Rethinking Fuelwood: People, Policy and the Anatomy of a Charcoal Supply Chain in a Decentralizing Peru
- Who are the actors along the supply chain and what are their roles?
- How are activities and relations distributed amongst and utilized by those actors?
- How are economic and power benefits in charcoal trade distributed amongst actors?
- What are the obstacles and opportunities for a more equitable charcoal supply chain within a multi-level governance context?
2. Study Site
3.1. Non-Probability Sampling and Choosing Informants
4.1. Who Are the Actors Along the Supply Chain and What Are Their Roles?
4.1.2. How Are Activities and Relations Distributed Amongst and Utilized by Those Actors?
4.1.3. The Importance of Kin
4.2. How Are Economic Benefits in Charcoal Trade Distributed Amongst Actors?
4.3. What Are the Obstacles to and Opportunities for a More Equitable Charcoal Supply Chain in a Governance Context?
Conflicts of Interest
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|1. Landowners||Landowners provide space to build charcoal kilns. In rural areas, kilns are frequently built in farm fields, either by the farmer or by itinerate carboneros, to produce charcoal in situ using remnant wood from forest clearance. On public lands itinerate carboneros build kilns in inactive forest concessions using logging waste wood. In urban areas, Timber companies build kilns on property around their sawmills to use mill waste. Carboneros also build kilns on private and public urban lots to transform mill wastes into charcoal. Many producers buy or rent kiln sites, but the government also allow the poor to build on marginal public lands.|
|2. Sawmill wood transporters (local)||Small-scale entrepreneurs buy sawmill waste-wood to transport and resell at urban kiln sites. Prices vary by distance.|
|3. Charcoal Producers (carboneros)||All carboneros urban and rural alike utilize artisanal kiln methods.|
|3.1 Artisanal (rural & urban)||Rural carboneros tend to make charcoal opportunistically as they clear farmland, or else harvest scraps left behind in abandoned concessions and farmlands.|
|3.2 Super Carbonero||Super carboneros increase the scale of their operations by hiring labour on large plots to manage multiple kilns. They have appeared with the recent increase in value of Amazonian charcoal and are beginning to dominate the market by buying up all the by-product of the quality hardwood shihuahuaco (Dipteryx spp.).|
|3.3 Carbonero Employees||Super carboneros as well as urban carbonero communities sometimes employ people to tend the kilns, especially at night.|
|4. Creditors/Facilitators||Creditors lend money and/or goods to carboneros in return for varying degrees of commitment and returns such as reduced charcoal prices or contractual sale agreements.|
|5. Traders||Traders are the crux of the commodity chain and bear the most fiscal and administrative responsibility for the transport and trade of commercial charcoal. Traders are often also creditors. They buy the charcoal from carboneros, organise charcoal transport to and distribute to wholesalers in Lima.|
|6. Local Vendors||Local vendors in Pucallpa mainly distribute from the main central markets. They sell sacks half the weight of commercial sacks. This charcoal is inferior in quality because of the wood species used and the small size of the pieces of wood.|
|7. Transporters (long haul)||Traders hire drivers to transport charcoal in 30,000 kilo loads to Lima. Drivers are often family members or well-known associates of the trader.|
|8. Wholesale Depository owners||Wholesalers buy vast quantities of charcoal on a weekly basis and distribute in bulk to large urban businesses. Wholesalers are almost always kin of traders.|
|9. Lima Market Vendors||Market Vendors in Lima distribute to street food sellers, small informal restaurant businesses and domestic clients.|
|10. Urban Consumers||Commercial and Industrial consumers buy charcoal in bulk from wholesalers. Residential consumers buy from markets.|
|Principal actors involved in the commercial charcoal supply chain between Ucayali and Lima, their roles and relations.|
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Bennett, A.; Cronkleton, P.; Menton, M.; Malhi, Y. Rethinking Fuelwood: People, Policy and the Anatomy of a Charcoal Supply Chain in a Decentralizing Peru. Forests 2018, 9, 533. https://doi.org/10.3390/f9090533
Bennett A, Cronkleton P, Menton M, Malhi Y. Rethinking Fuelwood: People, Policy and the Anatomy of a Charcoal Supply Chain in a Decentralizing Peru. Forests. 2018; 9(9):533. https://doi.org/10.3390/f9090533Chicago/Turabian Style
Bennett, Aoife, Peter Cronkleton, Mary Menton, and Yadvinder Malhi. 2018. "Rethinking Fuelwood: People, Policy and the Anatomy of a Charcoal Supply Chain in a Decentralizing Peru" Forests 9, no. 9: 533. https://doi.org/10.3390/f9090533