How to Compensate Forest Ecosystem Services Through Restorative Justice: An Analysis Based on Typical Cases in China

Abstract

The ongoing degradation of global forests has severely weakened ecosystem service functions, and traditional judicial remedies have struggled to quantify intangible ecological losses. China has become an important testing ground for restorative justice through the establishment of specialized environmental courts and the practice of environmental public interest litigation. Since 2015, China has actively explored and institutionalized the application of the concept of restorative justice in its environmental justice reform. This concept emphasizes compensating environmental damages through actual ecological restoration acts rather than relying solely on financial compensation. This shift reflects a deep understanding of the limitations of traditional environmental justice and an institutional response to China’s ecological civilization construction, providing critical support for forest ecosystem restoration and enabling ecological restoration activities, such as replanting and re-greening, habitat reconstruction, etc., to be enforced through judicial decisions. This study conducts a qualitative analysis of judicial rulings in forest restoration cases to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of restorative justice in compensating for losses in forest ecosystem service functions. The findings reveal the following: (1) restoration measures in judicial practice are disconnected from the types of ecosystem services available; (2) non-market values and long-term cumulative damages are systematically underestimated, with monitoring mechanisms exhibiting fragmented implementation and insufficient effectiveness; (3) management cycles are set in violation of ecological restoration principles, and acceptance standards lack function-oriented indicators; (4) participation of key stakeholders is severely lacking, and local knowledge and professional expertise have not been integrated. In response, this study proposes a restorative judicial framework oriented toward forest ecosystem services, utilizing four mechanisms: independent recognition of legal interests, function-matched restoration, application of scientific assessment tools, and multi-stakeholder collaboration. This framework aims to drive a paradigm shift from formal restoration to substantive functional recovery, providing theoretical support and practical pathways for environmental judicial reform and global forest governance.

1. Introduction

Forest ecosystem services (FESs) serve as a vital foundation for human well-being and are currently facing unprecedented global threats [1]. Forests not only provide supply services such as timber but also perform critical functions such as climate regulation, soil and water conservation, and biodiversity maintenance [2]. However, global forest cover continues to decline. Over the past 60 years, global forest area has decreased by 81.7 million hectares (approximately 10% larger than the entire island of Borneo), with forest loss (437.3 million hectares) exceeding forest restoration (355.6 million hectares) [3]; broken down by 20-year intervals, forest loss shows different trends, with a net decrease of 129 million hectares between 1960 and 1980, 159 million hectares between 1980 and 2000, and 129 million hectares between 2000 and 2020 [4]. This loss not only threatens the achievement of climate change mitigation targets but also poses a serious challenge to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. To address this challenge, the international community has adopted various initiatives, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement, to mitigate forest loss and promote forest restoration.

In fact, when forest ecosystems are damaged, the multidimensional services they provide often cannot be restored in the short term, and some losses are irreversible [5], posing a severe challenge to traditional judicial remedies. The United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) defines ecosystem services as the benefits people receive from ecosystems, categorized into four types: provisioning services, regulating services, cultural services, and supporting services [6]. In the National Forest Management Plan (2016–2050) issued by the National Forestry Administration of China in 2016, the FESs were further categorized into four types: forest product supply, ecological protection and regulation, ecological culture, and ecosystem support [7]. The National Forest Management Plan (2016–2050) has achieved remarkable successes during 2016–2025, including an increase in the national forest coverage rate from 21.66% to 24.02%, and the successful rehabilitation of more than 30 million hectares of degraded forest land through key projects such as ‘Returning Farmland to Forests’. In addition, the plan promotes the construction of 10 national forest city clusters, with a 15% increase in carbon sink capacity compared to the baseline period. Forest Ecosystem Service Function Assessment Specifications (GB/T 385822020) uses 18 indicators, including soil conservation, forest nutrient retention, water conservation, carbon sequestration and oxygen release, air purification, forest protection, biodiversity conservation, forest product supply, and forest health and wellness, to assess the FESs [8]. At the international level, the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration (2021–2030) calls for global collaboration to reverse ecosystem degradation. Typical examples include the European Union’s Natura 2000 network, which protects more than 18 percent of terrestrial habitats and strengthens biodiversity corridors, and the U.S. Forest Service’s Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP), which has restored 2.8 million hectares of degraded forests since 2010. China has made remarkable achievements through the Returning Cultivated Land to Forestry Project launched in 1999, which by 2020 will have restored 28 million hectares of fallow land, increased forest coverage by 3.3 per cent, and sequestered 2.6 billion tons of carbon. On this basis, the Master Plan for Major Projects for the Protection and Restoration of Nationally Important Ecosystems (2021–2035) aims to achieve the target of 30 per cent forest cover by 2035 through integrated watershed management and the construction of biodiversity corridors, which will provide a key reference for global forest governance. In addition, by organizing and implementing the Green Great Wall project, China has scientifically protected 538 million mu of sandy land, effectively managed 118 million mu of sandy land, significantly increased the forest coverage rate of the Green Great Wall project area, and made a major breakthrough in desertification prevention and control [9], and through the implementation of the natural forest resource protection project, the forest stock of the northeastern forest area has increased by 40 million cubic meters, and the amount of sediment in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River has been reduced by 42% [10]. With the help of six major ecological forestry projects, including natural forest protection, returning farmland to forests, the Three-North Protective Forests, the Yangtze River Protective Forests, the treatment of Beijing–Tianjin wind and sand sources, wildlife protection, and the construction of fast-growing and productive forest bases, China has completed the creation of forests of 4.446 million hectares, the planting of grass to improve 3.224 million hectares, and the treatment of sandy and rocky desertified land of 2.025 million hectares by 2024 [11]. These projects are not only highly effective in ecological restoration but also provide strong support for realizing the goal of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality and building a beautiful China, and their innovative models provide an important model for global ecological restoration.

Traditional environmental damage judicial remedies primarily rely on monetary compensation and injunctions, which are relatively effective in addressing quantifiable direct economic losses [12]. However, these mechanisms exhibit significant limitations in compensating for losses of FESs. Many important ecosystem services, such as biodiversity conservation and cultural value, are difficult to accurately monetize. Traditional compensation mechanisms often underestimate or overlook these losses, and monetary compensation cannot directly restore damaged ecological functions, while injunctions can prevent further damage but cannot repair existing harm [13]. More critically, FESs exhibit long-term and complex characteristics, with their losses often involving disruptions to ecological processes and the breakdown of ecological relationships. These impacts may persist for decades or even longer, far exceeding the timeframe of traditional judicial procedures [14]. In China’s judicial practice, there are three main categories: one is the neglect of indirect ecological losses; for example, in (2020) Qian 03 Min Chu 391, where commercial logging led to forest destruction, the court only calculated compensation based on the market value of timber and did not incorporate the loss of biodiversity; and in (2024) Yue 0232 Xing Chu 61, where the judgment was based on the cost of land reclamation to account for compensation but ignored the long-term impact of habitat fragmentation on gene flow, leading to a decline in the resilience of regional ecosystems. In the case of (2024) Yue 0232 Xing Chu 61, compensation was calculated on the basis of land reclamation costs, but the long-term impact of habitat fragmentation on gene flow was ignored, leading to a decline in the resilience of the regional ecosystem. Secondly, long-term cumulative losses are ignored. In (2020) Hei 75 Xing Zhong 14, the court set a three-year care period and compensated only according to the current carbon sink, ignoring the cumulative carbon losses during the period; in (2022) Qian 03 Min Chu 291, compensation was based on immediate landscape restoration costs and did not quantify the loss of cultural service flows. Thirdly, confusing service flow value with stock value, in (2024) Gan 0821 Min Chu 190, the court compensated on the basis of timber stock value but ignored annual water regulation loss and did not calculate its flow value; in (2025) Min 08 Min Zhong 193, ecological damage compensation covered only forest stock, but forest recreation service flow was not included.

Against this backdrop, China, as a country with significant forest resources, faces enormous economic development pressures, providing a unique testing ground for the practical application of restorative justice principles in environmental protection. In recent years, China has actively explored the application of restorative justice principles in environmental judicial reform. This approach emphasizes compensating for environmental damage through actual ecological restoration rather than relying solely on economic compensation [15]. Since 2015, China has actively explored and institutionalized the application of the concept of restorative justice in its environmental justice reform, and during this decade-long period, China’s environmental public interest litigation system has developed rapidly, and the system of compensation for ecological and environmental damages was formally established in 2018. The institutional innovations that have evolved since 2015 have provided a critical time dimension and substantive support for the implementation of restorative justice. The restorative justice shift reflects a profound recognition of the limitations of traditional environmental justice and represents an institutional response to China’s ecological civilization construction. China has established over 2800 specialized environmental courts and organizations, consolidating the judicial functions for criminal, civil, and administrative environmental resource cases under environmental resource courts. China’s environmental public interest litigation system has developed rapidly, with over 400,000 environmental public interest litigation cases handled by procuratorial organs at all levels nationwide [16], and the establishment of an ecological and environmental damage compensation system. These institutional innovations provide important support for the implementation of restorative justice. However, despite the theoretical potential of restorative justice to compensate for losses of FESs, there is currently a lack of systematic empirical research on its actual effectiveness, particularly in countries like China that are actively implementing such measures. Existing studies primarily remain at the theoretical level or focus on case analyses, lacking in-depth examinations of the degree of alignment between restorative justice measures and losses of FESs, as well as the identification and analysis of systemic issues encountered during implementation.

