1. Introduction
By the end of 2018, the cumulative installed capacity of grid-connected wind power in China has reached 164,000 MW, accounting for 9.7% of the total installed power generation capacity, but the annual energy production of wind power accounts for only 5.2% of the total production [
1]. Although the curtailment of wind power is decreasing year by year, it is still a serious problem [
2,
3]. Usually, the decrease of generator output and the increase of load during valley load periods can contribute to decrease wind power curtailment, which can be viewed as system peaking capability. At present, insufficient peaking capability of power system is the main limitation of large-scale wind power integration in China [
4]. Under the existing energy structure in China, system peaking capability is guaranteed by peaking ancillary services which are mainly provided by thermal units. In the process of providing peaking service, thermal units have to give up part of electric revenue to decrease their output, and frequent adjustment of output also increases their operating cost. However, under the existing peaking compensation mechanism, system peaking cost is all borne by thermal units. As a consequence, thermal units are unwilling to ramp down as far as possible for their own economic interest when there is a surplus of wind power (therefore, surplus wind power will be curtailed), which leads to the insufficiency of the system peaking capability [
5,
6]. Therefore, perfecting the compensation mechanism for peaking auxiliary service instead of vigorously developing the installed wind power capacity has been become the focus of attention, which can explore the peaking potential of existing power systems and then promote the WPC integration [
7,
8].
With the construction of China’s power market, how to establish a reasonable and perfect peaking compensation mechanism to fully ensure the economic interests of peaking providers so as to encourage them to actively participate in wind power integration has become the key research topic. In particular, the research and application of demand response (DR) provide new system peaking approaches [
9,
10]. Union peaking combining demand side with supply side has become a research focus [
11,
12].
Presently, there has been lots of research on the peaking compensation mechanism, and the most widely used method in the relevant literatures is cooperative game theory. In [
13], based on the theory of cooperative games, a Shapley value was calculated to allocate peaking compensation fees according to the marginal contribution of peaking providers. As the most common method for solving cooperative game problems, there is a “combination explosion” problem when a Shapley value is applied in large-scale systems [
14,
15,
16]. On the basis of analyzing the monotonicity, superadditivity and convexity of the peaking cost allocation, the bilateral Shapley value and unit combination were proposed in [
17] to overcome this problem. Obviously, the Shapley value method only considers the marginal contribution of peaking providers, ignoring their individual differences. The difference of energy utilization among peaking units was analyzed, and then the Shapley value was modified by a thermoelectric ratio in [
18]. In [
19], the peaking compensation model was improved by introducing the realization coefficient of peaking capability. A bilayer peaking compensation mechanism that mitigated “combination explosion” and considered individual differences was proposed in [
20]. Under the increasingly severe system peaking situation, some scholars have begun to pay attention to the rational distribution of system economic interests, aiming to improve the incentive and fairness of peaking compensation mechanism. The interest relationship between wind power and thermal power was studied in [
21], while the most optimal solution to the allocation of system interests was given. A two-part compensation mechanism and corresponding calculation method combining peaking compensation and excess power generation revenue sharing were proposed in [
22].
With the construction of smart grids, flexible loads such as battery energy storage and electric vehicles are increasing substantially, which can participate in system scheduling through demand response [
23,
24]. Demand response subversively makes the demand side change from passive electricity consumption to active operation optimization, which greatly increases the adjusting capability of power systems [
25]. For example, DR resources can provide peaking ancillary services by changing their electricity consumption according to peak and valley periods. At the same time, the system optimization scheduling considering demand response is becoming more and more complex [
26,
27,
28]. Usually, DR resources can realize economic scheduling by building microgrids or virtual power plants with distributed generators [
29,
30,
31]. However, the research on demand response mainly focuses on how to correspond with time-of-use electricity price, policy rewards and punishment mechanism to adjust consumption behaviors, how to plan with other subjects, how to form a reasonable response strategy or how to achieve economical deployment [
32,
33,
34,
35]. And DR resources are rarely regarded as the peaking providers that can promote wind power integration.
To summarizing the existing studies, there are three prominent problems as follows:
- (1)
The current peaking compensation mechanism is not an incentive, and the benefits of peaking providers are difficult to guarantee;
- (2)
There is no corresponding mechanism to encourage DR participation in wind power integration, which has huge peaking potential to provide peaking auxiliary services. What’s more, DR resources are relatively scattered, requiring effective integration methods;
- (3)
The combination explosion problem is difficult to solve when a Shapley value is applied in large-scale systems.
Thus, from the view of supply side and demand side union peaking, a peaking compensation mechanism for promoting wind power integration is proposed with considering virtual peaking plant (VPP). The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the methodology of this paper.
