Effectiveness of Chemical- and Hazardous-Waste-Based MEAs in Sustaining Life and Land: Analysis of Implementing Legislations and Practice in Ethiopia

Abstract

The general purpose of regulating chemical and hazardous waste in international legal frameworks is to protect against life-threatening and adverse impacts on the environment during its generation and use at the domestic level and global transfer. Implementing these global regimes can be effective at the national level when the top leadership makes environmental protection a priority agenda in its policy and legislation, shifting from a traditional economic development attitude to harmonizing environmental, human rights, and economic growth needs. To this end, the joint plans and actions of institutions, which should be augmented by public involvement and judicial activism, play crucial roles. Mining companies should also be part of this cooperative framework, changing their enclave attitude and exclusionary approach. This paper analyzes the implementation of chemical- and hazardous-waste-based global regimes in Ethiopia by adopting a comparative method as a lesson from other jurisdictions. It argues that realizing multilateral agreements remains in the dock due to legal and practical gaps. The applicable domestic laws are flawed, exhibiting inconsistency, fragmentation, and inadequacy. Additionally, the state’s conduct does not balance its or investors’ economic interests with those of indigenous people, including their health, livelihood, and the environment. Thus, it recommends legal rectification and practical compliance with international law to realize the sustainable viability of human health and environmental media.

1. Introduction

It is well known that extractive businesses and commercial farming on land taken from collective communities negatively impact the latter’s health and the environment. Mining activities require the use of sustainable land and natural resources, among other investments in the land. Although mining activities are praised for countries’ economies and upgrading their wealth status, they end in ecological and topographical changes in land resources, bringing about flora and fauna extinction due to the loss of vegetation and unfavorable climate [1]. Prudent leadership in resource-rich developing countries uses mining as an engine to eliminate poverty at a national level and improve the local community’s livelihood [1]. However, unsustainable land use and the unsafe governance of such activities exacerbate the impoverishment of vulnerable groups such as children, women, aged people, and ethnic and indigenous people [1]. Mining-induced displacements followed by insufficient compensation and improper resettlements also endanger indigenous people’s livelihoods [1]. For example, it brings about land-use change and affects productivity, disturbing the ecosystem and the health of the community [2]. Therefore, comprehensive legal and practical measures are needed to prevent, mitigate, and remedy land-grabbing threats. In this regard, many argue that protection against mine-caused danger to land, other natural resources, and human health should be the first duty of any industrial operation actors and the State at all levels [2].

This article focuses on the pollution impacts on the land that was taken and utilized for investment by the MIDROC Laga-Dambi gold mine [3]. It analyzes the integration of MEAs in the domestic implementation of laws and their effectiveness in adequately safeguarding the health and the environment so that our contribution can help readers to understand the role of law in paralleling economic growth policy with human rights and environmental protection. Accordingly, it first overviews chemical and hazardous waste (CHW) pollution and its impacts on indigenous people and the ecological media using the same case, which was selected based on complaints from the general public and the assessment results of the on-site biophysical conditions as a sample. As MIDROC is the largest mining company in Ethiopia, assessing its impacts could be representative of similar pollution cases [4,5]. Section 3 discusses the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that govern CHW and national participation in these agreements. Section 4 critically evaluates the national implementation of the MEAs by adopting a comparative approach with India and China, focusing on the implementation of the environmentally sound management (ESM) of CHW. China reversed its negative soil, air, and water pollution records through its environmental campaigns, especially the war on pollution, and is leading the implementation of MEAs [6,7]. India has also developed comprehensive CHW legislation and the realization of IEL through judicial activism. Thus, the current stance of these two countries in protecting human health and the environment by recourse to international environmental law (IEL) provides a helpful lesson [8]. This section also addresses the governance of CHW laws and the challenges of implementing CHW-based MEAs in Ethiopia to understand whether it has taken the necessary measures to meet its international obligations. Section 5 summarizes the paper, with concluding remarks.

2. The Impacts of CHW Pollution on the Environment and Human Health: The MIDROC Gold Mine Case

Minerals play a pivotal role in helping low-income countries to eradicate poverty and ensure economic growth by creating job opportunities and generating foreign currency and technology transfer [9]. However, in Ethiopia, the contribution of minerals in the economy is far from significant, totaling no more than 14% of the country’s export and 1% of the GDP with less than 4000 employment chances [9]. Agriculture takes the lead, followed by industry, trade, and mining, sequentially. The Guji-zone of Oromia, Ethiopia, was one of the highest producers of coffee and cattle for the domestic and international market, upon which the livelihood of indigenous people depended [10]. However, its indigenous people became the victims of mining-induced threats rather than being beneficiaries of the contribution of the extractive industry. They suffered exclusion, animal and human health problems from the effluents, the loss of their land’s productivity, and dispossession, among other issues that led them to rebel against the mining industry [5]. However, irrespective of their economic status, international environmental law and human rights laws oblige states to at least balance their national economic interests with two other interests: the people’s economic benefits on the one hand and the protection of the environment and human health on the other [11]. As the theme of this paper is limited to the latter, this section discusses the CHW governance trends of the MIDROC gold mine, which operates both in open pits and underground pits.

Companies that invest in land acquired for extractive industries and commercial agriculture usually use chemicals to increase the quality and volume of their product. Some others, such as gold mine companies, also extract heavy metals, such as cyanide, arsenic, and mercury, which are toxic to human and animal health, and pollute the environment [12,13]. Scientifically known harms of these poisonous metals extend to the degree of lethality to life; for example, arsenic and lead injure pregnancies, diminish brain development, and damage organs [14]. Mercury exposure also distorts physical growth, sight, hearing, and memory, including poisonous results on the “nervous, digestive, and immune systems” [14]. MIDROC gold’s initial concession agreement on the land grabbed from the public includes duties to prevent the emission and discharge of these substances, mitigation of the initial EIA findings, and disposal of 100 kg vat of mercury storage it received from the government [5,15].

However, frequent environmental audits of the site and gold-ore storages showed improper identification, use, storage, and release (emission) of these metals to ecological media [15,16]. The assessments found extreme amounts of mercury, arsenic, and cyanide discharged into the environment from the mining dams and plants, affecting the community’s soil, water, farms, and grazing fields, amounts of which are beyond the WHO standards [15]. For instance, “discharge from the third dam to the environment showed a concentration of arsenic (As) of 98.0 g/L—a level nearly ten times as high as the World Health Organization’s 10.0 g/L standard for arsenic; mercury levels in the tailings pond were found to be more than 800 times the allowable amount, whereas samples of streambank sediment along the Lega Dembi River downstream from the mine contained more than 250 times the WHO standard for water; and analysis of soil samples revealed concentrations of mercury of about 145 times the level permitted under international standards [15]. Additionally, dumping laboratory chemicals and batteries and directly discharging diesel-contaminated water from a wash area via a pipe into the rivers are part of the defects [17]. The company also confirmed using cyanide to separate gold from ore [14]. The release affected mainly five rivers (Laga-Dambi, Chemiti, Mormora, and Wollena) used for public domestic consumption, in addition to latchet infiltration into the groundwater, which formed contaminated streams and joined these rivers [15,17]. Moreover, emissions from mercury distillation and the gold assay laboratory, dust from the haul roads, drilling and blasting, waste rock dumps, and tailings deposits exacerbated air contamination [17].

