A Traffic Splitting Algorithm for Load Balancing in Tor
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- Better balance of the utilization of various nodes to effectively improve the congestion problem of high-bandwidth nodes, as well as the problem of bandwidth scarcity and reducing the load of high-bandwidth nodes.
- (2)
- A traffic splitting algorithm is proposed.
- (3)
- A new performance evaluation metric is proposed for performance analysis.
- (4)
- Anonymity can be guaranteed.
2. Related Work
2.1. Tor
2.2. Conflux
2.3. mTor
3. Traffic Splitting Mechanism with Multiple Middle Relays in Parallel
3.1. Circuit Construction
Algorithm 1 Bandwidth-Weighted Path Selection Algorithm. |
Require: A list of nodes fetched from Directory Servers Ensure: A chosen 1: for to do 2: 3: 4: 5: end for 6: 7: while do 8: 9: 10: end while 11: return |
3.2. Traffic Splitting
Algorithm 2 Traffic Splitting Algorithm. |
Require: A list of middle relays and the traffic sent by the sender Ensure: Traffic which is allocated at each relay 1: for to m do 2: 3: 4: end for 5: for to m do 6: 7: end for 8: return |
4. Performance Evaluation
4.1. Performance Metrics
4.2. Simulation Design
4.3. Results
5. Anonymity Analysis
5.1. Threat Model
5.2. Path Compromise
5.3. Anonymity Degree
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Bandwidth Utilization | Tor | TSMMR-3 | TSMMR-5 | mTor-3 | mTor-5 | Conflux-3 | Conflux-5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0∼30% | 99.7% | 100% | 100% | 84.9% | 85.5% | 99.8% | 99.8% |
30%∼80% | 0.2% | 0 | 0 | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
80%∼100% | 0.1% | 0 | 0 | 14.6% | 14% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
Bandwidth Utilization | Tor | TSMMR-3 | TSMMR-5 | mTor-3 | mTor-5 | Conflux-3 | Conflux-5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0∼30% | 99.7% | 100% | 100% | 84.6% | 84.6% | 99.6% | 99.6% |
30%∼80% | 0.2% | 0 | 0 | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
80%∼100% | 0.1% | 0 | 0 | 15.1% | 15% | 0.2% | 0.2% |
Bandwidth Utilization | Tor | TSMMR-3 | TSMMR-5 | mTor-3 | mTor-5 | Conflux-3 | Conflux-5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0∼30% | 72.7% | 84% | 85.7% | 74.9% | 76.2% | 82.4% | 83.7% |
30%∼80% | 24.1% | 15.9% | 14.3% | 8.6% | 7.2% | 16.4% | 14.9% |
80%∼100% | 3.2% | 0.1% | 0 | 16.5% | 16.6% | 1.2% | 1.4% |
Bandwidth Utilization | Tor | TSMMR-3 | TSMMR-5 | mTor-3 | mTor-5 | Conflux-3 | Conflux-5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0∼30% | 52% | 64.5% | 64.9% | 49.3% | 49.8% | 61.4% | 62.9% |
30%∼80% | 33.7% | 30.7% | 30.6% | 30.7% | 30.5% | 32.5% | 32% |
80%∼100% | 14.3% | 4.8% | 4.5% | 20% | 19.7% | 6.1% | 5.1% |
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Meng, X.; Liang, M. A Traffic Splitting Algorithm for Load Balancing in Tor. Entropy 2022, 24, 807. https://doi.org/10.3390/e24060807
Meng X, Liang M. A Traffic Splitting Algorithm for Load Balancing in Tor. Entropy. 2022; 24(6):807. https://doi.org/10.3390/e24060807
Chicago/Turabian StyleMeng, Xiance, and Mangui Liang. 2022. "A Traffic Splitting Algorithm for Load Balancing in Tor" Entropy 24, no. 6: 807. https://doi.org/10.3390/e24060807
APA StyleMeng, X., & Liang, M. (2022). A Traffic Splitting Algorithm for Load Balancing in Tor. Entropy, 24(6), 807. https://doi.org/10.3390/e24060807