2.1. Deterrence Theory and Regulatory Behavior
The essence of regulation is that a prohibited behavior does not occur. However, compliance with the rules is never taken for granted. Why are individuals reluctant to follow the rules? Becker described choice behavior in a general sense from the perspective of utility maximization and illustrates this process through three propositions: (1) eco-nomic agents seek to maximize utility, which can be either an economic factor in the market or a non-monetary factor, such as dignity or prestige; (2) the basic preference types of individuals are relatively stable and do not undergo large dynamic fluctuations in the short term; and (3) the utility maximization motive is based on market choice, where the market adjusts the behavior of the participants to facilitate the realization of preferences through the allocation of resources [
9,
19]. In short, utility maximization, preference stability, and market equilibrium combine to shape individual behavioral choices. After specifying this idea from generalized choice behavior to regulatory or legal compliance behavior, Becker found that, when the expected benefits gained from performing a behavior prohibited by a rule exceed the benefits gained from devoting time and resources to engaging in other behaviors, rational individuals will perform that behavior regardless of whether they have the same risk preferences. Therefore, efficient public policy should raise the actor’s cost of performing a rule. Efficient public policy should therefore raise the cost to the actor performing a behavior prohibited by a rule in order to reduce the benefit gained by performing that behavior [
10,
20].
How, then, can one improve the effectiveness of regulation? The effectiveness of regulation depends primarily on two behavioral relationships: the cost of punishment and the elasticity of the offender’s response to arrest and conviction. For the same violation, differences in efficiency often stem from the elasticity of the response. Conversely, differences in efficiency are determined by the cost of arrest and conviction for different types of violation [
10]. In terms of strategy choice, three strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulatory policies. The first is to reduce the cost of arrest and conviction: applying fingerprint technology, chemical detection, and other types of technology can reduce the cost of apprehension and increase the likelihood that the perpetrator will be punished. The second strategy is to increase the elasticity of the offender’s response to punishment: punishment methods such as imprisonment have a greater deterrent effect than monetary fines. The third strategy is timeliness: the time between the occurrence of an offense and its detection is also a factor that affects the effectiveness of regulation. The earlier the behavior is detected, the higher the likelihood is that the offense will be punished. In theory, all three strategies can reduce the benefits obtained from violations of regulatory requirements. In practice, increasing the likelihood and severity of the behavior being punished is the primary strategy. Thus, the deterrent effect of punishment reduces the expected benefits of the individuals committing such acts, and the effectiveness of regulatory policies depends on the certainty and severity of the regulation, the former being the likelihood of arrest and conviction, and the latter being the severity of the punishment following conviction.
On the one hand, improving regulatory certainty can achieve good regulatory effects. In general, there are two ways to increase the probability that a violation of a regulatory requirement will be punished. One is to increase the number of law enforcement officers. An increase in the number of police officers in an area can reduce the crime rate [
21], and the number of environmental enforcers can also reduce the amount of emissions from businesses [
15]. The other way is to change the scope of deployment and the means through which enforcers perform their duties without increasing the number of enforcers, which can also significantly improve the effectiveness of regulation [
22]. For example, more advanced monitoring equipment and technology can help to obtain more effective information about an enterprise’s emissions; thus, the distance to the monitoring station in the field becomes a key factor influencing an enterprise’s emissions behavior [
15,
23]. Of course, the policy effect of improving the environment cannot be achieved if there is no deterministic deterrent effect on the discharge behavior of enterprises. In China, national monitoring stations are often set up in heavily polluted industrial areas. Large- and medium-sized enterprises that are strictly regulated do not pollute secretly at night because they face strict environmental monitoring, while small enterprises are more likely to engage in frenzied clandestine emissions under the cover of night [
23]. In addition, the fundamental reason for the failure of the environmental subsidy program implemented by the Chinese government to motivate companies to participate in environmental management is the inadequacy of the existing environmental enforcement force [
17]. Accordingly, this paper proposes Hypothesis 1:
H1: Certainty enhances the policy effectiveness of environmental regulation.
On the other hand, increasing the severity of regulation is also an effective way to achieve the effect of environmental regulation. Many development practices show that strict environmental law enforcement is key to the improvement of environmental quality. Strict environmental law enforcement can act as a significant deterrent of the discharge behavior of enterprises, and after experiencing strict environmental penalties, both the illegal discharge behavior of enterprises and the number of illegal discharge enterprises show a decreasing trend [
24,
25]. For example, in the fight against air pollution, strict environmental regulatory policies and political incentives have contributed to the achievement of the policy goal of a 10% reduction in sulfur dioxide during the period of the Eleventh Five-year Plan [
11]. Adopting extraordinarily stringent environmental regulatory measures is the main way of dealing with the water pollution crisis, and such strict regulatory measures can mobilize concentrated resources and attention in the short term to achieve control results [
13]. What is more, strict environmental enforcement produces transitional compliance with the rules. Studies have shown that, when environmental agencies impose fines, companies with emissions that are already below the legally allowed standards reduce them further. In contrast, companies that are not in compliance cut their emissions to meet the penalties well beyond the legal standards; thus, the policy effects of severity are far greater than expected [
26]. Accordingly, this paper proposes Hypothesis 2:
H2: Severity can improve the policy effectiveness of environmental regulation.