As the dams and tailing ponds were unfenced, they were accessible to humans, livestock, and wildlife [15]. Accordingly, residents near the mine area enter and fetch water from the dams, streams, and rivers for drinking, washing, cooking, bathing, and other daily needs, as they have carried out for centuries. They also continued grazing their herds and watering their farms there as before [3,15]. They were lately impacted by toxins from these sources and the three tailing dam facilities but continued using them, thinking that the water was pure as before [3]. Concerning air pollution, mining activity itself and the use of some chemicals disrupt the atmosphere and breathable air. In their petition to CEDAW, DUBAF, Girda, and CIHR argue:

“Explosions, which are used to break the rock to extract the ore, create huge amounts of dust carried on the wind into the surrounding communities. The large machines used for crushing the rock into small particles also generate large amounts of dust. During the dry season, portions of the tailings ponds dry up, leaving behind the toxic residue. This toxic residue and the heavy-metal-laden dust from the open pits are blown about by the wind, polluting the air people breathe and poisoning crops and plants. Finally, both the water and the air contaminate the soil in which people grow their crops.”

[14]

As a result, the EIA and SIA report indicated that using contaminated water, consuming foods grown from infected soil, and breezing polluted air affected life on earth [3]. Among the human severe health ailments affecting children and adults, the following have been noted: Many newborn infants die or are born with abnormal physical conditions such as misshaped limbs, loss of ability to move, and loss of memory; predominantly children aged 1–15 suffer from deformities, congenital malformations, and musculoskeletal disorders; both adults and children have infertility, tumors, headaches, and vision problems. Many children and young girls could not go to school [3,18,19]. Livestock and wildlife alike have suffered from sickness, deformity, miscarriage, and death [14]. Sounds from dynamite explosions and a shortage of dense forest forced the biodiversity, including elephants, lions, and many other endemic animals, to die or leave the area [3,5]. Therefore, similar to land grabbing for commercial agriculture and state projects, land grabbing for mining and the resulting operations have negatively impacted human, animal, and wildlife health, including deteriorating biodiversity and the ecosystem.

As discussed in another document, these pollution issues and communal land dispossession, which increased the goldmine area at the expense of the indigenous people’s interests, worsened the grievances of the indigenous people against the state and the MIDROC [11]. In 1997, MIDROC received the government-operated Laga-Dambi goldmine concession for 20 years [5]. In 2009, the government additionally gave the ‘Sakaro’ underground gold mining site of 9.78 km² to the project by grabbing indigenous people’s communal land and making the mining site’s total area grow to 485 km² in 2003 from 15.8 hectares (ha) in 1988 [3]. This land grabbing created grievances by affecting spiritual areas, culture, heritage, livelihood, health, and the biophysical ecosystem of the people [5]. According to a regional leader, irrespective of public demand to rectify such wrongs in their 2009, 2014, and 2017 protests, the government persisted in renewing MIDROC gold’s mining license until early May 2018 to satisfy its revenue needs and political motive to encourage developmental investors, thus justifying unheard public voice [5].

The following section analyses CHW-oriented international legal frameworks and ESM of CHW.

3. CHW-Oriented Multilateral Environmental Agreements: ESM in Focus

3.1. An Overview

As sustainable use of CHWs has become critical to saving our world from recurring environmental pollution, To this end, International Environmental Law (IEL) instruments regulate different chemicals and hazardous wastes such as arsenic, cyanide, mercury, lead, etc., and their compounds. The MEAs discussed in this section include the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel 1989) [20]; the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam 1998) [21]; the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm 2001) [22]; the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into and the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa (Bamako Convention 1991] [23]; and the Minamata 2013] [16] and related instruments.

These MEAs share similar features, which stem from their primary objective of “protecting the environment and human health” from risks of CHW pollution and giving binding effects to the commitments of states in the previous non-legally binding instruments such as the Rio Declaration through cooperation and individually at the national level [24]. First, they provide that the extent of environmental protection starts from the production point of the CHWs, including transportation and disposal stages [25]. Second, despite their variation in scope and issues they address, the MEAs are mutually supportive of “providing legal solutions to the CHW risks [16,20,22,23]. For example, without prejudice to the specificity of each convention, all of them provide for minimizing generation, disposal, and obligation to reduce CHW movements [16,20,22]. Additionally, they converge in stressing ESM schemes to attain their primary goals [26]. In addition to defining CHWs, ESM is a critical regulation. It involves handling, collecting, transporting, storing, disposing, and releasing or emitting [26]. These treaties also target marine and land-based sources and destinations of waste.

Third, they prioritize domestic governance, which must be supported by organized information exchanges [20,27]. In this regard, they give due attention to the local communities of developing countries due to their physical exposure to the pollutant wastes coming from overseas or domestically generated and easily contaminating their media and vegetation [22].

Fourth, these MEAs also provide similar procedural principles to effectively implement the agreements and meet the intended objectives at domestic, bilateral, and multilateral levels [6]. The fundamentals comprise IEL and sustainable development principles, among other things, Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), participation and accountability, information on the ways of implementation, technical assistance, and financial issues [28]. For example, although the Rotterdam convention specifically requires FPIC for the use of dangerous listed chemicals, the rest similarly provide consent [16,20,21,22]. Additionally, the MEAs require parties to submit annual reports on their performance and notify the secretariat whether they ban, exempt, or export/import CHWs in their bilateral communications [20,22]. Despite procedural convergence, they also overlap in addressing pollutants such as mercury [16,20,21]. These similarities indicate duplications of efforts that should have been avoided through one overarching framework convention.

However, these MEAs vary in the issues they cover and the principles to which the state parties should comply with their domestic pollution protection regimes. The Basel and Bamako conventions classify CHWs as wastes that must be controlled or banned [20]. However, they differ in that, although the first stresses are on three pillars: minimization of generation, ESM of wastes, and transboundary movement control, including prevention and illegal waste trafficking [20], the latter sticks to banning movements of such wastes in Africa [23]. Annex C of the Stockholm convention lists eliminable or restricted persistent organic pollutants (POPs) [22]. Similarly, the Rotterdam convention classifies CHWs under a restricted category, whereas the Minamata convention imposes limitations, including production prevention and minimum release of mercury and its compounds [16].

