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Open AccessArticle

The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

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School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China
2
School of Information Science and Engineering, University of Jinan, Jinan 250022, China
3
Joseph M.Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16(18), 3351; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16183351
Received: 13 August 2019 / Revised: 31 August 2019 / Accepted: 2 September 2019 / Published: 11 September 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental and Health Efficiency Evaluation)
Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction. View Full-Text
Keywords: environmental governance; public participation; government supervision; multi-player evolutionary game; participation mechanism environmental governance; public participation; government supervision; multi-player evolutionary game; participation mechanism
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Chen, Y.; Zhang, J.; Tadikamalla, P.R.; Gao, X. The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 3351.

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