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Article

Biodiversity Protection in Private Forests: PES Schemes, Institutions and Prosocial Behavior

1
INRAE, BETA-Université de Lorraine, 54000 Nancy, France
2
INRAE, BETA-Université de Strasbourg, 67081 Strasbourg, France
3
FCBA, 38610 Grenoble, France
4
Faculty of Economics and Management, Université de Lyon, 69007 Lyon, France
5
AgroParisTech, 54000 Nancy, France
6
Parc du Ballon des Vosges, 68140 Munster, France
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Jessica Leahy
Forests 2021, 12(9), 1241; https://doi.org/10.3390/f12091241
Received: 21 June 2021 / Revised: 26 August 2021 / Accepted: 26 August 2021 / Published: 14 September 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Methods and Models to Assess Forest Ecosystem Services)
The overall research question addresses the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms in poli -cies that enhance private forest owners’ biodiversity protection. In particular, the paper focuses on the link between forest owners’ motivations, incentives, and institutions, and questions the incentives of the current biodiversity protection policies. Our hypothesis is that the purely monetary nature of the incentives can cause a “crowding out effect”, i.e., forest owners may reduce their voluntary contribution to biodiversity protection that is driven by prosocial motivations (altruism, self-image, etc.). With this in mind, as well as the knowledge acquired via this project about forest owners’ motivations, we looked for the most effective combinations of “incentive mechanisms” (monetary and non-monetary) and “institutions” (national and local authorities, NGOs, etc.) to encourage forest owners to adopt biodiversity protection measures in their forests. View Full-Text
Keywords: PES; prosocial behavior; crowding out; biodiversity; choice experiment; forest owners PES; prosocial behavior; crowding out; biodiversity; choice experiment; forest owners
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MDPI and ACS Style

Abildtrup, J.; Stenger, A.; de Morogues, F.; Polomé, P.; Blondet, M.; Michel, C. Biodiversity Protection in Private Forests: PES Schemes, Institutions and Prosocial Behavior. Forests 2021, 12, 1241. https://doi.org/10.3390/f12091241

AMA Style

Abildtrup J, Stenger A, de Morogues F, Polomé P, Blondet M, Michel C. Biodiversity Protection in Private Forests: PES Schemes, Institutions and Prosocial Behavior. Forests. 2021; 12(9):1241. https://doi.org/10.3390/f12091241

Chicago/Turabian Style

Abildtrup, Jens, Anne Stenger, Francis de Morogues, Philippe Polomé, Marieke Blondet, and Claude Michel. 2021. "Biodiversity Protection in Private Forests: PES Schemes, Institutions and Prosocial Behavior" Forests 12, no. 9: 1241. https://doi.org/10.3390/f12091241

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