Section 3 introduces peaking providers both supply side and demand side. Based on K-means clustering, deep peaking units in supply side are divided into three clusters, and DR resources dispersed on the demand side are integrated based on VPP. The two-stage coordinated optimization scheduling model is presented in
Section 4. The two-layer peaking compensation method based on peaking contribution is presented in
Section 5. Simulation results are discussed in
Section 6. The conclusion is summarized in
Section 7.
6. Simulation Results
6.1. Basic Data
The proposed peaking compensation mechanism was tested on a ten machine synthetic system. In this created system, the loads include fixed loads, shiftable loads and transferable loads. The generators include thermal units and wind farms. Transmission is not considered. On the supply side, units 1~8 provided deep peaking service, and units 9~10 provided on-off peaking services whose compensation fees were not considered in this paper. The specific parameters are listed in
Table 1. Among them,
Pbasic,min and
Pdeep,min are fixed parameters of thermal units, which need to meet the requirement of regional utilities and the limit of minimum output.
Pbasic,min reflects the minimum output of thermal units when they provide basic peaking service, depending on some certain standards set by regional utilities. Once a unit’s output decreases below
Pbasic,min, this unit will be considered to provide deep peaking service.
Pdeep,min reflects the minimum output when thermal units provide deep peaking service, depending on their minimum technical output. On the demand side, the schedulable units of VPP consist of two types of shiftable load and two types of transfer load, whose parameters are shown in
Table 2 and
Table 3. The 24-hour output of wind farms, fixed load demand and initial consumption information of schedulable units are given in
Figure 6. The feed-in tariff of wind power and thermal power were 83.05
$/MWh and 55.06
$/MWh, respectively. The scheduling model was solved by CPLEX.
6.2. Union Peaking
To analyze the impact of union peaking, the following cases were simulated. Among them, Case 0 provided a basis. The simulation results in different cases are shown in
Table 4:
- Case 0:
without wind farms integration, thermal units provide basic peaking and without VPP.
- Case 1:
with wind farms integration, thermal units provide basic peaking and without VPP.
- Case 2:
with wind farms integration, thermal units provide deep peaking and without VPP.
- Case 3:
with wind farms integration, thermal units provide basic peaking and considering VPP.
- Case 4:
with wind farms integration, thermal units provide deep peaking and considering VPP, the proposed method in this paper.
(1) Comparing Case 0 with the others, thermal units are partially replaced by wind farms, which leads to a decrease of operating cost and electric revenue. Therefore, it is necessary to motivate thermal units through reasonable electric revenue compensation.
(2) Comparing Case 1 with Case 2 and Case 4, after receiving the electric revenue compensation, thermal units’ net profits can be guaranteed. If peaking compensation fees are taken into account, the incentive for thermal units is more obvious. The WPC of Case 2~Case 4 is lower than Case 1, which indicates both supply side and demand side can promote the integration of wind power especially in Case 4. The daily load curve optimized by VPP in Case 4, is shown in
Figure 7. Compared with the original load curve, the load in the periods of curtailing wind power increases while the peak load decreases. The match between daily load curve and wind farms output is better, which is conducive to the integration of wind power. When wind power is sufficient, thermal units provide deep peaking services by reducing their output while the VPP shift or transfer DR resources to valley periods. At this time, the curtailment of wind power is minimized and the system additional income is maximized.
(3) By comparing Case 2 with Case 3, it can be seen that Case 2 significantly increases the integration of wind power due to the deep peaking of thermal units, which reduces coal consumption costs. However, the additional oil costs and pollution charges also increase system operating costs. In Case 3, the optimized load curve also increases the integration of wind power, thus reducing the output of some generators and decreasing system operating costs. Although the operating costs in Case 2 and Case 3 are not significantly different, the unit generation cost of Case 2 is much higher than that of Case 3.
6.3. Outer Allocation
In the outer layer, clusters A~C were taken as participants A~C, and the VPP was taken as participant D. Based on the method proposed in this paper, the compensation fee of each peaking alliance was calculated. The results are shown in
Table 5.
The compensation fee of each peaking participant was calculated according to Equation (18)–(22). The results are shown in
Table 6.
6.4. Inner Allocation
The compensation fee of each thermal unit or each schedulable unit is shown in
Table 7.
(1) In this region, there are 12 peaking participants on both the supply side and demand side. If the traditional Shapley value method is used for compensation allocation, the number of calculations ise 212. Based on the method proposed in this paper, the number of calculations is only 24, which effectively alleviates the problem of “combination explosion”.
(2) As shown in
Table 6 and
Table 7, the capacity of participant C is small, but its degree of peaking capability realization is high. The compensation mechanism proposed in this paper enables participant C to obtain a relatively higher compensation fee, so the cost allocation is more fair, which is conducive to promoting the peaking enthusiasm of units.
(3) Under the peaking compensation mechanism proposed in this paper, wind farm and peaking participants not only ensure their own benefits, but also obtain some additional income, which is an obvious incentive.