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Keywords = wavefunction realism

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16 pages, 300 KB  
Article
Set Theory and Many Worlds
by Paul Tappenden
Quantum Rep. 2023, 5(1), 237-252; https://doi.org/10.3390/quantum5010016 - 2 Mar 2023
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3257
Abstract
The 2022 Tel Aviv conference on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics highlighted many differences between theorists. A very significant dichotomy is between Everettian fission (splitting) and Saunders–Wallace–Wilson divergence. For fission, an observer may have multiple futures, whereas for divergence they always [...] Read more.
The 2022 Tel Aviv conference on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics highlighted many differences between theorists. A very significant dichotomy is between Everettian fission (splitting) and Saunders–Wallace–Wilson divergence. For fission, an observer may have multiple futures, whereas for divergence they always have a single future. Divergence was explicitly introduced to resolve the problem of pre-measurement uncertainty for Everettian theory, which is universally believed to be absent for fission. Here I maintain that there is indeed pre-measurement uncertainty prior to fission, so long as objective probability is a property of Everettian branches. This is made possible if the universe is a set and branches are subsets with a probability measure. A universe that is a set of universes that are macroscopically isomorphic and span all possible configurations of local beäbles fulfills that role. If objective probability is a property of branches, then a successful Deutsch–Wallace decision-theoretic argument would justify the Principal Principle and be part of probability theory rather than specific to many-worlds theory. Any macroscopic object in our environment becomes a set of isomorphs with different microscopic configurations, each in an elemental universe (elemental in the set-theoretic sense). This is similar to the many-interacting-worlds theory, but the observer inhabits the set of worlds, not an individual world. An observer has many elemental bodies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics)
9 pages, 385 KB  
Article
The Ontology of the Many-Worlds Theory
by Per Arve
Quantum Rep. 2023, 5(1), 228-236; https://doi.org/10.3390/quantum5010015 - 1 Mar 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3269
Abstract
It is shown that the wavefunction describes our observations using the postulate that relates position to the distribution |Ψ|2. This finding implies that a primary ontology is unnecessary. However, what is real is not directly represented by the wavefunction [...] Read more.
It is shown that the wavefunction describes our observations using the postulate that relates position to the distribution |Ψ|2. This finding implies that a primary ontology is unnecessary. However, what is real is not directly represented by the wavefunction but by the gauge invariants. In light of the presented ontology, Spacetime State Realism becomes not a fundamental ontology but derived. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics)
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11 pages, 247 KB  
Article
Everett’s Multiverse and the World as Wavefunction
by Tappenden Paul
Quantum Rep. 2019, 1(1), 119-129; https://doi.org/10.3390/quantum1010012 - 12 Sep 2019
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4257
Abstract
Everett suggested that there’s no such thing as wavefunction collapse. He hypothesized that for an idealized spin measurement the apparatus evolves into a superposition on the pointer basis of two apparatuses, each displaying one of the two outcomes which are standardly thought of [...] Read more.
Everett suggested that there’s no such thing as wavefunction collapse. He hypothesized that for an idealized spin measurement the apparatus evolves into a superposition on the pointer basis of two apparatuses, each displaying one of the two outcomes which are standardly thought of as alternatives. As a result, the observer ‘splits’ into two observers, each perceiving a different outcome. There have been problems. Why the pointer basis? Decoherence is generally accepted by Everettian theorists to be the key to the right answer there. Also, in what sense is probability involved, when all possible outcomes occur? Everett’s response to that problem was inadequate. A first attempt to find a different route to probability was introduce by Neil Graham in 1973 and the path from there has led to two distinct models of branching. I describe how the ideas have evolved and their relation to the concepts of uncertainty and objective probability. Then I describe the further problem of wavefunction monism, emphasized by Maudlin, and make a suggestion as to how it might be resolved. Full article
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