Based on the above background, this study aims to systematically examine the actual performance of restorative justice in compensating for the loss of FESs through a qualitative analysis of Chinese judicial practices. On this basis, it proposes directions for improvement. This study is not only of great significance for improving China’s environmental justice system, but its experience and lessons are also of great reference value for other countries facing similar challenges. Through an in-depth analysis of Chinese judicial practices, this study aims to provide valuable experience and reference for the protection of FESs through judicial means on a global scale.

2. Theoretical Framework

The concept of restorative justice originated from a series of small-scale judicial experiments in Canada and the United States in the 1970s [17]. After decades of development, restorative justice has been increasingly adopted by countries around the world into their domestic judicial practices. In the field of ecological and environmental protection, restorative justice emerges as a new judicial philosophy, whose core principles include repairing harm, restoring relationships, active participation of the responsible parties, and community involvement [18]. Unlike the traditional punitive judicial model, restorative justice places greater emphasis on repairing the harm caused by illegal acts through concrete actions, emphasizing the constructive and forward-looking nature of responsibility [19]. This is manifested through measures such as ecological restoration and environmental governance to compensate for environmental harm, rather than relying solely on traditional sanctions such as fines or imprisonment. These characteristics of restorative justice give it unique advantages in handling environmental damage cases, particularly when dealing with complex ecosystem damage, enabling it to better achieve the substantive goal of compensation for harm [20]. Restorative justice measures can be categorized into behavioral measures, monetary measures, and contractual measures. For example, land reclamation, soil remediation, afforestation, and restocking in practice belong to behavioral measures, while compensating for ecological restoration costs or paying ecological restoration guarantees involve monetary measures, and signing agreements or commitments for ecological restoration belong to contractual measures.

A classification framework for forest ecosystem services provides a reference for understanding and assessing the effectiveness of restorative justice. Based on the framework of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), FESs can be categorized into four major types: provisioning services provided by wood and non-wood forest products, regulating services such as climate regulation and hydrological regulation, supporting services such as nutrient cycling and soil formation, and cultural services including recreational and leisure activities, spiritual and cultural values, and esthetic values. This classification framework not only helps comprehensively identify the various losses that forest destruction may cause but also provides a scientific basis for designing targeted restoration measures. When forest ecosystems are damaged, different types of service functions may be affected to varying degrees, and the difficulty and time required for their restoration also vary significantly. This requires restorative justice measures to be systematic and targeted.

Restorative justice exhibits distinct characteristics in environmental resource cases and demonstrates a high degree of intrinsic compatibility with compensation for forest ecosystem services. Its theoretical advantages are primarily manifested in several aspects. First, compared to monetary compensation, restorative justice places greater emphasis on substantive ecological restoration, enabling the direct repair of damaged ecological functions [21], which aligns more closely with the functional characteristics of FESs. Second, restorative justice possesses adaptive management characteristics, enabling adjustments to restoration strategies based on the complexity and uncertainty of ecosystems [19], which is crucial for addressing the dynamic changes in forest ecosystems. Third, restorative justice places greater emphasis on protecting collective interests, aligning with the public good attributes of FESs and better safeguarding the overall environmental rights of society [22]. Fourth, restorative justice emphasizes long-term effects, which aligns with the long-term nature of FESs and contributes to achieving sustainable environmental protection [23]. Judicial practice in the EU provides an important reference for functional compensation mechanisms. For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 2021 ruling on the Climate Protection Act, which compels the government to set annual emission reduction targets by sector after 2030, directly links judicial intervention to the restoration of regulating services. France’s Ecological Damage Doctrine, on the other hand, recognizes the independent juridical status of biodiversity and carbon sinks, requiring courts to appoint multidisciplinary panels of experts to design compensation schemes. These cases show that the justice system can enforce the restoration of non-marketed ecosystem services through scientific assessments and legislative accountability, which is where China’s current restorative justice framework is weak.

Restorative justice views human society and the ecological environment as a community with a shared future, breaking free from the constraints of traditional “anthropocentrism.” It emphasizes equal protection for the public ecological environment, the environmental rights of contemporary people, and the survival and development of future generations and other biological species, striving for the unity of judicial outcomes, social outcomes, and environmental outcomes [24]. Unlike traditional judicial systems, which are punitive in nature, restorative justice emphasizes “restitution for harm,” encouraging and guiding offenders to actively participate in damage restoration and environmental protection activities [25]. The methods of assuming responsibility include behavioral measures such as replanting and reforestation, restocking and release, and land reclamation; monetary measures such as ecological restoration costs and ecological restoration guarantees; and contractual measures such as ecological restoration agreements and environmental protection commitments. Restorative justice advocates proactive judicial intervention throughout the entire process, from preventive measures before the fact, intervention during the incident, to post-incident supervision. This proactive approach breaks through the passivity of traditional justice and allows preventive measures to be initiated when there is a risk of significant damage to the ecological environment, rather than waiting for the damage to actually occur. Additionally, restorative justice mobilizes relevant stakeholders such as judicial authorities, administrative departments, professional technical units, and community organizations to collaborate in the environmental justice governance process [26], achieving a “win–win” outcome—punishing violators, compensating victims, restoring damage, alleviating governance pressures on stakeholders, and transcending the traditional separation of criminal and civil, as well as civil and administrative, judicial systems. It integrates criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities to maximize ecological restoration. These characteristics make restorative justice highly compatible with forest ecosystem service compensation in multiple dimensions: the essence of forest ecosystem services is ecological function, and the goal of restorative justice—to restore damaged social relationships and enhance the overall quality of the ecological environment—aligns closely with the restoration objectives of forest ecosystem services [27]. Restorative justice emphasizes long-term and sustainable outcomes, establishing institutional arrangements such as forest protection and long-term monitoring, which aligns with the long-term nature of FES restoration; the “principle of balance” in restorative justice requires comprehensive consideration of the complexity of ecological and environmental damage, the technical nature of restoration, and the long-term nature of recovery [28], providing a framework for addressing the multidimensional, multi-scale, and non-linear characteristics of forest ecosystem services; based on ecological justice theory, restorative justice not only focuses on economic value losses but also places greater emphasis on the protection of ecological value, cultural value, and other diverse values, which corresponds to the multi-value system of FESs encompassing supply, regulation, support, and cultural services.

The institutionalization of restorative justice in China provides an important institutional backdrop for this study. In recent years, China has actively incorporated restorative principles into environmental resource adjudication, promoting the practice of restorative justice through a series of judicial interpretations and institutional innovations. Relevant judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court have clarified the principles and methods of ecological and environmental damage compensation, providing a legal basis for restorative justice. The establishment of specialized adjudication bodies, such as the widespread establishment of environmental resource courts, has provided organizational guarantees for the professional implementation of restorative justice. Explorations of alternative restorative practices, such as off-site restoration and labor compensation, have enriched the implementation methods of restorative justice. These institutional efforts not only reflect China’s emphasis on environmental protection but also create favorable conditions for the application of restorative justice in forest protection.

The core focus of this study is to examine the actual effectiveness and challenges of restorative justice in compensating for losses of FESs through an analysis of judicial rulings and practices. This study will revolve around the following core questions: To what extent do restorative measures in Chinese judicial practice cover various types of damaged FESs? Are existing mechanisms capable of effectively compensating for losses of FESs? How can a more scientific forest ecosystem service-oriented restorative justice pathway be constructed? Through in-depth exploration of these questions, this study aims to provide a scientific basis and policy recommendations for improving the restorative justice system and enhancing the effectiveness of forest ecosystem protection (Figure 1).

3. Methods and Data Sources

This paper adopts a qualitative research methodology, including textual analysis of judicial cases and summarization of their constituent elements, focusing on understanding the logic, value trade-offs, institutional inertia, and potential contradictions embodied in the text of the court’s judgment. The textual analysis of the judicial cases includes the following aspects: in terms of FES loss determination, a careful analysis of how the text of the judgment describes and defines the damage caused by forest destruction, whether the text of the judgment explicitly mentions or implicitly deals with specific types of FESs, and how the judgment argues for the scope, extent, and nature of the loss. In terms of restorative measures, the text of the judgment was carefully read to analyze the restoration objectives, specific measures, and expected results proposed by the court and to analyze whether and to what extent the design of these measures responded to the FES damages identified by the court, and whether the selection of these measures was mainly based on legal provisions, expert opinions, or administrative practices. In terms of the enforcement and monitoring mechanism, analyze the provisions in the text of the judgment regarding the responsible parties, the supervisory parties, the acceptance criteria, the monitoring cycle, and the consequences of non-compliance, and pay attention to the scientific, operational, and institutional articulation of the judgment. In terms of the chain of argumentative reasoning, examine the reasonableness of the judgment’s argumentative restoration scheme, for example, analyze whether the judgment simply cites legal provisions, relies on appraisal reports, or elaborates on the principles of ecological restoration, as well as identifying potential value preferences reflected in the text.

