The Role of Gender Equality at the Country Level on the Relationship Between Women’s Board Representation and Sustainability Assurance Adoption
Department of Business Administration, Jubail Industrial College, Al-Jubayl 35718, Saudi Arabia
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2025, 18(2), 87; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020087
Submission received: 19 December 2024
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Revised: 24 January 2025
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Accepted: 30 January 2025
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Published: 5 February 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Accounting Ethics and Financial Management)
Abstract
:Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of gender equality in the relationship between the critical mass of women’s representation on boards and companies’ decisions to adopt external assurance on their sustainability reports. Design and methodology: The relationship is investigated using secondary data from an international sample of 1924 firms across 41 countries sourced from the Eikon database, ensuring comprehensive coverage of firms that publish sustainability reports. The study uses a logistic regression model to study two aspects: first, the relationship between the critical mass of women’s representation on boards and companies’ decisions to provide external assurance on their sustainability reports, and second, the moderating role of countries’ gender equality policies using the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law (WBL) index. Findings: The findings of this study indicate that in the case of sustainability assurance adoption, the critical mass of women’s representation on boards is important in countries where the gender equality index is low. Therefore, this study extends the findings of prior studies investigating the critical mass of women’s representation on boards by proving that critical mass is more effective in countries that have a lower gender equality index. Originality: The two main contributions of this study are the findings that (i) the association of women’s representation on boards with companies’ decisions to provide assurance over their sustainability reports is affected by critical mass, and (ii) the critical mass of women’s representation on boards is essential in countries that have a lower gender equality index.
JEL Classification:
G34; M14; Q561. Introduction
The role of board gender diversity in influencing company performance has been widely studied, with a particular focus on financial (Carter et al., 2010; Martinez-Jimenez et al., 2020) and sustainability performance (Ben-Amar et al., 2017; Cosma et al., 2024; Kamarudin et al., 2022; Webb, 2004). Research has emphasized the critical mass of women on boards, suggesting that women’s representation only becomes effective when it reaches a certain threshold (Buertey, 2021; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024). This study aims to explore the relationship between board gender diversity and companies’ decisions to provide external assurance on sustainability reports, considering the moderating role of institutional factors, specifically gender equality policies in different countries.
The motivation for this study arises from the growing importance of sustainability reporting, with many companies facing increasing pressure to adopt transparent and reliable practices. Despite the emphasis on sustainability, concerns regarding greenwashing persist, where companies may overstate their sustainability performance (Khan et al., 2021). This raises the question of how to ensure the reliability of sustainability reports. Research suggests that external assurance can enhance the credibility of these reports (Dobija et al., 2022; Zhou et al., 2020), yet little is known about what drives companies to adopt external assurance voluntarily (K. F. Alsahali & Malagueño, 2022). This study proposes that the critical mass of women on boards can serve as a driving force for companies to make these decisions.
The theoretical background builds on research suggesting that women’s representation on boards is crucial for sustainability performance (Kizys et al., 2023). Women tend to be more ethical (Francoeur et al., 2008; Rodriguez-Dominguez et al., 2009) and risk-averse (Levin et al., 1988; Sila et al., 2016), which may lead them to advocate for more reliable sustainability reporting practices. Previous studies indicate that board gender diversity influences corporate governance, improving companies’ disclosure practices and reducing financial misreporting risks (Gupta et al., 2020). Despite these insights, the evidence on the direct relationship between board gender diversity and sustainability performance remains inconsistent (Byron & Post, 2016; Rao & Tilt, 2016). Some studies suggest a positive correlation (Post et al., 2011; Skaggs et al., 2012), while others find negative or insignificant results (Rao et al., 2012). Additionally, cross-country studies on the impact of women’s board representation are scarce (Nguyen et al., 2020), with Ciappei et al. (2023) urging further research to resolve contradictory findings in the literature. This study addresses this gap by examining the impact of the critical mass of women’s representation and the moderating role of countries’ gender equality policies on companies’ adoption of sustainability assurance.