Although other fundamentals are implicit, most of these treaties prioritize precautionary and ‘polluter pays’ principles without distorting the smooth flow of investment [29]. Note that general principles of international law are applicable in the conventions based on the issues demanded therein. Preference for the precautionary approach over other principles relates to the severity of risks from CHWs. First, it enables one to meet the objectives of the agreements as there seems to be scientific uncertainty about the pollutants’ harm subject to these MEAs except for the Minamata Convention. The latter adopts the prevention principle, with differentiated but shared responsibilities [30,31]. The Minamata convention follows prevention as the damages resulting from mercury exposure are scientifically proven, but it also provides for sharing the cost of prevention between developed countries and developing ones [32]. Second, the precautionary principle enables actors to be cautious before materializing the risks of CHW pollution. Integrated with it, the concept of prevention enables the preservation of indigenous environmental resources [32]. This approach is correct as the world has experienced five extinctions whereas the existing trend shows towards the sixth one [33,34]. Additionally, rehabilitation is costly compared with preserving the existing ones [30]. Mainly, prevention benefits emerging economies and infantile technology in developing states as remedying environmental damage becomes cumbersome [27]. Third, the ‘polluter pays’ principle presupposes the continuance of trade and investment without creating harm to the environment.

Additionally, there are noticeable inconsistencies among these conventions on the ESM of the CHWs. For instance, the Stockholm and the Minamata conventions regulate mercury issues differently. Although the former provides for strict control of stockpiles and mercury wastes in due course of handling, collecting, transporting, and storing the pollutants in Article 6, the latter flexibly allows a state party concerning primary mercury mining to enhance its domestic developmental plans in Article 7. Although both instruments prohibit “recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct reuse,” and other hazardous exposures to CHWs, the latter does not prohibit storage unless severe measures are taken to reduce emission, release, and use of “total mercury” in artisanal and small-scale gold mining [16]. It says nothing about large-scale mining. However, the above-discussed Ethiopian practice shows that large-scale mining also exposes the environment and life to similar risks of mercury.

If a law is intended to govern behavior in this regard, it must have a binding effect on the subjects of state parties or legal persons other than states. The MEAs obligate state parties to impose criminal and civil liability that justifies domestic jurisdictions’ legal effectiveness. For instance, under the Basel Convention, illegal trafficking of hazardous wastes entails criminal liability for the absence of notification, consent of destination or transit countries, fraud (falsification) of documents, and deliberate dumping [20]. It also obligates state parties to have appropriate national laws to prevent and punish unauthorized shipments of pollutant waste and chemicals [20]. Although domestic disposal of hazardous wastes in their own seas and waters is prohibited, the Bamako convention imposes strict tort liability on generators in addition to criminalizing such acts [23].

These MEAs also face fragmentations, which is the core problem of environmental law. This problem stems from ad hoc approaches to creating MEAs that result in institutional and implementation inconsistencies, which weaken the agreements’ binding nature [35]. Carlene states that failure in “mapping out the field and developing a comprehensive strategy for addressing environmental problems in a pre-crisis, joined-up, and efficient way” puts CHWs exemplary of the IEL crisis [36]. Indeed, the defect exposed the CHW-based MEAs to similarities and differences in scope and operations discussed above.

However, until comprehensive MEAs come into the field of IEL, applying them together helps the global community solve the problem of fragmentation [35]. Although some favor the ad hoc (fragmented) implementation approach at the sovereign national level, synergy among the conventions increases administrative efficiency in cost, information exchange, and reporting issues [35]. For example, provisions in CHW treaties obligate comprehensive management of cyanides, mercury, arsenic, and many others from their inception to disposal, which Risby and Amador call “life cycle,” to change them from “cradle-to-grave” [37]. This risky character necessitates state parties to create synergy in their legal, ecological, and policy measures. Mainly, adhering to several principles in land grabbing-based projects may protect rights holders’ interests and save the environment by sharing duties with actors; for example, the polluter should allocate prevention funds and strictly apply control measures as the authorities provide [37]. Nonetheless, the current combined operational efforts model the precautionary principle by emphasizing the elimination of risks to humans and the environment rather than the elimination of existing harm [35,37].In that sense, the principles, substances, and procedural compliance are critical implementation factors.

As the principles and procedural rules have already been discussed, there is no need to repeat them here. However, the following sections analyze the effectiveness of these conventions, emphasizing the FPIC and ESM concepts, which we chose for comparative purposes in this study among tools for achieving fundamental environmental sustainability objectives at the local level.

3.2. Environmentally Sound Management of CHWs

All of the mentioned CHW pollution conventions use the term: “Environmentally Sound Management” without defining what it means, except the Basel convention. The ESM of CHWs in the context of wastes is defined as follows in Article 2 (9) of the Basel Convention, which is the oldest of the other treaties and has a broader scope and operation:

“Environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes or other wastes” means taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner that will protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes.

[20]

The ESM framework document elaborates that ESM is about adopting and realizing systems, including “policies, legislation, and regulations, monitoring and enforcement, incentives and penalties, technologies, and other tools in which all key stakeholders participate and cooperate” [38]. It also lists nine elements of consideration to establish, implement, or evaluate proper management of environmental media (e.g., prevention of pollution, emission limit values for air, water, and soil) [38]. Furthermore, the framework document provides detailed criteria for ESM to better understand its scope and contents, which include “regulatory infrastructure, facilities with environmentally sound technologies, and training for those involved in the management of wastes” [38]. Here, the Basel, Convention, representing other conventions, clarifies the ESM despite an argument against its lack of clarity. Although the Basel does not explicitly mention measures to minimize waste and ESM by a party state, information tools, cleaner production, raising of customer awareness, and advanced technologies are vital measures in Basel to reduce or avoid hazardous substances [20,27].

Concerning the substances of ESM in relation to the release of POPs, one can note the strictness of the Stockholm convention. It provides for eliminating POPs, which includes stopping production, removing some of them from storage, and allowing a very minimal amount for decisive purposes such as research, education, medicine, and electric installations [27]. Although urging for plan-based characterization and reduced release, or where feasible, to eliminate unintentional production of POPs [32], it also requires guaranteed disposal mechanisms before transporting ten intentionally made ones as provided in Article 3 (2) of the Stockholm convention [22]. The convention adopts a similar rule to the Basel convention about managing and disposing of POPS stockpiles.

