigate the Problem of Information Asymmetry? Evidence from a UK Crowdfunding Platform. Sustainability 2019, 11, 692. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11030692
Usman SM, Bukhari FAS, Usman M, Badulescu D, Sial MS. Does the Role of Media and Founder’s Past Success Mitigate the Problem of Information Asymmetry? Evidence from a UK Crowdfunding Platform. Sustainability. 2019; 11(3):692. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11030692
Chicago/Turabian StyleUsman, Sardar Muhammad, Farasat Ali Shah Bukhari, Muhammad Usman, Daniel Badulescu, and Muhammad Safdar Sial. 2019. "Does the Role of Media and Founder’s Past Success Mitigate the Problem of Information Asymmetry? Evidence from a UK Crowdfunding Platform" Sustainability 11, no. 3: 692. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11030692
APA StyleUsman, S. M., Bukhari, F. A. S., Usman, M., Badulescu, D., & Sial, M. S. (2019). Does the Role of Media and Founder’s Past Success Mitigate the Problem of Information Asymmetry? Evidence from a UK Crowdfunding Platform. Sustainability, 11(3), 692. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11030692