In response to the generalization of case components, cross-case comparisons are made based on in-depth readings of individual cases. The focus is on identifying the following: patterns of differences in the scope of FES loss determination across cases, associations between types of restoration measures and types of losses, patterns of common flaws in the design of monitoring mechanisms, and patterns of typical logical limitations in judicial reasoning. On this basis, the results obtained are interpreted in the context of the theoretical framework of restorative justice and the institutional context of China’s environmental justice reform. Based on the problems exposed in the text and the dilemmas faced by the courts, the institutional root causes are explored.

The judicial cases selected for this paper were obtained from the Judicial Instruments Website (https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/, accessed on 3 May 2025), the Beida Legal Information Network (https://www.pkulaw.com/, accessed on 3 June 2025), and the People’s Court Case Bank Website (https://rmfyalk.court.gov.cn/, accessed on 10 June 2025). In order to guarantee the representativeness of the samples and the validity of the analysis, the selection was based on the following criteria: the core dispute of the cases must involve the destruction of forest resources, including, but not limited to, logging, deforestation, reclamation, and forest fires, and the main text of the decisions explicitly adopts restorative judicial measures, such as in situ or out of situ restoration, alternative restoration, and compensation in lieu of labor, instead of purely financial compensation. It needs to be ensured that the cases can cover the major forest types and typical destruction situations in China and geographically cover different ecological regions such as the old-growth forest, secondary forest, plantation forest, and protected area. In terms of the type of damage, it includes different triggers such as commercial development, infrastructure encroachment, agricultural expansion, subsistence logging, etc. In terms of the scope of trial, it includes typical cases of environmental resources issued by the Supreme People’s Court, reference cases of provincial high courts, and judgments of grassroots courts, reflecting the whole picture of judicial practice. Finally, the data integrity quality rules; that is, the judgment documents need to be public and contain key information that can be analyzed: the factual determination of damage includes clear destruction, damaged area, FES loss description; the restoration program includes goals and specific measures. The implementation subject includes the implementation and supervision mechanism: acceptance criteria, supervision subject, and accountability provisions. Effectiveness tracking information includes acceptance report, third-party assessment data, and follow-up inspection records. In order to ensure the reliability and representativeness of the findings, we adopted multiple validation strategies: Hierarchical validation of case selection: we not only analyzed the judgments of the grassroots courts but also included the typical cases of the intermediate courts and the high courts, as well as the guiding cases issued by the Supreme People’s Court, to ensure the hierarchical completeness of the sample. Validation of balanced geographical distribution: The sample cases cover seven major geographical regions in China, including different climate zones, vegetation types, and levels of economic development, ensuring the universality of the study’s conclusions. Validation of continuity in a time span: The sample cases span from 2020 to 2025, covering an important period in the rapid development of China’s environmental justice system and reflecting the dynamic characteristics of the system’s evolution.

In the screening process, we screened judicial cases through core behavioral words, judicial procedure words, measure words, and loss words. The core behavioral words include forest destruction, forest theft, deforestation, deforestation, illegal occupation of forest land, and forest fire. The words of judicial process include environmental civil public welfare litigation, ecological and environmental damage compensation litigation, and restorative justice. Measures include ecological restoration, replanting and re-greening, off-site restoration, labor compensation, and stock enhancement. Loss words include ecological service function loss, ecological environment damage, etc. In total, 343 adjudication documents were obtained through screening, and the distribution characteristics of the adjudication documents are shown in

Table 1. Distributed characterization of selected judicial cases.

Regional Distribution
Northeast	Southwest		South	East	North		Northwest
42 (12.24%)	100 (29.15%)		61 (17.78%)	104 (30.32%)	16 (4.66%)		20 (5.83%)
Major Forest Type
Natural forests		Secondary forests		Plantations		Protected areas
140 (40.82%)		90 (26.24%)		80 (23.32%)		33 (9.62%)
Major Damage Type
Illegal logging		Deforestation for agriculture		Wildfire		Illegal occupation
170 (49.56%)		75 (21.87%)		60 (17.49%)		38 (11.08%)
Restoration Measures (Contains duplicate options)
In situ reforestation		Restoration fee payment		Off-site restoration		Mountain closure
280 (81.63%)		150 (43.73%)		40 (11.66%)		30 (8.75%)
Labor compensation		Stock enhancement
20 (5.83%)		10 (2.92%)

, and the index numbers of specific cases cited in the text are shown in

Table A1. Case index number cited in the text.

Case Index Number Cited in the Text
Zang 05 Min Chu 9	Sichuan 33 Min Chu 16	Sichuan 33 Min Chu 18	(2020) Gan 0721 Xing No. 62	(2020) Hei 75 Criminal Final 14	(2020) Min 0681 Min Chu 1209
(2020) Qian 03 Min Chu 391	(2020) Qian 06 Criminal Final 146	(2020) Qiong 01 Xing No. 4	(2020) Su 01 Min Chu 798	(2020) Zhe 11 Min Chu 147	(2021) Sichuan 08 Min Chu 23
(2021) Liaoning 0602 Xing No. 258	(2021) Lu 06 Min Chu 280	(2021) Min 06 Civil Final 3932	(2021) Min 0981 Xing No. 492	(2021) Qian 26 Criminal Final 105	(2021) Qian 26 Criminal Final 13
(2021) Qian 2702 XingNo. 241	(2021) Hunan 0422 XingNo. 387	(2021) Hunan 3123 XingNo. 262	(2021) Yu 08 Min Zhong 3505	(2022) Sichuan 0802 Xing No. 217	(2022) Gan 0827 Xing No. 155
(2022) Gui 7102 Xing No. 11	(2022) Hei 1025 Xing No. 33	(2022) Hei 75 Criminal Final 25	(2022) Liaoning 0502 Xing No. 162	(2022) Liaoning 0502 Xing No. 36	(2022) Liaoning 0502 Xing No. 37
(2022) Min 0121 XingNo. 173	(2022) Qian 03 Min Chu 291	(2022) Hunan 3122 Xing No. 107	(2022) Hunan 3122 Xing No. 113	(2022) Hunan 3122 Xing No. 69	(2022) Yun 0922 Xing No. 213
(2023) Sichuan 0727 Xing No. 42	(2023) Sichuan 0727 Xing No. 50	(2023) E03 Min Chu 56	(2023) E0525 Xing No. 15	(2023) E0526 Xing No. 97	(2023) Gan 0925 Xing No. 41
(2023) Gui 10 Criminal Final 359	(2023) Hei 0781 Xing No. 27	(2023) Hei 0781 Xing No. 35	(2023) Hei 0781 Xing No. 36	(2023) Qian 2625 Xing No. 228	(2023) Yue 1823 Enforcement No. 1032
(2023) Zhe 11 Min Chu 107	(2023) Zhe 11 Min Chu 94	(2024) Hubei 1125 Xing No. 132	(2024) Gan 0521 Xing No. 122	(2024) Gan 0703 Xing No. 185	(2024) Gan 0723 Xing No. 59
(2024) Gan 0821 Min Chu 190	(2024) Gan 1030 Xing No. 156	(2024) Jilin 7101 Xing No. 48	(2024) Jilin 7102 Xing chu 181	(2024) Jilin 7103 Xing No. 62	(2024) Min 0526 Xing No. 164
(2024) Min 0926 Xing Shen 15	(2024) Qian 0221 Xing No. 440	(2024) Qian 0525 Xing No. 288	(2024) Qian 2627 Xing No. 114	(2024) Qian 2627 Xing No. 225	(2024) Qian 2627 Xing No. 247
(2024) Qian 2634 Xing No. 63	(2024) Qian 2702 Xing No. 149	(2024) Hunan 0181 Xing No. 683	(2024) Hunan 1128 Xing No. 184	(2024) Yu 05 Min Zhong 2692	(2024) Yu 14 Min Chu 24
(2024) Yue 0232 Xing No. 61	(2024) Zhe 06 Min Chu 4	(2025) Gui 0922 Xing No. 10	(2025) Jilin 7103 Xing No. 7	(2025) Jing 03 Min Zhong 3666	(2025) Min 08 Civil Final 193
(2025) Qian 2634 Xing Shen 1	338.(2025) Qian 2627 Xing No. 34	(2025) Qian 2731 Xing No. 15	(2025) Xin 7101 Xing No. 29	(2025) Yu 7101 Xing No. 97	(2025) Qian 2627 Xing No. 34

; all sample index numbers are shown in the Supplementary Files.