The Minamata convention also complements these laws that prescribe for the reduction in or elimination of mercury emissions without prejudice to its use for a state party’s development plans [16]. Article 7 (3) and Annex C (b) bind states to eliminate ore amalgamation, amalgam-related activities, and cyanide leaching in sediments or tailings without removing mercury [16]. The convention also regulates the early design and implementation of the ESM criteria, including legislative and other strategic measures to prevent vulnerable exposure to mercury use in gold mining, considering the risky nature of exposure to it [16].

The concept of ESM is also crucial to CHWs subject to trade. In this regard, the laws advocate for FPIC requirements to lead the import/export transaction as a tool of establishing transparency so that the importer takes knowledge-based decisions concerning the import [21]. If this option fails, ESM becomes a mandatory requirement known as “a substantive backstop on waste trades” [39,40]. Thus, FPIC and ESM ensure transparency, rationality, and strict globalization of environmental harm from CHWs.

In short, the concept of ESM obliges operators to comply with the local regulations practically. It aims to harmonize the latter with the necessary technology to manage the waste cost-effectively. In so doing, it sets the hierarchy of waste management in priority order: “waste avoidance or waste minimization, then recovery, reuse, recycling, and finally disposal [41]. Hence, ESM lays down a pivotal guide to institutionalized national implementation as per the country’s relevant global, regional, and federal laws.

4. Participation in and National Implementation of CHW-Based MEAs

This section analyzes participation and implementation of CHWS-oriented MEAs in Ethiopia compared with Chinese and Indian similar laws. The recent developments in the legal regimes of the two can be taken as a precedent for the former. Until recently, China had no compiled CHW-related rules; in 2017, it revolutionized the fight against waste imports [6]. This section compares domestic ESM realization regulations in these countries using some ESM criteria provided under the framework document as indicators [38].

4.1. Participation in MEAs

Ethiopia is state party to many international legal architectures by participating in adopting or acceding/ratifying some of them. It ratified Bamako (2003 [42], Stockholm (2001) [43], Basel (2000) [44], Rotterdam (2002) [45], and is a signatory to the Minamata conventions as of 2013 [46]. In addition to policy measures, Ethiopia also enacted equivalent laws as a way forward to implement these instruments and to realize human health and environmental duties such as any state party to the conventions [47]. China is also party to CHW-based conventions, including necessary amendments and annexes of each of these MEAs [43,44,45,46], as is India. Although preventing and controlling pollution and hazardous waste to protect the “living environment and ecology” are duties of the State in China [48], the same safeguard is citizens’ individual and collective rights and is the duty of the State in Ethiopia [47]. The essential difference between the two constitutional provisions on pollution prevention is that Ethiopia’s constitution imposes pollution prevention obligations and control upon physical and juridical persons, including the state. However, in the Chinese law of the land, one cannot see others obliged in this manner unless other legislation provides for citizens’ and others’ duties [48]. Unlike the two countries’ constitutions, the Indian constitutional regime does not directly address environmental protection [49,50,51]. However, construing the provision of the “right to life” as implied in the 1948 UDHR and based on existing precedents, the Indian constitution, too, protects humans and the environment from pollution [49,50,51,52].

Ethiopia passed the Pollution Control Proclamation (EPCP, 2002) [53], the Solid Waste Management Proclamation (SWMP, 2007) [54], the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (2002) [55], the Industrial Chemicals Registration and Administration Proclamation (ICRAP, 2018) [56], and the Hazardous Waste Management and Disposal Control Proclamation (HWMDP, 2018) [57]. Additionally, sectoral laws such as the 1993 mining law (amended twice, in 2010 and 2013) [58], the 2005 rural and urban proclamations [59], the 2019 land expropriation law (revised twice) [60], the 2020 Investment Proclamations [61], Water Law in 2000 [62], Forest Law (2018 changed twice) [63], etc., form part of MEA’s implementing legislation. However, most of these laws, especially proclamations that govern natural resources subject to depletion and pollution, such as the water law, remain unrevised and lag behind in complying with the latest conventions. However, as the water law has taken a couple of decades since its promulgation, many MEAs have been issued with new scenarios, necessitating its amendment. India also promulgated implementing laws for its CHWs-oriented MEAs obligations, of which the Solid Waste Management, Plastic Waste Management, and Biomedical Waste Rules of 2016 are typical examples [64] (Rules 2016 of India, Art.3 (17)). China, on its part, issued multiple laws, including the law on Prevention and Control of Soil Contamination (PCSC in 2020) [65], Water Pollution (PCWP in 2017) [66], Solid Waste (PCEPSW in 2017) [67], and many others. However, national laws vary in complying with the MEAs, including definitions or listings, ESM, and other standard settings, discussed as follows.

4.1.1. CHWs in National Laws

The MEAs allow state parties to include poisonous or toxic substances and wastes that the conventions did not cover in their domestic lists and definitions. In other words, defining CHWs is one of the sovereign prerogatives of state parties without reducing or derogating from the treaties’ meanings. For instance, the Basel convention provides the general guiding scope of application and definition of “hazardous waste” and opts that a member state may include other deleterious wastes in its contents [20]. The Minamata and Stockholm conventions also share similar meanings, whereas the Rotterdam convention employs an additional prefix: “severe,” emphasizing the harmful effects of some chemicals [16,21]. Based on these global frameworks, the definition in the national laws of India is comprehensive and quite precise compared with others [64]. It defines hazardous wastes based on physical, chemical, biological, reactive, toxic, flammable, explosive, or corrosive characteristics that anticipate future danger alone or with others [64]. It also relates to the annexes of Basel, which India transplanted to its 2016 rules on CHWs [64].

On the contrary, the definitions of CHWs differ in various domestic laws of China and Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s legislation has loosely defined “hazardous waste” for a couple of decades. However, the 2018 hazardous waste law included a definition that complements the Basel convention in listing wastes [57]. For example, the ICRAP Article 2 (16) and EPCP Article 2 (9) define chemicals and hazardous wastes in a blurred way, leaving the terms open to interpretation [53,56]. In EPCP Article 2, hazardous waste is defined as “any unwanted material that is believed to be deleterious to human safety or health or the environment.” This definition does not include risky chemicals such as mercury and arsenic. However, their toxic and poisonous nature makes them subject to control, i.e., minimized use or eliminated to prevent potential harm. Additionally, Ethiopia’s SWMP does not include hazardous wastes and chemicals; its entire scope and definition [54].