The research objective is to investigate how board gender diversity, as influenced by institutional gender equality policies, affects companies’ decisions to adopt external assurance for sustainability reports. Using an institutional perspective, this study first tests the association between women’s board representation and assurance decisions. Results indicate a significant positive association when women’s representation reaches a threshold of 30%. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the impact of women’s representation varies by the level of gender equality in a country. In countries with lower gender equality, a critical mass of women on boards is necessary for a significant effect, while in more gender-equal countries, women’s representation begins to influence decisions even before reaching the critical mass.
This study contributes to the ongoing debate in the literature on the impact of women’s representation on sustainability practices. It highlights the significant role of national gender equality laws in shaping the influence of women board members on corporate sustainability decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on sustainability reporting assurance and women’s board representation, along with hypothesis development. Section 3 outlines the methodology and sample. Section 4 and Section 5 present the empirical results, discussion, and conclusion.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between board gender diversity and companies’ performance (e.g., Brahma et al., 2021; Carter et al., 2010; Cosma et al., 2024; Kizys et al., 2023; Simionescu et al., 2021; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024); however, research on board gender diversity and companies’ sustainability reporting reliability is still emerging. Galletta et al. (2022) found a positive association between women board directors and social performance in banking industries. Kyaw et al. (2017) also found that board gender diversity improves companies’ sustainability performance. However, other studies found either no significant relationship between board gender diversity and companies’ sustainability performance (Manita et al., 2018), or a negative relationship between board gender diversity and companies’ sustainability performance (Cucari et al., 2018). The contradictory findings might be due to the single-country focus which forms the sample for these studies. For example, Cucari et al. (2018) examined a US sample whereas Kyaw et al. (2017) examined a broader European sample. Therefore, this study considers a broader international sample to examine the effect of an institutional factor (i.e., gender equality index) on the relationship between board gender diversity and companies’ decision to externally assure their sustainability report.
Studies investigating companies’ decisions to externally assure their sustainability reports find that firm-level factors, corporate governance factors, and institutional factors influence companies’ decisions to provide external assurance (e.g., Alomran & Alsahali, 2023; K. Alsahali et al., 2023; Maroun & Prinsloo, 2020; Simnett et al., 2009). Furthermore, studies found that companies’ board characteristics including women’s board representation are also driving companies to pursue external assurance (e.g., K. Alsahali et al., 2023; Liao et al., 2018; Zaman et al., 2021). Buertey (2021) examined the association between board gender diversity and companies’ decisions to adopt assurance using a sample of the top 100 companies from South Africa and found that the inclusion of women on the board is positively and significantly associated with such decisions. As suggested by Buertey (2021), these findings cannot be extended to different countries, and therefore, this study uses an international sample to investigate such phenomena. This study is also taking a different angle by investigating a different institutional factor and by focusing on how this institutional factor influences the relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ decisions to engage in sustainability assurance.
Building on prior literature and in line with critical mass theory, this study argues that women’s representation on boards is affecting companies’ decisions to engage in sustainability assurance, but only if they reach a critical mass of 30%. The critical mass theory suggests that the presence of a factor will only have an impact if a certain threshold is reached (Kanter, 1977; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024). Studies investigating board gender diversity have used the critical mass theory to suggest that, in order for women’s representation on boards to have an impact on companies’ decisions, women need to hold a certain proportion of board seats (Buertey, 2021; Manita et al., 2018; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024). The argument is that one woman appointed on the board is perceived as a “token” and in such a case, the impact on board decisions is limited (Dobija et al., 2022; Torchia et al., 2011). Studies suggest that having a greater proportion of women’s representation on boards will not be perceived as tokenism and will have an impact on companies’ decisions (Kanter, 1977; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024). Studies applied the critical mass theory to examine the role of women board members and suggest that for women to influence companies’ decisions, they need to represent 30% of the board (Joecks et al., 2013; Khatri, 2023). This study therefore expects that a positive and significant association between women’s representation on boards and companies’ assurance decisions will appear when the number of women on the board reaches the critical mass of 30%. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is identified as follows:
Hypothesis 1.
