Decarbonization Commitment, Political Connections, and Firm Value: Evidence from China
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Hypothesis Development
- H1: The decarbonization announcement reduces firm value in China.
- H2a: Political connections have adverse effects on firm value around the decarbonization announcement, consistent with a “grabbing hand” channel that prioritizes political agendas over shareholder value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; C. R. Chen et al., 2017; F. Liu et al., 2018).
- H2b: The adverse effects of political connections are more pronounced for private firms than for SOEs, reflecting differences in embedded political status, incentives, and access to state support (J. P. Fan et al., 2007; C. R. Chen et al., 2017; Yu & Zheng, 2019).
- H3a: The negative effect of political connections is industry-specific (Ramiah et al., 2013; W. Li & Lu, 2016; M. Guo et al., 2020; Han et al., 2021).
- H3b: Decarbonization and/or environmental protection-related firms experience more pronounced adverse impacts of political connections (Jones et al., 2018; D. Guo et al., 2014; Dong et al., 2022).
3. Research Design
3.1. Event Study
3.2. Regression Specification
4. Data
4.1. Data Documentation
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Overview of Market Reaction
5.2. Regression Results
5.3. Additional Checks
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
---|---|---|---|
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 | −0.001 * |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | |
SOE | −0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Regional development | −0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Total assets | 0.000 | 0.004 *** | 0.005 *** |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | 0.009 *** | 0.014 *** | 0.012 *** |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.014 *** | −0.015 *** | −0.031 *** |
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.010 * | 0.021 *** | 0.010 |
(0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |
CEO duality | 0.003 ** | 0.005 *** | 0.005 ** |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Manage ownership | −0.007 * | −0.007 | −0.002 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
Board size | 0.001 ** | 0.002 *** | 0.001 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | 0.006 | 0.010 | −0.002 |
(0.012) | (0.015) | (0.018) | |
Leverage | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.004 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Constant | −0.026 ** | −0.132 *** | −0.120 *** |
(0.012) | (0.015) | (0.017) | |
Obs. | 3391 | 3390 | 3390 |
0.022 | 0.035 | 0.032 | |
F-statistic | 6.260 | 12.080 | 10.046 |
Event Window | Private Firm | SOE | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | |
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 * | −0.001 * | 0.001 | 0.002 * | 0.001 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Regional development | −0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Total assets | 0.001 | 0.006 *** | 0.007 *** | −0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | 0.011 *** | 0.015 *** | 0.011 ** | −0.000 | 0.008 | 0.009 |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.017 *** | −0.022 *** | −0.039 *** | −0.005 | 0.004 | −0.011 * |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.023 *** | 0.031 *** | 0.017 | −0.008 | 0.007 | 0.000 |
(0.008) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.011) | |
CEO duality | 0.003 * | 0.005 *** | 0.006 ** | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Manage ownership | −0.007 * | −0.006 | 0.000 | 0.032 | −0.002 | −0.015 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.033) | (0.029) | (0.036) | |
Board size | 0.002 *** | 0.002 ** | 0.001 | −0.000 | 0.002 ** | 0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | 0.017 | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.021 | 0.017 |
(0.016) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.027) | |
Leverage | −0.007 | −0.002 | −0.006 | 0.014 ** | 0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.009) | |
Constant | −0.046 *** | −0.163 *** | −0.162 *** | 0.005 | −0.081 *** | −0.053 ** |
(0.016) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.017) | (0.022) | (0.024) | |
Obs. | 2491 | 2491 | 2491 | 900 | 899 | 899 |
0.033 | 0.042 | 0.043 | 0.020 | 0.029 | 0.013 | |
F-statistic | 8.334 | 11.257 | 10.875 | 1.696 | 2.720 | 1.125 |
Event Window | EP | NEP | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | |
Political connection | −0.004 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.008 *** | 0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
SOE | −0.004 | 0.011 * | 0.009 | −0.002 | −0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.005) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Regional development | 0.002 | 0.003 * | 0.004 * | −0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