Similarly, the diversity of CHW definitions in Chinese legislation challenges the uniform application of national commitments. To see two meanings among many, Article 88 (4) of the Chinese Solid Waste Law (CSWL) defines hazardous waste based on national criteria set for categorizing a substance into a hazard and limits the type of CHWs to solid items [67]. Additionally, in the Chinese water pollution control law, “hazardous waste” is not defined, except for water and toxic pollutants [66]. Similarly, many other environmental and related rules in China vary in scope due to differences in giving meaning to CHWs, exposing users to understanding difficulties [65,66,67,68,69]. Besides chemical-related laws, there are many pollution prevention and control laws in China, including Order 26 on Marine Environment Protection Law, Order No. 77 on pollution from noise, Order No. 8 on soil contamination, etc. [65,66,67,68,69]. However, recent amendments to Chinese pollution prevention laws may solve the problem and offer valuable lessons that require periodic reviews to demonstrate actual compliance [70]. However, China’s new solid waste law is comprehensive and includes ecological and health safeguards such as EIA and compulsory insurance for hazardous waste handling entities for the first time under Article 99 [67]. Thus, the domestic laws adopted different scopes and definitions for identified CHWs based on the MEA they acceded or ratified.

4.1.2. Implementation of ESM in Domestic Laws

This section analyzes the domestic laws of Ethiopia about CHWs’ import–export and generation management, including a ban, storage duration, transfer, priority identification, and insurance requirements, compared with Chinese and Indian laws.

Table 1. Comparison of compliance with ESM and safety rules of soil contaminating CHWs in Chinese, Ethiopian, and Indian domestic laws.

No.	Requirement	Country			Compliance with Comparison MEAs
		China	Ethiopia	India
1.	Importing CHWs in the new law	Banned lately	Allowed lately	unidentified	Chinese law complies
2.	Duration: notify previously imported or produced tons for export or import	One year	Not specified	180 days for existing and 90 days for new	India’s laws treat CHWs quickly
3.	Duration: registration per ton for export/import	Not provided in environmental law (refers to other laws	immediate	For 37 listed items of 1 tone 18 months	compliance variation
4.	Maximum storage duration	One year and less	One month for temporary storage and unknown for a permanent one	Reduced from one year to 90–180 days	Chinese law takes more time, which may be harmful
5.	Number of priority identification	Not provided	Not specified	750 items	Indian laws are more explicit than others
6.	CHWs generation Control system	Centrally developed Ledger-based register	Local government based	Administered by board	Chinese law enables uniform governance
7.	CHWs transfer control Means	Technology supported Electronic/paper-based	Paper and manual	Paper/electronic	Ethiopia’s rules need updating
8.	Liability insurance of actors	Insured	Insured for transportation and storage	Not insured	Chinese law gives protection to all
9.	Legal Liability/penalties	Compensation, incremental police force measures	Criminal and administrative, no compensation	financial	Ethiopian laws lack redressing victims

(Source: compiled from domestic laws of China, Ethiopia, and India. New law refers to Ethiopian Proclamation 1090/2018, China’s new law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, and Order No. 8/ 2018, on soil contamination; and India’s 2016 rules).

shows the comparison between the ESM of CHWs and safety rules in these countries.

Governments and other stakeholders play pivotal roles in ensuring the implementation of ESM. The states should have workable policies in their legislative and regulatory frameworks, infrastructure, and institutions at the necessary levels [38]. Additionally, other stakeholders, such as waste generators, carriers, dealers, brokers, waste managing facilities, and NGOs, should also strive to systematically and comprehensively improve the ESM of CHWs [38]. Some countries implemented import ban policies and regulations per IEL to reduce CHW pollution. China has become an exemplary state in its measures to control pollution and improve sustainable development by launching a “war on pollution” since 2014, one component of its 2013 ecological revolution [6]. Among many successful measures, it announced an import ban on twenty-four types of solid waste in July 2017 [71]. Although the international community did not praise the country for this measure, its effort brought continued pollution reduction and reversed its preceding years’ track record [68].

The Chinese war against pollution effectively controls domestic CHW generation and transfers. Aside from legislative regulation, this domestic success in waste ESM results from strict policy measures and public attitude changes. Typically, it solved production safety failures, corporate discharges, water and air pollution to minimized amounts of 40.9%, 4.4%, 45%, and 30%, respectively [68]. Institutionalizing prevention operations reduced air pollution trends by 47% by replacing coal with electricity employing cleaner production technology in industries by 2016 [68]. The lesson from self-practice enabled China to institutionalize “V-clean petroleum” use, legislative-based soil and water pollution control and monitoring, and management of heavy metal pollution by 2017 [71,72,73]. Visible waste collection, storage, transportation, utilization, and disposal serve as models for other countries. People accustomed to using recyclable waste cans as a tradition while heavily charging plastic containers have contributed to practical success since 2017 [73]. Hence, MEA effectiveness in China is built through state conduct, later owned by the public, positively impacting ecological viability.

By way of comparison, the Indian context of ESM of CHWs-based laws consists of generation, storage, transportation, and disposal stages in one legal document. The 2016 rules address observances of MEAs, but with slight practical differences [16,20,64]. Unlike China and Ethiopia’s laws, the 2016 Indian regulations on hazardous and other waste management and transboundary movement hold detailed duties and obligations of the occupier, importer, and exporter altogether [64]. However, despite their comprehensiveness, the 2016 rules also face inadequate legal requirements and practical implementations such as the Ethiopian system. For example, it does not regulate insurance requirements as critical to the actors’ victims and employees, except for the waste’s storage and transportation. In addition, plastic and other hazardous waste are still frustrating. The law’s actual implementation has not made a difference yet compared with Chinese achievements. The Indian central pollution control board’s report justifies this issue by indicating a double-fold rise in plastic consumption every ten years; it reached 17,800.000 tons in 2017 from 85,000,000 tons in 2007 and 61,000 tons in 1996, respectively [74]. This figure warns that states should conduct according to the law to realize the objectives of waste-related regulations. However, India’s judicial decisions and activism play critical roles in balancing such practical irregularities, linking the protection of life and the environment to constitutional rights. The supreme court, which is the most active globally on environmental matters, has decided numerous cases to realize human health and the environment, clarifying that these rights are embedded in the right to life [75]. For instance, in Virendra Gaur v. State of Haryana [76], MC Mehta v. Union of India [75], and many other cases, the Indian ESM of pollutants was magnified, stressing protection of the healthy environment as embedded in the right to life [75]. The court’s decisions amplified water, land, soil, and air pollution protections, including redressing of victims by the companies [75].

The lesson from the two countries shows that wise national legislation alone may not save “human health and the environment” from pollution unless actions follow it. Legislation-wise, Ethiopia has issued many laws to implement CHW-based MEAs, including legal provisions creating civil, criminal, and administrative sanctions against potential polluters, as discussed above. For instance, the contamination of water and pastureland, ecological pollution, improper handling of dangerous waste, and introducing other hazardous metals into the environment are criminal acts [53,77].

