Search Results (4)

Reverse factoring is a retailer-led supply chain financing system that can enhance liquidity of suppliers and reduce factoring fraud. This paper proposes a bargaining game theory model to analyze the profit distribution in reverse factoring for a two-echelon supply chain system that comprises a core retailer and a capital-constrained supplier. By taking into account the retailer’s credit loss risk, the impact of buying back and bargaining is investigated. Our study shows that in reverse factoring without buying back, the supplier would rather not bargain but the retailer would like to negotiate the wholesale price if the supplier’s bargaining power is low. If buying back exists and the supplier’s bargaining power is low, the retailer is also willing to negotiate the wholesale price. If there is no bargaining but the supplier takes a large portion of the supply chain’s profit, buying back is preferred. Furthermore, when there is bargaining on the wholesale price, both supplier and retailer can benefit from buying back. In addition, bargaining on the buy-back price in reverse factoring is bargaining-proof. Our study first contributes to the growing body of literature on reverse factoring and bargaining game theory. Two managerial implications for reverse factoring also emerge from the study. We find that bargaining should be considered if the supplier tends to coordinate the supply chain financing system by buying back the retailer’s unsold products. In addition, both supplier and retailer should negotiate the wholesale price as they cannot benefit from bargaining on the buy-back price. Full article

Facial attractiveness, vocal attractiveness, and social interest influence two-person decision making. However, it remains unclear how these three factors jointly influence three-person bargaining. We investigated the impact of facial attractiveness, vocal attractiveness, and social interest on fairness decisions in a three-person ultimatum game and a third-party punishment dictator game. The results of the ultimatum game showed that in the condition of positive social interest, the acceptance rate of unfair/fair offers was higher when third players had attractive faces or attractive voices. Attractive faces of third players also increased acceptance rates of unfair/unfair offers than unattractive faces when third players expressed negative social interest. In the third-party punishment game, participants rated unfair allocations from unattractive-voice proposers with attractive faces (compared to unattractive faces) and proposers who expressed negative social interest (compared to positive social interest) as more reasonable. Regarding the punishment intentions, among the three factors, both the effect of vocal attractiveness and social interest were modulated by the combinations of the other two factors, while the effect of facial attractiveness remains robust across all conditions. These findings suggest that fairness decisions in three-person bargaining games are affected by beauty premium and social interest, while these effects vary across different decision contexts. Full article

The present research investigated the role of sex in the effect of vocal attractiveness on fairness judgment in a two-person Ultimatum Game. Each participant in the game decided whether to accept offers from a proposer who was either associated with an attractive or unattractive voice. The results showed that while participants were more likely to accept fair offers, they would also accept some unfair offers that were associated with an attractive voice. This effect of vocal attractiveness was more clearly shown by female participants, although all male and female participants took longer to make a decision when an attractive voice was associated with an offer, regardless of whether the voice was from the same sex or the opposite sex. Overall, the results inform the role of sex in the effect of vocal attractiveness and further confirm the beauty premium effect on economic bargaining, where people with an attractive voice would benefit. Full article

In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes. Full article