4. Results

4.1. Disconnection Between Restoration Efforts and FES Typologies

Through in-depth textual analysis of typical cases, it can be found that in judicial cases, the restoration measures decided by the judges show a highly homogeneous character, with a large number of judgments adopting simple replanting and re-greening modes, and there is a serious disconnect between the restoration measures and the type of FESs. For example, in cases such as (2024) Yu14 Minchu 24, (2023) E03 Minchu 56, and (2021) Min06 Minfin 3932, the judge only ordered that the parties should replant and re-green the burnt public welfare forest land. The disconnect between restoration efforts and FES types is shown in

Table 2. Disconnection between restoration efforts and FES typologies.

Missing Function Type and Percentage	Judicial Practice	Typical Case Index Numbers
Supply, Regulation, Support, Culture 55 (16.0%)	Only requires replanting the same number of trees, without considering the impact of stand structure and growth cycle on the quality of supply services; neglects regulation/support services like soil/water conservation and biodiversity; fails to restore landscape cultural value.	(2019) Lu Min Zhong No. 1086, (2024) Xiang 0181 Xing Chu No. 683, (2024) Ji 7103 Xing Chu No. 62, (2024) Qian 2702 Xing Chu No. 149
Supply, Regulation, Support 33 (9.6%)	Focuses on restoring timber production function, without designing regulatory measures for carbon sink, water conservation, etc.; fails to rebuild soil ecosystems or animal habitats.	(2023) E 03 Min Chu No. 56, (2021) Min 06 Min Zhong No. 3932
Supply, Regulation, Culture 31 (9.0%)	Only restores timber supply, without formulating a restoration plan targeting climate regulation function; neglects damaged landscape esthetics and recreational functions.	(2020) Chuan 33 Min Chu No. 18, (2024) Gan 1030 Xing Chu No. 156
Supply, Support, Culture 40 (11.7%)	Replants trees but does not optimize nutrient cycling capacity; fails to integrate biodiversity conservation measures; fails to restore the continuity of cultural services.	Zhe 11 Min Chu No. 147 Gan 1030 Xing Chu No. 156 (2021) Yu 08 Min Zhong No. 3505
Regulation, Support, Culture 26 (7.6%)	Does not specifically restore regulatory services like carbon sink or flood control; neglects support functions like soil formation and biodiversity; does not consider loss of spiritual/cultural value.	Yu 14 Min Chu No. 24 Gan 0703 Xing Chu No. 185 (2020) Chuan 33 Min Chu No. 16
Supply and Regulation 34 (9.9%)	Only replants commercial tree species, fails to restore regional hydrological regulation function.	(2024) Zhe 06 Min Chu No. 4
Supply and Support 21 (6.1%)	Restores timber yield but ignores issues of forest land soil degradation.	Qiong 01 Xing Chu No. 4 Qian 2627 Xing Chu No. 247 (2024) Qian 2627 Xing Chu No. 247
Supply and Culture 17 (5.0%)	After replanting, fails to reconstruct landscape integrity, affecting recreational experience.	Su 01 Min Chu No. 798 (2025) Xin 7101 Xing Chu No. 29
Regulation and Support 23 (6.7%)	Fails to restore water conservation function in soil erosion areas; does not design biodiversity corridors.	(2020) Su 01 Min Chu No. 798
Regulation and Culture 16 (4.7%)	Does not formulate measures targeting climate regulation loss; neglects the cultural symbolic significance of forests in cultural heritage sites.	Yu 05 Min Zhong No. 2692 (2025) Qian 2627 Xing Chu No. 114
Supply 11 (3.2%)	Only quantifies the timber volume of replanted trees, does not optimize the sustainable supply capacity of forest products.	(2023) Zhe 11 Min Chu No. 107
Regulation 12 (3.5%)	After large-scale deforestation, simply plants trees without restoring regional carbon sink balance or microclimate regulation function.	Ji 7102 Xing Chu No. 181 (2020) Gan 0721 Xing Chu No. 62
Support 8 (2.3%)	No repair requirements proposed for damaged soil microbial systems or pollinator habitats.	(2024) Qian 2627 Xing Chu No. 225
Culture 9 (2.6%)	In deforestation cases within scenic areas, only focuses on visual coverage, fails to restore landscape integrity and cultural continuity.	(2022) Qian 03 Min Chu No. 291
No such issues, or the information is not related to this item 7 (2.1%)

. Courts have generally adopted a single replanting as the standard solution, regardless of whether the damage is to natural forests that provide critical regulating services, scenic forests with important cultural service values, or woodlands with impaired support services. This one-size-fits-all approach ignores the specific FESs dominated by different forest types, levels of damage, and geographic regions. The lack of restoration measures for specific service types is prevalent in the judgments, which can be attributed to, on the one hand, the lack of awareness of the complexity of forest ecosystems and the plurality of FESs in judicial practice, and the habitual equation of restoration with vegetation cover restoration; and, on the other hand, the fact that judicial appraisals tend to focus on the direct, visible resource losses and lack comprehensive assessment of intangible, compound ecosystem service losses and targeted restoration recommendations, leading to a lack of scientific basis for courts to formulate programs. This disconnect means that even if the seedlings survive, the damaged ecosystem services may not be substantially restored.

From the perspective of the supply service function provided by forests, existing restoration measures can indeed restore tangible outputs such as timber and non-timber forest products to a certain extent, but such restoration tends to remain at the quantitative rather than the qualitative level. For example, in the case of (2020) Chuan 33 Minchu 18, the court required the replanting of the same number of trees in situ, but there was a lack of scientific consideration of key factors affecting the quality of supply services such as the choice of tree species, stand structure, growth cycle, etc. The court failed to take into account that there are significant differences between natural forests and planted forests in terms of the stability, diversity, and sustainability of the supply services, and that the simple quantitative compensation could not truly restore the original level of supply services. Simple quantitative compensation cannot truly restore the original level of supply services. Regarding the regulatory services provided by forests, the lack of restoration measures in the court’s judgment is even more obvious. The regulating services of forests, such as carbon sink function, water conservation, climate regulation, flood control, etc., often take decades or even longer to be fully restored and have special requirements on forest stand structure, tree species configuration, and spatial layout [29]. However, in the cases analyzed, few judgments explicitly mention the loss of these regulatory services, not to mention the lack of targeted restoration programs. The case of (2020) Zhe 11 Minchu 147 showed that the court only required replanting of horsetail pines according to the original density but did not make any specific arrangements for restoring the soil and water conservation function of the area, improving the soil structure, and reconstructing the groundwater recharge system, among other key regulating services. This neglect results in a restored forest that may be functionally deficient in regulating services for a long period of time.

In addition, support service functions such as soil formation, nutrient cycling, and biodiversity maintenance are the basis of FESs, and their loss is often irreversible or extremely difficult to recover [30]. In the sample cases, there are almost no judgments dealing with the requirements for the restoration of soil ecosystems, and the restoration of biodiversity is only at the plant level, lacking the consideration of animal habitat reconstruction, ecological corridor construction, and genetic diversity protection. This lack makes the restored FESs defective in supporting other service functions. The restoration of forest cultural service functions has likewise received little attention. Cultural services such as the landscape esthetic value, recreational and leisure function, and spiritual and cultural significance of forests are increasingly important in modern society [31] but have received little attention in judicial practice. In (2022) Qian03 Minchu 291, (2023) Yu0102 Criminal 543, and other cases involving forest destruction in scenic areas or cultural heritage sites, the court’s restoration requirements also focused mainly on the visual restoration of vegetation cover, and there was a lack of systematic consideration of the need for deeper cultural services, such as the wholeness of the landscape, the continuity of culture, and the integrity of the recreational experience.

Under the framework of restorative justice, this disconnect is rooted on the one hand in the one-sided and simplifying tendency of judicial practice to perceive FESs, and under the traditional judicial framework that focuses on property loss, judges are more likely to understand and deal with tangible and quantifiable losses, while there is a lack of effective tools for perceiving and evaluating intangible and complex FESs [32], which leads to the fact that courts tend to formulate restoration programs in a manner that simplifies complex ecosystems into visible vegetation cover, and diversified ecological service functions into single-timber production functions. On the other hand, the judicial appraisal of environmental damage often focuses on the direct loss of ecological elements, such as forest stock, vegetation cover, etc., while the comprehensive assessment of ecosystem services is insufficient, and the appraisal reports based on which the judgment is made seldom involve different types of ecosystems.

4.2. Inadequate Valuation Methods Leading to Insufficient Compensation

The second core problem in restorative judicial practice is the serious mismatch between the scale of compensation and the actual loss of forest ecosystem services (FESs), which is fundamentally due to the flaws in the current valuation methodology. Decisions on the amount of damages or the scale of restoration in current judicial practice are often based on simple accounting, such as market timber prices and the cost of planting trees per unit area, or only consider losses that are easy to monetize and lack valuation of indirect FES losses (e.g., decline in pollination/pest control functions due to biodiversity loss and impacts of habitat fragmentation on gene flow) and long-term cumulative losses (ecosystem restoration lag) methodology. The phenomenon of valuation method deficiencies in forest restoration cases is shown in

Table 3. The phenomenon of valuation method deficiencies in forest restoration cases.