However, practical irregularities counter the CHW conventions’ objectives against these regulations. Human health suffering and environmental disruption cases from the MIDROC gold support this argument because they demonstrate uncompleted state tasks of implementing MEAs through the standards discussed above and operational actions [14]. Lack of practical steps from the stakeholders, mainly the State and waste generators, exposes victims to suffering from imported and stored mercury for decades for gold-ore separation activities and other heavy metals [15]. To that effect, the focal institution for MEAs’ implementation, EFCCC, did not issue any criterion or measure against toxins that poison the environment. Neither the MOMP nor the licensing authorities of mining operations took the business of compliance and enforcement programs seriously [15]. Thus, the country should have adopted practices such as the Chinese war against pollution and updated its laws regularly.

National laws should strictly comply with relevant principles of IEL, mainly the precautionary principle and EIA, to effectively regulate uncertain adverse impacts that result from investment in inland-induced CHWs. Ethiopian laws deviate from the import ban duty of CHWs under the Bamako convention [23]. Although it recently issued a CHW pollution protection law to implement the Basel and Bamako conventions after a couple of decades of ratifying these treaties, the recent law allows the importation and reuse of some CHWs for the unconvincing reason of “identified purposes” [57]. The law does not specify or define the purposes for which such waste must be imported and reused. Additionally, ignoring the precautionary principle, it considers cleaner production, an element of the former, as a fundamental part of the legal principle among many measures [57]. Cleaner production does not encompass all issues listed under the two global and regional agreements [23,38]. Furthermore, the law downsizes and limits the precautionary principle only to transportation and storage conditions [57]. Thus, the CHWs based on national law are inadequate and fragmented, albeit missing the tenets of the precautionary principle [31].

The principles of access to information and justice play a pivotal role in protecting the public from CHWs’ hazards in advance and remedying damage. Nonetheless, Ethiopia’s recent hazardous waste management proclamation does not refer to the duties of conducting and publicizing findings of EIA, which violates the Rotterdam convention and other provisions of MEAs on providing information to the people [16,22]. It also deviates from IEL’s environmental justice duties for victims of pollution and disruption due to such commercial operations inland. The promulgation of this law was intended to rectify gaps in the previous statutes and practical irregularities such as the MIDROC goldmine case discussed earlier [14]. However, the executive body could not remedy them, nor could NGOs take their visible issues to the courts or administrative agencies [14]. Adequate control, frequent plant visits, and analyzing the operational conditions of industries that generate CHWs are among the precautionary measures, but this activity did not receive enough attention in practice [78,79,80]. There is evidence that MIDROC uses mercury and cyanide to separate gold from ores [15]. Additionally, the research proved the existence of arsenic, mercury, and lead at the gold site with gold, including other heavy metals [15].

MEAs require a specific time to store, register, and notify CHWs as one of the information provisions to minimize complications resulting from decomposition due to longer period accumulations. The legislative frameworks also vary in omitting or including critical issues, as indicated in Table 1. In the Ethiopian hazardous waste storage context, generators should not keep them for more than a month; the law does not provide permanent storage or importers’ or exporters’ duties, unlike Chinese law (Table 1). This gap gives room for importers and transporters to take unnecessary time, further extending the damaging effects of waste. Ethiopian laws lack requirements for the duration of notification of imported or produced CHWs, whereas Indian rules give a maximum of 180 days (Table 1). This time is longer than China’s period of one year (Table 1). Moreover, as an import ban has become operational in China, there is no registration requirement for such items [8,75]. However, Ethiopian law requires immediate registration, and the Indian rule extends to 18 months for 37 articles (Table 1). Surprisingly, Ethiopian laws do not prohibit or allow storage by fixing its stay period, except for temporary storage, whereas China and India set a maximum of one year. Therefore, no one can condemn owners for damping or keeping toxins for an unknown time once they register them in the name of temporary storage so long as the length of “temporary” is undefined.

In summary, despite efforts to achieve legal effectiveness, the fragmentation of CHWs based on domestic laws and their inconsistency with MEAs in Ethiopia are fundamental problems. These legal lacunae seem to overwhelm promising efforts to address the uncertain effects of CHWs through precautionary principles in these countries. Notably, the Ethiopian laws fail to capture complete cautionary lists. China’s legal achievements in the CHW ban, practically implemented to reduce or eliminate hazardous waste and replace plastic bags and containers with recyclable items, are vital lessons to protecting the environment from pollution (Table 1). India’s consolidated CHWs management rules also enable one to avoid legal fragmentations (Table 1). Likewise, multiple national legal regimes provide severe penalties, including fines and imprisonment, which have deterrent effects on potential polluters. However, the laws miss issues requiring legal concerns. Among the gaps are issues concerning national definitions of CHWS, insufficient ESM requirements, and redressing health and economic damage caused by pollution victims [81]. Moreover, the lack of clarity in Ethiopia’s laws regarding chemical handling, storage, and movements needs legislative revision (Table 1). In short, all stakeholders should stop paltry practices of reaping economic benefits at the expense of human health and the environment to bring behavioral and ecological effectiveness to practices.

4.2. Challenges Contributing for Poor Enforcement of Global Obligations and Domestic Laws

The previous section addressed the implementation status of CHW-oriented MEAs in Ethiopia compared with the Chinese and Indian situations. It identified that the enforcement of international and regional MEAs remains in the dock due to legal and practical gaps. In addition to economic favor instead of social and environmental considerations, challenges inhibit CHWP-based MEAs and sustainable development. This section deals with challenges that hinder the implementation of CHW-oriented MEAs.

4.2.1. Policy Bias

Politically motivated legislation weakened equal implementation of CHWs based on domestic laws on all subjects. Conversely, the over-promotion of extractive industries such as MIDROC gold leads to state failures to hold the company accountable for its breach of legal obligations. On the other hand, the law exempts artisanal miners from EIA submission and ecological rehabilitation fund deposit duties [58]. The State has taken policy measures to create employment opportunities for youth in the mining area. It amended MOP in their favor, contrary to the Minimata and Basel conventions that strictly control mercury and other pollutants [16]. In this regard, research findings argue for the EIA’s need for artisanal mining to solve its practical drawbacks [78]. For instance, artisanal mining in Ghana, Tanzania, and Mali uses mercury to separate gold from other minerals above public exposure limits cheaply [79]. Health risks are found in mothers’ hair samples and breast milk [79].