Total assets | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.004 *** | 0.005 *** |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | −0.010 | 0.018 | −0.011 | 0.009 *** | 0.014 *** | 0.012 *** |
(0.013) | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.004 | 0.000 | 0.003 | −0.015 *** | −0.016 *** | −0.034 *** |
(0.012) | (0.016) | (0.019) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.018 | 0.069 ** | 0.042 | 0.009 | 0.018 ** | 0.008 |
(0.024) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |
CEO duality | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.003 ** | 0.005 *** | 0.006 ** |
(0.006) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Manage ownership | −0.034 * | −0.027 | −0.020 | −0.005 | −0.005 | −0.001 |
(0.018) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
Board size | 0.000 | 0.001 | −0.001 | 0.001 *** | 0.002 *** | 0.001 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | −0.005 | 0.023 | −0.017 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.003 |
(0.051) | (0.052) | (0.061) | (0.013) | (0.016) | (0.019) | |
Leverage | −0.006 | −0.003 | −0.033 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.003 |
(0.016) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Constant | −0.057 | −0.135 ** | −0.118 | −0.024 ** | −0.132 *** | −0.120 *** |
(0.048) | (0.066) | (0.081) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.017) | |
Obs. | 265 | 265 | 265 | 3126 | 3125 | 3125 |
0.068 | 0.123 | 0.093 | 0.024 | 0.034 | 0.036 | |
F-statistic | 2.127 | 3.882 | 2.367 | 6.531 | 11.016 | 10.357 |
Event Window | DC | NDC | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | |
Political connection | −0.003 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.006 *** | 0.000 | 0.000 | −0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
SOE | −0.006 | 0.001 | −0.003 | −0.002 | 0.000 | 0.002 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Regional development | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | −0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
Total assets | −0.001 | 0.003 | 0.007 ** | 0.000 | 0.004 *** | 0.005 *** |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | −0.004 | 0.018 | −0.001 | 0.010 *** | 0.014 *** | 0.013 *** |
(0.010) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.003 | −0.010 | −0.020 | −0.015 *** | −0.016 *** | −0.034 *** |
(0.010) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.020 | 0.033 | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.020 *** | 0.012 |
(0.016) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |
CEO duality | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.003 ** | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** |
(0.005) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Manage ownership | −0.035 *** | −0.037 ** | −0.021 | −0.004 | −0.004 | 0.000 |
(0.014) | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
Board size | −0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 *** | 0.002 *** | 0.001 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | −0.017 | 0.013 | −0.009 | 0.010 | 0.011 | 0.003 |
(0.039) | (0.045) | (0.056) | (0.013) | (0.017) | (0.019) | |
Leverage | 0.005 | 0.007 | −0.014 | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.005 |
(0.012) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
Constant | 0.006 | −0.108 ** | −0.170 *** | −0.029 ** | −0.136 *** | −0.116 *** |
(0.040) | (0.051) | (0.065) | (0.012) | (0.015) | (0.018) | |
Obs. | 426 | 426 | 426 | 2965 | 2964 | 2964 |
0.047 | 0.069 | 0.053 | 0.025 | 0.035 | 0.037 | |
F-statistic | 1.797 | 3.469 | 2.125 | 6.506 | 10.749 | 10.142 |
Panel A: Excluding Firms Publishing Q3 Financial Report | |||
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 * | −0.001 ** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
Obs. | 3389 | 3388 | 3388 |
F-statistic | 5.919 | 10.985 | 8.657 |
Panel B: Excluding Firms Involved in M&A | |||
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 | −0.001 ** |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Obs. | 3087 | 3086 | 3086 |
F-statistic | 5.274 | 10.532 | 7.883 |
Panel C: Excluding Firms Offering Dividends | |||
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
Political connection | −0.001 * | −0.001 * | −0.002 *** |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Obs. | 2402 | 2402 | 2402 |
F-statistic | 4.923 | 12.116 | 9.555 |
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
---|---|---|---|
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 | −0.001 ** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
EP | −0.002 | −0.000 | 0.003 |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |
Obs. | 3391 | 3390 | 3390 |
F-statistic | 5.552 | 10.168 | 8.163 |