There is a positive relationship between women’s representation on boards and companies’ adoption of external assurance for sustainability reports, but this relationship becomes significant only when women’s representation reaches a critical mass of 30%.
The legitimacy of women directors has been perceived as questionable in some contexts (Post & Byron, 2015; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024). Different institutional contexts, including gender equality, have an effect on the relationship between board gender diversity and companies’ performance (Byron & Post, 2016; Post & Byron, 2015; Zaccone & Argiolas, 2024). Women in countries that have greater gender equality are more likely to have structural advantages and the expertise required to grant them influence in the boardroom (Wright et al., 1995) and, therefore, are more likely to influence companies’ decisions to adopt mechanisms to enhance sustainability reporting reliability (i.e., external assurance). In such countries, women’s board representation does not need to reach the critical mass threshold to have an impact on companies’ decision making. However, in countries with less gender equality, women are expected to have less empowerment and therefore might need to have a greater level of representation on the board in order to influence companies’ decisions. The question at hand is whether it is always necessary to have women reach a critical mass on the board to influence companies’ decisions, or if the need for a critical mass of women’s representation is more pronounced in countries where gender equality is lacking. This study argues that the level of gender equality at the country level will positively moderate the relationship between women’s representation on boards and companies’ assurance adoption decisions. The argument is that the critical mass of women’s board representation is more positively related to companies’ external assurance adoption in countries with lower gender equality. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is identified as follows:
Hypothesis 2.
The relationship between women’s board representation and the adoption of sustainability report assurance is positively moderated by the level of gender equality in the country.
3. Methodology and Sample
Logistic regression is used to study the effect of women’s representation on boards (critical mass) on companies’ decisions to engage in sustainability assurance. This approach is in line with prior studies that used a logistic regression model to examine factors that drive companies’ decisions to engage in sustainability assurance (K. Alsahali et al., 2023; Simnett et al., 2009), when considering the moderating role of the country level factor. This study uses the same model with an interaction effect between the variable critical mass and the Women, Business and the Law (WBL) index (World Bank, 2023). WBL is a panel dataset for countries that report a score for gender equality. The index consists of eight indicators measuring and analyzing laws and implementation of the law and measures experts’ opinions on the outcome of the law for women. The index considers the laws and regulations that can influence women’s economic opportunities. WBL is extracted from the world bank for the period 2010 to 2020, and the dataset includes WBL scores for all countries in the study sample. The study sample was composed of 1924 firms from 41 countries that issued a sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020 extracted from the Eikon database.
The critical mass of women on company boards is determined based on previous studies applying critical mass theory. This theory posits that women must constitute at least 30% of board members to exert meaningful influence on board decisions (Joecks et al., 2013; Khatri, 2023). Accordingly, this study classifies board representation into distinct categories: when 30% or more of the board members are women, it is considered critical mass, while lower percentages fall outside this threshold. This classification informs the study’s analysis and hypothesis that achieving critical mass is essential for women’s representation to significantly influence companies’ decisions to adopt external assurance for sustainability reports.
The dependent variable in the model is assurance, which is equal to 1 if the companies provide external assurance over their sustainability report and zero otherwise. The independent variable of interest in the model is the critical mass of women on the board. Crit_womenonboard represents the companies’ women’s board representation if it is equal to or more than 30%. Low_womenonboard represents companies’ women’s board representation if it is less than 20%. High_womenonboard represents companies’ women’s board representation if it is equal to or more than 40%. Other board variables are controlled for in the model along with firm-level control variables and institutional investors. The model also uses country and industry fixed effects.
4. Data Analysis and Discussion
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistics of the study sample, which demonstrate that 50% of the companies are providing external assurance. In total, 15% of the companies in the sample have reached a critical mass of women’s board representation (i.e., above 30% representation), and 59% of the companies have a low level of representation (i.e., below 20% representation).
Table 2 presents the correlation between variables. It demonstrates that there is a positive and significant association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions. When the variable is split into low-womenonboard and Crit-womenonboard, results show that there is a negative and significant correlation between low-womenonboard and companies’ assurance decisions but a positive and significant association between Crit-womenonboard and companies’ assurance decisions. Further, there is a positive and significant correlation between WBL and women’s board representation. This provides initial evidence which supports the study hypothesis.