Theoretically, certainty and severity form the policy toolset for inducing compliance with respect to corporate behavior, and environmental regulation thus includes basic administrative inspections and penalties for polluting behavior. Regarding the relationship between the parties, certainty is a prerequisite for severity. Further discussion of the degree of punishment becomes possible only if the perpetrator of the crime is caught for his illegal act [
27]. Thus, the effectiveness of environmental regulations depends on the extent to which they are enforced, and the decoupling of environmental regulation from enforcement can weaken the influence of regulation on corporate environmental behavior [
28]. For example, the new ambient air quality standards, originally introduced to improve air quality, did not have the desired effect in provinces where enforcement was weak [
29]. Moreover, rather than being a hierarchical system of rules that are uniformly implemented and enforced, environmental enforcement is a coordination mechanism that interacts regularly with market pressures, local governments, environmentalists, and corporate management culture [
30], with different interactive processes capable of producing different policy effects. In this sense, therefore, the severity of the penalty determines the policy effect of the entire environmental regulation process. In general, certainty can have a deterrent effect provided that the regulatory system can effectively identify violations and impose penalties: the higher the degree of severity, the more credible the promise of certainty. If a company’s violations are not strictly punished, the probability that the violations will be punished is insignificant. Therefore, under a complete environmental regulation system, severity is a mediating variable of certainty. The higher the degree of environmental regulation certainty is, the higher the severity of the punishment and the stronger the binding force on enterprises’ emission behavior will be. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 3:
H3: Firms with higher deterministic pressure to regulate are subject to higher severity punishment.
2.2. Regulatory Space Theory and Regulatory Effects
The deterrent effect of punishment relies on the accountability of the regulatory process, but the fragmented distribution of resources can also result in regulatory capture, which, in turn, weakens the accountability of environmental regulation. Regulatory space theory suggests that effective regulation requires the possession of financial, human, information, and other organizational resources, but that these resources are fragmented and distributed between the regulator and the regulated. The regulator is unable to achieve monopoly possession of resources, as the regulated enterprises have a greater advantage in terms of information resources and can therefore gain greater bargaining power. This informal power has a significant impact on the entire regulatory process [
31]. Logically, when a firm’s violation is identified by a regulator, the firm can either accept the penalty by paying a fine, or it can evade environmental regulation by paying a fee to collude with the regulator. In China, environmental enforcement is neither adequate nor effective in the local sector. On the one hand, due to factors such as environmental values, the perceived organizational capacity for enforcement, and the level of government support for environmental protection, local officials have a biased understanding of the effectiveness of enforcement, resulting in little success in environmental enforcement by local environmental departments [
32]. On the other hand, the network of relationships emphasized in Chinese cultural values increases the flexibility of environmental enforcement, and the bargaining power of firms affects the performance of environmental enforcement authorities in collecting sewage charges, with state-owned firms having more political connections and higher bargaining power than private firms [
33]. Thus, in a multilayered bureaucracy, firms have political connections that can regulate the enormous impact of their behavior. The ability of firms to influence the regulatory behavior of local governments through contacts, bribes, or favors and the ability of localities to use their discretionary power to protect these politically connected firms [
34], which results in bureaucratic or regulatory capture, suggest that environmental regulation by local governments does not rely on their own formal authority, but rather on the decisions made by the firms that are supposed to be regulated [
35,
36]. Thus, the effectiveness of environmental regulations depends on the specific ways in which they are implemented in practice, and the political connections that companies have are a key factor in the enforcement of regulations. In terms of regulatory strategy, the effectiveness of central environmental inspectors lies in their ability to break the influence of corporate political connections on local environmental regulation, which, in turn, can strengthen the effectiveness of local environmental regulation [
37,
38].
In fact, in the transition period in China, companies are often keen to reduce the impacts of mandatory regulations by acquiring political connections, often through tax and employment contributions, so as to gain the popularity or approval of local officials and, thus, the opportunity to become deputies to the National People’s Congress or members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at various levels. Once such political connections have been obtained, companies are able to use them (the political connections do not represent a status) to influence the policy-making process of local governments or to avoid penalties in the policy implementation process. Political connections can moderate the deterrent effect in two ways. On the one hand, political connections can moderate the deterministic policy effect, as firms with more political connections are less likely to be subject to environmental fines and will be fined less. On the other, political connections can also influence the effect of harsh policies, as firms with political connections are more reluctant to change their emission behavior, even when faced with the same amount of fines as other firms without political connections. Thus, firms with political connections can influence the effects of regulation, and this influence can be achieved by moderating the effects of deterministic and severe policies. Accordingly, we propose Hypotheses 4 and 5:
H4: Political relations have a weakening effect on the punitive effect of regulatory certainty.
H5: Political relations have a weakening effect on the pollution control effect of regulatory severity.