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
---|---|---|---|
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 | −0.001 ** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
DC | −0.002 | 0.001 | 0.006 *** |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Obs. | 3391 | 3390 | 3390 |
F-statistic | 5.571 | 10.159 | 8.704 |
Event Window | CAR[−10, 0) | CAR[−5, 0) | CAR[−1, 0) |
---|---|---|---|
Political connection | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | |
Regional development | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | |
Obs. | 3399 | 3399 | 3399 |
F-statistic | 1.543 | 1.667 | 5.112 |
Variable | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max | Median |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
AR[−1] | −0.000 | 0.008 | −0.011 | 0.112 | 0.000 |
AR[−2] | 0.000 | 0.009 | −0.011 | 0.111 | 0.000 |
AR[−3] | 0.000 | 0.010 | −0.011 | 0.334 | 0.000 |
AR[−4] | −0.000 | 0.010 | −0.011 | 0.116 | −0.001 |
AR[−5] | −0.000 | 0.008 | −0.011 | 0.111 | 0.000 |
AR[−6] | 0.000 | 0.010 | −0.011 | 0.141 | 0.000 |
AR[−7] | 0.000 | 0.010 | −0.011 | 0.302 | 0.000 |
AR[−8] | −0.000 | 0.009 | −0.011 | 0.080 | 0.000 |
AR[−9] | −0.000 | 0.009 | −0.012 | 0.135 | −0.001 |
AR[−10] | −0.000 | 0.008 | −0.011 | 0.084 | −0.000 |
1 | Available from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world/, accessed on 6 August 2024. |
2 | Source: https://www.iea.org/reports/co2-emissions-in-2023/the-changing-landscape-of-global-emissions, accessed on 6 August 2024. |
3 | Available from https://rmi.org.cn/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/202104270934095267.pdf, page 15, accessed on 6 August 2024. |
4 | Available from: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/, accessed on 6 August 2024. |
5 | This can be exemplified by the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan’s Decarbonization Working Plan of the State Council. See Section 2 of https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-11/04/content_5128619.htm, accessed on 6 August 2024. |
6 | We do not include the listed firms in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan because of institutional differences. |
7 | Available from: https://data.csmar.com/, accessed on 6 August 2024 and https://choice.eastmoney.com/, accessed on 6 August 2024. |
8 | Classification available from the Choice database. |
9 | We do not report in the regression output tables because is not used as a measure of fit for robust regressions (Rousseeuw & Leroy, 2005). |
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Variable | Definition | Description | Source |
---|---|---|---|
SOE | =1 if the firm is state-owned, =0 otherwise | CSMAR | |
Regional development | NERI Regional Development Index of a firm’s headquarter host province | G. Fan et al. (2011) and https://cmi.ssap.com.cn/, accessed on 6 August 2024 | |
Total assets | Natural log of total assets (in CNY) | CSMAR | |
ROE | Return on Equity | CSMAR | |
Book-to-Market value | Book value divided by market value | CSMAR | |
Herfindahl Index | The sum of the squares of the shares held by the top five shareholders | CSMAR | |
CEO duality | =1 if the chairman and CEO positions are held by the same individual, =0 otherwise | CSMAR | |
Manage ownership | =1 if the chairman and general manager are compatible, =0 otherwise | CSMAR | |
Board size | Number of board members | CSMAR | |
Independent director | Number of independent directors divided by total number of directors | CSMAR | |
Leverage | Total liabilities divided by total assets | CSMAR |
Variable | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max | Median |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
AR1 | 0.003 | 0.023 | −0.104 | 0.196 | −0.000 |
AR2 | −0.011 | 0.022 | −0.154 | 0.154 | −0.011 |
AR3 | −0.003 | 0.023 | −0.203 | 0.203 | −0.002 |
AR4 | −0.006 | 0.025 | −0.192 | 0.206 | −0.006 |
AR5 | 0.004 | 0.025 | −0.208 | 0.198 | 0.002 |
AR6 | −0.000 | 0.021 | −0.102 | 0.201 | −0.002 |
CAR[0, 2] | −0.013 | 0.036 | −0.112 | 0.115 | −0.015 |
CAR[0, 4] | −0.022 | 0.046 | −0.165 | 0.123 | −0.022 |
CAR[0, 6] | −0.018 | 0.053 | −0.184 | 0.148 | −0.018 |
Political connection | 0.769 | 1.410 | 0.000 | 4.000 | 0.000 |
SOE | 0.265 | 0.441 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 |
Regional development | 9.392 | 1.851 | −1.420 | 11.400 | 10.000 |
Total assets | 22.378 | 1.473 | 18.299 | 30.973 | 22.137 |
ROE | 0.047 | 0.228 | −3.835 | 2.378 | 0.071 |
Book-to-Market value | 0.624 | 0.279 | 0.036 | 1.582 | 0.609 |
Herfindahl Index | 0.145 | 0.110 | 0.001 | 0.696 | 0.113 |
CEO duality | 0.317 | 0.465 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 |
Manage ownership | 0.145 | 0.192 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 |
Board size | 8.389 | 1.713 | 4.000 | 18.000 | 9.000 |
Independent director | 0.378 | 0.055 | 0.166 | 0.800 | 0.363 |