Table 3 represents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women on the board and companies’ assurance decisions. Column (1) shows that representation of women on the board is positively and significantly associated with companies’ assurance decisions. This result is in line with previous findings (K. Alsahali et al., 2023). In Column (2), we can see that the positive relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions is positive and significant only if the critical mass of women’s representation is reached. Such a finding extends previous research outcomes (K. Alsahali et al., 2023; Liao et al., 2018), and shows that women need to reach a critical mass on the board to have an impact on companies’ assurance decisions, which is also in line with the critical mass theory.
There is a positive and significant association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions if women represent 30% or more of the board. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 1, as women affect companies’ performance if they represent more than 30% of board positions. The results identify the important role of women at the board level in terms of companies’ decisions to assure their sustainability reports. Further, the results suggest that the role of women on the board is only effective when their representation reaches the critical mass of 30% which is in line with critical mass theory. Women are known for their high level of ethical behavior (Francoeur et al., 2008) and, therefore, it is expected that they play an essential role in companies’ sustainability activities including ensuring the reliability of such reports, which can be reached through external assurance.
This study’s findings align with the research conducted by Dobija et al. (2022), which examines the relationship between board gender diversity and financial reporting quality. Dobija et al. (2022) found that increased representation of women on boards improves financial reporting quality through enhanced oversight. Similarly, this study demonstrates that women’s representation is crucial for sustainability assurance adoption, particularly in countries with lower gender equality. The study highlights the importance of institutional context and alternative mechanisms that enable women to drive improvements in governance outcomes. By extending this line of research to sustainability practices, this study further emphasizes the role of board gender diversity in driving organizational performance, even in challenging institutional environments.
Table 4 presents the results of logistic regressions examining the interaction between women’s board representation and WBL on companies’ assurance decisions. In Column (1), the presence of women on the board is positively and significantly associated with companies’ assurance decisions after controlling for WBL. Also, WBL is positively and significantly associated with companies’ assurance decisions. In Column (2), we can see the interaction between low women’s board representation and a low WBL score. The interaction shows no significant association with companies’ assurance decisions. In Column (3), the interaction between a critical mass of women on the board and a low WBL score results in a significant and positive association with companies’ assurance decisions. These results suggest that in countries with low gender equality, the critical mass of women’s board representation is important if women are to have an impact on companies’ decisions.
There is a positive and significant association between the critical mass of women’s board representation and a low WBL index. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2 that the relationship between women’s board representation and sustainability report assurance is positively moderated by countries with greater gender equality. The results suggest that the critical mass of women’s board representation is more important in countries that have lower gender equality. In countries with higher gender equality, the presence of women on the board has an impact even if critical mass is not reached.
Table 5 presents the results with a subsample based on low versus high WBL. In Columns (1) and (2), the results represent the subsample of low WBL. In Column (1), women’s board representation is positively and marginally significantly associated with companies’ assurance decisions, and in Column (2), positively and highly significantly associated if there is a critical mass of women’s representation. In Columns (3) and (4), the results represent the subsample of high WBL. In Column (3), the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions is positive and highly significant even without reaching the critical mass representation. Therefore, the results support the argument that it is more important to achieve critical mass for the representation of women on boards in countries that have a low WBL. To ensure the robustness of the results, Table 6 and Table 7 provide a mean analysis incorporating the lag of women’s representation on boards (t − 1) as a robustness check. The findings in these tables align with the main results.
The findings of this study align with Zaccone and Argiolas (2024), who emphasize the importance of institutional context in shaping the influence of a critical mass of women on corporate boards. Zaccone and Argiolas demonstrate that in institutional contexts with significant progress toward gender equality, the presence of a critical mass of women on boards has a diminished effect on firm performance. Similarly, this study highlights that the critical mass of women on boards is crucial for sustainability assurance adoption, particularly in countries with low gender equality indices. By extending the focus to sustainability practices, this research reinforces the notion that the impact of women on boards is most pronounced in less gender-equal contexts.