Ethiopian artisanal miners are not different from those in these countries. They also caused environmental destruction in the Adola belt and other places long earlier [80]. They contributed to water and soil pollution and land degradation but did nothing to rehabilitate them as no law obliges them to do so. The then ministry of mines and energy pledged government and partner intervention in its reports showing missing elements due to a finance shortage [80]. As most of Ethiopia’s mining area inhabitants, including 16 licensed ones in the Odo Shakiso district (Lega-Dambi), are artisan miners, this impact may continue unless they are obliged to avert the problem by remediating the vulnerable indigenous people. Yet, this action depends upon the will of administrative agancies, albeit addressing legal lacunua [82]. The law should require them to conduct an EIA before commencing any mining activity, or the State should devise alternative funding in advance to remedy the environment [15]. Thus, political decisions backed by laws challenge MEAs’ effectiveness.

Policymakers fail to assist and accelerate environmental justice on the impacts of pollution on the environment and human health to keep their political momentum. Regarding the importance of actors’ roles, especially of administrative agencies, in adjudicating ecological damage due to air pollution, Yue Zhao argues: “Where there is a will, there is a way…” [82]. Large-scale miners receive licenses from and submit reports to the federal MOMP in Ethiopia. The EPA and MOMP should provide supporting evidence in public interest litigation or take administrative actions to prevent CHW pollution and compensate victims [15,16,20,21,22,23]. In reverse, they usually smooth over or defer local governments’ and environmental NGOs’ efforts to seek justice [81]. In the MIDROC gold case, the State kept the reports of the EIA audits confidential and delayed communications presented to CEDAW by DUBAF [14]. It did so to protect the investors it called ‘developmental agents’ and try to cool down public unrest. It did not counteract land degradation and pollution damage, nor did it respond to EIA reports in this regard; instead, a regional state-issued land letting directive ignored EIA, reasoning out encouraging investment during COVID-19, which liberalizes the existing LSLA criteria and jeopardizes local land use rights [83].

4.2.2. Lack of Awareness and Access to Justice

The issue of awareness of MEAs has already been discussed in the preceding section. There is no need to repeat it here, lest we mention the severity of the problem to receive a judicial remedy. This challenge touches victims, administrative agencies, judges, and the public in accessing or providing knowledge-based justice [84].

An uninformed society is susceptible to the dangers of CHW pollution and is prone to standing against planned development. As discussed in Section 2 above, exposure to hazardous chemicals and substances stems from victims’ lack of awareness of CHWs’ risks [84]. This problem is related to the transparency of development project governance [16,22]. The State and developers should consider participation, FPIC, and public consultation before deciding on the indigenous people’s resources and lands [85]. CHW generators, such as MIDROC Gold, have a responsibility to inform and educate the public, protect them from polluted water, and avoid release or emission. Contrastingly, it commenced and continued extractive operations in the residents’ vicinity, whereas the latter were ignorant of the negative impacts of the CHWs. This act violates the indigenous people’s rights [85].

Adjudicating environmental issues has been another challenge for a long time in Ethiopia. Environmental regulations violations are justiciable in Ethiopian courts, and any person has legal standing in such trespasses [53]. Nevertheless, judges rarely adjudicate and decide on visible environmental damage and consequential impacts on flora and fauna. This problem may arise due to the training gap, as most lawyers and judges were not taught IEL courses in universities, which may have inhibited them from properly construing environmental laws earlier. To this end, there was no domestic practice of adjudicating environmental pollution until the APAP vs. EPA case that introduced public interest litigation in the country for the first time [86]. This case justifies the challenge where courts of different benches construed the clear law and decided against the applicant, claiming they had no standing at the lower bar [84]. The court did not hold the State representative, the EPA, accountable for its legal duty to control investors’ illegal practices. In this regard, at the appeal bench, too, the court agreed that the EPA was not a polluter, whereas damage to the environment and people from the industrial release of hazardous waste was visible [84].

On the other hand, the limitation on educating implementers ends up in the police force’s limited capacity, too. The unwillingness or failure of police officers to investigate pollution offenses, added to the policy-makers’ influence in not considering the severity of pollution impacts as a major issue during public grievances, could also be caused by awareness gaps [84]. Concerned people do not participate in pollution control training and remain unaware; thus, they delay cases or decide against victims [84]. As discussed earlier, this problem usually makes the affected people refrain from taking their issues to court [3]. In a study conducted in Addis Ababa, administrative agencies received 4002 complaints, beyond the proposed number of 3612. None of these cases were decided or referred to the court [84].

The resort to remedies from regional and international bodies is minimal in Ethiopian contexts. On the one hand, it is difficult for victims to access the African Human Rights and Peoples Commission (ACHR) or related global institutions due to a lack of awareness, finance, and other infrastructure [87]. On the other hand, Ethiopia is not a party to the ACHR and the court to which it is not legally bound. The only access tried so far is pleading to the CEDAW through environmental, which is too remote for the victims’ multiple remedial demands [14]. Access to justice becomes narrow where there is tit for tat between the company and core administrative agencies, and this trend triggers seeking a solution in different ways [81]. For instance, the whole Oromo youth had chosen public uprising since 2009, representing victimized collective populations, such as the Guji indigenous Oromo [5].

4.2.3. Lack of Technological, Human, and Resource Capacity

Enforcing ESM of CHWs based on MEAs is about seeking harmony between human health, the environment, and industrial operations according to pollutant release and emission standards, EIA recommendations, and other procedures. These issues require vital capacities such as relevant and up-to-date technology, skilled human resources that can employ the technology, and financial resources to foster the realization of laws according to required standards. Nonetheless, the practice hitherto shows that the State lacks the capacity to meet these requirements and sometimes depends on the company’s utilities and skilled workforce [17]. They hire consultants to perform the job, making daily control and supervision challenging and costly, affecting the reports’ transparency throughout the project’s life [15]. For instance, in the MIDROC goldmine case, the EIA was conducted by the generator’s agent or the EIA assessing institution using facilities of the company, violating the impartial and independent rule of assessment [88].

4.2.4. Legal Drafting Challenges

Legal defects related to unevenness, fragmentation, inadequacy, and inconsistency posed challenges to implementing the CHWP-based MEAs. Each of the proclamations’ underpinning principles is not clearly stated or varies from the rationales of scientific justifications developed by IEL theories and are not in line with the MEAs they are intended to implement [31]. For example, there is no explicit mention of fundamentals in the ICRAP, an implementing proclamation of the Stockholm and Rotterdam conventions, to guide its application [21,22,56]. As discussed earlier, one may notice similar problems describing guiding principles in the recent CHWs law, which may arise from the drafting problem. The SWMP and EPCP face the same ambiguities unless textually construed from clues indicating prevention as a fundamental tenet in the former and the guiding principles of the latter, which are precautionary and ‘polluter pays’ principles [53].

