On Vulnerability of Selected IoT Systems to Radio Jamming—A Proposal of Deployment Practices
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. The Paper Organization
3. The Problem Statement
4. Related Works
5. Presentation of the Selected IoT Systems: The Weightless and the Sigfox
5.1. Systematics of IoT Systems
5.2. Weightless
- ‘M’ sub-band: 868–868.60 MHz, ERP = 25 mW, DC ≤ 1%;
- ‘P’ sub-band: 869.40–869.65 MHz, ERP = 500 mW, DC ≤ 10%.
5.3. SigFox
- the frequency range 868.034 MHz–868.226 (yielding 192 kHz of the total band);
- uplink (UL) bandwidth, BW: 100 Hz;
- downlink (DL) bandwidth, BW: 600 Hz;
- network topology: star;
- maximum EIRP: 14 dBm (25 mW);
- modulations: Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying (DBPSK) in UL, GFSK in DL;
- maximum transmission rate Rb in UL: 100 b/s;
- maximum transmission rate Rb in DL: 600 b/s;
- sensitivity Pmin equal to −144 dBm in UL and −134 dBm in DL (assuming the Signal-to-Noise Ratio, SNR =7 dB, Gp = 4.8 dB and a noise factor (NF) equal to 5 dB and 3 dB in DL and UL, respectively).
6. The Measurement of the Weightless and Sigfox Susceptibility to Interference
6.1. The Measurement Set-Up
6.2. Discussion of Results
7. Calculations of the Interference Margin Based on CNIR (PER) Measurements
8. Conclusions
8.1. Practical Recommendations
- the “slowest” Weightless modes that use OQPSK modulation, particularly narrowband (0.625/1.25 kb/s) are at the same time the most robust in terms of resistance to jamming. Thus, these two data rate settings can be recommended for use in networks for their immunity to “legal-jamming”, as one particularly problematic to detect since the jammer’s signal does not exceed lawful limits, which makes it practically untraceable, as opposed to strong jammers;
- on the far end of immunity lie the two fastest Weightless modes, i.e., 50/100 kb/s, experiencing disruption in communication, expressed by negative Mint, with the jammer placed at the at distances between 0.1 and 0.3 d/CR with respect to BS;
- in SigFox there exists a sufficient safety margin for jamming even at proximity between the jammer and the BS, which leaves some space for additional attenuation, e.g., due to vegetation or buildings;
- the idea of low throughput has proved correct for use in the Internet of Things systems. Not only because it provides low receiver noise (due to narrow channels, here: 12.5 kHz in Weightless, and 100 Hz in SigFox) but also due to increased immunity to EM cyberattacks. Their appearance is recognized to be a growing threat as the massive machine-type traffic becomes more and more prevalent in the years to come and as it conveys increasingly more crucial data concerning our living environment.
8.2. Further Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Channel Bandwidth BW | Modulation MOD | Coding Rate R | Spreading Factor, SF | Data Rate [kb/s] Rb |
---|---|---|---|---|
12.5 kHz (narrowband, NB) | OQPSK | 0.5 | 8 | 0.625 |
0.5 | 4 | 1.25 | ||
GMSK | 0.5 | 1 | 5 | |
1 | 1 | 10 | ||
100 kHz (wideband, WB) | OQPSK | 0.5 | 8 | 6.25 |
0.5 | 4 | 12.5 | ||
GMSK | 0.5 | 1 | 50 | |
1 | 1 | 100 |
A Set-up Element | Parameter | Value/Type |
---|---|---|
| An arbitrary signal generator Output power, Pgen
| Tektronix AWG 70002 14, 13, 12… −16 dBm
|
The measurement infrastructure | Localization | An anechoic chamber |
| EIRP Channel bandwidth, BW
| 14 dBm 12.5 kHz, 100 kHz
|
Data rate, Rb Spreading factor, SF Modulation, MOD
| 0.625 kb/s, 100 kb/s 8 and 1 OQPSK, GMSK
| |
SigFox | EIRP Channel bandwidth, BW Frequency band Data rate, Rb Modulation, MOD
| 14 dBm 100 Hz 868.034–868.226 MHz 100 b/s DBPSK
|
Weightless | SigFox | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
OQPSK | GMSK | DBPSK | |||||||
NB | WB | NB | WB | ||||||
Data Rate Mode, Rb [kb/s] | |||||||||
0.625 | 1.25 | 6.25 | 12.5 | 5 | 10 | 50 | 100 | 0.1 | |
1.0 | 32.0 | 31.6 | 21.1 | 18.6 | 22.0 | 21.8 | 9.6 | 8.0 | 21.8 |
0.9 | 31.1 | 30.7 | 20.2 | 17.7 | 21.1 | 20.9 | 8.7 | 7.1 | 20.9 |
0.8 | 30.1 | 29.7 | 19.1 | 16.6 | 20.1 | 19.9 | 7.6 | 6.0 | 19.9 |
0.7 | 28.9 | 28.5 | 18.0 | 15.5 | 18.9 | 18.7 | 6.5 | 4.9 | 18.7 |
0.6 | 27.6 | 27.2 | 16.6 | 14.1 | 17.6 | 17.4 | 5.1 | 3.5 | 17.4 |
0.5 | 26.0 | 25.6 | 15.1 | 12.6 | 16.0 | 15.8 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 15.8 |
0.4 | 24.1 | 23.7 | 13.1 | 10.6 | 14.1 | 13.9 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 13.9 |
0.3 | 21.6 | 21.2 | 10.6 | 8.1 | 11.6 | 11.4 | −0.9 | −2.5 | 11.4 |
0.2 | 18.0 | 17.6 | 7.1 | 4.6 | 8.0 | 7.8 | −4.4 | −6.0 | 7.9 |
0.1 | 12.0 | 11.6 | 1.1 | −1.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 | −10.4 | −12.0 | 1.8 |
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Staniec, K.; Kowal, M. On Vulnerability of Selected IoT Systems to Radio Jamming—A Proposal of Deployment Practices. Sensors 2020, 20, 6152. https://doi.org/10.3390/s20216152
Staniec K, Kowal M. On Vulnerability of Selected IoT Systems to Radio Jamming—A Proposal of Deployment Practices. Sensors. 2020; 20(21):6152. https://doi.org/10.3390/s20216152
Chicago/Turabian StyleStaniec, Kamil, and Michał Kowal. 2020. "On Vulnerability of Selected IoT Systems to Radio Jamming—A Proposal of Deployment Practices" Sensors 20, no. 21: 6152. https://doi.org/10.3390/s20216152
APA StyleStaniec, K., & Kowal, M. (2020). On Vulnerability of Selected IoT Systems to Radio Jamming—A Proposal of Deployment Practices. Sensors, 20(21), 6152. https://doi.org/10.3390/s20216152