This study advances the literature by demonstrating that critical mass’s efficacy depends on national gender policies. While prior research emphasizes internal board dynamics, this study highlights the contextual role of gender equality, offering more insights into board diversity’s impact on assurance decisions.
This study recommends that policymakers promote gender diversity on corporate boards, aiming for at least 30% female representation to enhance decision-making and the reliability of sustainability reports, especially in countries with low gender equality. Additionally, policymakers should consider mandating assurance for sustainability reports, as it is crucial for ensuring their reliability.
5. Conclusions
Women’s board representation has captured the attention of many different stakeholders including policymakers, companies, and academic scholars. This paper investigates the role of women board members in enhancing companies’ sustainability report reliability through external assurance. The study examines the role of women on boards in line with the critical mass theory, which suggests that women need to represent at least 30% of the board to affect decision making. The study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it finds that women play a significant role on boards to enhance the reliability of sustainability reports, and second, it identifies when their impact is more powerful. The results are in line with the critical mass theory. Women’s board representation is positively and significantly associated with companies’ assurance decisions only when they reach a critical mass of 30%. More importantly, the need for representation to reach the critical mass is more important in countries where the gender equality index is low. This study’s reliance on publicly available data and secondary sources may limit the depth of understanding regarding internal governance and gender dynamics within individual companies. One notable data limitation is the unavailability of information on the level and scope of assurance, which are crucial to fully understanding the influence of women’s board representation on assurance practices. Interviews with board representatives could have provided additional insights into how gender diversity influences decision making, including the adoption of assurance practices. Future research should therefore explore these dynamics further, including analyzing the level and scope of assurance, to provide a more comprehensive view of the influence of women on board on companies’ assurance decisions.
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
Restrictions apply to the availability of these data. Data were obtained from [Eikon]. WBL data is openly available in [World Bank’s] at [https://wbl.worldbank.org/en/wbl-data] (accessed on 18 December 2024).
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics: summary statistics for companies’ assurance decisions and women’s board representation. In addition, the table provides summary statistics for control variables used in the model. The sample contains 1924 firms that issued a sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020.
Table 1.
Descriptive statistics: summary statistics for companies’ assurance decisions and women’s board representation. In addition, the table provides summary statistics for control variables used in the model. The sample contains 1924 firms that issued a sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020.
| N | Mean | Median | SD | P25 | P75 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assurance | 13,467 | 0.509 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Low_womenonboard | 13,467 | 0.593 | 0.491 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| High_womenonboard | 13,467 | 0.046 | 0.209 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Crit_womenonboard | 13,467 | 0.157 | 0.364 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| WBL | 13,467 | 87.312 | 10.188 | 83.750 | 86.875 | 96.875 |
| CEO Separation | 13,467 | 0.652 | 0.476 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Board Size | 13,467 | 11.158 | 3.534 | 9.000 | 11.000 | 13.000 |
| Board Meetings | 13,467 | 9.607 | 5.751 | 6.000 | 8.000 | 12.000 |
| Independents on Board | 13,467 | 0.592 | 0.249 | 0.400 | 0.600 | 0.813 |
| Sustainability Committee | 13,467 | 0.822 | 0.382 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Audit Committee Compensation | 13,467 | 0.788 | 0.409 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Audit Committee Independents | 13,467 | 0.860 | 0.234 | 0.750 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Institutional Ownership | 13,467 | 0.459 | 0.287 | 0.214 | 0.411 | 0.704 |
| ROA | 13,467 | 0.045 | 0.086 | 0.012 | 0.039 | 0.075 |
| Sales | 13,467 | 15.475 | 1.565 | 14.467 | 15.493 | 16.527 |
| Leverage | 13,467 | 0.199 | 0.157 | 0.079 | 0.181 | 0.288 |
Table 2.
Correlation matrix for the variables in the study, showing the relationships between women’s board representation, assurance decisions, and control variables. The sample contains 1924 firms that issued a sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020.
Table 2.