Sectoral laws also provide different approaches than the principles provided under the mentioned CHWs-based conventions. For instance, rather than prevention or precautionary principles to save water from pollution, the water law follows the polluters’ pay principle, which makes it permissible to pollute but punishes with fines after discharging waste into water bodies [22,62]. However, the money collected is insufficient to compensate for some of the most chemical water pollutants [88]. The purpose section of this law also does not provide for the protection of water from pollutant substances. Instead, it offers a means to prevent others from polluting water. It reads: “… prevention of harmful effects of water” and protection of water banks from physical encroachments [62]. This law’s fundamentals magnify only the production and allocation of water resources rather than dowelling into toxin waste protection and management matters [62].

Moreover, SWMP is a typical example to illustrate the thesis of CHW pollution’s legal fragmentation, inadequacy, and clarity problems to address urban and rural-based wastes [10]. It deals only with “other wastes” without mentioning hazardous and chemical pollutants [54]. It only applies to urban waste, and no law governs waste generated by rural and rural-based businesses [54]. It also does not consider liquid and gaseous wastes [54]. The management of liquid wastes is also assigned to urban governments’ water sectors, a different institution from the waste management and disposal agency. In addition, SWMP does not systematically determine wastes based on their constituents, organic contents, or those requiring special consideration as per the Basel convention [20]. It merely categorizes waste as “plastic, used tires, glass containers, tin cans, food-related, household, and construction debris” [54].

Furthermore, ICRAP and EPCP face inconsistency with MEAs and overlap issues [56]. They do not classify CHWPs based on harm types and their compounds into POPs, mercury, hazardous, and chemical-based CHWPs, unlike the MEAs. Instead, the classification of the laws depends on the sources of trash such as solid waste, industrial chemicals, etc. The EPCP seems to allow the recycling of some persistent and hazardous substances such as mercury, which is against the CHW-oriented conventions [53]. Likewise, the ICRAP focuses only on industrial chemicals, but it does not address other chemicals listed in the Stockholm and Rotterdam conventions. Specifically, it deals with banned, expired, or deteriorated industrial chemicals, leaving those that are restricted, must be reduced, or need ESM as provided under the Stockholm and Rotterdam conventions [21,22]. The record-keeping and reporting procedures provided under it also miss the latter agreement’s goal, as it regulates post-use of the chemicals rather than before importing them [56].

Multiple environmental and sectoral laws provide civil, criminal, and administrative liabilities. Nonetheless, the diversity of remedies and punishments for a single violation they provide creates confusion of implementation. The Ethiopian system provides for fault-based, strict, and vicarious liabilities concerning civil accountability [89]. Likewise, the criminal code and environmental laws incriminate and punish environmental media pollution. The criminal code lists ecological crimes, including contamination of water and pastureland, environmental pollution, improper handling of dangerous waste, and other materials [77]. Additionally, it punishes the intentional poisoning of wells, cisterns, springs, water holes, rivers, or lakes by hazardous wastes or other means ranging from simple to rigorous imprisonment and fines [77]. Additionally, environmental proclamations impose different punishments of fines and sentences. It is not clear whether such penalties are concurrent or selective. However, Article 12 (3) of the EPCP prioritizes the law that imposes a severe punishment [53]. At the same time, the provisions of the EIA seem additional to what the Criminal Code provides.

In summary, these challenges indicate an unbalanced intersection of environmental law, human rights, and economic development. Environmental justice remains in vain following inequality between victims and state/companies in extractive industries areas, which challenge the ineffective implementation of Ethiopia’s global commitments.

5. Conclusions and the Way Forward

By presenting a case study of pollution impacts on health, livelihood, and the environment caused by MIDROC Goldmine’s release of heavy metals in Ethiopia, this article contributes to improved ways of CHW-based implementation at national levels and possible solutions to public-state/company contestations to effectively utilize mineral resources for the country’s development.

It is clear that national legislation is the most crucial part of the effective implementation of CHW-oriented MEAs and is therefore relevant when it comes to analyzing the extent to which state parties fulfill their commitments to the treaty. The above analysis shows that administrative practices and domestic legislation used to implement the MEAs defy the latter and the country’s constitution. Although IEL enforcement requires dynamism, it should not deviate from and contravene the existing global norms and rules. In this regard, the pollution threat-based legislative experiences and enforcement mechanisms of China and India help us understand the nitty-gritty of ESM and FPIC to make a difference. This comparative analysis argues that Ethiopia’s CHWs-based MEAs implementing laws exhibit limitations of stagnation, inadequacy, and fragmentation in properly accommodating these issues and related core principles of EIL, IHRL, and sustainable development.

The analysis in this article also shows that policymakers from the above, including other actors such as the judiciary, investors, NGOs, and the public, have irreplaceable roles in realizing the MEAs, aside from comprehensive and adequate legislation [90,91,92]. The central government’s political commitment should give equal weight to environmental protection and the health of human beings, including animals, by promoting and incentivizing investments. However, it was argued that failure to comply with the legal norms, including remediating the victims and redressing the problem, impaired the rights and stability of the country. Political partiality in favor of the mining sector, excluding the local government and the victims, against the international regimes of ESM has interrupted the country’s economic gain from minerals, as currently, MIDROC is facing a temporary shutdown. In such violations, the analysis shows how active judicial and other actors’ roles are pivotal in balancing competing interests and maintaining ecological sustainability. However, this option was also argued to be one of the challenges, including lack of awareness, legal drafting, and technological and resource capacity shortages. In short, the entire lesson gained from the analysis of this paper is that balancing states’ economic interests with people’s sociocultural and environmental interests needs strict adherence to changing circumstances within existing global regimes, lest the implementation approaches vary from country to country.

As a way forward, we suggest the following points: First, to ensure that national implementation of CHW-based MEAs receives the best possible outcomes, especially in indigenous people’s land at a national level, indigenous people’s rights protection should receive priority consideration. In particular, in addition to considering environmental issues in the national development goals, the federal government should issue detailed implementing regulations on investors’ social and ecological sustainability duties recently adopted in the new investment law [61]. Second, central–local relations should be based on constitutional self-rule and mutual support rather than dictation. The centrality of implementing CHWs rests with administrative agencies’ political will. This article suggests the State be subjected to the rule of law rather than paralyzing corporate social responsibility and accountability. Third, the involvement of citizens as per the core sustainable development principles enables solving public-state/investor contestation [93,94]. In this regard, domestic laws and policies should be revised in conformity with the treaty they implement. Mainly, the country should accede to the African human rights commission and the court system to widen options for judicial justice. Additionally, vigorously defending environmental rights could be possible with increased awareness and relevant resource and technological capacities. To this end, continuous training to all stakeholders and actors on IEL regimes should be given to open up the roadblocks to realizing CHWs’ induced pollution.