Issue Type and Percentage	Judicial Practice	Typical Case Index Numbers
Neglect of the indirect value of forest ecosystem service functions 66 (19.2%)	Failure to incorporate indirect ecological losses such as the decline in forest functions and weakened capacity	(2020) Qian 06 Xing Zhong 146 (2024) Yue 0232 Xing Chu 61 (2024) E 1125 Xing Chu 132 (2024) Xiang 1128 Xing Chu 184
Neglect of long-term cumulative losses 64 (18.7%)	Failure to account for the cumulative devaluation of perpetually regenerating ecosystem service flows	(2020) Hei 75 Xing Zhong 14 (2023) E 0526 Xing Chu 97 (2022) Qian 03 Min Chu 291
Confusion between service flow value and stock value 31 (9.0%)	Failure to assess annual carbon sequestration and water regulation capacity, underestimating dynamic service value	(2024) Gan 0821 Min Chu 190 (2025) Min 08 Min Zhong 193 (2024) Yu 05 Min Zhong 2692
Over-reliance on market value assessment 78 (22.7%)	Only quantifying losses of marketable forest products	Qian 03 Min Chu 391 (2020) Zhe 11 Min Chu 147 (2020) Chuan 33 Min Chu 18
Lack of application of professional ecosystem service assessment models and tools 73 (21.2%)	Failure to use models for quantifying multidimensional service losses	(2021) Qian 26 Xing Zhong 105 (2021) Chuan 08 Min Chu 23
No such issues, or the information is not related to this item 31 (6.1%)

. The core problem lies in the over-reliance of current judicial practice on simplified, market-oriented valuation methods, resulting in systematic under-compensation for FES losses. Table 3 clearly demonstrates the three main manifestations of this inadequacy: (1) Neglect of indirect value losses: e.g., loss of biodiversity leading to reduced pollination, pest control functions, or long-term erosion of regional ecological resilience by habitat fragmentation. Little quantitative assessment of such knock-on effects has been made in these cases. (2) Neglecting long-term cumulative losses: Full restoration of forest ecosystem services takes decades, during which the ongoing loss of service flows is not included in compensation calculations. The short-term care period set by the court is seriously inconsistent with the long-term nature of ecological restoration. (3) Confusing stock and flow values: Judgments often focus only on the loss of stock of resources such as trees and neglect the value of the flow of services that forests continue to provide each year. The deeper reason is that advanced ecosystem service assessment models are rarely applied in judicial appraisals and trials, and existing appraisal organizations lack relevant technical and normative support to scientifically quantify multidimensional and dynamic FES losses, resulting in compensation scales that are much lower than actual ecological damages.

In cases such as (2022) Qian03 Minchu 291, (2024) Qian2634 Jinchu 63, and (2023) Yu0102 Jinchu 543, the court mainly relied on the market value of the felled forest trees to determine the economic loss and used this as the basis for calculating the scale of restoration inputs. This approach reduces the complex forest ecosystem to a timber commodity, completely ignoring the value of the regulating and supporting services provided by natural forests, such as the value of carbon sinks, the function of biodiversity maintenance, and the capacity of water containment. A search for similar judgments reveals that the drawbacks of traditional valuation methods are mainly reflected in the following: First, the neglect of the indirect value of forest ecosystem service functions, and the loss of the indirect value of forest ecosystems sometimes far exceeds the direct loss, e.g., the loss of biodiversity may lead to the decline in pollination services and natural enemy control functions, which in turn affects the stability of the neighboring agricultural production system; the fragmentation of habitats may block the gene flow, reducing the adaptability and resilience of ecosystems throughout the region [33]. However, in the cases analyzed, few judgments addressed the assessment of such indirect losses. The second is the neglect of long-term cumulative losses. Forest ecosystems are characterized by an obvious time lag, and it often takes decades or even hundreds of years for their services to be fully restored. During this long recovery process, society continuously suffers the loss of missing ecosystem service functions, and it takes quite a long time for a piece of mature natural forest to recover to its original level of carbon sink function, water containment capacity, biodiversity maintenance function, etc., even if restoration is started immediately after the destruction [34]. During this period, society loses these important ecosystem services, and this time-dimension loss should be included in the compensation calculation. Third, the value of service flows is confused with the value of stocks. Forest ecosystems not only have the value of being a stock of natural capital, but more importantly, they have the value of their continued provision of ecosystem service flows. Traditional valuation methods tend to focus only on the stock value of forest resources, such as forest tree stock, biomass, and other static indicators, while ignoring the dynamic flow value of ecosystem services. In fact, the true value of forest ecosystems is mainly reflected in the flow of services that they continue to provide, including annual carbon sinks, water conservation, biodiversity maintenance benefits, and so on.

In fact, although a variety of ecosystem service valuation methods have been developed globally, such as the InVEST model and the ARIES system, the application of these advanced techniques in Chinese judicial practice is still very limited [35]. Existing judicial appraisal organizations in China often lack the technical capacity to apply these complex valuation tools, and appraisers have insufficient reserves of expertise in ecosystem service valuation. At the same time, the lack of relevant assessment standards and technical specifications also makes it difficult for institutions to carry out standardized assessment work even if they have the technical capacity to do so.

4.3. Fragmented and Weak Post-Restoration Monitoring and Enforcement

Another serious problem manifested in China’s restorative justice practice is the fragmentation and weakness of the post-restoration monitoring and enforcement mechanism, which is not only reflected in the technical limitations of the monitoring system but also reflects, at a deeper level, the misalignment of functions and insufficient coordination between the judiciary and the executive branch in long-term environmental governance, as well as the absence of an adaptive management system. The problems are mainly manifested in four aspects: (1) Monitoring indicators are superficial: acceptance criteria are generally limited to superficial indicators such as seedling survival rate and coverage and lack assessment of whether ecosystem service functions (e.g., improvement in soil permeability, restoration of carbon sink capacity, and reconstruction of biodiversity) have been substantially restored. (2) The care cycle violates the ecological law: the judgment generally sets uniform short-term care, which is far lower than the time required for natural forest restoration (often decades), resulting in a lack of late-stage care, and the restoration results are difficult to be consolidated or even degraded. (3) The main body of authority and responsibility is fragmented: the responsibilities of the court, procuratorate, forestry department, etc., in supervision, acceptance, and accountability are ill-defined and poorly articulated, resulting in a supervisory vacuum or shirking of responsibilities. (4) Lack of technical capacity and resources: grassroots courts and administrative departments lack professional staff and budgets for long-term, effective monitoring; once the restoration program is determined, there is a lack of a mechanism for dynamic adjustment according to the actual situation. This fragmentation and lack of power stem from the failure of institutional design to effectively integrate the long-term and complex nature of ecological restoration with the phases of judicial implementation and the fragmentation of administration, resulting in the restoration goals set by the judgment being difficult to truly realize in reality, and the ecological benefits being greatly reduced. The fragmentation of monitoring and enforcement after forest restoration is shown in

Table 4. The fragmentation of monitoring and enforcement after forest restoration.

Issue Type and Percentage	Judicial Practice	Typical Case Index Numbers
Overly Simplistic Monitoring Metrics 110 (32.1%)	Acceptance criteria only required seedling survival rate, failed to set functional restoration indicators.	(2018) Hu 02 MinZhong 1897
Maintenance Period Violating Ecological Laws 87 (25.4%)	Uniformly set a maintenance period shorter than natural forest recovery time.	(2020) Yu 08 MinZhong 3505 (2024) Jing 03 MinZhong 3666 (2021) Liao 0602 XingChu 258
Fragmentation between Rights, Responsibilities, and Entities 62 (18.1%)	Failed to clarify acceptance standards and accountability mechanisms for negligence.	(2019) Lu MinZhong 1086 (2021) Zhe 11 MinChu 94 (2022) Qian 03 MinChu 291
Lack of Technical Capacity and Resources 29 (8.5%)	No dedicated budget to support long-term tracking and assessment.	(2023) Chuan 0727 XingChu 50 (2023) E 0525 XingChu 15 (2023) Chuan 0727 XingChu 42 (2022) Liao 0502 XingChu 162
Lack of Adaptive Management 20 (5.8%)	Restoration plan failed to establish a mechanism for dynamically adjusting measures.	(2020) Qian 06 XingZhong 146 (2024) Yue 0232 XingChu 61 (2024) E 1125 XingChu 132
No such issues, or the information is not related to this item 35 (10.2%)

.

In the sample cases, the vast majority of the judgments set a relatively fixed period of time for management and conservation, usually three years, with a few extending to five years. This time setting may seem reasonable, but it actually seriously underestimates the complexity and long-term nature of forest ecosystem restoration.

In cases such as (2021) Yu 08 Civil Final No. 3505, the duration of care is one year, for (2025) Beijing 03 Civil Final No. 3666, the duration of care is three years, and for (2021) Liao 0602 Criminal No. 258, the duration of care is five years.