Correlation matrix for the variables in the study, showing the relationships between women’s board representation, assurance decisions, and control variables. The sample contains 1924 firms that issued a sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Assurance | 1.000 | ||||||
| (2) Womenonboard | 0.050 *** | 1.000 | |||||
| (3) low_womenonboard | −0.064 *** | −0.813 *** | 1.000 | ||||
| (4) Crit_womenonboard | 0.086 *** | 0.670 *** | −0.523 *** | 1.000 | |||
| (5) WBL | 0.088 *** | 0.289 *** | −0.230 *** | 0.193 *** | 1.000 | ||
| (6) ceo_sepration | 0.030 *** | 0.006 | −0.019 *** | 0.022 *** | 0.072 *** | 1.000 | |
| (7) boardsize | 0.168 *** | 0.111 *** | −0.044 *** | 0.035 *** | −0.048 *** | −0.053 *** | |
| (8) boardmeeting | 0.092 *** | −0.039 *** | 0.022 *** | 0.010 * | −0.002 | 0.082 *** | |
| (9) womenonboard | 0.050 *** | 1.000 *** | −0.813 *** | 0.670 *** | 0.289 *** | 0.006 | |
| (10) indboard | −0.085 *** | 0.306 *** | −0.236 *** | 0.110 *** | 0.209 *** | −0.134 *** | |
| (11) csrcommittee | 0.243 *** | 0.134 *** | −0.116 *** | 0.087 *** | 0.113 *** | 0.048 *** | |
| (12) audit_com_exp | −0.088 *** | 0.262 *** | −0.175 *** | 0.064 *** | 0.164 *** | −0.085 *** | |
| (13) audit_com_ind | −0.057 *** | 0.097 *** | −0.068 *** | −0.001 | 0.057 *** | −0.101 *** | |
| (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | |
| (7) boardsize | 1.000 | ||||||
| (8) boardmeeting | −0.017 *** | 1.000 | |||||
| (9) womenonboard | 0.111 *** | −0.039 *** | 1.000 | ||||
| (10) indboard | −0.158 *** | −0.120 *** | 0.306 *** | 1.000 | |||
| (11) csrcommittee | 0.229 *** | 0.057 *** | 0.134 *** | −0.023 *** | 1.000 | ||
| (12) audit_com_exp | 0.020 *** | −0.175 *** | 0.262 *** | 0.491 *** | −0.020 *** | 1.000 | |
| (13) audit_com_ind | −0.124 *** | −0.102 *** | 0.097 *** | 0.604 *** | −0.039 *** | 0.298 *** | 1.000 |
*** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1.
Table 3.
Women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions. The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Table 3.
Women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions. The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| Womenonboard | 1.342 *** | |
| [0.228] | ||
| Low_womenonboard | −0.197 *** | |
| [0.052] | ||
| Crit_womenonboard | 0.271 *** | |
| [0.067] | ||
| CEO Separation | 0.196 *** | 0.195 *** |
| [0.051] | [0.051] | |
| Board Size | 0.063 *** | 0.066 *** |
| [0.008] | [0.008] | |
| Board Meetings | 0.018 *** | 0.018 *** |
| [0.005] | [0.005] | |
| Independents on Board | 0.446 *** | 0.459 *** |
| [0.153] | [0.152] | |
| Sustainability Committee | 1.191 *** | 1.200 *** |
| [0.061] | [0.061] | |
| Audit Committee Compensation | 0.131 ** | 0.139 ** |
| [0.063] | [0.063] | |
| Audit Committee Independents | 0.084 | 0.081 |
| [0.135] | [0.134] | |
| Institutional Ownership | −0.204 * | −0.192 |
| [0.123] | [0.123] | |
| ROA | 1.359 *** | 1.356 *** |
| [0.287] | [0.286] | |
| Sales | 0.374 *** | 0.374 *** |
| [0.019] | [0.018] | |
| Leverage | 0.532 *** | 0.540 *** |
| [0.149] | [0.148] | |
| Constant | −9.480 *** | −9.221 *** |
| [0.320] | [0.326] | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.22 | 0.22 |
| Log likelihood | −7309.34 | −7302.67 |
| Chi2 | 2705.9 | 2741.33 |
| p | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| N | 13,467 | 13,467 |
Table 4.
