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Article

Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

1
Department of Economics, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Findelgasse 7, 90402 Nürnberg, Germany
2
RWI—Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17(15), 5540; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540
Received: 6 May 2020 / Revised: 29 June 2020 / Accepted: 29 June 2020 / Published: 31 July 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Incentive and Market Perspectives in Health Care)
Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party which represents the health insurance that finances medical service provision under a prospective payment scheme. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical care. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as in medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly and are more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing. View Full-Text
Keywords: health economic experiment; framing; physician behavior; prospective payment schemes health economic experiment; framing; physician behavior; prospective payment schemes
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MDPI and ACS Style

Reif, S.; Hafner, L.; Seebauer, M. Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540

AMA Style

Reif S, Hafner L, Seebauer M. Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17(15):5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540

Chicago/Turabian Style

Reif, Simon; Hafner, Lucas; Seebauer, Michael. 2020. "Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments" Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 17, no. 15: 5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540

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