2. Literature Review
3. The Theoretical Model
4. Four Regions of Environmental Investment
4.1. Region A
4.2. Region B
4.3. Region C
4.4. Region D
4.5. Boundaries of the Four Regions
5. An Optimal Pollution Control Model
5.1. The Optimal Equilibrium
5.2. Discusion and Insights
Conflicts of Interest
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