The role of WBL on the relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions. The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the interaction between women’s board representation and WBL on companies’ assurance decisions. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.
The role of WBL on the relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions. The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the interaction between women’s board representation and WBL on companies’ assurance decisions. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Womenonboard | 1.336 *** | ||
| [0.228] | |||
| Low_womenonboard | −0.185 *** | −0.191 *** | |
| [0.056] | [0.052] | ||
| Crit_womenonboard | 0.274 *** | 0.225 *** | |
| [0.067] | [0.069] | ||
| Low_WBL | 0.213 | 0.257 | 0.147 |
| [0.166] | [0.178] | [0.168] | |
| Low_womenonboardXlow_WBL | −0.069 | ||
| [0.129] | |||
| Crit_womenonboardXlow_WBL | 0.589 *** | ||
| [0.227] | |||
| Constant | −9.479 *** | −9.235 *** | −9.249 *** |
| [0.320] | [0.327] | [0.326] | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 |
| Log likelihood | −7308.57 | −7301.71 | −7298.53 |
| Chi2 | 2707.09 | 2741.13 | 2739.5 |
| p | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| N | 13,467 | 13,467 | 13,467 |
Table 5.
The relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions. The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions on a subsample by WBL. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Table 5.
The relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions. The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions on a subsample by WBL. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
| (1) Low | (2) Low | (3) High | (4) High | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Womenonboard | 0.931 * | 1.314 *** | ||
| [0.511] | [0.259] | |||
| Crit_womenonboard | 0.836 *** | 0.213 *** | ||
| [0.234] | [0.071] | |||
| Low_womenonboard | −0.169 | −0.171 *** | ||
| [0.127] | [0.058] | |||
| CEO Separation | 0.196 ** | 0.206 ** | 0.212 *** | 0.209 *** |
| [0.096] | [0.096] | [0.061] | [0.061] | |
| Board Size | 0.040 *** | 0.044 *** | 0.071 *** | 0.075 *** |
| [0.014] | [0.014] | [0.010] | [0.010] | |
| Board Meetings | 0.011 | 0.01 | 0.023 *** | 0.023 *** |
| [0.007] | [0.007] | [0.007] | [0.007] | |
| Independents on Board | 0.423 | 0.465 | 0.442 ** | 0.458 ** |
| [0.302] | [0.302] | [0.186] | [0.185] | |
| Sustainability Committee | 0.859 *** | 0.874 *** | 1.346 *** | 1.354 *** |
| [0.112] | [0.113] | [0.074] | [0.074] | |
| Audit Committee Compensation | −0.056 | −0.059 | 0.203 *** | 0.208 *** |
| [0.114] | [0.114] | [0.076] | [0.076] | |
| Audit Committee independents | −0.027 | −0.062 | 0.117 | 0.125 |
| [0.232] | [0.231] | [0.167] | [0.167] | |
| Institutional Ownership | 0.322 | 0.279 | −0.330 ** | −0.318 ** |
| [0.264] | [0.263] | [0.141] | [0.141] | |
| ROA | 2.155 *** | 2.265 *** | 1.119 *** | 1.126 *** |
| [0.645] | [0.638] | [0.309] | [0.309] | |
| Sales | 0.428 *** | 0.437 *** | 0.354 *** | 0.355 *** |
| [0.038] | [0.039] | [0.021] | [0.021] | |
| Leverage | 0.444 | 0.521 * | 0.541 *** | 0.545 *** |
| [0.310] | [0.310] | [0.169] | [0.169] | |
| Constant | −8.745 *** | −8.725 *** | −9.585 *** | −9.368 *** |
| [0.658] | [0.672] | [0.365] | [0.373] | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.24 |
| Log likelihood | −1814.16 | −1805.93 | −5466.11 | −5465.1 |
| Chi2 | 539.75 | 549.98 | 2182.81 | 2201.3 |
| p | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| N | 3127 | 3128 | 10,340 | 10,340 |
Table 6.