In terms of the monitoring system, the monitoring indicators in most of the cases were limited to simple appearance indicators such as seedling survival rate and degree of coverage and lacked scientific assessment of the effect of restoration of ecosystem service functions. For example, in Case No. (2023) Guangdong 1823 Enforcement 1032, the acceptance criteria only required the vegetation coverage rate but did not make any requirements for the core water conservation function indicators, such as improvement in soil permeability, restoration of groundwater recharge capacity, and the effect of runoff regulation. This kind of superficial monitoring cannot truly reflect the restoration of forest ecosystem services, let alone provide a scientific basis for subsequent adaptive management. In terms of the division of responsibilities between the judicial and administrative sectors in monitoring implementation, the judgment usually requires that the local forestry authorities are responsible for supervising the implementation and acceptance of the restoration project, but there is a lack of clear provisions on the specific supervision standards, procedures, frequency, and accountability mechanism for supervision failure. This ambiguous institutional arrangement leads to the practice that the court believes that the enforcement responsibility has been transferred to the administrative department after the judgment has entered into force, and the administrative department believes that it is only assisting in the enforcement rather than the main responsible person, and the responsible person takes advantage of this ambiguity to negatively fulfill the restoration obligation [36].

The fragmentation of the post-restoration monitoring and enforcement mechanism is also reflected in the following: First, the lack of an effective adaptive management mechanism under the existing institutional framework. Forest ecosystem restoration is a dynamic process, affected by a variety of uncertainties such as climate change, pests and diseases, and anthropogenic interference, which requires the timely adjustment of restoration strategies according to the actual situation [37]. However, in the cases analyzed, almost no judgments have established a dynamic adjustment mechanism, and once the restoration program is determined, it becomes a solidified implementation standard, and it is difficult to correct the problem in time, even if it is found in the implementation process. Second, the lack of professional and technical support further exacerbates the lack of monitoring and implementation. Grassroots courts and forestry departments generally lack professional and technical personnel in forest ecology, ecosystem service assessment, etc., and are often more than capable of handling complex ecological restoration projects. At the same time, existing forensic institutions mainly specialize in damage assessment and have limited capacity for the long-term tracking and evaluation of restoration effects. Third, the lack of resources constrains the effectiveness of monitoring and implementation. Long-term ecological monitoring requires sustained human, material, and financial resources, but the existing system lacks a clear source of funding and a guarantee mechanism. The court system itself does not have the budget and staffing for long-term environmental monitoring, while the monitoring resources of the administrative departments are often prioritized for key ecological projects and protected areas, with relatively little attention paid to judicial restoration projects. This irrational allocation of resources has led to a lack of ongoing monitoring and maintenance after the initial investment in many restoration projects, which ultimately affects the consolidation and enhancement of restoration effects.

4.4. Limited Stakeholder Engagement Undermining Legitimacy and Long-Term Sustainability

At this stage, the development and implementation of forest restoration programs in China are mainly dominated by courts, procuratorates, and administrative agencies [38]. Substantive participation of key stakeholders, especially local communities and professional NGOs, is very limited. This makes it difficult to construct linkages between local knowledge and social–ecological systems, affecting the long-term socio-ecological resilience and sustainability of restoration programs. In the sample cases, the process of developing restoration programs was almost exclusively internalized by judicial and administrative institutions. The court usually determines restoration goals and measures based on judicial appraisal reports and relevant legal provisions, the prosecutor’s office is responsible for supervising the implementation, and the forestry and other administrative departments provide technical support, with the whole process lacking substantial participation of external stakeholders. This closed decision-making model ignores the socio-ecological complexity of forest ecosystems and fails to adequately consider the needs, concerns, and knowledge contributions of different stakeholders. This lack of participation is particularly pronounced when it comes to forest areas with significant ecological and cultural values. In a case of tropical rainforest destruction in Hainan, the damaged forest was located in an area traditionally inhabited by the Li ethnic group, and the local Li community possessed a wealth of traditional knowledge and practical experience in forest protection, as well as an in-depth understanding of the ecological characteristics of the area, the distribution of species, and seasonal changes. However, this valuable local knowledge was completely ignored during the development of the restoration plan, and the court determined a standardized tree-planting plan based only on the technical appraisal report, without taking into account local traditional forest management practices and ecological wisdom. This neglect not only led to a lack of relevance of the restoration program, but more importantly, severed the organic link between the restoration project and the local socio-ecological system, affecting the long-term stability of the restoration effect. The phenomenon of limited multi-party participation in forest restoration cases is shown in

Table 5. The phenomenon of limited multi-party participation in forest restoration cases.

Issue Type and Percentage	Judicial Practice	Typical Case Index Numbers
Lack of Local Community Participation 87 (25.4%)	Failure to adopt traditional ecological knowledge, reducing community willingness to maintain the area.	Gui 10 Xing Zhong No. 359 Qian 26 Xing Zhong No. 13 (2020) Zang 05 Min Chu No. 9
Insufficient Participation of Professional NGOs 83 (24.2%)	NGOs not involved in the design and effectiveness evaluation of restoration plans.	Min 06 Min Zhong No. 3933 (2020) Min 0681 Min Chu No. 1209
Closed Decision-Making Weakens Legitimacy 67 (19.5%)	Restoration plans not publicly debated or open for public consultation.	Lu 06 Min Chu No. 280 Lu 06 Min Chu No. 410 (2020) Chuan 33 Min Chu No. 16
Absence of Long-Term Sustainability Guarantee Mechanisms 33 (9.6%)	Degeneration of restoration outcomes due to lack of local maintenance.	(2020) Gan 0721 Xing Chu No. 62
Socio-Ecological System Disconnection 30 (8.7%)	Restoration plans failing to reconcile ecological goals with community livelihood needs.	Xin 7101 Xing Chu No. 29 (2022) Gui 7102 Xing Chu No. 11
No such issues, or the information is not related to this item 43 (12.5%)

.

Professional NGO participation and its scarcity in the sample cases. As professional environmental protection forces, environmental NGOs usually have rich experience in ecological restoration, advanced technical methods, and extensive social networks and can provide important technical support and social supervision for restorative justice [39]. In the sample cases, the participation of NGOs is mainly limited to being the main body of prosecution in public interest litigation, and they seldom play a substantive role in key aspects such as the formulation of restoration programs, implementation supervision, and evaluation of effects. This limited participation not only wastes valuable professional resources but also weakens the social supervision of the restoration program and increases the risk of restoration failure.

The limited multi-party participation directly leads to three problems: first, the lack of legitimacy of the restoration program. Legitimacy is not only reflected in compliance with legal procedures but, more importantly, in the degree of social recognition and support. When the restoration program lacks the full participation of stakeholders, the democracy and transparency of the decision-making process will be questioned, and it will be difficult for the scientific and reasonable content of the program to be recognized by society. This lack of legitimacy may not only trigger social controversy and resistance but also affect the smooth implementation and long-term maintenance of the restoration program [40]. Second, it seriously affects the long-term sustainability of restoration projects. Forest ecosystem restoration is a long-term process that requires continuous maintenance and management. As direct users and beneficiaries of forest resources, local communities’ sense of ownership and voluntary maintenance behavior are crucial to the consolidation of restoration results. When communities are excluded from the restoration decision-making process, their sense of identity and responsibility for the restoration project will be greatly reduced, and even if the restoration project achieves some success at the initial stage, it will be difficult to obtain long-term maintenance and protection, which may ultimately lead to the degradation and failure of restoration results [41]. Third, it accelerates the social–ecological system rupture. Forests are not only natural ecosystems but also important components of social–ecological composite systems. The health of forests is closely related to the production and living styles, cultural traditions, and economic structures of local communities [42]. When restoration projects ignore this socio-ecological linkage, restoration programs that are incompatible with the local social system may arise, leading to conflicts and contradictions between restoration projects and the social environment.

This reveals a deep-rooted social governance flaw in restorative justice practices in forest restoration: the substantial participation of key stakeholders, especially local communities and professional non-governmental organizations, is seriously lacking. Currently, the formulation, implementation, and supervision of restoration programs are dominated by courts, prosecutors’ offices, and administrative authorities, forming a relatively closed decision-making circle. This lack of participation has multiple negative impacts: First, the knowledge and needs of local communities are ignored: local ecological knowledge and community livelihood needs are not incorporated into the program design, weakening the ecological adaptability of the program and the community’s sense of identity and willingness to maintain it. Second, the role of professional NGOs is limited: NGOs usually act only as public interest litigation prosecutors and are not sufficiently involved in key aspects such as program design, technical support, and independent monitoring, wasting their professional resources. This directly undermines the legitimacy and long-term sustainability of restoration programs. Programs face challenges to their legitimacy due to a lack of democratic consultation and transparency; communities are not empowered and lack the intrinsic motivation to maintain the results, leading to easy degradation of the restoration results. More deeply, it creates a socio-ecological system rupture, with restoration programs focusing on ecological goals only and not coordinated with social systems, making it difficult to create lasting resilience. The lack of multi-party participation makes it difficult to realize the goals of restorative relationships and long-term sustainability pursued by restorative justice.