Leverage | 0.423 | 0.208 | 0.006 | 1.411 | 0.410 |
Variable | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
---|---|---|---|
Political connection | −0.009 | −0.008 | −0.021 |
SOE | −0.034 | 0.044 | 0.000 |
Regional development | 0.004 | 0.032 | 0.038 |
Total assets | −0.031 | 0.112 | 0.044 |
ROE | 0.076 | 0.099 | 0.089 |
Book-to-Market value | −0.002 | −0.003 | 0.082 |
Herfindahl Index | 0.022 | 0.073 | 0.030 |
CEO duality | 0.055 | 0.012 | 0.022 |
Manage ownership | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Board size | −0.053 | −0.042 | 0.091 |
Independent director | −0.006 | −0.010 | −0.018 |
Leverage | −0.044 | 0.031 | −0.019 |
Panel A: Private Firm vs. SOE | ||||
Event window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | N |
Private | −0.013 | −0.024 | −0.018 | 2500 |
SOE | −0.015 | −0.019 | −0.018 | 903 |
Panel B: Environmental Protection (EP) vs. Non-Environmental Protection (NEP) Firm | ||||
Event window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | N |
EP | −0.017 | −0.024 | −0.020 | 267 |
NEP | −0.013 | −0.022 | −0.018 | 3136 |
Panel C: Decarbonization (DC) vs. Non-Decarbonization (NDC) Firm | ||||
Event window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | N |
DC | −0.015 | −0.021 | −0.015 | 430 |
NDC | −0.013 | −0.022 | −0.018 | 2973 |
Event Window | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] |
---|---|---|---|
Political connection | −0.000 | −0.001 * | −0.001 ** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
SOE | −0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Regional development | 0.000 * | 0.000 | 0.001 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Total assets | 0.000 | 0.004 *** | 0.004 *** |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | 0.010 *** | 0.015 *** | 0.012 *** |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.010 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.026 *** |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.003 | 0.016 ** | 0.005 |
(0.005) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
CEO duality | 0.002 * | 0.004 ** | 0.003 * |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Manage ownership | −0.007 ** | −0.007 * | −0.004 |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Board size | 0.001 * | 0.001 | −0.000 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | 0.018 | 0.011 | −0.004 |
(0.011) | (0.015) | (0.017) | |
Leverage | 0.002 | −0.000 | −0.001 |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Constant | −0.035 *** | −0.125 *** | −0.103 *** |
(0.011) | (0.015) | (0.017) | |
Obs. | 3391 | 3390 | 3390 |
F-statistic | 5.951 | 11.016 | 8.777 |
Event Window | Private Firm | SOE | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | |
Political connection | −0.001 | −0.001 * | −0.002 ** | 0.000 | 0.001 | −0.001 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Regional development | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 ** | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Total assets | 0.001 | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** | −0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 * |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | 0.011 *** | 0.015 *** | 0.011 ** | 0.005 | 0.009 * | 0.008 |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.013 *** | −0.021 *** | −0.035 *** | −0.003 | 0.006 | −0.009 * |
(0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.013 ** | 0.025 *** | 0.015 | −0.006 | 0.008 | −0.007 |
(0.007) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.010) | |
CEO duality | 0.002 * | 0.003 * | 0.004 * | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.002 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
Manage ownership | −0.007 ** | −0.006 | −0.002 | 0.023 | −0.005 | −0.028 |
(0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.024) | (0.031) | (0.033) | |
Board size | 0.001 ** | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | −0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.000 | 0.025 | −0.010 | −0.011 |
(0.015) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.016) | (0.021) | (0.023) | |
Leverage | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.003 | 0.010 ** | 0.006 | 0.002 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
Constant | −0.051 *** | −0.166 *** | −0.146 *** | −0.016 | −0.062 *** | −0.051 ** |
(0.016) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.020) | |
Obs. | 2491 | 2491 | 2491 | 900 | 899 | 899 |
F-statistic | 6.494 | 10.570 | 9.856 | 1.713 | 2.791 | 0.962 |
Event Window | EP | NEP | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | |
Political connection | −0.003 *** | −0.004 ** | −0.006 *** | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.001 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
SOE | −0.000 | 0.009 | 0.010 | −0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