Women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions (using lag variables). The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions using lag variables. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
Table 6.
Women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions (using lag variables). The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the association between women’s board representation and companies’ assurance decisions using lag variables. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| L.Womenonboard | 0.985 *** | |
| [0.249] | ||
| L.Low_womenonboard | −0.159 *** | |
| [0.056] | ||
| L.Crit_womenonboard | 0.180 ** | |
| [0.077] | ||
| L.CEO Separation | 0.226 *** | 0.225 *** |
| [0.055] | [0.055] | |
| L.Board Size | 0.071 *** | 0.074 *** |
| [0.009] | [0.009] | |
| L.Board Meetings | 0.020 *** | 0.020 *** |
| [0.006] | [0.006] | |
| L.Independents on Board | 0.401 ** | 0.419 ** |
| [0.165] | [0.165] | |
| L.Sustainability Committee | 1.181 *** | 1.185 *** |
| [0.067] | [0.067] | |
| L.Audit Committee Compensation | 0.231 *** | 0.233 *** |
| [0.069] | [0.069] | |
| L.Audit Committee Independents | 0.106 | 0.109 |
| [0.146] | [0.146] | |
| L.Institutional Ownership | −0.189 | −0.18 |
| [0.133] | [0.133] | |
| L. | 1.380 *** | 1.375 *** |
| [0.308] | [0.308] | |
| L.Sales | 0.372 *** | 0.371 *** |
| [0.020] | [0.020] | |
| L.Leverage | 0.551 *** | 0.554 *** |
| [0.164] | [0.163] | |
| Constant | −9.315 *** | −9.121 *** |
| [0.342] | [0.349] | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| Log likelihood | −6290.11 | −6289.66 |
| Chi2 | 2248.27 | 2274.26 |
| p | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| N | 11,528 | 11,528 |
Table 7.
The role of WBL on the relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions (using lag variables). The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the interaction between women’s board representation and WBL on companies’ assurance decisions using lag variables. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
Table 7.
The role of WBL on the relationship between women’s board representation and companies’ external assurance decisions (using lag variables). The table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the interaction between women’s board representation and WBL on companies’ assurance decisions using lag variables. The analysis is performed on a sample of 1924 firms that issued an assured sustainability report during the period from 2010 to 2020. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| L.Womenonboard | 0.977 *** | ||
| [0.249] | |||
| L.Low_womenonboard | −0.163 *** | −0.153 *** | |
| [0.060] | [0.056] | ||
| L.Crit_womenonboard | 0.180 ** | 0.118 | |
| [0.077] | [0.080] | ||
| L.Low_WBL | 0.260 | 0.264 | 0.194 |
| [0.190] | [0.202] | [0.192] | |
| L.Low_womenonboardX L.low_WBL | 0.032 | ||
| [0.139] | |||
| L.Crit_womenonboardX L.low_WBL | 0.759 *** | ||
| [0.258] | |||
| Constant | −9.313 *** | −9.115 *** | −9.150 *** |
| [0.342] | [0.350] | [0.349] | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| Log likelihood | −6289.25 | −6288.63 | −6284.41 |
| Chi2 | 2250.42 | 2278.87 | 2272.74 |
| p | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| N | 11,528 | 11,531 | 11,531 |
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MDPI and ACS Style
Alsahali, K.F. The Role of Gender Equality at the Country Level on the Relationship Between Women’s Board Representation and Sustainability Assurance Adoption. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2025, 18, 87. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020087
AMA Style
Alsahali KF. The Role of Gender Equality at the Country Level on the Relationship Between Women’s Board Representation and Sustainability Assurance Adoption. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2025; 18(2):87. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020087
Chicago/Turabian StyleAlsahali, Kholod F. 2025. "The Role of Gender Equality at the Country Level on the Relationship Between Women’s Board Representation and Sustainability Assurance Adoption" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 18, no. 2: 87. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020087
APA StyleAlsahali, K. F. (2025). The Role of Gender Equality at the Country Level on the Relationship Between Women’s Board Representation and Sustainability Assurance Adoption. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 18(2), 87. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020087