5. Discussion

Through a qualitative analysis of 343 Chinese forest restoration judicial cases, it can be observed that while restorative justice provides a framework at the institutional level for compensating for losses of FESs, its practical effectiveness faces multiple systemic challenges. When addressing the complex subject matter of FESs, China’s restorative justice system still exhibits conflicts and mismatches in its institutional design and operational logic. These conflicts stem not only from technical operational limitations but also from the value tensions between restorative principles and traditional judicial frameworks, the challenges in recognizing the independence of ecological legal interests, and the balancing act between procedural fairness and the substantive effectiveness of restoration. It is imperative to explore potential reconciliation pathways and innovative directions to facilitate a paradigm shift in restorative justice from formal restoration to substantive functional recovery. Based on the issues related to forest ecosystem restoration cases under the restorative justice framework, we propose a comprehensive solution. The improved pathway for compensating FESs under the restorative justice framework is illustrated in Figure 2.

5.1. The Value Conflict Between the Concept of Restorative Justice and Traditional Retributive Justice and Its Path to Reconciliation

The primary jurisprudential dilemma faced in China’s forest ecological restorative justice practice lies in the deep value conflict between restorative justice and traditional retributive justice. While traditional environmental justice emphasizes state-based punishment, restorative justice focuses on the actual restoration of damaged forest ecological legal interests. In forest cases, if punishment is overemphasized, ecological restoration may be neglected; if only restoration is talked about, the deterrent effect of the law may be weakened. The path to reconciliation lies in the construction of a judicial model that emphasizes both punishment and restoration. The core lies in the following: (1) Legislative parallelism: within the criminal framework, it is clear that ecological restoration responsibility is an independent obligation, coexisting with the penalty rather than substituting for it. (2) Dynamic convergence: establishing a mechanism for evaluating restoration effects; perpetrators who actively and effectively fulfill their restoration responsibilities may receive a reduction or exemption of their penalties within the range of statutory penalties and vice versa may receive an aggravation. This not only maintains the deterrent effect of justice through the retention of penalties but also guides the perpetrators to take the initiative to assume responsibility through the incentive restoration mechanism, substantially restoring the damaged ecological service functions of forests, and realizing the balance and unity of the two concepts of justice at the value level. Traditional environmental justice is centered on state-based justice, emphasizing retribution for environmental violations through administrative penalties, while restorative justice is oriented towards the restoration of harmed legal interests [43]. This conflict is particularly evident in forest ecology cases: traditional justice focuses on the punishment of forest-destroying actors but neglects the actual restoration of forest ecosystem services. This difference in value orientation is rooted in different understandings of the concept of “justice”—the former equates justice with the reciprocity of punishment, while the latter understands justice as the substantive restoration of damage [44].

In fact, in the case of forest restoration, the two views of justice are not diametrically opposed; on the one hand, the judge needs to be based on the specific circumstances of the parties and the relevant legal basis for its punitive measures to urge the perpetrator passive acceptance of the corresponding restoration of the type of punishment; on the other hand, the judge in the judgment should also encourage the perpetrator to take the initiative to make the restoration of forests or guide the criminal behavior of the stakeholders to determine the negotiation of forest restoration of these two types, the judge, according to the perpetrator of the forest restoration commitment, or the results of the final determination of punitive damages for the perpetrator. Therefore, it is necessary to build a dual-track judicial model that emphasizes both punishment and restoration. Specifically, the mechanism of parallel application of restorative and punitive measures should be clarified at the legislative level, and the responsibility for ecological restoration should be incorporated into the criminal liability system, but not as a substitute for due criminal punishment. At the same time, the establishment of the “restoration effect evaluation—penalty adjustment” dynamic convergence mechanism, according to the perpetrator, is carried out to fulfill the actual effect of ecological restoration responsibility in the statutory range of punishment for its corresponding adjustment to achieve retributive justice and restorative justice organic unity. In terms of procedure, restorative justice allows parties with an interest in the case to negotiate on a voluntary basis, and in the case of forest restoration, the content of the negotiation should include how to compensate for the loss of forest ecosystem functions, with the fundamental aim of restoring the supply service, regulation service, support service and cultural service functions provided by forests. This model not only maintains the deterrent function of justice but also incentivizes perpetrators to actively participate in ecological restoration, thus reconciling the two concepts of justice at the value level.

5.2. The Dilemma of Recognizing the Independence of Forest Ecological Legal Interests and the Innovation of Judicial Protection Paths

Another deeper jurisprudential issue in the current application of restorative justice in forest cases is the dilemma of recognizing the independence of ecological legal interests in forests. Traditional legal theory treats forests mainly as a carrier of property or public safety legal interests, while ignoring their attributes as independent ecological legal interests. Forest ecosystem service functions include multiple values such as climate regulation, soil and water conservation, and biodiversity maintenance, and the loss of these functions is often difficult to measure by traditional property damage or personal injury standards [45]. This ambiguity in the identification of legal interests has directly led to problems such as inconsistent standards for assessing forest ecological damage and difficulties in selecting restoration measures in judicial practice. From the viewpoint of the object of forest ecological legal interests, the object of ecological protection interests, in general terms, refers to the ecosystem of the forest, specifically expressed as the functional benefits of the ecosystem of the subject and the ecosystem of the function of the form being carried out [46]. The former forest is the ecosystem service value, indicating the utility of ecosystem function, and the latter is the ecological and physical carrier of forest ecosystem service utility. In terms of the subject of forest ecological legal interests, in the context of restorative justice, it should include two categories, the first category is the forest ecosystem itself, including living and non-living objects, the second category is human beings, in the traditional judicial context. Forest ecological interests of the “beneficiary subject” are only human beings, as a “service” ecosystem is entirely “service”. In the traditional judicial context, the “beneficiary subject” of forest ecological benefits is only human beings, and the ecosystem as the “service object” is completely in the position of the “service object” and is treated as an object. The theory of restorative justice encourages a greater “vitalization” of the “beneficiary subject” and a weakening of the artificial servitude of traditional social law, which treats the ecosystem itself as an “object”.

Traditional law has primarily viewed forests as property or resources, with damage measured in terms of economic value or administrative violations, ignoring their inherent value as independent ecosystems that provide regulatory, supportive, cultural, and other services. This cognitive ambiguity has led to confusing assessment standards and a disconnect between restoration measures and functional loss in judicial practice. The solution lies in the following: Firstly, establishing the principle of independent protection of ecological legal interests in legislation and making it clear that the FES function of forests itself is an independent type of legal interest protected by law. Secondly, to formulate specialized standards and assessment systems for the identification of functional damage, beyond the value of timber, to scientifically quantify the loss of carbon sinks, the damage to biodiversity, and the decline in water source regulation function. Third, to establish a function-oriented judicial protection mechanism: judges order targeted restoration measures based on the specific type of FESs damaged, rather than uniform tree planting. Finally, strengthening the judicial appraisal support, which requires that professional organizations must carry out scientific assessments of the loss of FES function. Through these innovations, justice can truly shift from protecting forest resources to protecting the service functions of forest ecosystems.

Meanwhile, to solve this dilemma, it is necessary to establish the principle of independent protection of ecological legal interests from legal theory. Forest ecosystem service function should be explicitly regarded as an independent type of legal interest in the legislation, and a special ecological damage identification standard and assessment system should be formulated. A function-oriented judicial protection mechanism should be established, i.e., with the restoration of forest ecosystem service functions as the core objective, and diversified measures such as replanting and re-greening, alternative restoration, and ecological compensation should be comprehensively applied. In addition, a judicial appraisal system for damage to ecosystem services should be introduced, so that professional organizations can scientifically assess the loss of forest ecosystem services and provide an objective basis for the selection of restorative measures. Through these institutional innovations, independent and adequate protection of forest ecological legal interests can be realized at the judicial level.

