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Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral bias that involves the overestimation of one’s own capabilities. We introduce a model in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to reduce their own effort by delegating the critical task to the agent more often than in an efficient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager engages in responsibility hoarding, i.e., is likely to delegate a critical task less often to the agent than a rational manager. In fact, a manager with a sufficiently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases the total welfare by refusing to delegate critical tasks and by exerting more effort than a rational manager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which the responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent. Full article

In 1949, it seemed that Western governments were ready to accept some delegation of sovereignty, which met the ambitions of increasingly well-organised Europeanists. One of the most ambitious advances was the proposal for a European Assembly, which could have heralded the beginning of an integration process. However, on this point, as on many others, there was not total agreement between the unionists and the federalists: for some, the Assembly was simply a co-operation structure, while others thought it should be a constituent body. The federalists—who had been united since December 1946 within the European Union of Federalists (EUF), which claimed to have no fewer than 150,000 members—were very demanding. After the adoption of the Statute of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949, the EUF Central Committee approved a “motion on the Consultative Assembly” in which it openly demanded the drafting of a federal pact that would lead to real European power. Faced with the modest intergovernmental status of the Council of Europe, the EUF proposed that the Assembly of this Council should be transformed from a “consultative” to a “constituent” assembly, which amounted to condemning any kind of conciliatory attitude. Therefore, the constituent path was becoming more and more important within the federalist organisation: it was now a matter of pressing, without restraint, for the triumph of ideals freed from initial reluctance, in the most diverse forums. The most important of these remained the Council of Europe, which was, in the eyes of the federalists, an institution that could be improved. Defending an integrated Europe, the federalists called for the creation of a democratic power on the scale of the challenges of the time, which seemed to them to exceed that of the nation states. To achieve this, they defended a “political” vision of integration, of which the Council of Europe could be the spearhead. It is this struggle, which took place at a time when the construction of Europe seems to be based on a simple but firm act of will, that this article will examine. Full article