(0.005) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Regional development | 0.003 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.000 | −0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Total assets | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.004 *** | 0.005 *** |
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | −0.004 | 0.029 * | 0.009 | 0.011 *** | 0.014 *** | 0.012 *** |
(0.013) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Book-to-Market value | −0.001 | −0.012 | −0.016 | −0.011 *** | −0.013 *** | −0.027 *** |
(0.011) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.011 | 0.049 * | 0.019 | 0.003 | 0.014 ** | 0.005 |
(0.021) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |
CEO duality | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.007 | 0.002 * | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** |
(0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Manage ownership | −0.022 * | −0.019 | −0.010 | −0.006 * | −0.006 | −0.003 |
(0.013) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Board size | −0.001 | 0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 * | 0.001 | −0.000 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | −0.001 | 0.035 | 0.014 | 0.020 * | 0.011 | −0.003 |
(0.041) | (0.052) | (0.054) | (0.011) | (0.016) | (0.018) | |
Leverage | 0.001 | −0.000 | −0.013 | 0.001 | −0.000 | −0.001 |
(0.013) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Constant | −0.067 | −0.164 ** | −0.095 | −0.032 *** | −0.124 *** | −0.106 *** |
(0.055) | (0.069) | (0.072) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.017) | |
Obs. | 265 | 265 | 265 | 3126 | 3125 | 3125 |
F-statistic | 1.747 | 3.256 | 2.385 | 5.895 | 9.511 | 8.437 |
Event Window | DC | NDC | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | CAR[0, 2] | CAR[0, 4] | CAR[0, 6] | |
Political connection | −0.003 *** | −0.003 ** | −0.005 *** | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.001 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
SOE | −0.003 | 0.004 | 0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Regional development | 0.002 * | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.000 | −0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Total assets | −0.001 | 0.002 | 0.005 ** | 0.000 | 0.004 *** | 0.004 *** |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
ROE | 0.003 | 0.025 ** | 0.004 | 0.011 *** | 0.014 *** | 0.012 *** |
(0.009) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Book-to-Market value | 0.003 | −0.009 | −0.027 ** | −0.011 *** | −0.013 *** | −0.027 *** |
(0.008) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |
Herfindahl Index | 0.009 | 0.005 | −0.023 | 0.003 | 0.017 ** | 0.009 |
(0.015) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |
CEO duality | 0.000 | −0.002 | −0.003 | 0.002 * | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
Manage ownership | −0.020 ** | −0.022 | −0.009 | −0.006 * | −0.005 | −0.002 |
(0.010) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Board size | −0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 * | 0.001 | −0.000 |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Independent director | 0.004 | 0.042 | 0.022 | 0.020 * | 0.010 | −0.003 |
(0.032) | (0.042) | (0.048) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.018) | |
Leverage | 0.009 | 0.013 | 0.001 | 0.001 | −0.002 | −0.002 |
(0.009) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |
Constant | −0.017 | −0.120 ** | −0.140 ** | −0.036 *** | −0.126 *** | −0.104 *** |
(0.036) | (0.047) | (0.054) | (0.011) | (0.016) | (0.018) | |
Obs. | 426 | 426 | 426 | 2965 | 2964 | 2964 |
F-statistic | 1.496 | 2.777 | 2.011 | 5.782 | 9.276 | 8.281 |
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Liu, Y.; Cao, Y.; Huang, J. Decarbonization Commitment, Political Connections, and Firm Value: Evidence from China. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2025, 18, 486. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18090486
Liu Y, Cao Y, Huang J. Decarbonization Commitment, Political Connections, and Firm Value: Evidence from China. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2025; 18(9):486. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18090486
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiu, Yun, Yuchang Cao, and Jingyao Huang. 2025. "Decarbonization Commitment, Political Connections, and Firm Value: Evidence from China" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 18, no. 9: 486. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18090486
APA StyleLiu, Y., Cao, Y., & Huang, J. (2025). Decarbonization Commitment, Political Connections, and Firm Value: Evidence from China. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 18(9), 486. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18090486