5.3. Construction of a Mechanism for Balancing the Tension Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Justice

The applicability of the concept of restorative justice in dealing with cases involving forest resources has always been accompanied by a contradiction, namely, the irreconcilable tension between the guarantee of procedural due process and substantive restoration outcomes. This tension is manifested in a structural dilemma: the core operational mechanism of restorative justice, i.e., the path of relying on non-confrontational methods such as negotiation and mediation to seek consensus and restorative solutions for all parties to a conflict, while enhancing the efficiency of resolution and situational adaptability, inevitably impacts on procedural norms and the predictability of outcomes maintained by the traditional justice model. Forest ecological restoration is highly specialized, long-term and territorial, requiring the incorporation of local knowledge, expert opinions, and dynamic adjustments, but this may conflict with the rigidity of traditional litigation procedures, resulting in the best restoration solutions not being able to be put in place or delayed due to procedural constraints. To address this tension, an institutional framework combining procedural flexibility and bottom-line control should be constructed: (1) Graded and categorized procedures: different procedural paths should be set according to the complexity of the damage, and the process of non-complex cases should be simplified. (2) Establishment of procedural bottom-line principles: the core includes voluntariness, expert participation, public knowledge, and supervision to ensure basic justice. (3) Compound safeguard mechanism: adopt the model of judicial confirmation, administrative supervision, and social supervision. (4) Giving judges moderate procedural discretion: allowing judges to make necessary adjustments to procedures in individual cases in order to safeguard the scientific nature of restoration. This framework aims to strike a balance between the effectiveness of restoration and the basic standardization and acceptability of the procedure. While traditional procedural rules aim to guarantee the rights of participants and the fairness and transparency of adjudication through standardized processes, the flexibility of restorative processes may lead to the dilution of such guarantees, especially in cases with asymmetric information or imbalanced power relations [47]. This tension is particularly tangible in the forest ecosystem restoration cases in this study. Forest ecosystems have a highly complex inner structure, dynamic succession laws, and close dependence on specific geographical environments, and any program development aimed at restoring their ecological functions is essentially a professional process that requires in-depth integration of local ecological knowledge [48], consideration of long-term restoration trajectories, and repeated dynamic adjustments, implying the exclusion of rigid, uniformly applicable procedural rule bindings, and a judicial process that excessively adheres to the strict formal requirements of the traditional judicial process, such as fixed deadlines for lawsuits, restrictions on the types of evidence, or complicated court hearings is likely to delay the timing of restoration, limit the full involvement of experts and local communities in program design, and ultimately make it difficult for the most ecologically sound and targeted restoration measures to take root.

Restorative justice takes repairing damage and restoring balance as its fundamental purpose, presenting the characteristics of “result-oriented” or “repair-oriented”, and its core lies in achieving concrete and effective ecological restoration results [49]. On the contrary, traditional justice emphasizes the universality of formal justice, and its operation revolves around the practical implementation of the established procedural rules, which has the attribute of “procedure-oriented” or “rule-oriented”. When these two models with different philosophical foundations and legal values converge in complex forest ecological restoration scenarios, the conflict between procedural legitimacy and substantive restoration effectiveness becomes a central issue that is difficult to avoid in practice.

To resolve this tension, it is necessary to build an institutional framework that combines procedural flexibility and bottom-line control. Specifically, it includes the following: establishing a hierarchical and classified procedural application mechanism, setting up different procedural paths according to the severity and complexity of the damage to forest ecosystem functions, establishing the bottom-line principles of restorative justice, such as the principle of party voluntariness, the principle of expert participation, and the principle of public supervision, etc., so as to ensure the basic fairness of the procedure. A composite safeguard mechanism of judicial confirmation, administrative supervision, and social supervision has been created to not only guarantee the scientific nature and feasibility of restoration programs but also to maintain the transparency and credibility of the process. At the same time, judges are given procedural discretion in forest restoration cases, allowing them to make appropriate adjustments to procedures in accordance with the actual needs of forest ecosystem restoration, so as to achieve a dynamic balance between procedural legitimacy and substantive justice.

5.4. The Mandatory Boundaries of Restorative Measures and the Jurisprudential Reconstruction of Incentives

The fourth jurisprudential dilemma faced by restorative justice in responding to forest ecology cases is the difficulty of defining the mandatory boundaries of restorative measures themselves. The theoretical framework of restorative justice usually places voluntary participation as the cornerstone of the legitimacy of restorative processes, emphasizing that the intrinsic motivation and sincere repentance of the parties, especially the responsible parties, are the key driving forces for repairing relationships and achieving substantial ecological restoration [50]. However, the limitations of relying purely on voluntariness are revealed when the central concern of the case turns to the damaged forest ecosystem, an environmental good with high public good properties and ecological value that is difficult to quantify instantaneously, but which is critical to long-term overall well-being. In practice, a purely voluntary framework may lead to the restoration of areas of specific ecological significance or urgent restoration needs, whose restoration responsibilities fall into a substantive state of failure due to the lack of motivation or lack of economic and technical capacity of the responsible parties, thus reducing the ecological justice pursued by restorative justice to a castle in the air [51]. If coercion is overemphasized or imposed in order to ensure that the goal of ecological restoration is achieved, such as setting harsh and non-negotiable restoration obligations with the help of the strong intervention of public power, it will easily slip into another risk of eroding the essence of restorative justice. Such coercion, if unchecked, may not only ignore the specific context and capacity of the perpetrator and inhibit the generation of his or her intrinsic sense of responsibility but may also alienate the restorative process, which is originally aimed at repairing social relations and the environment and focuses on education and transformation, into a kind of hidden retributive punishment under the guise of “restoration” [52]. Instead of contributing to the long-term stability of reconciliation and environmental restoration, the result may be a departure from the core values of participatory, dialogical, and future-oriented restorative justice.

The essence of this dilemma is far more than a simple procedural issue and reflects the legal conflict between the concept of restorative justice in dealing with the protection of the integrity and function of forest ecosystems and the rights of the individual parties, especially their free will to act. How to establish legal concepts and institutional design that do not sacrifice the public interest requirements of ecological restoration effectiveness but also do not fall into the individual freedom and dignity of the coercive trap, really needs to break through the simple dichotomy. To solve this problem, we need to build a “bottom line mandatory + full incentives” system. First of all, clear ecological restoration of the mandatory bottom line; that is, to cause ecological damage to forests, the perpetrator has a non-exempt restoration obligation, and such obligations have legal and mandatory status. Secondly, in the choice of restoration methods, to give the actors full autonomy, allowing them to choose among a variety of restoration programs will stimulate their initiative to restore their enthusiasm. Once again, a perfect incentive mechanism should be established, including the reduction or exemption of criminal liability, the reduction in administrative punishment, and credit repair, so that the perpetrators can obtain substantial benefits from the fulfillment of their ecological restoration responsibilities. Finally, the creation of the “ecological restoration fund” system, the perpetrators who really cannot afford to bear the responsibility of restoration can pay the restoration fund to fulfill their obligations, ensuring that the forest ecological restoration goal is achieved. This system design not only maintains the rigid requirements of ecological restoration but also retains the flexible character of restorative justice.

To summarize, purely voluntary measures may result in key ecological restoration due to the unwillingness or inability of the responsible person; excessive coercion may alienate the essence of restorative justice and degenerate into punishment in disguise. There is a need to build the bottom line of mandatory and full incentives for the reconstruction of the system of jurisprudence: (1) Clear mandatory bottom line: the legislation provides that the perpetrators of ecological damage to forests have a non-exempt legal obligation to repair to ensure the bottom line of public interest. (2) The right to choose the mode of restoration: the actor is given the right to choose the mode of fulfillment of the obligation to stimulate its initiative. (3) Establishment of adequate incentive mechanism: link the effect of the perpetrator’s fulfillment of the restoration responsibility with substantive benefits such as reduction in criminal liability, reduction in administrative punishment, and credit repair, to create a strong incentive. (4) Create an ecological restoration fund: for those responsible, who really cannot afford restoration, they are allowed to pay into the fund to be fulfilled by a professional organization on their behalf to ensure that the restoration goal is not defeated. This system is designed to rigidly guarantee the objectives of forest ecological restoration while retaining the core value of restorative justice of encouraging responsibility and transformation through a flexible mechanism and to address capacity issues in actual implementation.

6. Conclusions

Restorative justice in China has built an institutionalized framework for compensating for the loss of forest ecosystem services, but empirical research reveals that it still faces systemic challenges. Judicial practice generally relies on standardized reforestation as the main restoration tool and fails to design differentiated programs to address multiple ecological functions such as regulating, supporting, and cultural services, resulting in ecological restoration that remains superficial. Compensation standards have significant flaws due to oversimplified valuation methods—relying on the accounting model of timber commodity attributes or basic afforestation costs and grossly neglecting indirect ecological losses, long-term cumulative damages, and the value of dynamic service flows, resulting in insufficient compensation for actual ecological damages. The post-rehabilitation monitoring mechanism is structurally weak: there is a serious disconnect between the setup of the care cycle and the law of forest ecological restoration, and the acceptance criteria are limited to superficial indicators such as vegetation cover, lacking a substantive assessment of the restoration of ecosystem service functions. The ineffectiveness of supervision is exacerbated by the poor connection between the powers and responsibilities of the judiciary and the executive branch, and the lack of resource safeguards further restricts the effectiveness of implementation. There is a serious lack of multi-party participation mechanisms, and the traditional ecological wisdom of local communities and the technical capacity of professional organizations have not been effectively integrated, thus weakening the legitimacy and sustainability of restoration projects. In order to break through this dilemma, it is urgent to build a new paradigm of restorative justice that focuses on ecosystem service functions: legislation establishes the principle of independent protection of ecological legal interests and incorporates core services such as carbon sinks and biodiversity into the damage assessment system; the judiciary promotes a function-oriented restoration model and customizes multilevel measures based on the types of damaged services; and technological innovations make the application of ecosystem service assessment tools mandatory and establish a long-lasting regulatory support system. Procedural reforms have activated the collaborative governance of communities and social organizations, realizing the deep interlocking of ecological restoration and social systems. This transformation not only concerns the improvement of China’s ecological civilization system but also provides an innovative path for judicial intervention in global forest governance.